Ghulam Ali (Editor) - Pakistan's Foreign Policy - Contemporary Developments and Dynamics-Routledge (2022) - 1

CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS AND DYNAMICS Edited by Ghulam Ali

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

This book analyses Pakistan’s foreign This book analyses Pakistan’s foreign policy policy and and external external relations relations with with aa focus focus on contemporary developments, including the impact of the new government on contemporary developments, including the impact of the new government of of Prime Minister Imran Khan, the powerful military, power” status. Prime Minister Imran Khan, the powerful military, and and the the “middle “middle powef’ status. Structured two parts parts–- Foundation the book book Structured in in two Foundation and and Operationalization– Operationalization - the provides a broad overview of Pakistan’s foreign policy and addresses specific provides a broad overview of Pakistan’s foreign policy and addresses specific foreign policy choices. Pakistan’s middle foreign policy choices. Contributors Contributors explore explore issues issues such such as as Pakistan’s middle power status from a theoretical perspective, Imran Khan’s foreign policy, power status from a theoretical perspective, Imran Khan’s foreign policy, Pakistan’s with Shanghai the EU, Pakistan’s relations relations with Shanghai Cooperation Cooperation Organization Organization (SCO), (SCO), the EU, and Pakistan’s evolving with and Pakistan’s evolving Indian Indian Ocean Ocean strategy. strategy. Based Based on on in-depth in-depth interviews interviews with Pakistani politicians, and the book book offers perspective Pakistani scholars, scholars, politicians, and diplomats, diplomats, the offers aa timely timely perspective on Pakistan’s foreign policy. on Pakistan’s foreign policy. The book will will be be of working on The book of interest interest to to academics academics working on Pakistan, Pakistan, South South Asian Asian Politics, Indian Ocean Studies, Security and Conflict Studies, International Politics, Indian Ocean Studies, Security and Conflict Studies, International Relations Foreign Policy, Policy, and Relations and and Foreign and Asian Asian Studies. Studies. Ghulam Ali is Marxism, Department Ghulam Ali is Associate Associate Professor Professor at at School School of of Marxism, Department of of Political Political Science, Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, Zigong, PR He Science, Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, Zigong, PR China. China. He is the author Relations: A AHistorical Analysis (2017) is the author of of China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Relations: Historical Analysis (2017) and and co-editor Perspectives on Pakistan Governance, Development co-editor of of Perspectives on Contemporary Contemporary Pakistan Governance, Development and Environment (Routledge, and Environment (Routledge, 2020). 2020).

Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics

24 Parliaments in South Asia India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Nizam Ahmed 25 Pakistan’s Security and the India-US Strategic Partnership Nuclear Politics& National Security Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari 26 Pakistan’s National Security Approach and Post-Cold War Security Uneasy Co-existence Arshad Ali 27 Political Theory and South Asian Counter-Narratives Maidul Islam 28 Islam and Democracy in the Maldives Zahir Azim 29 Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska 30 Human Rights Violations in Kashmir Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska 31 Law and Conflict Resolution in Kashmir Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska 32 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Contemporary Developments and Dynamics Edited by Ghulam Ali For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ asianstudies/series/RSSAP

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Contemporary Developments and Dynamics Edited by Ghulam Ali

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2023 First published 2023 by Routledge Routledge by Park Square, Square, Milton Milton Park, Park, Abingdon, Abingdon, Oxon Oxon OX14 OX14 4RN 4RN 44 Park Routledge and by and by Routledge 605 605 Third Third Avenue, Avenue, New New York, York, NY NY 10158 10158 Routledge is an an imprint imprint of ofthe the Taylor& Taylor & Francis Group, an an informa informa Routledge is Francis Group, business business © 2023 2023 selection selection and and editorial editorial matter, Ali; individual individual chapters, © matter, Ghulam Ghulam Ali; chapters, the the contributors contributors The right right of of Ghulam Ghulam Ali Ali to identified as as the author of of the editorial The to be be identified the author the editorial material, and and of of the authors for for their individual chapters, chapters, has has been asserted material, the authors their individual been asserted in accordance accordance with sections 77 and and 78 78 of of the Copyright, Designs Designs and and in with sections77 the Copyright, Patents Act Act 1988. 1988. Patents All rights rights reserved. reserved. No part of of this reprinted or or reproduced reproduced or or All No part this book book may may be be reprinted in any any form form or or by any electronic, electronic, mechanical, or other other means, means, now now utilised in utilised by any mechanical, or known or or hereafter hereafter invented, invented, including including photocopying and recording, or in in known photocopying and recording, or any information information storage storage or or retrieval retrieval system, system, without in writing any without permission permission in writing from the publishers. from the publishers. Trademark notice: notice: Product Product or or corporate corporate names names may be trademarks or Trademark may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are are used used only only for for identification identification and and explanation explanation registered trademarks, and without intent intent to infringe. without to infringe. British Library Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Data British A catalogue catalogue record for this is available available from from the British Library Library A record for this book book is the British Library of ofCongress Library Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Cataloging-in-Publication Data Data Names: Ali, Ali, Ghulam (Professor), editor. editor. Names: Ghulam (Professor), Title: Pakistan’s Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy contemporary developments developments and and Title: policy :: contemporary dynamics // Ghulam Ghulam Ali, Ali, [editor]. [editor]. dynamics Description: London London ;; New York, NY Routledge, Taylor Taylor & & Francis Francis Description: New York, NY :: Routledge, Group, 2022. 2022. || Series: Series: Routledge Routledge Studies Studies in in South South Asian Asian Politics Politics || Group, Includes bibliographical and index. index. Includes bibliographical references references and Identifiers: LCCN LCCN 2022002531 2022002531 (print) (print) || LCCN LCCN 2022002532 2022002532 (ebook) (ebook) || Identifiers: ISBN 9781032169057 9781032169057 (hardback) (hardback) || ISBN ISBN 9781032169071 9781032169071 (paperback) (paperback) || ISBN 9781003250920 (ebook) (ebook) ISBN 9781003250920 ISBN Subjects: LCSH: LCSH: Pakistan—Foreign Pakistan—Foreign relations—1971Subjects: relations—1971– Classification: LCC LCC DS383.5.A2 DS383.5.A2 P375 P375 2022 2022 (print) (print) || LCC LCC DS383.5.A2 DS383.5.A2 Classification: (ebook) || DDC DDC 327.5491—dc23/eng/20220405 327.5491—dc23/eng/20220405 (ebook) LC record record available available at at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022002531 LC https://lccn.loc.gov/2022002531 LC ebook ebook record available at at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022002532 https://lccn.loc.gov/2022002532 LC record available ISBN: ISBN: 978-1-032-16905-7 978-1-032-16905-7 (hbk) (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-16907-1 978-1-032-16907-1 (pbk) (pbk) ISBN: ISBN: ISBN: 978-1-003-25092-0 978-1-003-25092-0 (ebk) (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920 10.4324/9781003250920 DOI: Typeset in in Times Times New Roman Typeset New Roman by by Apex Apex CoVantage, CoVantage, LLC LLC

Contents

List of Figuresvii List of Contributorsviii PART I

Foundation1 1 Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan: An Overview

GHULAM ALI

2 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan

SYED ALI ZIA JAFFERY

3 Is Pakistan a Middle Power?

SAMEE LASHARI

4 The Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan: An Analysis

EJAZ HUSSAIN

PART II

Operationalization83 5 China–Pakistan: A Decade of Transformation in Diplomacy, 2010–2020

GUL-I-HINA SHAHZAD-VAN DER ZWAN AND RABBIYA KAMAL NAGRA

6 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations: From Uncertainty and Confrontation to Optimism MUHAMMAD AZAM

vi Contents 7 Indian Factor in Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan

111

SHAHZAD AKHTAR AND ARSHAD ALI

8 Geopolitics, the Thucydides Trap, and the China–Pakistan– India Trilateral

128

RIZWAN ZEB

9 Conservative Administration in Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations

142

KHURRAM ABBAS

10 Pakistan–U.S. Relations: Is Past the Prologue?

159

RABIA AKHTAR

11 The Contours of Pakistan’s Relations with Russia

181

ADEELA AHMED

12 The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations: ACritique of Strategic Engagement Plan

193

NAJIMDEEN BAKARE

Index208

Figures

9.1 A Brief Comparison of Pakistan–Iran Trade During Conservative and Moderates’ Era (USD in Million)

150

Contributors

Khurram Abbas is Research Fellow at Islamabad Policy Research Institute. He has earned his PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) from Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), NUST, Islamabad. His area of interest includes Geo-politics of Persian Gulf and Arab Peninsula and Foreign Policy of India and Pakistan towards Middle East. DrAbbas regularly delivers lectures in international and national universities as well as participates in national and international conferences. He has one book chapter, 11 peer-reviewed research articles and more than hundred newspaper articles to his credit. DrAbbas undertakes extensive research and regularly contributes in academic research journals and national/international dailies. Currently, DrAbbas is at the review panel of globally renowned academic journals including Asian Survey and Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3895-0434 Adeela Ahmed is a Ph.D. scholar in International Relations at the University of Lahore’s School of Integrated Social Sciences(SISS)in Lahore. She did her MPhil in Defence and Strategic Studies from Quaid e Azam University, Islamabad. She is working as Research Fellow with Pakistan Institute of Conflict and Strategic Studies (PICSS), Islamabad. Her area of research is Pakistan’s Foreign Policy and Deterrence Stability in South Asia. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2414-5373 Rabia Akhtar is Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, University of Lahore. She is an Associate Professor and Director, School of Integrated Social Sciences at University of Lahore. She holds a PhD in Security Studies from Kansas State University. She is a Fulbright alumna (2010–2015). DrAkhtar received her master’s in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, and her master’s in Political Science from Eastern Illinois University, USA. She has written extensively on South Asian nuclear security and deterrence dynamics. She is the author of the book titled The Blind Eye: U.S. Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan from Ford to Clinton. DrAkhtar is also Editor of Pakistan Politico, Pakistan’s first strategic and foreign affairs magazine. DrAkhtar is a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory

Contributors ix ix Contributors Council Foreign Affairs. Nonresident Senior Fellow at Council on on Foreign Affairs. Dr Dr Akhtar Akhtar is is aa Nonresident Senior Fellow at the the South DC. South Asia Asia Center, Center, Atlantic Atlantic Council, Council, Washington Washington DC. ORCID: ORCID: 0000-0002-1556-6096 0000-0002-1556-6096 Shahzad Akhtar is Shahzad Akhtar is Assistant Assistant Professor Professor in in School School of of Integrated Integrated Social Social Sciences Sciences at Lahore, Pakistan. Pakistan. He He holds at University University of of Lahore, Lahore, Lahore, holds aa PhD PhD in in Politics Politics and and International from the the University New Zealand. International Relations Relations from University of of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand. He He researches terrorism. He He has the Third researches on on conflict conflict and and terrorism. has published published articles articles in in the Third World Asian Sun’ey Survey and book chapters World Quarterly Quarterly and and Asian and contributed contributed book chapters in in edited edited books. books. ORCID: ORCID: 0000-0002-5299-1964 0000-0002-5299-1964 Arshad Ali the Department Department of Political Science Arshad Ali is is Assistant Assistant Professor Professor at at the of Political Science and and International relations, University of Management and Technology, Lahore, International relations. University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan. He He holds Relations from from the the University Pakistan. holds aa PhD PhD in in International International Relations University of of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. He He is Pakistan’s.V National National Secu SecuOtago, Dunedin, New Zealand. is the the author author of of Pakistan rity Approach Approach and rity and Post-Cold Post-Cold War War Security: Security: Uneasy Uneasy Co-existence Co-existence (London (London and and New York: Routledge, 2021). New York: Routledge, 2021). Ghulam Ali is Marxism, Department Ghulam Ali is Associate Associate Professor Professor at at School School of of Marxism, Department of of Political Political Science, Zigong, PR Science, Sichuan Sichuan University University of of Science Science and and Engineering, Engineering, Zigong, PR China. China. He obtained PhD from Monash University, University, Australia, He obtained PhD from Monash Australia, and and his Ms postdoc postdoc from from Peking University, Relations: Peking Umversity, Beijing. Beijing. He He is is the the author author of of China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Relations: A Historical Analysis (2017) Perspectives on A Historical Analysis (2017) and and co-editor co-editor of of Perspectives on Contemporary Contemporary Pakistan Governance, Development and Environment (London Pakistan Governance, Development and Environment (London and and New New York: York: Routledge, 2020) Buddhist Ties, Regional Inte InteRoutledge, 2020) and and Crossing Crossing the the Himalayas: Himalayas: Buddhist Ties, Regional gration and Rivalry (Singapore: gration and Great-Power Great-Power Rivalry (Singapore: Springer, Springer, 2022). 2022). His His articles articles have been published published in Pacific Review, Review, Pacific Pacific Focus, Focus, and Issues & Studhave been in The The Pacific and Issues & Stud ies ies among among others. others. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1803-0905 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1803-0905 Muhammad Azam is Professor in Department of Muhammad Azam is Assistant Assistant Professor in the the Department of Politics Politics and and International Relations, University of Sargodha, Pakistan. He has International Relations, University of Sargodha, Pakistan. He has aa PhD PhD in in International International Relations Relations from from the the International International Islamic Islamic University, University, Islamabad. Islamabad. He was the Gulf Dubai, UAE, He was Visiting Visiting Fellow Fellow at at the Gulf Research Research Center Center (GRC), (GRC), Dubai, UAE, in in 2010. He has also presented research papers in several national and 2010. He has also presented research papers in several national and internainterna tional conferences. Research Officer, the National tional conferences. As As Research Officer, he he has has served served at at the National AssemAssem bly Secretariat, Parliament House, Islamabad, and as Research bly Secretariat, Parliament House, Islamabad, and as Research Analyst Analyst and and Associate Peace Studies. Studies. His His most Associate Editor Editor of of Conflict Conflict and and Peace most recent recent research research paper “Provincial Finance Commissions the Punjab: for Govpaper “Provincial Finance Commissions in in the Punjab: Implications Implications for Gov ernance and Development” has appeared in Ghulam Ali and Ejaz ernance and Development” has appeared in Ghulam Ali and Ejaz Hussain Hussain (eds.), Pakistan: Governance, Development (eds.), Perspectives Perspectives on on Contemporary Contemporary Pakistan: Governance, Development and Environment (Routledge, 2020). He has appeared in several and Environment (Routledge, 2020). He has appeared in several TV TV and and radio radio programmes and has contributed columns to several newspapers including programmes and has contributed columns to several newspapers including Pakistan Observer, Frontier Post, Post, and Pakistan Obsen’er, Frontier and Daily Daily Times. Times. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8818-0311 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8818-0311

x Contributors Najimdeen the Department Peace and Najimdeen Bakare Bakare teaches teaches and and also also heads heads the Department of of Peace and Conflict Conflict Studies at the Centre for International Peace& Stability (CIPS), National UniStudies at the Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS), National Uni versity of Sciences& Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan. His areas versity of Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan. His areas of of interest Politics, global politics, African interest largely largely revolves revolves around around the the EU EU Politics, global politics, African PoliPoli tics, Developmental Studies, tics, Issues Issues of of European European Muslims, Muslims, Regionalism, Regionalism, Developmental Studies, TheoTheo ries of IR, Minority Issues, and (Islamic and Western) Philosophy. ries of IR, Minority Issues, and (Islamic and Western) Philosophy. Najimdeen Najimdeen is the dynamics the years, is also also particularly particularly interested interested in in the dynamics of of conflict, conflict, and, and, over over the years, he has been investigating the relevance of Islamic peace paradigm as the world world he has been investigating the relevance of Islamic peace paradigm as the grapples with violent conflicts. Additionally, Najimdeen has extensively pubgrapples with violent conflicts. Additionally, Najimdeen has extensively pub lished on EU politics and its ramifications for the diaspora communities across lished on EU politics and its ramifications for the diaspora communities across Europe, the Muslim Europe, particularly particularly the Muslim community. community. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3257-9718 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3257-9718 Ejaz from Heidelberg Heidelberg University Ejaz Hussain Hussain did did his his PhD PhD in in Political Political Science Science from University (2010) (2010) and postdoc from from UC UC Berkeley Military Agency, Agency, Poli Poliand postdoc Berkeley (2017). (2017). He He has has authored authored Military tics State in Pakistan (2013) Perspectives on tics and and the the State in Pakistan (2013) and and coedited coedited Perspectives on Contemporary Contemporary Pakistan: Governance, Development and Environment (Routledge, 2020). 2020). In In Pakistan: Governance, Development and Environment (Routledge, addition, he has contributed contributed to to peer-reviewed peer-reviewed journals such as as Armed & Armed Forces Forces& addition, he has journals such Society Political Science Review. Dr DrHussain was Visiting Society and and Chinese Chinese Political Science Review. Hussain was Visiting Fellow Fellow at DAAD, FDDI, at Fudan Fudan University University in in 2016. 2016. He He is is DAAD, FDDI, and and Fulbright Fulbright fellow. fellow. MoreMore over, University, Islamabad; University, over, he he taught taught at at COMSATS COMSATS University, Islamabad; FC FC College College University, Lahore; Lahore; and and Shanghai Shanghai International International Studies Studies University University (SISU), (SISU), Shanghai, Shanghai, China. China. Besides, his commentaries BBC (Urdu), Express Tribune, Besides, his commentaries have have appeared appeared in in BBC (Urdu), Express Tribune, The The First Post, The Post, The First Post, The Friday Friday Times, Times, Global Global Times, Times, South South China China Morning Morning Post, The News, Daily Times, News, Daily Times, Naya Naya Daur, Daur, and and CGTN. CGTN. Currently, Currently, he he is is Associate Associate ProfesProfes sor, Department of University, Islamabad, sor, Department of Social Social Sciences, Sciences, Iqra Iqra University, Islamabad, and and Invited Invited Researcher, Development Institute Fudan University, University, Shanghai. Researcher, Fudan Fudan Development Institute (FDDI), (FDDI), Fudan Shanghai. ORCID: ORCID: 0000-0003-3117-1649 0000-0003-3117-1649 Syed Ali Zia Editor of Pakistan Politico Research AssoSyed Ali Zia Jaffery Jaffery is is Associate Associate Editor of Pakistan Politico and and Research Asso ciate at the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, ciate at the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, University University of of Lahore. was Visiting the Stimson Lahore. Ali Ali was Visiting Fellow Fellow at at the Stimson Center, Center, Washington Washington D.C. D.C. Ali Ali regularly writes on regularly writes on strategic strategic issues issues for for national national and and international international publications publications to include Routledge, South Asian Voices, The National Daily Times, to include Routledge, South Asian Voices, The National Interest, Interest, Daily Times, and fields and The The News News among among other other publications. publications. His His research research interests interests lie lie in in the the fields of nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, and geopolitics. He is teaching underof nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, and geopolitics. He is teaching under graduate policy, national graduate level level courses courses on on foreign foreign policy, national security, security, arms arms control control and and disarmament, disarmament, and and non-proliferation, non-proliferation, since since 2018. 2018. ORCID: ORCID: 0000-0003-3903-8658 0000-0003-3903-8658 Samee the Fulbright Samee Lashari Lashari is is aa recipient recipient of of the Fulbright Doctoral Doctoral Scholarship. Scholarship. He He received received his from Northern Northern Arizona Lechis doctorate doctorate from Arizona University University in in 2017. 2017. Currently, Currently, he he is is Lec turer, Department of USA. He He turer, Department of Political Political Science, Science, South South Texas Texas College, College, Texas, Texas, USA. is is Visiting Visiting Faculty Faculty Member Member at at Lone Lone Star Star College College and and the the University University of of Texas Texas Rio Rio Grande Grande Valley. Valley. ORCID: ORCID: 0000-0001-7245-398X 0000-0001-7245-398X

Contributors

Rabbiya Kamal Nagra holds a BSc (high honors) in Economics and Political Science from LUMS. She received a full scholarship to complete her MSc in Economics from the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, China. Her academic excellence and high-quality work led her to be at the top of her class and in her graduation in 2016. She went on to the corporate world to work as a top employee at Standard Chartered Bank heading the talent acquisition team in the Central region from Multan to Swat. Moving back to Pakistan, she led the China–Pakistan Management Initiative (CPMI) in LUMS and worked as faculty in LGS University. She has various case studies and publications under her belt. In 2019, she moved to Chicago and is currently Faculty at DePaul University and is conducting research as part of her thinktank – Poli-C Lab. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8232-3553 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad-van der Zwan is Research Fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, Netherlands, working on the New Silk Roads programme directed by Dr Richard Griffiths. She is currently working on the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project at the institute while pursuing her doctoral research in Political Studies programme at the University of Milan, part of the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies (NASP) in Italy. Gul-i-Hina’s research is aimed at analysing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its domestic political implications in the participating BRI countries, focusing on two specific aspects, namely its impact on the processes of democratization and regime change in the countries involved. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1327-5145 Rizwan Zeb is Associate Professor and Directing Staff Research at the Air War College Institute Karachi. Prior to joining AWCI, he was Head of the Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad. He is Associate Editor, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs (Sage). His area of academic interest includes South Asian Strategic Stability Issues with particular focus on Pakistan’s Security. He is a former Benjamin Meaker Professor, Institute of Advanced Studies, University of Bristol, UK; Charles Wallace Visiting Research Fellow, Governance Research Center, Department of Politics, University of Bristol, UK (2006–07) and Visiting Scholar, South Asia Project, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution. He was RCSS Mahbub-ul-Haq Fellow, Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. From 2003 to 2010, he was Research Fellow, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, where he was dealing with nuclear stability in South Asia. He has taught and tutored at National Defense University, Quaid-e-Azam University, Air University, Fatima Jinnah University, Murdoch University, and University of Western Australia. He was educated at University of Western Australia, Uppsala University Sweden, Quaid-e-Azam University, and Gordon College and is the alumnus of Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Summer workshop on Defense, Technology and Cooperative Security in South Asia. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1017-291X

Taylor St Francis Taylor & Francis Croup httpyVtay lora ndfra nc i s.com

Part I

Foundation

Taylor St Francis Taylor & Francis Croup httpyVtay lora ndfra nc i s.com

1 Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan An Overview Ghulam Ali

Introduction Foreign policy is a key method through which a state interacts with others to pursue its interests. Asuccessful foreign policy can bring economic, political, and strategic gains and can help a state to raise its stature regionally and even globally. Foreign policy of any state is shaped by various internal and external factors. Pakistan has pursued complex foreign policy since its independence in August1947. The Islamic identity, disputes with India, and the geostrategic location played a key role in shaping its foreign policy. Pakistan was the first modern Muslim state that was created in the name of Islam. At that time, it was the largest Muslim-populated country and maintained this status until its dismemberment in 1971.1 This religious identity impacted its internal and external politics. The bloody partition of the Indian subcontinent with the British’s hasty departure, leaving behind unresolved territorial disputes mainly Kashmir, Junagadh, and Sir Creek proved to be permanent sources of tension between India and Pakistan. Among them, Kashmir proved to be the most dangerous issue which not only caused wars between the two neighbors but also became one of the reasons behind the nuclearization of the subcontinent. The intensity of Indo-Pakistan hostility could be measured from the fact that both fought their first war within a year of gaining their independence. Now well over seven decades, Indo-Pakistan relations remained hostile. For Pakistan, territorial disputes coupled with India’s bigger size, military superiority at least in numbers, occasional claims of the Indian leadership to ultimately render the 1947 partition undue to merge Pakistan with India, created a deep sense of insecurity. This, along with Pakistan’s narrow lines of communications and two wings separated from each other by a thousand miles of Indian territories, added to its anxiety.2 The “fear” from India dominated the mindset of Pakistani policy makers throughout the decades and led the country to do a “balancing act” by seeking support from other powers. There is a consensus among scholars that the India factors created a lasting impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy and in the choice of partnerships which it made.3 Thus, the Indian factor has been playing most important role in Pakistan’s foreign policy since its birth. This volume also elaborates it. DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-2

4 Ghulam Ghulam Ali 4 Ali

Third, played aa key foreign Third, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s geostrategic geostrategic location location played key role role in in shaping shaping its its foreign policy. Pakistan is located at the juncture of important regions of South, policy. Pakistan is located at the juncture of important regions of South, West, West, and the one the energy-rich Middle East and Central Central Asia Asia on on the one hand hand and and the energy-rich Middle East on on the the other. other.44 In Pakistan is the second-most In the the east east of of Pakistan is India, India, the second-most populated populated country; country; in in its its north north is is China with world’s largest population and a permanent member of UNSC; China with world’s largest population and a permanent member of UNSC; in in its its north-west that is troubled countries north-west is is Afghanistan Afghanistan that is one one of of the the most most troubled countries of of the the world; world; and in the west is Iran which has acrimonious ties with many Western and in the west is Iran which has acrimonious ties with many Western capitals, capitals, especially the south Pakistan is the Indian especially with with Washington. Washington. In In the south of of Pakistan is the Indian Ocean. Ocean. PakiPaki stan is the third-largest Indian Ocean littoral state, with a 1,046-km-long stan is the third-largest Indian Ocean littoral state, with a 1,046-km-long coastline coastline and Exclusive Economic Economic Zone and aa 290,000 290,000 Exclusive Zone (EEZ). (EEZ). It It is is ranked ranked 74th 74th among among the the 5 Being an Indian Ocean littoral state added to its 142 coastal states of the world. 142 coastal states of the world.5 Being an Indian Ocean littoral state added to its strategic the “middle strategic significance. significance. The The geostrategic geostrategic location location coupled coupled with with the “middle power” power” status underlined Pakistan’s Pakistan’s role big powstatus underlined role in in the the region region and and drew drew the the attention attention of of big pow ers right from the beginning. Pakistan’s role in regional and global politics ers right from the beginning. Pakistan’s role in regional and global politics during during the post-9/11, and Belt and the Cold Cold War, War, in in post-Cold post-Cold War, War, in in post-9/11, and in in the the age age of of Belt and Road Road IniIni tiative (BRI) was largely based on its geostrategic location and the middle power tiative (BRI) was largely based on its geostrategic location and the middle power status. status. Going back to post-independence period, period, the the United Going back to the the post-independence United States States and and other other states developed relations with Pakistan against the backdrop of the states developed relations with Pakistan against the backdrop of the Cold Cold War War which blocks. The which had had sharply sharply divided divided the the world world into into two two blocks. The US US policy policy makers makers realized Pakistan’s strategic bulwark against the sorealized that that Pakistan’s strategic location location could could act act as as aa bulwark against the socalled expansionism of communism (of the USSR and China) toward the called expansionism of communism (of the USSR and China) toward the warm warm waters the Indian the United United States brought Pakistan Pakistan into waters of of the Indian Ocean. Ocean. Therefore, Therefore, the States brought into its its anti-communist alliance system. In 1954, Pakistan joined Southeast Asia anti-communist alliance system. In 1954, Pakistan joined Southeast Asia Treaty Treaty Organization(SEATO)or Manila Pact Pact to become aa formal Organization (SEATO) or Manila to become formal military military ally ally with with the the United States. By the end of the 1950s, the number of military pacts signed with United States. By the end of the 1950s, the number of military pacts signed with the joining these brought the United United States States had had reached reached four. four. Pakistan’s Pakistan’s joining these defense defense pacts pacts brought much-required economic and military assistance to the country. At the same time, much-required economic and military assistance to the country. At the same time, these agreements placed Pakistan in the US sphere of influence and established these agreements placed Pakistan in the US sphere of influence and established the base of bilateral relationship which continued the base of bilateral relationship which continued in in ensuing ensuing decades decades (this (this is is disdis cussed in detail in Chapter10 of this volume). It was under the obligations cussed in detail in Chapter 10 of this volume). It was under the obligations of of these that Pakistan to the the US US demand these pacts pacts that Pakistan agreed agreed to demand to to establish establish aa secret secret intelliintelli gence for the the U-2 U-2spy to gather gence facility facility in in Peshawar Peshawar for spy plane plane to gather military military information information of of the Soviet Union. In 1960, one of such plans was hit by the Soviet defense the Soviet Union. In 1960, one of such plans was hit by the Soviet defense system, system, and pilot of was captured. Union which and the the pilot of the the spy spy plane plane was captured. This This angered angered the the Soviet Soviet Union which threatened Pakistan of dire consequences. In those days, Pakistan owing to its threatened Pakistan of dire consequences. In those days, Pakistan owing to its loyloy alty being one Highlightalty was was described described as as being one of of Washington’s Washington’s closest closest allies allies in in Asia. Asia. Highlight ing Pakistan’s military ing Pakistan’s Pakistan’s commitment commitment to to the the United United States, States, Pakistan’s military ruler ruler General General Ayub Khan once stated: Ayub Khan once stated: Pakistan the West, unlike Pakistan has has openly openly and and unequivocally unequivocally cast cast its its lot lot with with the West, and and unlike several other countries around us, we have shut ourselves off almost several other countries around us, we have shut ourselves off almost comcom pletely from the the possibility pletely from possibility of of any any major major assistance assistance from from the the Communist Communist bloc. We believe in bloc. We do do not not believe in hunting hunting with with the the hound hound and and running running with with the the hare. hare. We wish to follow, and are following, a clear and unambiguous path. We wish to follow, and are following, a clear and unambiguous path.66

Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan 5 The pattern of regional alignment during the 1950s was in a manner in which Pakistan consolidated an alliance relationship with the United States and Western powers. Pakistan’s relationship with the communist block, especially China and the USSR, remained limited. On the other hand, China developed closer ties with India and the USSR. The Sino-Indian relationship during this period was described as Hindi-Chini bhai bhai (Chinese and Indians are brothers). This pattern of regional alliances existed till the late 1950s when they began to change format on new lines. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, some interrelated developments led to the readjustment of regional alliances. China’s relations with its Communist comrade, the USSR (that was also the main source of techno-military assistance and political support to China), as well as with India changed from amity to enmity. For Sino-Soviet relations, their ideological differences became a source of contention, while for the Sino-Indian relations, the ill-defined boundary, Tibetan issue, Dalai Lama and his thousands of followers’ escape to India, and the contest for the role of regional leadership proved to be the main sources of conflict. This Sino-Indian hostility culminated at a short but bitter war in 1962, which changed the dynamics of their relationship permanently. The Sino-Indian hostility also impacted upon US–Pakistan relationship in some ways. In the backdrop of the deterioration of Sino-Indian tension, the United States– then Pakistan’s main source of military hardware– began giving a large-scale economic and military assistance to “non-aligned” India. Despite Pakistan’s “protest” that the assistance could be used against US ally– Pakistan – the aid continued till the late 1960s.7 The rift in the US–Pakistan relations further widened as President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration placed an arms embargo on the subcontinent before the outbreak of the 1965 war. The embargo, which remained in place until 1975, affected Pakistan severely which had a near-complete dependence on the United States for arms procurement. India, on the other hand, continued to receive arms from the USSR, New Delhi’s chief supplier throughout the Cold War. Pakistan’s disappointment with the United States led it to review its foreign policy to expand its foreign policy options by reaching out to communist world than mere depending exclusively on the West. Under this new approach, Pakistan began to strengthen its ties with countries from both blocks of the Cold War, with AfroAsian nations and the Islamic world.8 An important and an enduring outcome of the reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign policy during the 1960s was the strengthening of its relationship with China. In fact, both Beijing and Islamabad had lost their key allies. This led them to search for new ones. Both gave a fresh look to their existing ties and found commonalities of interests. To further their newly emerging partnership, China and Pakistan settled their unresolved boundary and signed the border agreement in March1963. Leaving behind no territorial dispute ushered in a new era in their bilateral ties. As a result of this bonhomie, China left its traditional neutrality on the Indo-Pakistan dispute and started supporting Pakistan. This was evident during the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 and 1971 and on the Kashmir issue. The most important outcome of this partnership was the emergence of Sino-Pakistan defense

6 Ghulam Ali cooperation. In 1966, China for the first time supplied arms to Pakistan. Even though Chinese arms were not of high quality, in the face of US arms embargo on Pakistan, China proved to be an alternative. Since then, Chinese arms to Pakistan never ceased and became a permanent feature of their bilateral cooperation. At times, China emerged to be the largest arms supplier to Pakistan.9 The partnership with China built during the 1960s further strengthened in the following years with China becoming a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Another outcome of the review of Pakistan’s foreign policy during the 1960s was an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. In April1965, Pakistani President Ayub Khan made the first ever visit to Moscow by any head of state or the head of government. Premier Alexei Kosygin termed the visit as “a momentous event in the history of Soviet–Pakistan relations” and expressed the hope that it would contribute to further strengthening of mutual understanding and good neighborliness between the two countries.10 As a result of this rapprochement, the USSR, which had an outright support of India, slightly modified its position toward the subcontinent and began to play the role of a balancer. This was evident during the Indo-Pakistan war in September1965. Moscow offered its good offices to settle post-war issues between India and Pakistan which signed USSRbrokered Tashkent Declaration in January1966. Under the sharply divided world politics, Pakistan–USSR rapprochement was only short-lived. Before the outbreak of the next Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, Moscow moved closer to New Delhi. In August1971, Moscow and New Delhi signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with a military clause, which enabled India to directly intervene in Pakistan’s civil war and dismember it. The dismemberment changed Pakistan’s geography thus ending its role in the Bay of Bengal and the Southeast Asia. The debacle of East Pakistan proved to be the most traumatic event for Pakistan as a nation. As Malik stated, After the loss of East Pakistan to the Indian forces, Pakistan was not merely a defeated country; it was a thoroughly demoralized state, whose population for the first time lost faith in its military’s defensive capability. Pakistanis also lost a sense of national direction, and confidence in their allies.11 Pakistan’s new leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed Pakistan’s presidency on 20 December1971 (he later became the Prime Minister and remained so till July1977 when his government was toppled in a military coup). Bhutto reviewed the foreign policy of the country. Instead of relying on a few Western sources, Bhutto attempted to expand country’s options by strengthening relations with the Islamic world, the USSR (once again), and the developing world. Immediately after the 1971 war, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO and few years later from CENTO too. After leaving US-led military pacts, Islamabad formally joined the Non-alignment Movement. Pakistan’s defeat and dismemberment at the hands of India in the 1971 war and India’s “peaceful” nuclear test 3years later became the main reasons behind the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program which was continued by successive

Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan 7 military and political leadership. Islamabad’s pursuit for nuclear program emerged as the major irritant in relations with the United States and various Western capitals. In April1979, the United States that had already imposed arms sanctions also cut off economic assistance, except for food assistance. In the backdrop of punitive US and Western sanctions, China proved to be the main source of arms supplies and assistance. China also played a role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program.12 Pakistan’s relations with the United States would have further deteriorated had the Soviet Union not invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December1979 opened a new chapter of Pakistan–US cooperation. Due to Pakistan’s strategic location, being the next door neighbor of Afghanistan, Pakistan became a crucial state in any strategy to force the Soviets to roll back from Afghanistan. In the face of US inducement, Pakistan’s military ruler General Ziaul-Haq weighed different options. The factors such as the desire to help the neighboring Afghanistan, to get an access to the sophisticated US military hardware, and to get legitimacy for his military regime led him to join the US alliance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan emerged as a frontline state in anti-Soviet collation during the 1980s. With the help of the United States and Saudi assistance, Pakistan trained anti-Soviet guerilla forces called Mujahideen who were brought from different Islamic countries. It is noteworthy to state that in a rare policy move, China also joined the anti-Soviet alliance and provided economic and military assistance which was channeled through Pakistan. Beijing reportedly sent some Uyghurs to fight along with Mujahideen.13 During the 1980s, the United States, Pakistani, and Chinese interests converged on Afghanistan.14 Moreover, under the shadows of Afghan War, the United States turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan took the advantage and accelerated the speed of implementation of its program. By the end of Afghan War, Pakistan had reached or even crossed the nuclear threshold. Pakistan could not have acquired nuclear capabilities– at least that early– had the United States not overlooked it in the backdrop of the Afghan War. The Soviet Union completed its withdrawal process from Afghanistan in 1989, and the next year the United States imposed arms sanctions on Pakistan over the pretext of Islamabad’s clandestinely developing nuclear and missile program. Islamabad remained under US sanctions for well over a decade until the War on Terror (WoT), which once again revived the two-way relationship. During the 1990s, Pakistan’s domestic politics overshadowed its foreign policy. Tussle between the two mainstream political parties, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) with frequent change of governments without completing their tenure, diverted attention from external relations. Political disputes among mainstream parties provided the military greater space to control various aspects of foreign and security policies especially relating to Afghanistan, India and the Kashmir. On the other hand, the military establishment continued supporting Mujahideen in Afghanistan even after the Soviet withdrawal. With Pakistan’s help, Mujahideen turned into the Taliban and established their government in Kabul (1996–2001). Pakistan’s continued support to different Islamic

8 Ghulam Ali groups groups drew drew international international criticism. criticism. This This also also impacted impacted on on Pakistan’s Pakistan’s relations relations with China which had growing concerns over the separatists. with China which had growing concerns over the separatists. China China reportedly reportedly conveyed to Pakistan the potential potential nexus between Islamist conveyed its its concerns concerns to Pakistan over over the nexus between Islamist groups and separatists the first time during the 1990s. On the other groups and separatists the first time during the 1990s. On the other hand, hand, aa tussle tussle between the the Pakistan between Pakistan military military and and the the government government resulted resulted in in the the military military coup coup in in October1999 then Chief Musharraf, October 1999 in in which which the the then Chief of of Army Army Staff, Staff, General General Pervez Pervez Musharraf, toppled Minister Nawaz toppled the the elected elected government government of of Prime Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Sharif, took took power power in in his own hands, and ruled the country until 2008. his own hands, and ruled the country until 2008. In the wake wake of Pakistan’s military join the the US US WoT. In the of 9/11, 9/11, Pakistan’s military ruler ruler decided decided to to join WoT. In In 2004, the the United United States States granted granted Pakistan Ally (MNNA) (MNNA) 2004, Pakistan the the Major Major Non-NATO Non-NATO Ally status. US military status. This This once once again again revived revived two-way two-way relationship relationship with with US military and and ecoeco nomic assistance coming to Pakistan. China was reportedly behind Pakistan’s nomic assistance coming to Pakistan. China was reportedly behind Pakistan’s decision join the decision to to side side with with the the United United States States and and join the WoT. WoT. The The repercussions repercussions of of Pakistan’s support to Islamic groups began to manifest in the new Pakistan’s support to Islamic groups began to manifest in the new century century with with rapid the country. became aa major rapid increase increase of of terrorism terrorism in in the country. This This policy policy also also became major source source of tension in Islamabad’s relations with other countries. India propagated of tension in Islamabad’s relations with other countries. India propagated PakiPaki stan’s with extremist forums. In stan’s links links with extremist groups groups at at different different international international forums. In part part due due to pressure and part due the conseto international international pressure and in in part due to to its its own own realization realization about about the conse quences Pakistan banned banned aa number quences of of this this policy, policy, Pakistan number of of organizations. organizations. From From around around mid-2000s, most of Pakistan’s time and attention was focused on combating mid-2000s, most of Pakistan’s time and attention was focused on combating the the internal wave of internal wave of terrorism terrorism and and extremism. extremism. In Pakistan held In 2008, 2008, Pakistan held general general elections, elections, and and under under mounting mounting domestic domestic pressure pressure General Musharraf resigned from the post of president. Since then, transiGeneral Musharraf resigned from the post of president. Since then, power power transi tion smoothly took place among three politically elected governments in Pakistan. tion smoothly took place among three politically elected governments in Pakistan. In the following following decade, In the decade, the the PPP PPP and and PML-N PML-N each each completed completed their their 5-year 5-year terms. terms. As a result of July2018 elections, PTI for the first time formed the government As a result of July 2018 elections, PTI for the first time formed the government at at the three provinces. provinces. In the cricketer-turned politician the center center and and in in three In August2018, August 2018, the cricketer-turned politician Imran became the Minister of Imran Khan Khan became the 22nd 22nd Prime Prime Minister of the the country. country. Against this backdrop, this volume studies contemporary Against this backdrop, this volume studies contemporary dynamics dynamics of of PakiPaki stan’s foreign policy. While there is no exact point to define contemporary, stan’s foreign policy. While there is no exact point to define contemporary, most most contributors them contributors covered covered developments developments in in the the past past decade– decade - the the 2010s. 2010s. Some Some of of them also background to to develop volume is also provided provided rich rich historical historical background develop the the context. context. This This volume is divided into two parts. Part Iconsists of four chapters (including this chapter) divided into two parts. Part I consists of four chapters (including this chapter) and and broadly covers Pakistan’s foreign Part II broadly covers conceptual conceptual aspects aspects of of Pakistan’s foreign policy. policy. Part II consists consists of of eight chapters and deals with Pakistan’s relations with its immediate eight chapters and deals with Pakistan’s relations with its immediate neighbors neighbors and and some some other other important important countries. countries. In Chapter2, MinIn Chapter 2, Syed Syed Ali Ali Zia Zia Jaffery Jaffery examined examined the the foreign foreign policies policies of of Prime Prime Min ister Khan who who assumed the 22nd Prime Minister Minister ister Imran Imran Khan assumed power power in in August2018 August 2018 as as the 22nd Prime of the country. was aa major Pakistani politics politics which the past past was of the country. It It was major change change in in Pakistani which in in the was dominated by two mainstream political parties PPP and PML-N and the dominated by two mainstream political parties PPP and PML-N and the military. military. The broke this this cycle formed the the government the center for the the first The PTI PTI broke cycle and and formed government at at the center for first time. Second, Khan did not represent traditional politics, as he hailed neither from time. Second, Khan did not represent traditional politics, as he hailed neither from dynastic politics nor feudal background. background. He He entered into politics politics to fight dynastic politics nor from from aa feudal entered into to fight what he termed as corrupt and “political mafia.” In the realm of foreign policy, what he termed as corrupt and “political mafia.” In the realm of foreign policy, he he held views different from other For example, held views different from other politicians. politicians. For example, from from the the early early days days of of

Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan 9 the WoT, he staunchly opposed the use of force in Afghanistan and stressed upon the need of a political solution. He was critical of Pakistan’s uneven relationship with the United States. As a cricket star, he was well known in India and therefore wanted to develop good neighborly ties with New Delhi. Jaffery identifies that as Khan assumed office, he faced four key challenges. First, the simmering, internecine war in Afghanistan compounded Pakistan’s security problems. India’s continued violence in the India-held Kashmir followed by revocation of the special status of the valley took the Indo-Pakistan ties to the lowest ebb. Three, Pakistan’s deepening ties with China undergirded by the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) brought it right in the middle of Sino-Indian and Sino-US rivalry. Four, the conflagration between Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states on the one hand and Iran on the other made it hard for Pakistan to balance its relations. Jaffery divided his chapter into five sections. In the first section, he delves into Khan’s views on Pakistan’s key foreign policy issues by sifting through his preelection writings, speeches, interviews, his party’s 2018 manifesto, and his victory speech. The second section deals with Pakistan’s relations with India especially with reference to the Kashmir. The third section evaluates Pakistan’s ties with the United States and Afghanistan. The fourth section examines Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China. The final section appraises the instruments of articulation, institutional arrangements, and other outreach initiatives. Jaffery concludes that Pakistan under Imran Khan has found a new anchor in economic security, which cannot be achieved without regional connectivity and conflict-resolution. The author also explains government’s engagement with friends and foes. Pakistan solidified partnerships with countries that helped it and showed resolve to those harming its interests. The author elaborated Pakistan’s response to Indian airspace violation in 2019 and Khan’s encounter with former President Donald Trump on Twitter. On the whole, the conduct of foreign policy underwent changes as evidenced by enhanced publicity; the establishment of interactive conduits; civil–military synchronization; and a newfound interest in long-term, strategic thinking. Jaffery ends with an optimistic note. The changes introduced by Khan’s government signal an end of torpor that had long stifled Pakistan’s ability to maneuver its way so as to advance its vital interests. The change in Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan from interference to the promotion of Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process was its vivid example. According to the author, Khan’s own views have been determining country’s (new) foreign policy direction. In Chapter3, Samee Lashari probes Pakistan’s middle power status. This is a new topic as hardly any existing study has covered it. Given Pakistan’s role in regional and, to some extent, international politics, examining Pakistan’s status as a middle power at the beginning of this book provides a framework for the subsequent chapters. Lashari sets two aims of his chapter. One, he provides a theoretical understanding of the concept of the middle power from its origin till recent debates. In the absence of a consensus on the definition of the term, he takes the “self-identification” and “material capabilities” as two key determining factors of a middle power. Two, he applies this model on Pakistan as a case study. He stated

10 Ghulam Ali that Pakistan has that Pakistan has deeply deeply embedded embedded ideological ideological standpoint standpoint (self-identification), (self-identification), plenty of natural and human resources, a communication plenty of natural and human resources, a communication network, network, raw raw industrial industrial base, and military prowess. These, taken together, constituted its material base, and military prowess. These, taken together, constituted its material capacapa bilities which used to to advance bilities which Pakistan Pakistan (successfully) (successfully) used advance its its national national interests. interests. On On the the basis of these capabilities basis of these capabilities and and geostrategic geostrategic location, location, Pakistan Pakistan fairly fairly manipulated manipulated its before, during Pakistan its external external environment. environment. As As mentioned mentioned before, during the the Cold Cold War, War, Pakistan allied with Western world and participated in military agreements while allied with Western world and participated in military agreements while simultasimulta neously partnership with particineously maintaining maintaining closer closer partnership with China. China. During During the the 1980s, 1980s, it it partici pated in the hot war of Afghanistan, facilitated USSR disintegration, and bought pated in the hot war of Afghanistan, facilitated USSR disintegration, and bought time to build its nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, as it faced economic sanctions, time to build its nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, as it faced economic sanctions, it Mujahideen to to replicate it developed developed an an indigenous indigenous “second “second defense defense line” line” of of Mujahideen replicate its its experience of Afghanistan in Kashmir to engage India in a low scale but costly experience of Afghanistan in Kashmir to engage India in a low scale but costly violence. In the wake became aa frontline frontline state the US violence. In the wake of of 9/11, 9/11, Pakistan Pakistan became state in in the US WoT. WoT. As a result, it gained the status of MNNA and reaped the benefits of increased As a result, it gained the status of MNNA and reaped the benefits of increased military United States. broadened military cooperation cooperation with with the the United States. Since Since 2013, 2013, Pakistan Pakistan has has broadened its multilateral strategic engagement with China by initiating CPEC to upgrade its multilateral strategic engagement with China by initiating CPEC to upgrade infrastructure, to modernize its industry and agriculture, and to become a infrastructure, to modernize its industry and agriculture, and to become a considconsid erably player in erably significant significant player in emerging emerging Sino-American Sino-American great-power great-power competition. competition. Lashari that Pakistan Power in Lashari concludes concludes that Pakistan “is “is aa Middle Middle Power in itself itself and and is is recognized recognized as as such by the decision makers in the most powerful countries around world.” such by the decision makers in the most powerful countries around the the world.” Pakistan’s powerful Pakistan’s powerful military military ruled ruled the the country country for for about about 30years 30 years directly directly and and remained influential for the remaining period. Among other areas remained influential for the remaining period. Among other areas of of national national policy, played an foreign policy policy decisionpolicy, military military played an important important role role in in country’s country’s foreign decision making. Against this backdrop, Ejaz Hussain examines the role of making. Against this backdrop, Ejaz Hussain examines the role of military military in in the the formulation Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy He formulation and and operationalization operationalization of of Pakistan’s policy in in Chapter4. Chapter 4. He argues that foreign policy in advanced democracies is framed by democratic instiargues that foreign policy in advanced democracies is framed by democratic insti tutions the Parliament, tutions such such as as the Parliament, while while in in “defective” “defective” democracies democracies and and autocratic autocratic regimes it is framed dubiously by supra-parliamentary institutions regimes it is framed dubiously by supra-parliamentary institutions such such as as milimili tary, bureaucracy, or monarchies. He puts Pakistan in the category of a “defective” tary, bureaucracy, or monarchies. He puts Pakistan in the category of a “defective” democracy policy is though theoretically theoretically made by Parliament Parliament but but democracy in in which which foreign foreign policy is though made by is operationally influenced by supra-parliamentary institutions. While his major is operationally influenced by supra-parliamentary institutions. While his major focus post-Musharraf period the roots focus is is on on the the post-Musharraf period (since (since 2008), 2008), he he also also traces traces the roots of of military’s influence since independence. During the 1950s, the civil bureaucracy military’s influence since independence. During the 1950s, the civil bureaucracy controlled politics and foreign policy policy with with the junior partner. controlled politics and foreign the military military as as aa junior partner. On On the whole, the (foreign)-policy-making institution, namely, the Parliament, the whole, the (foreign)-policy-making institution, namely, the Parliament, was was cornered by non-elective bureaucracy and cornered by non-elective institutions institutions such such as as civil civil bureaucracy and the the military military in in the last 75years. the last 75 years. Hussain stated from India, the beginning, beginning, led Hussain stated that that security security threat threat from India, right right from from the led milmil itary to play a greater role not only in security but also in foreign policy decisionitary to play a greater role not only in security but also in foreign policy decision making. the main behind Pakistan’s Pakistan’s tilt toward the United making. This This was was also also the main reason reason behind tilt toward the United States for military and economic assistance. While invoking its agency, General States for military and economic assistance. While invoking its agency, General Ayub became the the first first Mar MarAyub Khan-led Khan-led military military regime regime became the principal principal actor actor since since the tial Law imposed in October1958. On the whole, the military agency prevailed tial Law imposed in October 1958. On the whole, the military agency prevailed in Pakistan over foreign policy in Pakistan over politics, politics, administration, administration, and and foreign policy during during much much of of the the 1960s, 1980s, and 2000s. In the intermittent periods, Pakistan theoretically 1960s, 1980s, and 2000s. In the intermittent periods, Pakistan theoretically had had

Foreign ofContemporary Contemporary Pakistan 11 Foreign Policy Policy of Pakistan 11 civilian fumbled at civilian dispensations. dispensations. Practically, Practically, however, however, aa civil civil government government either either fumbled at or failed to mark its agency to counterbalance the military vis-à-vis foreign policy. or failed to mark its agency to counterbalance the military vis-a-vis foreign policy. Consequently, the military prevailed over foreign policy Consequently, the military prevailed over foreign policy making making and and operationoperation alization. In the contemporary context, too, the military has, while alization. In the contemporary context, too, the military has, while marking marking its its agency, the contours agency, controlled controlled the contours of of foreign foreign policy. policy. Hussain the role PeoHussain explained explained the role of of military military during during three three periods: periods: Pakistan Pakistan Peo ple’s Party Muslim League-N League-N (2013–2018); Pakiple’s Party (2008–2013); (2008-2013); Pakistan Pakistan Muslim (2013-2018); and and Paki stan political leaders tried to to assert stan Tehrek-e-Insaf Tehrek-e-Insaf (2018 (2018 to to present). present). Generally, Generally, political leaders tried assert their role on foreign policy. Zardari’s visit to Afghanistan, the United States, their role on foreign policy. Zardari’s visit to Afghanistan, the United States, and and China Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy.” policy.” The China reflected reflected his his “interest “interest in, in, if if not not control control over, over, Pakistan’s The Kerry–Lugar-Berman by the preference Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act Act passed passed by the US US legislature legislature reflected reflected US US preference for political government over military. This was considered as PPP’s success for political government over military. This was considered as PPP’s success over over military policy. But But such military in in the the domain domain of of foreign foreign policy. such aa success success did did not not long long lost. lost. Soon, Memogate scandal Pakistan’s Ambassador United States Soon, the the Memogate scandal in in which which Pakistan’s Ambassador to to the the United States wrote US president to curtail wrote aa letter letter to to the the US president to curtail the the role role of of military military in in political political affairs, affairs, Raymond Davis case, Salala attacks, and military operations against Raymond Davis case, Salala attacks, and military operations against local local extremextrem ist between the the PPP ist groups groups drove drove aa wedge wedge between PPP and and the the military. military. The PML-N during its third stint (2008–2013) by Prime The PML-N during its third stint (2008-2013) initially initially led led by Prime Minister Minister Nawaz Sharif (who was later disqualified by the court verdict) tried to assert Nawaz Sharif (who was later disqualified by the court verdict) tried to assert his his agency He kept kept the the portfolio the Foreign under his agency over over military. military. He portfolio of of the Foreign Minister Minister under his perper sonal for closer ties with taking military sonal control. control. Sharif’s Sharif’s desire desire for closer ties with India India (without (without taking military on on board) and participation in Prime Minister board) and the the participation in Indian Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Modi’s inauguration inauguration cercer emony ties proved proved to to be be some the reasons behind his emony and and expansion expansion of of trade trade ties some of of the reasons behind his growing differences with the military. Later, the Dawn Leak and Panama growing differences with the military. Later, the Dawn Leak and Panama Papers Papers further with military. Hussain noted, further destabilized destabilized PML-N’s PML-N’s ties ties with military. As As Hussain noted, “the “the military military assumes itself as a major stakeholder as far Pakistan’s foreign policy assumes itself as a major stakeholder as far Pakistan’s foreign policy was was concon cerned. with India cerned. It, It, thus, thus, distrusts distrusts the the civil civil government(s) government(s) normalising normalising with India and/or and/or Afghanistan pursuing ties the US US when when the the institution Afghanistan and and pursuing ties with, with, for for example, example, the institution thinks otherwise.” thinks otherwise.” Unlike the government Prime Minister Khan (since Unlike Sharif, Sharif, the government of of Prime Minister Imran Imran Khan (since August2018) has maintained closer ties with the military. Both the Parliament August 2018) has maintained closer ties with the military. Both the Parliament and the military page on foreign policy and the military seemingly seemingly are are on on the the same same page on major major foreign policy issues. issues. Hussain explained that how the military helped the government of Prime MinisHussain explained that how the military helped the government of Prime Minis ter Khan to ties with with China ter Khan to repair repair ties China and and Gulf Gulf states states in in its its initial initial period. period. The The author author argues that international constraints such as Financial Action Task Force argues that international constraints such as Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (FATF) put whole, the put aa limit limit on on military’s military’s role. role. On On the the whole, the synchronization synchronization of of political political and and military visions on foreign policy issues as is seen under the current military visions on foreign policy issues as is seen under the current government government will benefit the that Pakistan will benefit the country. country. The The author author concludes concludes that Pakistan military military has has asserted asserted its agency in foreign policy decision-making throughout the history. its agency in foreign policy decision-making throughout the history. Part begins with with analyzing with its Part II II begins analyzing Pakistan’s Pakistan’s relations relations with its “all-weather” “all-weatheff’ friend, friend, China. Gul-i-Hina Shahzad-van der Zwan and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra in China. Gul-i-Hina Shahzad-van der Zwan and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra in Chapter5 Chapter 5 argue argue that that since since the the establishment establishment of of entente entente cordial cordial in in the the mid-1960s, mid-1960s, relations relations with China have become a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign be it politiwith China have become a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy, policy, be it politi cal leadership or military government. In recent years, the relationship has cal leadership or military government. In recent years, the relationship has transtrans formed politics, and formed into into economics, economics, politics, and diplomacy. diplomacy. More More Chinese Chinese professionals, professionals,

12 Ghulam Ali projects, products are being seen vice versa. versa. projects, and and products are increasingly increasingly being seen in in Pakistan Pakistan and and vice The chapter divided into three phases: Sowing the Seed under PPP, 2008–13; The chapter divided into three phases: Sowing the Seed under PPP, 2008-13; Accelerated Reaping the the Benefits Benefits under Accelerated Growth Growth under under the the PML-N, PML-N, 2013–18; 2013-18; and and Reaping under the PTI since 2018. The authors have examined the various aspects of diplomacy the PTI since 2018. The authors have examined the various aspects of diplomacy with financial assistance under the with aa focus focus on on how how Chinese Chinese investment investment and and financial assistance under the CPEC CPEC evolved to become the focal point of the diplomatic ties. Chinese investment proevolved to become the focal point of the diplomatic ties. Chinese investment pro vided a much-needed relief to Pakistan’s struggling economy. Moreover, China’s vided a much-needed relief to Pakistan’s struggling economy. Moreover, China’s presence being aa strong presence and and support support as as being strong and and reliable reliable partner partner enhanced enhanced Pakistan’s Pakistan’s leverage regionally and internationally. For China, Pakistan played leverage regionally and internationally. For China, Pakistan played aa crucial crucial role role in via in the the implementation implementation of of BRI BRI and and provided provided it it an an access access to to the the Indian Indian Ocean Ocean via Gwadar Port. Once fully functional, this route will provide China an alternative to Gwadar Port. Once fully functional, this route will provide China an alternative to the Strait of Malacca. Despite some setbacks such as the renegotiation of terms of the Strait of Malacca. Despite some setbacks such as the renegotiation of terms of some some of of the the agreements, agreements, change change of of governments, governments, and and aa global global pandemic, pandemic, the the relarela tionship between China and Pakistan has evolved further. The continuation tionship between China and Pakistan has evolved further. The continuation and and the the CPEC to the the fact both the implementation implementation of of the CPEC projects projects stand stand as as aa testament testament to fact that that both countries to further the relationship focus countries are are determined determined to further expand expand the relationship with with aa greater greater focus on geoeconomics. The chapter concludes that the net gains for both countries on geoeconomics. The chapter concludes that the net gains for both countries are are positive positive and and anticipate anticipate even even deeper deeper cooperation cooperation in in the the future. future. In Muhammad Azam In Chapter6, Chapter 6, Muhammad Azam examines examines Pakistan’s Pakistan’s relations relations with with AfghaniAfghani stan by taking into account sources of conflict and cooperation. The stan by taking into account sources of conflict and cooperation. The chapter chapter disdis cusses Pashtunistan, the cusses the the dispute dispute over over the the Durand Durand Line; Line; the the concepts concepts of of Pashtunistan, the idea idea of the impact of Pakistan–Afghanistan Pakistan-Afghanistan confederation; confederation; the impact of of Soviet Soviet invasion invasion during during the the 1980s; the Taliban factor; implications of 9/11; the state of intra-Afghan peace 1980s; the Taliban factor; implications of 9/11; the state of intra-Afghan peace process; bilateral trade. process; and and the the prospects prospects of of bilateral trade. The The analysis analysis covers covers political political and and security aspects of the relations and identifies the lowest and highest points in in security aspects of the relations and identifies the lowest and highest points the trajectory of this relationship over the decades. The author argues that being the trajectory of this relationship over the decades. The author argues that being neighbors Pakistan and to sort their neighbors it it is is in in the the core core interests interests of of Pakistan and Afghanistan Afghanistan to sort out out their differences and develop a cooperative relationship in the age of globalization. differences and develop a cooperative relationship in the age of globalization. Landlocked Pakistan for trade, while while Pakistan Pakistan Landlocked Afghanistan Afghanistan is is dependent dependent on on Pakistan for its its trade, needs Afghanistan to get an access to the Central Asian Republics. Azam needs Afghanistan to get an access to the Central Asian Republics. Azam stresses stresses upon the Durand Durand Line, prevention upon the the need need of of the the settlement settlement of of the Line, increased increased trade, trade, prevention of by other of the the use use of of territory territory by other elements, elements, and and efforts efforts to to rebuild rebuild trust. trust. The The recent recent developments in which Pakistan played an important role for Afghan peace pro prodevelopments in which Pakistan played an important role for Afghan peace cess leading to the signing of the Doha Agreement (also known as the Agreement cess leading to the signing of the Doha Agreement (also known as the Agreement for to Afghanistan) between the United States the Taliban for Bringing Bringing Peace Peace to Afghanistan) between the United States and and the Taliban in February2020 was duly acknowledged by Afghan and international in February 2020 was duly acknowledged by Afghan and international actors. actors. This was aa shift toward Afghanistan from geostrategic to This was shift in in Islamabad’s Islamabad’s approach approach toward Afghanistan from geostrategic to geoeconomics and indicates better ties in the future. What would be the impact of geoeconomics and indicates better ties in the future. What would be the impact of the bilateral relationship the advent advent of of the the Taliban Taliban in in Afghanistan Afghanistan in in August2021 August 2021 on on bilateral relationship is yet to be seen. is yet to be seen. As the beginning, beginning, the the hostility between India Pakistan As mentioned mentioned in in the hostility between India and and Pakistan moves beyond their borders. Both countries compete for a sphere of moves beyond their borders. Both countries compete for a sphere of influinflu ence ence in in other other countries countries and and regions regions to to use use against against each each other. other. Afghanistan Afghanistan has has become aa new theater of become new theater of Indo-Pakistan Indo-Pakistan rivalry. rivalry. Shahzad Shahzad Akhtar Akhtar and and Arshad Arshad Ali Ali in Chapter7 argue that the attitudes and policies of Pakistani decision-makers in Chapter 7 argue that the attitudes and policies of Pakistani decision-makers

Foreign of Contemporary Contemporary Pakistan 13 Foreign Policy Policy of Pakistan 13 concerning been conditioned by apprehensions concerning Afghanistan Afghanistan have have historically historically been conditioned by apprehensions about Indian hostility toward Pakistan and the development about Indian hostility toward Pakistan and the development of of close close relations relations between India between India and and Afghanistan. Afghanistan. The The removal removal of of the the Taliban Taliban regime regime after after 9/11 9/11 deprived Pakistan of deprived Pakistan of aa pro-Pakistan pro-Pakistan regime regime in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Moreover, Moreover, the the emeremer gence Kabul and gence of of unfriendly unfriendly regime regime in in Kabul and the the increasing increasing involvement involvement of of India India in in Afghanistan, especially opening of new consulates, added to Islamabad’s Afghanistan, especially opening of new consulates, added to Islamabad’s inseinse curities. it as being encircled from both both eastern western curities. Pakistan Pakistan perceived perceived it as being encircled from eastern and and western 15 fronts. According to Akhtar and Ali, many analysts concurred that Pakistan’s fronts.15 According to Akhtar and Ali, many analysts concurred that Pakistan’s continued to the the Taliban which invoked was continued support support to Taliban (the (the support support which invoked huge huge criticism) criticism) was mainly driven by its strategic calculations about India. This context provides mainly driven by its strategic calculations about India. This context provides aa clear understating why why Pakistan clear understating Pakistan did did not not take take decisive decisive actions actions against against the the TaliTali ban, even though it was a US ally in the WoT. Later, the United States’ to ban, even though it was a US ally in the WoT. Later, the United States’ plan plan to pull out of Afghanistan as a result of the Doha Agreement provided an opporpull out of Afghanistan as a result of the Doha Agreement provided an oppor tunity to to secure with the the inclusion the Afghan tunity to Pakistan Pakistan to secure aa political political setup setup with inclusion of of the Afghan Taliban to protect its security interests while minimizing the Indian influence Taliban to protect its security interests while minimizing the Indian influence in in Afghanistan. while the the Taliban the Afghanistan. According According to to the the authors, authors, while Taliban has has already already taken taken the control will remain control of of the the country, country, Afghanistan Afghanistan will remain aa security security concern concern for for Pakistan Pakistan for the foreseeable future. for the foreseeable future. the triangular triangular relationship In In Chapter8, Chapter 8, Rizwan Rizwan Zeb Zeb examines examines the relationship of of China– ChinaPakistan–India from Thucydides’ idea. According to Athenian historian who Pakistan-India from Thucydides’ idea. According to Athenian historian who wrote wrote the History History of Peloponnesian, whenever threatened the ofthe the Peloponnesian, whenever an an existing existing great great power power felt felt threatened to be be displaced by an it would would result war. Zeb this logic to displaced by an emerging emerging one, one, it result in in aa war. Zeb linked linked this logic to the Sino-Indian and the Sino-US relations which are increasingly interlinked to the Sino-Indian and the Sino-US relations which are increasingly interlinked to to each He maintained that India per some, each other. other. He maintained that India was was an an emerging emerging regional regional and, and, as as per some, aa global the United United States global player. player. For For well well over over aa decade, decade, the States projected projected India India as as aa balancer to the rising Chinese power in the region. American strategic planners balancer to the rising Chinese power in the region. American strategic planners envisaged policing in in the envisaged aa role role for for India India in in monitoring monitoring and and policing the arc arc stretching stretching from from Aden, Singapore, to central Asia. Growing Indo-US strategic partnership Aden, Singapore, to central Asia. Growing Indo-US strategic partnership and and the the recent Pacific command recent renaming renaming of of the the Pacific command to to the the Indo-Pacific Indo-Pacific command command were were indiindi cations New Delhi’s cations of of Washington’s Washington’s confidence confidence in in New Delhi’s ability ability as as its its strategic strategic ally ally and and to do its bidding in and around the region. At the same time, the challenge to do its bidding in and around the region. At the same time, the challenge of of aa rising was getting for Washington rising China China was getting stronger stronger for Washington as as whenever whenever an an existing existing great great power feels threatened to be displaced by an emerging one, a war would power feels threatened to be displaced by an emerging one, a war would inevitainevita bly happen. this coming play bly happen. The The author author argued argued that that in in this coming clash, clash, South South Asia Asia would would play the most pivotal role. the most pivotal role. The posits that both the the United The author author posits that apparently apparently both United States States and and China China have have picked picked their partners in this theater: India was moving toward the United States, while their partners in this theater: India was moving toward the United States, while Pakistan established partnership with with China. PakiPakistan established an an “all-weather” “all-weather” partnership China. China China and and Paki stan’s proximity with with each with their stan’s geographic geographic proximity each other other as as well well as as with their common common enemy, enemy, India, the context India, was was their their advantage. advantage. In In the context of of recent recent Pulwama/Balakot Pulwama/Balakot crises crises between Pakistan and India and Doklam and Galwan between between Pakistan and India and Doklam and Galwan between India India and and China, China, Zeb questioned two-frontal war the Zeb questioned India’s India’s two-frontal war strategy. strategy. The The chapter chapter also also evaluated evaluated the impact of India’s problematic relations with other South Asian neighbors and impact of India’s problematic relations with other South Asian neighbors and analyzed that will will adversely analyzed how how that adversely affect affect India’s India’s regional regional strategy. strategy. India’s India’s absence absence from South Asia, according to Zeb, provided China an opportunity from South Asia, according to Zeb, provided China an opportunity to to engage engage and and

14 Ghulam Ali enhance enhance its its influence. influence. Zed Zed concluded concluded that that India’s India’s further further role role will will greatly greatly depend depend upon how it manages its ties with Pakistan, China, and other regional upon how it manages its ties with Pakistan, China, and other regional countries. countries. Iran third largest joint border. border. Iran is is Pakistan’s Pakistan’s third largest neighbor neighbor in in terms terms of of the the length length of of joint In spite of common historical, cultural, and religious bonds, the relations between In spite of common historical, cultural, and religious bonds, the relations between the faced many troubles. In Khurram Abbas focused on the two two have have faced many troubles. In Chapter9, Chapter 9, Khurram Abbas focused on recent recent political transformation in Iran and its impact on bilateral relations with Pakistan. political transformation in Iran and its impact on bilateral relations with Pakistan. After President Hassan Rouhani’s tenure After 7years 7 years of of President Hassan Rouhani’s tenure and and aa moderate moderate Parliament, Parliament, Iranian political landscape has changed recently. The 11th Parliamentary Iranian political landscape has changed recently. The 11th Parliamentary elections elections of Results were of Iran Iran were were held held on on February21, February 21, 2020. 2020. Results were surprising surprising as as conservatives conservatives achieved victory by by winning the moderates achieved aa landslide landslide victory winning 221 221 out out of of 290 290 seats, seats, while while the moderates could get only 30 seats. The election of Mohammad Ghalibaf as a Speaker could get only 30 seats. The election of Mohammad Ghalibaf as a Speaker of of the the Parliament denotes extraordinary influence of ultra-conservative faction in Parliament denotes extraordinary influence of ultra-conservative faction in the the newly Parliament committee. Pakistan’s relations newly elected elected Parliament committee. The The chapter chapter discusses discusses Pakistan’s relations with the conservative the issues with Iran Iran under under the conservative government government in in Tehran Tehran especially especially on on the issues of of bilateral security and regional geopolitical matrix. According to Abbas, conservabilateral security and regional geopolitical matrix. According to Abbas, conserva tives towards various bilateral tives have have historically historically maintained maintained an an inflexible inflexible attitude attitude towards various bilateral issues with Pakistan. Border management mechanisms, bilateral trade, issues with Pakistan. Border management mechanisms, bilateral trade, Afghan Afghan peace witnessed peace process, process, and and Pakistan–Gulf Pakistan-Gulf Cooperation Cooperation Council Council relations relations often often witnessed tough by the the conservative tough scrutiny scrutiny by conservative political political leadership leadership of of Iran. Iran. Abbas Abbas concluded concluded that the future of bilateral relationship will largely rely upon domestic politics of that the future of bilateral relationship will largely rely upon domestic politics of Iran as Islamabad’s eagerness to develop a cordial relationship with Tehran Iran as Islamabad’s eagerness to develop a cordial relationship with Tehran was was too be ignored. behavior of too strong strong to to be ignored. Therefore, Therefore, the the behavior of the the conservative conservative government government of Iran will be a stronger variable between bilateral relations two countries. of Iran will be a stronger variable between bilateral relations of of the the two countries. While through While history history suggested suggested that that conservatives conservatives were were good good at at making making enemies enemies through outrageous statements and supporting of religious groups in other countries outrageous statements and supporting of religious groups in other countries (Shi(Shi ite in Pakistan), that two two sides ite community community in Pakistan), diplomats diplomats and and scholars scholars were were optimistic optimistic that sides might be able to overcome to develop ties in the face might be able to overcome irritants irritants to develop good good ties in the face of of regional regional and besides mutual and global global changes. changes. According According to to Abbas, Abbas, besides mutual desires desires of of Islamabad Islamabad and and Tehran for good neighborly relations, Pakistan’s balanced role in Gulf–Iran Tehran for good neighborly relations, Pakistan’s balanced role in Gulf-Iran concon flict ties with with China which will flict and and Iran’s Iran’s deepening deepening ties China which will minimize minimize India’s India’s influence influence omen well for future ties. omen well for future ties. In Pakistan–US relationship In Chapter10, Chapter 10, Rabia Rabia Akhtar Akhtar has has examined examined Pakistan-US relationship which which she she termed as a unique experience of Pakistan’s foreign policy. This relationship has termed as a unique experience of Pakistan’s foreign policy. This relationship has centered foreign aid centered around around foreign aid and and economic economic sanctions, sanctions, with with strong strong narratives narratives of of mutual grievances and misunderstandings about each other’s motives mutual grievances and misunderstandings about each other’s motives and and inteninten tions. with the the United United States years tions. Pakistan’s Pakistan’s choice choice of of partnership partnership with States since since the the early early years of the Cold War led it to understand the inner workings of both the Republicans of the Cold War led it to understand the inner workings of both the Republicans and Democratic administrations. its fair fair share and the the Democratic administrations. The The United United States States also also had had its share of of frustrations in attempting to understand Pakistan in return. Rabia Akhtar used frustrations in attempting to understand Pakistan in return. Rabia Akhtar used historical to analyze historical lenses lenses to analyze the the relationship relationship and and divided divided her her chapter chapter into into different different phases according to the nature of the relationship. She charts the periods phases according to the nature of the relationship. She charts the periods of of mutual mutual affinity bilateral frustrations frustrations through post-Cold War post 9/11 affinity and and bilateral through the the post-Cold War period period to to the the post 9/11 period to understand understand if if the would be be aa prologue. prologue. This period to the past past would This is is particularly particularly imporimpor tant to assess foreign policy policy is tant to assess as as Pakistan’s Pakistan’s new new foreign is anchored anchored on on economic economic security. security. She found that contemporary challenges in Pakistan–US bilateral She found that contemporary challenges in Pakistan-US bilateral relations relations were were

Foreign of Contemporary Contemporary Pakistan 15 Foreign Policy Policy of Pakistan 15 not faced during the Cold bringnot entirely entirely different different than than those those faced during the Cold War. War. Islamabad Islamabad was was bring ing many ghosts from the past to this current relationship. She identified ing many ghosts from the past to this current relationship. She identified three three key the relationship. First was in Afghanikey challenges challenges in in the relationship. First was the the unfolding unfolding situation situation in Afghani stan the wake US withdrawal that stan especially especially in in the wake of of US withdrawal in in August2021. August 2021. She She cautioned cautioned that under the changing geopolitical environment, the United States should not view under the changing geopolitical environment, the United States should not view Pakistan from the foreign policy Pakistan from the same same lens lens of of Af-Pak, Af-Pak, aa neologism neologism the the US US foreign policy circles circles began to use in 2008 to designate Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single began to use in 2008 to designate Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater theater of of operations. is how balance its operations. The The second second challenge challenge is how Pakistan Pakistan would would balance its relationship relationship with the United with China China and and the United States. States. Akhtar Akhtar anticipated anticipated an an intensification intensification in in SinoSinoUS rivalry with its direct impact on Pakistan. The United States on record US rivalry with its direct impact on Pakistan. The United States on record raised raised its its concerns concerns on on the the BRI BRI and and CPEC. CPEC. She She argued argued that that Islamabad Islamabad should should reassure reassure to Washington that CPEC was not a zero-sum game– rather it would bring ecoto Washington that CPEC was not a zero-sum game - rather it would bring eco nomic nomic development development which which would would create create aa positive positive impact impact on on regional regional stability. stability. The the burgeoning burgeoning ties ties of The third third major major challenge challenge is is the of the the United United States States with with India. India. The United States is grooming India in the backdrop of Sino-US rivalry. The United States is grooming India in the backdrop of Sino-US rivalry. Rabia Rabia Akhtar Akhtar elaborated elaborated aa series series of of agreements agreements such such as as the the nuclear nuclear deal, deal, the the strategic strategic communication agreement, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation communication agreement, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement Agreement which highlighted the Indo-Pacific the United United which highlighted India’s India’s central central role role in in the Indo-Pacific strategy strategy of of the States. Under these agreements, India will get access to sophisticated US weapons States. Under these agreements, India will get access to sophisticated US weapons and technology. This will naturally perturb Pakistan. and defense defense technology. This will naturally perturb Pakistan. As As she she argued, argued, If U.S. continues be the the highest the world world and If the the U.S. continues to to be highest exporter exporter of of arms arms in in the and India India taking the second slot as world’s highest arms importer, the strategic taking the second slot as world’s highest arms importer, the strategic stability stability in fragile between between the in South South Asia Asia which which is is already already fragile the three three nuclear nuclear armed armed states states sharing disputed borders with each other [China, India and Pakistan], will sharing disputed borders with each other [China, India and Pakistan], will become more precarious. become more precarious. How and United States How and will will the the United States address address Pakistan’s Pakistan’s concerns concerns is is not not clear. clear. She She is is of of the view that new conversation between the United States and Pakistan has started the view that new conversation between the United States and Pakistan has started and there is is enough to discuss and that that there enough space space to discuss each each other’s other’s expectations expectations and and deliverdeliver ances, the rich their shared which allows to learn from ances, given given the rich history history of of their shared past past which allows them them to learn from what worked for both. If Pakistan plays its cards right, without compromising what worked for both. If Pakistan plays its cards right, without compromising on on its core foreign policy this relationship will surits core national national security security and and foreign policy interests, interests, this relationship will sur vive the tells that the US–Pakistan the vive the rough rough waters. waters. The The history history tells that the US-Pakistan relationship relationship has has the potential to come back with much more force and vigor than before. Therefore, potential to come back with much more force and vigor than before. Therefore, the past past will will definitely be the the prologue prologue for for this this uneasy uneasy but but essential the definitely be essential relationship. relationship. It It will only set the context if the right lessons are learned by both sides. will only set the context if the right lessons are learned by both sides. She She reminds reminds that even US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it will will remain that even after after the the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it remain an an important important player in player in South South Asia Asia region. region. Adeela Adeela Ahmed, Ahmed, in in Chapter11, Chapter 11, has has discussed discussed recent recent developments developments in in Pakistan– PakistanRussia (Soviet Union until 1991) relationship which were in troubles for the the most Russia (Soviet Union until 1991) relationship which were in troubles for most part of the Cold War. She argues that both the countries have given a fresh part of the Cold War. She argues that both the countries have given a fresh look look to their their bilateral bilateral relationship which is is now into aa new phase especially to relationship which now entering entering into new phase especially from the the 2010s. internal and been driving both sides from 2010s. In In fact, fact, internal and external external factors factors have have been driving both sides to come to each Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy to come closer closer to each other. other. Pakistan’s policy is is undergoing undergoing changes changes with with

16 Ghulam Ali a focus on economic, trade, and connectivity with regions. Likewise, Russia is searching for new allies and economic opportunities. This changing environment is bringing new opportunities of cooperation for Islamabad and Moscow such as coordination on the peace process in Afghanistan, economic and security dialogues, and an interaction at military and political levels. For Pakistan, Russia can potentially be an arms supplier in the wake of an unstable US–Pakistan relationship which is likely to witness further dip once the US objectives in Afghanistan are met. Russia intends to minimize the spillover of terrorism into its periphery, which could impact potential Russian economic projects in the region. Pakistan can play an important role to this end. The author argues that although the level of cooperation between Islamabad and Moscow in the existing geostrategic milieu is still fragile, however, various initiatives have been taken, and the ice has started to melt. She has highlighted various opportunities and made various recommendations including an emphasis on increased joint trade activities, building of the North–South Gas Pipeline projects, and cooperation on counterterrorism and security matters. The bilateral cooperation between Islamabad and Moscow will help in bringing stability and prosperity to the region besides serving their mutual interests. In Chapter12, Najimdeen Bakare has examined the European Union (EU)Pakistan relationship which stretched back to the 1960s. He argued that this equation has witnessed periods of oscillation, agreement, disagreement, negotiation, and compromise over the decades. In spite of long historical contacts, the existing literature on the EU–Pakistan relations primarily focused on how the EU became the largest donor as well as the trading partner of Pakistan. It also covered the nature of Islamabad’s cooperation with Brussel in the areas of democracy, peace and security, counterterrorism, development, governance, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. The author points out the scarcity of the literature pertaining to the dynamics of power relations between the EU and Pakistan, especially against the backdrop of EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan signed in June2019. The plan was considered as another watershed in a relationship that stretched back to the 1960s. As a result, the two sides agreed to hold the first meeting of the new EU–Pakistan Security Dialogue in 2021, including on the fight against terrorism.16 The author argues that the EU–Pakistan relationship does not portray a transactional diplomatic intercourse, given the imbalance of power and dependency contour. While the EU might apparently appear more influential than Pakistan, it does not discount the ability of Islamabad to influence Brussels. For the EU, its influence over Islamabad is ever more glaring and deeper, and for Islamabad, the relations draw it closer to the most powerful economic Union, having accessibility to the EU market, but at some cost. Islamabad has to fulfil the demands of the EU and trade-off some of its sovereign rights and integrity in order to achieve a greater good. Though not entirely like the CEE, yet, Islamabad had to initiate internal reforms, not because of its own volition, but upon the demand of a foreign entity. Najimdeen Bakare concludes that the EU–Pakistan relation is not truly transactional but is rather based on power relations predicated on compromise, persuasion, reward, and threat.

Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan 17

Notes Notes 1 Muhammad Muhammad Qasim Qasim Zaman, in Pakistan: History (Princeton: (Princeton: Princeton Univer 1 Zaman, Islam Islam in Pakistan: A AHistory Princeton University Press, sity Press, 2018). 2018). 2 At the the time time of August1947, Pakistan consisted two parts, East Paki2 At of its its creation creation in in August 1947, Pakistan consisted of of two parts, East Paki stan and and West West Pakistan. Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, 1971, East declared stan Pakistan. During During the the Indo-Pakistan war in East Pakistan Pakistan declared separation from from West West Pakistan Pakistan and and became became an an independent independent country, country, Bangladesh. separation Bangladesh. 3 Foreign Policy,” Survival 36, 3 Samina Samina Yasmeen, Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s Cautious Cautious Foreign Policy,” Survival 36, no. no. 22 (1994): (1994): 115; Khalid Sayeed, “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s Foreign Foreign Policy: of Pakistani Pakistani Fears Fears 115; Khalid Bin Bin Sayeed, Policy: An An Analysis Analysis of and Interests,” Interests,” Asian 4, no. (1964): 746. 746. and Asian Survey Survey 4, no. 33 (1964): 4 Pakistan’ made made Pakistan’s Pakistan’s claims the Bay Bengal and Asia pos pos4 ‘East ‘East Pakistan’ claims in in the Bay of of Bengal and in in Southeast Southeast Asia sible. The The separation separation of of East East Pakistan in 1971 1971 reduced reduced Pakistan’s geostrategic scope scope sible. Pakistan in Pakistan’s geostrategic to South South Asia alone. This chapter refers refers to geostrategic location location of of the the present-day present-day to Asia alone. This chapter to geostrategic Pakistan. Pakistan. 5 Ghulam Ghulam Ali, “China - Pakistan Cooperation in in the the Indian Indian Ocean,” Ocean,” Issues & 5 Ali, “China– Pakistan Maritime Maritime Cooperation Issues& Studies 55, no. (September 2019). Studies 55, no. 33 (September2019). 6 Ayub Khan, Foreign Affairs Affairs 38, 6 Mohammed Mohammed Ayub Khan, “Pakistan “Pakistan Perspective,” Perspective,” Foreign 38, no. no. 44 (July1960): (July 1960): 555. 555. 7 For For details details of of these these developments, developments, see see Ghulam Ghulam Ali, China-Pakistan Relations: His 7 Ali, China–Pakistan Relations: A AHistorical Analysis (Karachi: University Press, Press, 2017), (Karachi: Oxford Oxford University 2017), 34–8. 34-8. torical Analysis 8 Vladimir Vladimir Moskalenko, Moskalenko, “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s Foreign Foreign Policy,” 14, no. no. 33 (1974): (1974): 267. 8 Policy,” Asian Asian Survey Survey 14, 267. 9 For For aa comprehensive comprehensive study study of of the arms trade between the two countries countries from from its its start start 9 the arms trade between the two till recent, Ali, “China– Pakistan Conventional Arms Trade: An Appraisal Appraisal till recent, see, see, Ghulam Ghulam Ali, “China - Pakistan Conventional Arms Trade: An of Supplier’s Supplier’s and and Recipient’s Motives,” Pacific 35, no. no. 33 (2020). (2020). of Recipient’s Motives,” Pacific Focus Focus 35, 10 Dawn, 5, 1965, 1965, www.dawn.com/news/1173970. www.dawn.com/news/1173970. 10 Dawn, April April5, 11 Soviet–Pakistan Relations Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamies, Dynamies, 1947–92 11 Hafeez Hafeez Malik, Malik, Soviet-Pakistan and Post-Soviet 1947-92 (London: (London: Macmillan, 1994), 226. 226. Macmillan, 1994), 12 Harsh Harsh V. V. Pant, Pant, “The “The Pakistan Pakistan Thorn Thorn in in China–India–U.S. China-India-U.S. Relations,” The Washington Washington 12 Relations,” The Quarterly Quarterly 35, 35, no. no. 11 (2012). (2012). 13 John John K. K. Cooley, Cooley, Unholy Unholy Wars: Wars: Afghanistan, Terrorism, 13 Afghanistan, America America and and International International Terrorism, 3rd ed. ed. (London: (London: Pluto Pluto Press, Press, 2002). 3rd 2002). 14 For For an an excellent excellent account account of of the the details details of of the War and and the role of of these three 14 the Afghan Afghan War the role these three countries, see see ibid. ibid. countries, 15 The The US invasion in in Afghanistan post-9/11 uprooted Taliban. The The US-installed 15 US invasion Afghanistan post-9/11 uprooted Afghan Afghan Taliban. US-installed new administrations administrations in in Kabul Kabul did did not friendly views views toward Pakistan. India India took new not hold hold friendly toward Pakistan. took the advantage advantage of of the the situation situation and and made made aa bold bold reentry in Afghanistan. It spent spent about about the reentry in Afghanistan. It US$3 billion in in the the form form of of economic economic and and military military assistance, assistance, signed signed Agreement on US$3billion Agreement on Strategic Partnership in 2011, trained Afghan security Strategic Partnership in 2011, trained Afghan security personnel, personnel, and and provided provided small small arms including including attack attack helicopters. India also also sent sent paramilitary forces to to ‘protect’ ‘protect’ Indian arms helicopters. India paramilitary forces Indian citizens and and projects projects in in Afghanistan. See Ghulam Ghulam Ali, “China - Pakistan Cooperation citizens Afghanistan. See Ali, “China– Pakistan Cooperation on Afghanistan: Assessing Assessing Key Implementing Strategies,” Pacific on Afghanistan: Key Interests Interests and and Implementing Strategies,” The The Pacific Review (2020): 8. 8. Review (2020): 16 European European Union Union External External Action Service, Joint Joint Press Press Release, 4, 2020, 16 Action Service, Release, November November4, 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/88122/european-unionhttps://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/88122/european-unionpakistan-strategic-dialogue-5th-round-joint-press-release_en. pakistan-strategic-dialogue-5th-round-joint-press-release_en.

2 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

Introduction Located at the crossroads of Central Asia and South Asia, Pakistan occupies a central position in regional and global geopolitics. Bordering its nemesis, India, to the east, an unstable Afghanistan and a beleaguered Iran to the west, China to the north, and the Arabian Sea to the south, the country cannot elude the fallout of events taking place in its hood. Given unresolved territorial disputes, the irredentist proclivities of neighbors, and the role of extra-regional forces, Pakistan’s foreign policy direction and discourse have reflected and prioritized the country’s quest for security and survival. According to Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad Khan, “Pakistan’s foreign policy has been determined by its volatile geo-political environment and an exceptionally hostile neighbourhood, leaving it with inescapable compulsions of preserving its sovereign independence and territorial integrity.”1 It is noteworthy to state that while Pakistan’s geographical location is an asset, it has inextricably tied the country to events that are beyond its control. This structural reality, in effect, has inhibited Islamabad’s foreign policy choices, forcing it to think tactically and be reactive, instead of focusing on eking out strategic gains and being proactive. This phenomenon has meant that circ*mstances outside of its borders go on to determine the state of its relations with other countries, especially the United States. When cricket-legend-turned politician, Imran Khan, assumed office as the 22nd Prime Minister of Pakistan in August2018, this peculiar environment had given shape to four factors that complicated Pakistan’s foreign policy landscape. One was that the simmering, internecine war in Afghanistan had not only added to Pakistan’s security concerns and threats but also ruptured its relations with the United States, who saw the country purely through the prism of Afghanistan. Two, India’s unremitting violence and continued occupation of Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir (IIOJK) had regenerated Kashmiris’ struggle to get their right to self-determination. Unable to win over and cower the Kashmiris, India ramped up its tirade against Pakistan while also showing military belligerence to punish and coerce that country. Taken together, the events in Kabul and Kashmir were used to accuse Islamabad of fomenting terrorism in the region. Three, Pakistan’s growing strategic partnership with China, undergirded by the China–Pakistan DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-3

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 19 Economic Corridor (CPEC), brought Pakistan right in the middle of the Sino-Indo rivalry while also drawing U.S. attention to China’s geoeconomic juggernaut in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This implied that Islamabad had to contend with yet another dangerous dimension in its acrimonious relations with New Delhi. Also, Islamabad had to deal with a Washington that might look at it through a Beijing lens going forward. Four, the conflagrations between Riyadh and Tehran, and those within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), made it harder for Pakistan to balance its relations with the Muslim world. Walking a tightrope was a real challenge that the country faced, especially because of its reliance on oil, financial and diplomatic support, and remittances from its diaspora. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section delves into Khan’s views on Pakistan’s key foreign policy issues by sifting through his pre-election writings, speeches, interviews, his party’s 2018 manifesto, and his victory speech. The second section deals with Pakistan’s relations with India and its fight for Kashmir. The third section evaluates Pakistan’s ties with the United States and Afghanistan. The fourth examines Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China. The fifth and final section appraises the instruments of articulation, institutional arrangements, and other outreach initiatives.

Imran Khan: Different Background, Different Outlook Born and raised in Lahore, Imran Khan’s background is very dissimilar to that of any other Pakistani politician.2 After successfully ending his legendary 21-yearlong cricket career as a World-Cup-winning captain, Khan entered the world of philanthropy and education, establishing a world-class cancer hospital3 for the needy and a university near his hometown.4 Khan did not belong to a feudal family and was not part of the established, entrenched political dynasties that had ruled Pakistan. In fact, Khan entered into politics to fight what he called a political mafia. In his book, Pakistan: APersonal History, Imran Khan writes as to what compelled him to join politics. Calling both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif corrupt, he said that the only route to challenge the old political order was for him to formally join politics.5 His views on the political leadership in the country also affected his thinking on foreign policy. Acareful analysis of Khan’s thoughts helps establish a connection between how he viewed Pakistan’s sovereignty, Pakistan–U.S. relations, and the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Commenting on what he called the capitulation of the Pakistani leadership, due to the pressure of the United States, he writes: Pakistan had recognized the Taliban regime since 1996; the alacrity with which Musharraf capitulated amazed even Washington, dismayed the Pakistani military and shocked the public. He took us into the “war on terror” when no Pakistani had been involved in the 9/11 attacks and Al-Qaeda was a CIA-trained militant group based in Afghanistan, and there were no militant Taliban in Pakistan. He also gave US intelligence agencies a free hand to pick up any Pakistani citizen or foreigner suspected of terrorism.6

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Khan been vociferous vociferous in in calling Khan had had been calling out out Washington Washington and and the the lopsided lopsided nature nature of of Pak–U.S. relations. Talking about how Washington humiliated and distrusted Pak-U.S. relations. Talking about how Washington humiliated and distrusted Islamabad, the latter’s war on terror, in to Islamabad, despite despite the latter’s sacrifices sacrifices in in the the war on terror, in an an interview interview to CNN, Khan said Pakistan must dissociate from a U.S.-led war on terror and reject CNN, Khan said Pakistan must dissociate from a U.S.-led war on terror and reject aid the United United States. BBC HARD Khan flayed aid from from the States.77 In In an an appearance appearance in in BBC HARD talk, talk, Khan flayed the United States for conducting airstrikes in Abbottabad that killed Bin the United States for conducting airstrikes in Abbottabad that killed Osama Osama Bin Laden, terming the act as an indication of how Washington disrespected IslamaLaden, terming the act as an indication of how Washington disrespected Islama bad. “Does the Pakistani bad. “Does the Pakistani government government not not have have any any semblance semblance of of sovereignty,” sovereignty,” questioned Khan? He vowed to fight the war on terror if he were become the questioned Khan? He vowed to fight the war on terror if he were to to become the Prime Minister, without being perceived as a lackey of the United States. Prime Minister, without being perceived as a lackey of the United States.88 In Khan maintained unfair the In an an interview interview to to The The Guardian Guardian in in 2011, 2011, Khan maintained how how unfair the United States had been to Pakistan. He said: “They’re talking about a country United States had been to Pakistan. He said: “They’re talking about a country in in which people have to do with us. which 35,000 35,000 people have died died during during aa war war that that had had nothing nothing to do with us. Ours Ours is the only in history that keeps bombed, through is perhaps perhaps the only country country in history that keeps getting getting bombed, through drone drone 9 attacks, by our ally.” Lambasting successive Pakistani governments for not attacks, by our ally.”9 Lambasting successive Pakistani governments for not enaena bling Pakistan to stand Khan said: bling Pakistan to stand on on its its own, own, Khan said: According the government been According to to the government economic economic survey survey in in Pakistan, Pakistan, $70bn $70bn has has been lost to the economy because of this war. Total aid has been barely $20bn. lost to the economy because of this war. Total aid has been barely $20bn. Aid Aid has to the people have has gone gone to the ruling ruling elite, elite, while while the the people have lost lost $70bn. $70bn. We We have have lost lost 35,000 be said be complicit. 35,000 lives lives and and as as many many maimed– maimed - and and then then to to be said to to be complicit. The The 10 shame shame of of it! it!10 Khan had been and veheKhan had been and still still is is aa staunch staunch critic critic of of U.S. U.S. war war in in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, vehe mently maintaining that there is no military solution to the Afghan imbroglio. mently maintaining that there is no military solution to the Afghan imbroglio. In In his with U.S. U.S. lawmakers U.S. think think tanks, tanks, Khan his conversations conversations with lawmakers and and U.S. Khan explained explained how how little the United United States that region, that was little the States understood understood the the history history of of that region, something something that was 11 one of the reasons why its strategy was faulty. Addressing the then U.S. Presione of the reasons why its strategy was faulty.11 Addressing the then U.S. Presi dent, in Forbes, Khan argued for dialogue dent, Barack Barack Obama, Obama, in in aa 2009 2009 article article in Forbes, Khan argued for dialogue with with militants in Afghanistan. He contended: militants in Afghanistan. He contended: The U.S. administration that there The new new U.S. administration should should have have no no doubt doubt that there is is no no military military solution in Afghanistan. As more innocent Pushtuns are killed, more solution in Afghanistan. As more innocent Pushtuns are killed, more space space is being an is created created for for new new Taliban Taliban and and even even Al-Qaida Al-Qaida recruits– recruits - revenge revenge being an integral the Pushtun integral part part of of the Pushtun character. character. So, So, as as with with Iraq, Iraq, the the U.S. U.S. should should give give aa time table for from Afghanistan NATO and U.S. time table for withdrawal withdrawal from Afghanistan and and replace replace NATO and U.S. 12 forces with U.N. troops during the interim period. forces with U.N. troops during the interim period.12 In Khan called for aa reappraisal In the the same same article, article, Khan called for reappraisal of of Washington’s Washington’s policy policy toward toward Islamabad. He cautioned President Obama against repeating his Islamabad. He cautioned President Obama against repeating his predecessor’s predecessor’s “do to make “do more” more” mantra mantra while while advising advising Washington Washington to make realistic, realistic, doable doable asks asks of of 13 Islamabad. Islamabad.13 The Pakistan–U.S. relations, U.S. war The gist gist of of Khan’s Khan’s analyses analyses of of Pakistan-U.S. relations, U.S. war in in AfghaniAfghani stan, and Pakistan’s engagements with the United States could be summarized stan, and Pakistan’s engagements with the United States could be summarized in ties needed in three three points. points. One, One, the the nature nature of of Islamabad–Washington Islamabad-Washington ties needed aa change. change.

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 21 Two, Pakistan must not compromise on its sovereignty. Three, terrorism and radicalization in this region have emanated from U.S. muscular policy in Afghanistan. It is noteworthy to state that Khan was fiercely berated for ostensibly being soft on the Taliban. Analysts have also criticized his views on the presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. U.S. scholar, Daniel S. Markey, in his book No Exit from Pakistan, critiques Khan’s refrain that links Islamabad’s security troubles with Washington’s continued deployment of troops in Afghanistan. He writes: “Imran Khan and his fellow travelers suffer from wishful thinking when they suggest that an American military withdrawal from the region would in itself bring a quick end to Pakistan’s security troubles.”14 After this backgrounder, it is important to assess how Khan’s takes on these issues were expressed through his party’s 2018 manifesto and his victory speech. The manifesto of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was a 61-page document released before the 2018 general election that laid out Khan’s vision and plan of action on a full spectrum of issues. An elaborate set of ideals, principles, and priorities was presented in the manifesto. Lamenting the inability to leverage the country’s geostrategic location, the manifesto noted that “over the years we (Pakistani leaders) have allowed this to become a source of weakness and exploitation especially by Extra Regional Powers.”15 The manifesto called for course correction in this regard while stressing that “PTI’s guiding principles will be of reciprocity, mutual interests and international norms that will govern Pakistan’s relations at the bilateral and multilateral levels.”16 All this resonated with Khan’s emphasis on how Pakistan had been hard done by in its relations with powerful global actors, especially the United States. The manifesto articulated, in clear terms, Khan’s desire to reset Pak–U.S. relations. According to the manifesto:” With the United States, reciprocity and mutuality of interest will be the determinants of our relationship.”17 Interestingly, the manifesto made no mention of the situation in Afghanistan, which lies at the heart of Pakistan–United States. relations, and a subject that elicited Khan’s attention since the start of the war on terror. The need to recalibrate Islamabad–Washington relations, as envisaged by Khan in his writings, speeches, and party’s manifesto, was reiterated by him in his victory speech. Accentuating the unequal and uneven trajectory of Pak–U.S. relations, Khan said: With the US, we want to have a mutually beneficial relationship... up until now, that has been one way, the US thinks it gives us aid to fight their war... we want both countries to benefit, we want a balanced relationship.18 Linked to that were Khan’s enunciations on Afghanistan, and how Pakistan, under him, would leave no stone unturned to achieve lasting peace in that country.19 The foregoing discussion shows a great degree of consistency in Khan’s viewpoint on Pak–U.S. relations and the Afghan conundrum. It also indicates that, with Khan at the helm, Islamabad would have likely engaged with Washington in a different manner altogether.

22 Syed Ali Zia Jaffery In a bid to fully understand Khan’s drift on foreign policy, it is imperative to scrutinize how he thought about Pakistan’s main adversary, India, and its strategic partner, China. By virtue of being a cricket star, Khan was a household name in India. Also, his visits to India garnered attention of the Indian press. Before becoming the Prime Minister, Khan appeared in television interviews and spoke at conferences, stressing the benefits of peace and the costs of continued acrimony. Terming the Kashmir dispute as the core issue between the two countries, Khan highlighted how resolving that was critical to creating an environment in which both countries could prosper and fight common threats. In his keynote address at the 2013 Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, Khan said that the biggest challenge for India and Pakistan was taking millions out of poverty.20 In an interview with Karan Thapar in 2015, Khan welcomed the resumption of the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, underscoring why peace between the two neighbors was critical to eradicating poverty. He added that all Indo-Pak tensions sprout from the Kashmir conflict.21 To put it succinctly, for Khan, peace and prosperity in the region were dependent on conflict-resolution between New Delhi and Islamabad. These thoughts percolated in PTI’s 2018 manifesto. Upfront, the manifesto dubbed the resolution of the Kashmir issue as one of the country’s vital interests. India was mentioned in the context of improving relations by adopting a conflict-resolution approach.22 Predictably, Khan was quick to offer a peace overture to India, after winning the 2018 election. It is noteworthy to state that Khan dedicated a major portion of his post-election speech to discussing peace with India. He assured that if India took one step toward peace, Pakistan will take two steps in that direction.23 With a singular focus on uprooting poverty and fighting multiple, dangerous non-traditional security threats, it was reasonable to expect that Khan would vigorously try to resuscitate a peace process with India. As for China, Khan’s line of thinking revolved around his appreciation of how it took millions of people out of poverty and put a lid on corruption. Besides, the thrust of opinions on China pertained to how he analyzed the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The stand of his party on CPEC reflected cautious optimism. While Khan’s party was supportive of CPEC as a general concept, it was apprehensive about how it was being implemented.24 Khan was skeptical about the ways in which the PML-N was taking CPEC forward, questioning the level of alleged corruption associated with the mega-project.25 Doubts over the trajectory of CPEC fed into PTI’s manifesto, for the document laid bare how the party intends to turn it into a real game-changer. While terming CPEC as a golden opportunity, the manifesto laid emphasis on creating a “solid and transparent foundation for a truly empowering corridor with two-way linkages.”26 The manifesto attributed Pakistan drawing less benefits from the project to insufficient transfer of knowledge and capabilities, lesser partnerships with local businesses, and “our(Pakistan’s) high dependence on imports of goods and services from China.” It is against this backdrop that the manifesto outlined the need for involving Pakistani businesses in CPEC by weaving together partnerships and learning from China.27

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 23 The manifesto categorically mentioned the significance of bolstering the strategic bonhomie with China. According to the manifesto, “PTI’s focus will be on moves to expand the existing strategic partnership with China.”28 That China was the first country Khan talked about in his victory speech is emblematic of where that country is placed in the pecking order for Khan. In his victory speech, Khan evinced a willingness to take Sino-Pak ties to the next level. Terming CPEC as a conduit for Pakistan’s economic recovery, Khan again committed himself to learning from the Chinese model of poverty-alleviation and anti-corruption.29 Broadly, Khan’s discourse on Pakistan’s relations with key countries correctly and lucidly identified some of the glaring challenges facing Pakistan with respect to its dealings with them. Going by pre-election positioning of Khan and his party, three overarching anchors and objectives come to the fore: ensuring sovereignty, enhancing economic security, and advancing the case for dispute resolution. Taken together, this set of factors has determined and shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy since 2018. The nature of Pakistan’s relations with other countries since 2018 has been predicated on these three objectives. Relations with countries that have and are likely to impede these end-goals, have either deteriorated, or been marred by tensions. Ties with countries that offered help on these counts have solidified. The ensuing sections will parse Pakistan’s foreign relations with India, the United States, Afghanistan, and China in light of these broad, core aims and concerns.

Pakistan, India, and the Kashmir Issue: AFlashpoint Pakistan’s relations with India, halfway into Imran Khan’s premiership, have deteriorated precipitously. Aglimmer of hope that might have stemmed from Imran Khan’s star value in India, his offer for dialogue, a gift from the Indian cricket team,30 Indian Prime Minister’s call31, and a letter32 to Khan ended in no time. Ties between the two countries are at an all-time low. Relations have plummeted not only because the two countries were embroiled in a deadly, nuclear-tinged crisis in 201933 but also due to India’s revocation of Articles 370 and 35-A,34 coupled with ramped up violence in Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir (IIOJK)35 and threats to capture Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.36 The only silver lining in the midst of tensions was the inauguration of the Kartarpur Corridor for Indian Sikhs.37 That said, in February2021, India and Pakistan agreed to uphold the 2003 ceasefire agreement on the Line of Control (LoC).38 The announcement was followed by speculations about a backchannel dialogue-led thaw between the two countries.39 However, relations between the two countries have been marked by hostile rhetoric. Pakistan has vehemently called out India for its annexation of, and atrocities in, IIOJK. Led by Khan himself, Pakistan has tasked itself with exposing India, globally.40 While keeping the world abreast of India’s sledgehammering in Kashmir, Pakistan has ramped up efforts to ascribe instability in the region to what it calls India’s intransigence, war-mongering, and revisionist tendencies. Islamabad has time and again reminded the world about the catastrophic consequences of militarized, jingoistic, and religious nationalism in a nuclearized environment. In November2020, the Government of Pakistan released a dossier, which entailed

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aa plethora plethora of terrorism in Pakistan.41 Prime Prime of evidence evidence of of India’s India’s direct direct espousal espousal of of terrorism in Pakistan.41 Minister Khan has also gone public in outlining India’s involvement in stoking Minister Khan has also gone public in outlining India’s involvement in stoking sectarian Pakistan.42 Islamabad warned the sectarian tensions tensions in in Pakistan.42 Islamabad has has also also warned the world world that that New New Delhi, ensnared in domestic crises and a border standoff with Beijing, will Delhi, ensnared in domestic crises and a border standoff with Beijing, will launch launch aa false-flag pin the blame on Pakistan.43 In to questions false-flag attack attack and and pin the blame on Pakistan.43 In response response to questions and and concerns about the highly touted backchannel diplomacy, Khan has concerns about the highly touted backchannel diplomacy, Khan has assured assured mulmul tiple that improving improving economic with India it tiple audiences audiences that economic relations relations with India at at aa time time when when it continues with its current maximalist position on Kashmir is akin to betraying continues with its current maximalist position on Kashmir is akin to betraying Pakistan has with India the Kashmiris.44 Also, the Kashmiris.44 Also, Pakistan has made made talks talks with India contingent contingent upon upon the the latter Kashmir.45 From From the the conciliatory latter reversing reversing its its August5 August 5 decisions decisions on on Kashmir.45 conciliatory tone tone in victory speech to an tone and Khan’s refrain in his his victory speech to an aggressive aggressive tone and tenor tenor on on India, India, Khan’s refrain on on India has changed drastically. Thus, it is important to understand how far the three three India has changed drastically. Thus, it is important to understand how far the principal this shift. preprincipal objectives objectives gleaned gleaned earlier earlier have have influenced influenced this shift. As As mentioned mentioned pre viously, a country that challenged and threatened Islamabad’s sovereignty, subviously, a country that challenged and threatened Islamabad’s sovereignty, sub verted verted its its economic economic security, security, and and dented dented the the prospect prospect of of conflict-resolution conflict-resolution has has fractured its ties with the latter. The question that arises is fractured its ties with the latter. The question that arises is whether whether or or not not India India posed formidable threat threat to to perpetuate its sovereignty, posed aa formidable to Pakistan’s Pakistan’s endeavors endeavors to perpetuate its sovereignty, increase its economic security, and resolve disputes. increase its economic security, and resolve disputes. Since breached Pakistan’s Pakistan’s territorial Since 2018, 2018, India India has has directly directly breached territorial integrity integrity and and abetabet ted subconventional activities in Pakistan while threatening to invade and ted subconventional activities in Pakistan while threatening to invade and capture capture territories the control territories under under the control of of Pakistan. Pakistan. Warning Warning India India after after an an attack attack on on Indian Indian paramilitary forces in Pulwama, IIOJK, Khan said Pakistan will retaliate, paramilitary forces in Pulwama, IIOJK, Khan said Pakistan will retaliate, if if India India 46 aggresses was aa red that could be crossed. However, aggresses against against it, it, for for it it was red line line that could not not be crossed.46 However, paying inside mainland paying little little heed, heed, India India launched launched airstrikes airstrikes inside mainland Pakistan. Pakistan. Addressing Addressing the nation after Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes conducted by Khan the nation after Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes conducted by its its air air force, force, Khan said there was no other option for a sovereign country than responding to India’s said there was no other option for a sovereign country than responding to India’s belligerence.47 Ever Pulwama–Balakot crisis belligerence.47 Ever since since the the Pulwama-Balakot crisis has has happened, happened, Pakistan, Pakistan, while acknowledging that war is not the panacea for Kashmir, while acknowledging that war is not the panacea for Kashmir, has has categorically categorically 48 stated that it will leave unturned to to defend territorial integrity. Pakistated that it will leave no no stone stone unturned defend its its territorial integrity.48 Paki stan has, understandably so, matched India’s war hysteria with vows to give stan has, understandably so, matched India’s war hysteria with vows to give the the latter befitting response, the push latter aa befitting response, if if the push comes comes to to shove. shove. India been found violating Pakistan’s Pakistan’s sovereignty through its India has has been found guilty guilty of of violating sovereignty through its outoutand-out succor to anti-Pakistan militants. As revealed in the dossier released by and-out succor to anti-Pakistan militants. As revealed in the dossier released by the Government of Pakistan, India has funded, trained, and armed outfits that have the Government of Pakistan, India has funded, trained, and armed outfits that have wreaked inside Pakistan. per the wreaked havoc havoc inside Pakistan. As As per the dossier, dossier, Indian Indian intelligence intelligence agencies agencies 49 were terrorists camps, were operating were running running 87 87 terrorists camps, 66 66 of of which which were operating out out of ofAfghanistan. Afghanistan.49 India’s patronage and sponsorship of terrorism against Pakistan has hardened the India’s patronage and sponsorship of terrorism against Pakistan has hardened the latter’s position. Khan Khan has latter’s position. has spearheaded spearheaded Pakistan’s Pakistan’s charge charge against against India-funded India-funded terrorism, demanding of the international community to hold to account for terrorism, demanding of the international community to hold India India to account for 50 its subversive activities aimed at destabilizing Pakistan. Islamabad has seemits subversive activities aimed at destabilizing Pakistan.50 Islamabad has seem ingly be set ingly convinced convinced itself itself that that the the record record on on terrorism terrorism needs needs to to be set straight. straight. PakiPaki stan’s officialdom has intensified its battle to swing the narrative terrorism, stan’s officialdom has intensified its battle to swing the narrative on on terrorism, 51 which favor of Thus, that India’s to which is is skewed skewed in in favor of India. India.51 Thus, it it is is quite quite clear clear that India’s attempts attempts to erode Pakistan’s sovereignty have significantly shaped the latter’s change of tack erode Pakistan’s sovereignty have significantly shaped the latter’s change of tack as the former former is as far far as as dealing dealing with with the is concerned. concerned.

Pakistan’ Under Imran 25 Pakistan’ss Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Under Imran Khan Khan 25 Pakistani New Delhi problem in broader Pakistani officials officials have have framed framed Islamabad’s Islamabad’s New Delhi problem in the the broader context of economic security. Senior Pakistani government officials have context of economic security. Senior Pakistani government officials have time time and that, with with India becoming aa rogue Pakistan’s ability and again again said said that, India fast fast becoming rogue state, state, Pakistan’s ability to to obtain become aa fulcrum fulcrum of obtain higher higher levels levels of of economic economic security security and and become of connectivity connectivity 52 is In to that, Pakistan has is greatly greatly attenuated. attenuated.52 In addition addition to that, Pakistan has reiterated reiterated how how India India is is 53 bent on the black black list Financial Action bent on pushing pushing it it in in the list of of the the Financial Action Task Task Force Force (FATF), (FATF),53 something that was corroborated when India’s Minister for External Affairs, Subsomething that was corroborated when India’s Minister for External Affairs, Subrahmanyam the very very body body rahmanyam Jaishankar, Jaishankar, admitted admitted to to having having played played aa major major role role in in the 54 Besides, India’s discomfiture with CPEC has translated into against Pakistan. against Pakistan.54 Besides, India’s discomfiture with CPEC has translated into an an economic threat for for Pakistan. by economic security security threat Pakistan. The The comprehensive comprehensive dossier dossier made made public public by 55 Pakistan, with India’s amply that Pakistan, coupled coupled with India’s outright outright opposition opposition of of CPEC, CPEC,55 amply testifies testifies that India is the primary threat to CPEC. That Pakistan attaches great importance to India is the primary threat to CPEC. That Pakistan attaches great importance to CPEC and its strong, deep ties with China are a reflection of the stakes involved. CPEC and its strong, deep ties with China are a reflection of the stakes involved. This implies that that Pakistan will be be willing the costs This implies Pakistan will willing to to increase increase the costs for for India India should should it it seriously make efforts to derail CPEC. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that, New seriously make efforts to derail CPEC. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that, New Delhi presents aa dangerous threats to Delhi presents dangerous package package of of threats to Islamabad’s Islamabad’s economic economic security, security, forcing the to talk to the former. forcing the latter latter to talk tough tough to the former. As previously, Khan, Khan, much predecessors, considers the As mentioned mentioned previously, much like like his his predecessors, considers the resolution of the Kashmir issue indispensable to peace and stability in the region resolution of the Kashmir issue indispensable to peace and stability in the region and beyond. Before Before and the election, Khan had and beyond. and after after winning winning the election, Khan had stressed stressed how how South South Asia’s development is tied to the amicable resolution of the decades-long KashAsia’s development is tied to the amicable resolution of the decades-long Kash mir Kashmir issue was and is the the make break for for mir dispute. dispute. In In other other words, words, the the Kashmir issue was and is make or or break Indo-Pak ties. India’s unilateral, illegal revocation of Articles 370 and 35-A was Indo-Pak ties. India’s unilateral, illegal revocation of Articles 370 and 35-A was aa blatant blatant violation violation of United Nations Nations Security Resolutions on of not not only only United Security Council Council Resolutions on Kashmir but also was against the spirit of the Simla Agreement signed between Kashmir but also was against the spirit of the Simla Agreement signed between India Pakistan in this, coupled with India’s India and and Pakistan in 1972. 1972. All All this, coupled with India’s obduracy obduracy in in calling calling Kashmir its internal affair, has shrunk space for dialogue. Abrutal military Kashmir its internal affair, has shrunk space for dialogue. A brutal military siege, siege, under Kashmiris are back and under which which Kashmiris are wilting, wilting, has has compelled compelled Pakistan Pakistan to to step step back and put put certain that for to certain conditions conditions in in front front of of India. India. Pakistani Pakistani officials officials have have said said that for talks talks to resume, India must lift the military siege in IIOJK and reverse domicile laws that resume, India must lift the military siege in IIOJK and reverse domicile laws that 56 are the demography are changing changing the demography of of Kashmir. Kashmir.56 In light of all this, Pakistan’s firmness in In light of all this, Pakistan’s firmness in dealing dealing with with its its eastern eastern neighbor neighbor can can be ascribed to the latter’s deliberate attacks on the country’s sovereignty be ascribed to the latter’s deliberate attacks on the country’s sovereignty and and ecoeco nomic the constant Kashmir dispute, nomic security security and and the constant rejection rejection of of resolving resolving the the Kashmir dispute, as as enshrined in the UN Charter. Analysts and experts have, however, warned Pakienshrined in the UN Charter. Analysts and experts have, however, warned Paki stan incorrectly. Former Former Pakistani stan against against giving giving mixed mixed signals signals and and reading reading India India incorrectly. Pakistani envoy to the United Nations, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Maleeha envoy to the United Nations, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Maleeha Lodhi argues that, “Pakistan must maintain its red lines on its principled Lodhi argues that, “Pakistan must maintain its red lines on its principled position position on that Delhi’s Delhi’s expectation on Kashmir Kashmir especially especially as as Indian Indian media media reports reports suggest suggest that expectation is is for Pakistan to cease the illegal Kashmir.”57 for Pakistan to cease insisting insisting on on reversal reversal of of the illegal annexation annexation of of Kashmir.”57 The Khan government’s been criticized by keen keen Indo-Pak The Khan government’s Kashmir Kashmir policy policy has has also also been criticized by Indo-Pak watchers, to include former officials. In his book entitled Hostility, former Pakiwatchers, to include former officials. In his book entitled Hostility, former Paki stani writes: “Simply put, the stani High High Commissioner Commissioner to to India, India, Abdul Abdul Basit, Basit, writes: “Simply put, the report report card the PTI PTI government under Imran Khan is poor. card of of the government on on Kashmir Kashmir under Imran Khan is dismayingly dismayingly poor. 58 Their failures on Kashmir will years to However, Their failures on Kashmir will haunt haunt Imran Imran Khan Khan for for years to come.” come.”58 However,

26 Syed Ali Zia Jaffery as identified earlier, hostility and recalcitrance continue to plague Indo-Pak relations. With the aforementioned factors affecting and shaping Pakistan’s India policy, it is difficult to witness a thaw between the two neighbors going forward.

Partners in Peace, Not War: Islamabad, Washington, and Kabul Relations with Afghanistan and the United States have been accorded priority status by the Khan government. The common agenda item that has guided Islamabad’s bilateral relations with Kabul and Washington is the Afghan peace process. With the United States, the Khan government has engaged on three broad issues: the Afghan peace process, trade, and the Kashmir issue. With Afghanistan, the Khan government has focused on the facilitation of trade and connectivity, border security and counterterrorism, and the Afghan peace process. Let’s succinctly look at the trajectories of these all-important relations that directly affect Pakistan’s fundamental interests. The on-again-off-again Pak–U.S. relations have seen visible improvements. Since 2018, they have been marked by interactions at the highest levels. After indirectly sparring on Twitter over Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror, erstwhile U.S. President, Donald Trump, and Khan developed a friendly, cordial link with each other. Trump and Khan had direct, candid conversations on six occasions that included three in-person meetings.59 While both countries committed themselves to increasing economic relations, discussions were geared toward keeping the Afghan peace process on track. As a facilitator of direct negotiations between Washington and the Afghan Taliban, Islamabad’s role in concluding the Doha agreement was instrumental, to say the least. Contacts between Khan and Trump were followed by frequent exchange of views and close coordination between civil and military interlocutors from both sides. The stand around which Pakistan pivoted its conversations with the United States was how continued violence in Afghanistan is an anathema to peace, stability, and the economic well-being of the region.60 Pakistan, thus, used the economic security lens to persuade the United States and other parties to take concrete steps toward peace in Afghanistan. The same framework was used by Khan to seek Washington’s help in resolving the Kashmir imbroglio.61 How did the United States respond to Pakistan’s asks and redlines? The United States did not, directly or indirectly, threaten Pakistan’s sovereignty. That the United States has not carried out a drone strike inside Pakistan since 2018 is reflective of its acknowledgement of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty.62 Additionally, by designating the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), the U.S. stamped on Pakistan’s sovereign right to confront the separatist group.63 All this is a welcome change from the recent past, when the United States through numerous drone attacks, the military operation in Abbottabad, the Raymond Davis saga,64 and the Salala incident, which resulted in the deaths of 26 Pakistani troops,65 derided the sacrosanctity of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Due to all that, relations were hit by an ever-widening trust-deficit. With

Pakistan’ Under Imran 27 Pakistan’ss Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Under Imran Khan Khan 27 the before, much the United United States States respecting respecting Pakistan’s Pakistan’s sovereignty sovereignty more more than than it it did did before, much of the suspicion has dissipated, making way for mending fences. of the suspicion has dissipated, making way for mending fences. In with the the United In its its conversations conversations with United States, States, Pakistan Pakistan has has increasingly increasingly stressed stressed the need for changing the nature of Pak–-U.S. relations from the need for changing the nature of Pak--U.S. relations from aa security-centric security-centric 66 one to one by trade trade and In one to one that that is is driven driven by and investment. investment.66 In his his congratulatory congratulatory tweet tweet addressing U.S. President Joe Biden, Khan expressed his desire addressing U.S. President Joe Biden, Khan expressed his desire to to solidify solidify Pak– PakU.S. relations trade and U.S. relations through through trade and economic economic engagement, engagement, something something that that he he had had accentuated Post.67 Outlining the contours accentuated in in his his 2020 2020 article article in in The The Washington Washington Post.61 Outlining the contours of vision, Khan wrote that Pakistan wants wants to prosof his his vision, Khan wrote that Pakistan to achieve achieve development development and and pros perity through connectivity and economic diplomacy. He added that discussions perity through connectivity and economic diplomacy. He added that discussions with Finance Corporation with “the “the U.S. U.S. International International Development Development Finance Corporation on on these these issues issues 68 That Pakistan received a positive response from the have been encouraging.” have been encouraging.”68 That Pakistan received a positive response from the United trade is the fact that, in the past past 2years, United States States on on shoring shoring up up trade is indicative indicative of of the fact that, in the 2 years, the improving its its economic the latter latter has has not not discredited discredited Pakistan’s Pakistan’s insistence insistence on on improving economic security profile. Islamabad, however, snubbed the United States, when security profile. Islamabad, however, snubbed the United States, when it it criticized criticized 69 the the cornerstone cornerstone of of economic economic security, security, CPEC. CPEC.69 In between India Pakistan, In terms terms of of conflict-resolution conflict-resolution in in Afghanistan Afghanistan and and between India and and Pakistan, the United States has extended cooperation to Pakistan. By agreeing use aa the United States has extended cooperation to Pakistan. By agreeing to to use Pakistan-facilitated reconciliation process to bring about an end to the destructive Pakistan-facilitated reconciliation process to bring about an end to the destructive war the United the mistrust between war in in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, the United States States considerably considerably lessened lessened the mistrust between the two countries. Tensions in Pak–U.S. relations, over the past decade or the two countries. Tensions in Pak-U.S. relations, over the past decade or so, so, had had stemmed from disagreement and bickering over how to tackle the conundrum in stemmed from disagreement and bickering over how to tackle the conundrum in Afghanistan. This positive turn has brought back a degree of calmness into Pak– Afghanistan. This positive turn has brought back a degree of calmness into PakU.S. ties have turnaround, they U.S. engagements. engagements. Though Though ties have not not seen seen aa dramatic dramatic turnaround, they have have not hit rock bottom. This is primarily because both countries are more not hit rock bottom. This is primarily because both countries are more or or less less on on the page when to terminating terminating the the war war in than the same same page when it it comes comes to in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Other Other than getting buy-in on Pakistan has, getting aa U.S. U.S. buy-in on the the Afghan Afghan peace peace process, process, Pakistan has, despite despite WashWash ington’s partnership with been able to garner ington’s strategic strategic partnership with New New Delhi, Delhi, been able to garner U.S. U.S. attention attention on the boiling boiling situation U.S. President, on the situation in in IIOJK. IIOJK. Former Former U.S. President, in in his his conversations conversations with with Khan, offered to mediate between India and Pakistan to put out fires in Kashmir. Khan, offered to mediate between India and Pakistan to put out fires in Kashmir. Ties with the the United United States would not be wrong wrong Ties with States have have steadily steadily ameliorated. ameliorated. It It would not be to credit this to Washington respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty, understanding to credit this to Washington respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty, understanding the the vitality vitality of of economic economic security, security, and and helping helping in in resolving resolving conflicts. conflicts. That That said, said, with with Islamabad Islamabad looking looking to to fundamentally fundamentally reset reset the the entire entire gamut gamut of of its its ties ties with with WashWash ington, it would take serious exceptions to the Indo-U.S. strategic embrace, ington, it would take serious exceptions to the Indo-U.S. strategic embrace, if if it, it, in any manner, impinges on its sovereignty and economic security. Pakistan in any manner, impinges on its sovereignty and economic security. Pakistan has has raised the negative raised its its concerns concerns over over the negative effects effects on on strategic strategic stability stability of of India’s India’s access access 70 to advanced military hardware, technologies, and knowledge. For to advanced military hardware, technologies, and knowledge.70 For Islamabad, Islamabad, aa buoyant and that is forbuoyant and reckless reckless India, India, one one that is laced laced with with U.S. U.S. weapons, weapons, presents presents aa for midable threat. Pakistani officials have communicated this to their counterparts midable threat. Pakistani officials have communicated this to their counterparts in in the United States. the United States. However, in ties ties between between the the two However, the the relative relative improvement improvement in two countries countries during during the latter part of President Trump’s tenure has not given impetus to their the latter part of President Trump’s tenure has not given impetus to their equation equation during to direct between during President President Biden. Biden. As As opposed opposed to direct lines lines of of communications communications between Khan and Trump, Khan and Biden have not interacted yet, despite the fact that that Khan and Trump, Khan and Biden have not interacted yet, despite the fact

28 Syed Syed Ali 28 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery Jaffery

the withdrawal of from Afghanistan the withdrawal of U.S. U.S. forces forces from Afghanistan requires requires aa closer closer coordination coordination between the two countries. By not inviting Khan to a climate between the two countries. By not inviting Khan to a climate change change conferconfer71 ence and limiting official to discussing ence71 and ostensibly ostensibly limiting official interactions interactions to discussing the the situation situation in in Afghanistan, the Biden Biden Administration unwillingness to to see Afghanistan, the Administration has has shown shown its its unwillingness see PakiPaki 72 stan through aa lens than Afghanistan. That stan through lens other other than Afghanistan.72 That said, said, though though focused focused on on the the Afghan imbroglio, parleys between the National Security Advisors and spy chiefs Afghan imbroglio, parleys between the National Security Advisors and spy chiefs 73 have been dubbed positive by by both both sides. have been dubbed positive sides.73 That said, as the United States leaves Afghanistan, ties between between the That said, as the United States leaves Afghanistan, ties the two two councoun tries are again being impeded by systemic and structural impediments. tries are again being impeded by systemic and structural impediments. With With the the United Pakistan in both in terms of United States States wanting wanting more more out out of of Pakistan in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, both in terms of pullpull 74 and providing that in maintaining ing plug on the Taliban ing the the plug on the Taliban74 and providing that country country support support in maintaining 75 Over-the-Horizon Pakistan is faced Over-the-Horizon (OTH) (OTH) counterterrorism counterterrorism capabilities, capabilities,75 Pakistan is again again faced with choices. So far, Islamabad’s response has been directed by Khan’s consistent with choices. So far, Islamabad’s response has been directed by Khan’s consistent views on which place place Pakistan’s Pakistan’s sovereignty their center. views on Pak–U.S. Pak-U.S. relations, relations, which sovereignty at at their center. In a flurry of interviews, articles, and speeches, Khan has reiterated his In a flurry of interviews, articles, and speeches, Khan has reiterated his stand stand that, that, Pakistan be aa partner partner in in peace, will not be aa hired Pakistan will will be peace, not not war, war, and and will not be hired gun gun of of the the United the National Khan said: that did United States. States. Speaking Speaking in in the National Assembly, Assembly, Khan said: “Iasked “I asked that did they they blamed blamed everything us. Iwant they even even acknowledge acknowledge our our losses? losses? Instead, Instead, they everything on on us. I want to assure that we would never compromise on our national sovereignty and to assure that we would never compromise on our national sovereignty and integinteg 76 rity for anyone This was made the debate rity for anyone or or any any country.” country.”76 This remark remark was made apropos apropos of of the debate on basing rights to the the United United States. Responding to on Pakistan Pakistan giving giving basing rights to States. Responding to aa question question on basing rights in his Axios interview, Khan emphatically said: “Absolutely on basing rights in his Axios interview, Khan emphatically said: “Absolutely not. not. There we are to allow bases, any from Pakistani There is is no no way way we are going going to allow any any bases, any sort sort of of action action from Pakistani 77 territory Khan territory into into Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Absolutely Absolutely not.” not.”77 Khan doubled-down doubled-down on on his his outright outright refusal to grant basing rights to the United States. In a Washington Post refusal to grant basing rights to the United States. In a Washington Post piece piece entitled Imran Khan: Khan: Pakistan Pakistan is partner for for peace peace in Afghanistan, entitled Imran is ready ready to to be be a a partner in Afghanistan, but will not not host host U.S. the decision to disallow the United United but we we will U.S. bases, bases, Khan Khan linked linked the decision to disallow the States from having bases in Pakistan with the country having lost heavily in both States from having bases in Pakistan with the country having lost heavily in both men and material by partnering that country in conflict before. He contended men and material by partnering that country in conflict before. He contended If Pakistan were to host bases, from from which which to to bomb bomb AfghaniIf Pakistan were to to agree agree to host U.S. U.S. bases, Afghani stan, and an Afghan civil war ensued, Pakistan would be targeted stan, and an Afghan civil war ensued, Pakistan would be targeted for for revenge revenge by terrorists this. We paid too too by terrorists again. again. We We simply simply cannot cannot afford afford this. We have have already already paid 78 heavy a price. heavy a price.78 All these have brought to to the the fore fore inherent Pak–U.S. relaAll these have brought inherent issues issues that that underlie underlie Pak-U.S. rela 79 tions while explaining their limited scope. Thus, it is reasonable that tions while explaining their limited scope.79 Thus, it is reasonable to to argue argue that Pakistan’s bid to change the trajectory of this important, old relationship will be Pakistan’s bid to change the trajectory of this important, old relationship will be challenged by tactical as well as systemic snags, especially in the context of the challenged by tactical as well as systemic snags, especially in the context of the ongoing to furongoing mayhem mayhem in in Afghanistan Afghanistan and and the the United United States States wanting wanting Pakistan Pakistan to fur 80 ther help in ensuring that the Taliban do not militarily seize control of Kabul. ther help in ensuring that the Taliban do not militarily seize control of Kabul.80 Related to the Khan Khan government Related to all all this, this, the government has has highlighted highlighted the the importance importance of of peace peace in Afghanistan in the context of economic connectivity. The economic connectivin Afghanistan in the context of economic connectivity. The economic connectiv ity ity and and security security angle angle has has resulted resulted in in Pakistan Pakistan laying laying more more emphasis emphasis on on opening opening conduits for trade with Afghanistan. Since the opening of the Torkham border conduits for trade with Afghanistan. Since the opening of the Torkham border

Pakistan’ Under Imran 29 Pakistan’ss Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Under Imran Khan Khan 29 crossing to facilitate facilitate trade between the crossing in in 2019, 2019, Pakistan Pakistan has has taken taken further further steps steps to trade between the two countries. The establishment of small markets on the Pak–Afghan border and two countries. The establishment of small markets on the Pak-Afghan border and the through the the Chaman border, even the allowance allowance of of trade trade through Chaman border, even during during the the height height of of the the COVID-19 pandemic, are some of the examples that point to Pakistan’s push to COVID-19 pandemic, are some of the examples that point to Pakistan’s push to 81 alter the dynamics Pak–Afghan relations. Moreover, in alter the dynamics of of Pak-Afghan relations.81 Moreover, in 2020, 2020, Pakistan Pakistan allowed allowed Afghanistan use Gwadar transit trade. first consignAfghanistan to to use Gwadar port port for for transit trade. In In July2020, July 2020, the the first consign ment of goods docked at Gwadar port and later was transported to ment of goods docked at Gwadar port and later was transported to Afghanistan. Afghanistan. 82 Pakistan termed Pivoted around Pakistan termed it it as as aa milestone. milestone.82 Pivoted around the the need need for for pouncing pouncing on on the the connectivity bonanza, Pakistan has intensified its efforts to push warring parties connectivity bonanza, Pakistan has intensified its efforts to push warring parties to vivendi for for Afghanistan. to chalk chalk out out an an Afghan-led Afghan-led and and Afghan-owned Afghan-owned modus modus vivendi Afghanistan. Engagements with the Afghan Taliban have been supplemented by those Engagements with the Afghan Taliban have been supplemented by those with with the Afghan government and other factions in Afghanistan. In his maiden visit to to the Afghan government and other factions in Afghanistan. In his maiden visit Afghanistan, Khan pledged all-out support to the Afghan peace process while urgAfghanistan, Khan pledged all-out support to the Afghan peace process while urg 83 Thus, ing parties to violence in the war-torn ing all all parties to end end violence in the war-torn country. country.83 Thus, economic economic security security is the prism that Pakistan wants to look Afghanistan through. is the prism that Pakistan wants to look Afghanistan through. With With Afghanistan Afghanistan having presented aa serious to Pakistan’s Pakistan’s economic having not not presented serious challenge challenge to economic security, security, room room has been created for constructive discussions on important bilateral has been created for constructive discussions on important bilateral issues. issues. That That said, to pull pull the from their said, Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s inability inability to the plug plug on on inimical inimical elements elements that, that, from their safe brings to fore threats safe havens havens in in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, are are targeting targeting Pakistan Pakistan brings to the the fore threats to to both sovereignty and economic security. In a joint document released after both sovereignty and economic security. In a joint document released after Khan’s Khan’s visit to to Kabul, Kabul, both both countries to disallowing their territo territovisit countries committed committed themselves themselves to disallowing their ries from being being used for terrorism.84 terrorism.84 However, tensions between between the the two two countries ries from used for However, tensions countries have to skirmishes border, outlining the value value have exacerbated exacerbated due due to skirmishes on on the the Pak–Afghan Pak-Afghan border, outlining the 85 Pakistan attaches to the inviolability of its borders. Aimed at safeguarding Pakistan attaches to the inviolability of its borders.85 Aimed at safeguarding its its sovereignty bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan is sovereignty and and integrity integrity on on its its territory territory bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan is raprap idly border. According the idly completing completing the the process process of of fencing fencing the the Pak–Afghan Pak-Afghan border. According to to the Pakistan Army, the fencing finishing stages Pakistan Army, the fencing project project was was in in its its finishing stages as as of of October2020. October 2020. Islamabad fencing of the border border with with Afghanistan to reducIslamabad has has dubbed dubbed fencing of the Afghanistan necessary necessary to reduc ing the biggest catalyst of terrorism in Pakistan. The project has gained ing the biggest catalyst of terrorism in Pakistan. The project has gained more more 86 traction, upsurge of terror-related incidents. Though traction, given given an an upsurge of terror-related incidents.86 Though Pakistan Pakistan has has taken taken aa series to make Pak–Afghan border border aa gateway prosseries of of measures measures to make the the Pak-Afghan gateway for for peace, peace, pros perity, and development, it has remained focused on its effective management perity, and development, it has remained focused on its effective management and and control to put terrorism and control so so as as to put aa lid lid on on terrorism and other other subversive subversive activities. activities. Thus, that Pakistan’s with the Thus, it it is is quite quite noticeable noticeable that Pakistan’s relations relations with the United United States States and and Afghanistan have been sensitive to sovereignty, economic security, and the value value Afghanistan have been sensitive to sovereignty, economic security, and the of ties with both of conflict-resolution. conflict-resolution. All All this this portends portends volatility volatility in in Islamabad’s Islamabad’s ties with both Washington and Kabul. In fact, ties between Kabul and Islamabad have vitiated. Washington and Kabul. In fact, ties between Kabul and Islamabad have vitiated. The up its Pakistan, accusing The Afghan Afghan government government has has whipped whipped up its criticism criticism of of Pakistan, accusing it it of of being behind Taliban’s relentless surge toward Kabul. At a regional conference being behind Taliban’s relentless surge toward Kabul. At a regional conference in Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan, Afghan blaming it in Afghan President President Ashraf Ashraf Ghani Ghani lashed lashed out out at at Pakistan, Pakistan, blaming it for extending all-out support to the Afghan Taliban. In the very conference, for extending all-out support to the Afghan Taliban. In the very conference, Khan Khan snapped back and snapped back and expressed expressed his his disappointment disappointment over over Ghani’s Ghani’s remarks, remarks, arguing arguing that Pakistan stands to lose should Afghan descend into chaos and that Pakistan stands to lose should Afghan descend into chaos and that that it it has has tried tried its best best to violence and push the the Taliban toward aa political political settlement its to help help reduce reduce violence and push Taliban toward settlement 87 in While Pakistan, with Khan in the lead, in Afghanistan. Afghanistan.87 While Pakistan, with Khan in the lead, frames frames its its Afghan Afghan policy policy

30 Syed Syed Ali 30 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery Jaffery 88 89 as rising violence in will but strain as one one of of neutrality, neutrality,88 rising levels levels of of violence in Afghanistan Afghanistan89 will but strain Pak–Afghan relations while also affecting Pak–U.S. relations. Most of Pakistan’s Pak-Afghan relations while also affecting Pak-U.S. relations. Most of Pakistan’s concerns becoming more fertile for concerns will will germinate germinate from from Afghan Afghan soil soil becoming more fertile for elements elements inimical to the country, including a reinvigorated Tehreek-i-Taliban inimical to the country, including a reinvigorated Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan Pakistan 90 (TTP). Violence western flank undermine Pakistan’s Pakistan’s sover(TTP).90 Violence on on Pakistan Pakistan western flank would would undermine sover eignty and economic security, protection of which lies at the heart of Pakistan’s eignty and economic security, protection of which lies at the heart of Pakistan’s foreign policy framework. foreign and and security security policy framework.

The The Sino-Pakistan Sino-Pakistan Entente Entente Under Under Khan, Khan, Islamabad’s Islamabad’s relations relations with with its its neighbor neighbor and and strategic strategic partner, partner, BeiBei jing, have gone from strength to strength. The equation between the two jing, have gone from strength to strength. The equation between the two countries countries has been marked by higher has been marked by higher levels levels of of cooperation cooperation and and diplomatic diplomatic support. support. These These two elements have aligned well with the sacrosanctity of Pakistan’s two elements have aligned well with the sacrosanctity of Pakistan’s sovereignty sovereignty and to and the the centrality centrality of of economic economic security. security. China’s China’s outright outright diplomatic diplomatic support support to Pakistan in international fora has complemented Pakistan’s conflict-resolution Pakistan in international fora has complemented Pakistan’s conflict-resolution initiatives. between the initiatives. This This has has deepened deepened the the even-otherwise even-otherwise friendly friendly relations relations between the two countries. It is pertinent to briefly elucidate how Beijing has aided two countries. It is pertinent to briefly elucidate how Beijing has aided Pakistan Pakistan in in advancing these objectives. advancing each each of of these objectives. China provided cushion to Pakistan far as is conChina has has provided cushion to Pakistan as as far as economic economic security security is con cerned in a number of ways. Unsurprisingly, CPEC has been the biggest cerned in a number of ways. Unsurprisingly, CPEC has been the biggest exemexem plar brotherhood between between China plar of of the the economy-led economy-led strategic strategic brotherhood China and and Pakistan. Pakistan. After After 91 highly touted hiccups, controversies, and slowdowns, during the Khan’s highly touted hiccups, controversies, and slowdowns,91 during the start start of of Khan’s tenure, up the pace in Not only back-to-back deals tenure, CPEC CPEC picked picked up the pace in 2020. 2020. Not only back-to-back deals were were 92 signed and Special Economic Zones opened, the mega-project entered signed and Special Economic Zones opened,92 the mega-project entered phase phase 22 93 as well and that too, the COVID-19-induced Prias well and that too, despite despite the COVID-19-induced crises crises and and constraints. constraints.93 Pri oritizing the creation to CPEC to oritizing the creation and and facilitation facilitation of of SEZs, SEZs, Pakistan Pakistan is is looking looking up up to CPEC to rekindle industrialization and job creation, something that Khan has laid empharekindle industrialization and job creation, something that Khan has laid empha 94 sis becoming the Prime Minister. China plate sis on on since since becoming the Prime Minister.94 China has has also also stepped stepped up up to to the the plate 95 in bailing out Pakistan, especially when the latter was staring at default. in bailing out Pakistan, especially when the latter was staring at default.95 BeiBei jing’s the day for aa govjing’s timely timely deposit deposit of of money money in in Pakistan’s Pakistan’s State State Bank Bank saved saved the day for gov ernment that was was in Khan has time and ernment that in the the grips grips of of external external account account deficit. deficit. Khan has time and again again 96 appreciated China for saving Pakistan’s economy in the midst of a crisis. China appreciated China for saving Pakistan’s economy in the midst of a crisis.96 China has, backing, compensated has, as as aa harbinger harbinger of of economic economic and and diplomatic diplomatic backing, compensated Pakistan Pakistan at a time when the latter had to repay US$1billion out of the US$3billion at a time when the latter had to repay US$1 billion out of the US$3 billion dollar dollar 97 loan to Saudi That Pakistan when loan to Saudi Arabia. Arabia.97 That Beijing Beijing extricated extricated Pakistan when the the latter latter apparently apparently landed yet another landed itself itself in in aa diplomatic diplomatic row row with with Saudi Saudi Arabia Arabia is is yet another corroboration corroboration of the former’s commitment to taking ties with the latter forward. In of the former’s commitment to taking ties with the latter forward. In addition addition to the entry Protocol to Amend the Free Trade Agreement between to that, that, the entry of of the the Protocol to Amend the Free Trade Agreement between China and Pakistan into force has paved the way for greater market access, trade China and Pakistan into force has paved the way for greater market access, trade 98 liberalization, and protection of local industries. In consonance with PTI’s 2018 liberalization, and protection of local industries.98 In consonance with PTI’s 2018 manifesto Khan’s own phase of the FTA between the manifesto and and Khan’s own inclination, inclination, the the second second phase of the FTA between the two countries is being termed as a marked improvement in terms of two countries is being termed as a marked improvement in terms of increasing increasing access Pakistani exporters. to aa study by the Pakiaccess for for Pakistani exporters. According According to study commissioned commissioned by the Paki stan Business Council, the CPFTA2 offers substantial improvements in Pakistan’s stan Business Council, the CPFTA2 offers substantial improvements in Pakistan’s

Pakistan’ Under Imran 31 Pakistan’ss Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Under Imran Khan Khan 31 tariff to capitalize this opportariff access access to to China. China. As As an an analyst analyst noted, noted, “In “In order order to capitalize on on this oppor tunity, Pakistan will need to ensure that its exporters can compete with tunity, Pakistan will need to ensure that its exporters can compete with China’s China’s 99 other partners for As Pakistani officials, other trade trade partners for market market share share in in China.” China.”99 As per per Pakistani officials, phase phase 22 of the FTA has doubled the trade volume between the two countries, with Paki Pakiof the FTA has doubled the trade volume between the two countries, with 100 stan all set to increase and diversify its exports. All this, coupled with rising stan all set to increase and diversify its exports.100 All this, coupled with rising 101 Chinese augurs Pakistan’s economic Chinese investments investments in in Pakistan, Pakistan,101 augurs well well for for Pakistan’s economic security security profile, underlining both the predictability and durability of Sino-Pak profile, underlining both the predictability and durability of Sino-Pak relations relations going going forward. forward. China batted for for Pakistan’s the latter’s China has has batted Pakistan’s sovereignty sovereignty while while lending lending help help in in the latter’s bid to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Not only has China castigated India bid to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Not only has China castigated India for for its its August5 gambit and urged bringing about an end to the Kashmir dispute August 5 gambit and urged bringing about an end to the Kashmir dispute in in accordance but also UNSC meetings accordance with with UNSC UNSC resolutions resolutions but also helped helped arrange arrange UNSC meetings on on Kashmir, Kashmir conflict, Kashmir, after after aa long long hiatus. hiatus. China, China, with with its its stakes stakes in in the the Kashmir conflict, has has berated India for tinkering with the status of Ladakh. It is believed berated India for tinkering with the status of Ladakh. It is believed that that India’s India’s August5 August 5 assaults assaults on on Kashmir’s Kashmir’s autonomy autonomy and and territorial territorial arrangements arrangements are are the the casus belli of the ongoing Sino-Indo standoff in Ladakh. With China considercasus belli of the ongoing Sino-Indo standoff in Ladakh. With China consider ing in the Ladakh as it is is ing changes changes in the status status of of Ladakh as an an infringement infringement of of its its sovereignty, sovereignty, it likely that it will extend consistent, vocal diplomatic assistance to Pakistan over likely that it will extend consistent, vocal diplomatic assistance to Pakistan over Kashmir.102 At when Islamabad bout for for Kashmir, Kashmir.102 At aa time time when Islamabad is is rallying rallying support support for for its its bout Kashmir, Beijing’s unflinching advocacy is not only instrumental but also epitomizing Beijing’s unflinching advocacy is not only instrumental but also epitomizing the the inherent strength furinherent strength of of Sino-Pak Sino-Pak relations. relations. Concomitantly, Concomitantly, China China has has created created fur ther diplomatic by officially ther diplomatic space space for for Pakistan Pakistan by officially accepting accepting Pakistan’s Pakistan’s stand stand on on the the 103 Afghan peace process and its meritorious sacrifices in fighting the scourge Afghan peace process103 and its meritorious sacrifices in fighting the scourge of of terrorism.104 Beijing tread an path terrorism.104 Beijing has has also also encouraged encouraged Islamabad Islamabad to to tread an independent independent path in in protecting protecting its its national national interests. interests. China has continued be Pakistan’s best bet, bet, as by taking China has continued to to be Pakistan’s best as evidenced evidenced by taking aa cursory cursory look at China’s conduct with Pakistan. It would not be wrong to the look at China’s conduct with Pakistan. It would not be wrong to say say that, that, as as the state galvanizing CPEC, China lies at the heart of Pakistan’s economic security state galvanizing CPEC, China lies at the heart of Pakistan’s economic security paradigm. Its interests in peace, stability, paradigm. Its growing growing interests in peace, stability, and and prosperity prosperity in in Pakistan Pakistan have have made it a stakeholder in upholding the country’s sovereignty while made it a stakeholder in upholding the country’s sovereignty while also also compelcompel ling it make headways ling it to to help help Islamabad Islamabad make headways in in mitigating mitigating and and terminating terminating conflicts. conflicts. These reasons have likely led Pakistani policy makers, including Khan, to to repose These reasons have likely led Pakistani policy makers, including Khan, repose confidence this enduring, time-tested, and with China, confidence in in this enduring, time-tested, and all-weather all-weather relationship relationship with China, one that, according Khan, is the road to Pakistan’s one that, according to to Khan, is the road to Pakistan’s economic economic redemption redemption and and 105 success.105 success.

A A Change Change in in Conduct Conduct and and Approach Approach After Pakistan’s relations After surveying surveying Pakistan’s relations with with key key regional regional and and international international actors, actors, it is befitting to assess as to how the Khan-led government forit is befitting to assess as to how the Khan-led government has has conducted conducted for eign policy since 2018. This section deals with four aspects: publicity, interaceign policy since 2018. This section deals with four aspects: publicity, interac tive tive mechanisms, mechanisms, civil–military civil-military relations, relations, and and outreach outreach initiatives. initiatives. Taken Taken together, together, these facets have changed the way Islamabad conducts its foreign policy, with these facets have changed the way Islamabad conducts its foreign policy, with it it becoming more robust, dynamic, and forward-looking. Acareful study of these becoming more robust, dynamic, and forward-looking. A careful study of these four is the the needful. four planks planks is needful.

32 Syed Syed Ali 32 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery Jaffery

Publicity Publicity Since policy actions fair degree Since 2018, 2018, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy actions have have gained gained aa fair degree of of publicpublic ity ity and and attention. attention. In In other other words, words, Islamabad Islamabad has, has, through through official official channels, channels, done done more its version version out for the world to to see. this more to to put put its out for the world see. Three Three reasons reasons have have driven driven this positive, predecessor(s), Imran positive, all-important all-important change. change. One, One, in in sharp sharp contrast contrast to to his his predecessor(s), Imran Khan Pakistan’s stand policy priorities priorities to to Khan has has eloquently eloquently presented presented Pakistan’s stand and and foreign foreign policy the world. Apart the usual Khan has the world. Apart from from the usual practice practice of of meeting meeting foreign foreign leaders, leaders, Khan has regularly foreign media, business communities regularly engaged engaged with with foreign media, think think tanks, tanks, and and business communities and and used to good Minister has taken upon to used Twitter Twitter to good effect. effect. That That the the Prime Prime Minister has taken upon himself himself to periodically update the the world world about what Pakistan periodically update about what Pakistan has has to to offer offer and and what what chalchal lenges but aa conspicuous lenges it it encounters encounters is is but conspicuous departure departure from from the the past. past. Two Two examples examples underscore this veritable veritable difference. first is underscore this difference. The The first is the the role role of of the the Prime Prime Minister Minister in in the Pulwama–Balakot crisis Khan’s public the Pulwama-Balakot crisis with with India India in in 2019. 2019. Khan’s public appearances appearances during during critical phases of critical phases of the the crisis, crisis, coupled coupled with with his his releasing releasing the the captured captured pilot, pilot, helped helped 106 terminate a deadly crisis. The second is how Khan’s two campaigns terminate a deadly crisis.106 The second is how Khan’s two campaigns in in the the United Nations General United Nations General Assembly Assembly comprised comprised speaking speaking commitments commitments on on multiple multiple panels journalists, and businessmen. The panels and and interactions interactions with with an an array array of of leaders, leaders, journalists, and businessmen. The dominant theme across the world leaders, interviews, dominant theme across all all official official parleys parleys with with the world leaders, interviews, and and keynote been this: this: Pakistan wants to to attract keynote addresses addresses has has been Pakistan wants attract the the world world for for economic economic connectivity, for that, that, peace peace in the region connectivity, investments, investments, and and tourism. tourism. However, However, for in the region is is 107 of It taken to of import. import.107 It is is noteworthy noteworthy to to state state that that Khan Khan has has frequently frequently taken to Twitter Twitter to world of festering situation to apprise apprise the the world of the the festering situation in in IIOJK IIOJK and and has has adroitly adroitly drawn drawn comparisons between Indian Narendra Modi Hitler.108 comparisons between Indian Prime Prime Minister Minister Narendra Modi and and Adolf Adolf Hitler.108 Two, previous government’s Two, as as opposed opposed to to the the previous government’s refusal refusal and and reticence reticence to to appoint appoint aa full-time full-time foreign foreign minister, minister, Khan Khan appointed appointed his his second-in-command second-in-command in in his his party party and former Foreign Foreign Minister, Minister, Shah top diplomat. and former Shah Mehmood Mehmood Qureshi, Qureshi, as as Pakistan’s Pakistan’s top diplomat. Qureshi, an an experienced experienced foreign foreign policy practitioner, has has been at the forefront in in Qureshi, policy practitioner, been at the forefront communicating perspectives to foreign counterparts. communicating Pakistan’s Pakistan’s perspectives to his his foreign counterparts. Given Given how how critical to having foreign critical aa fully fully functional functional foreign foreign office office is is to having aa vibrant vibrant and and dynamic dynamic foreign policy, believed that be led by aa full-time, full-time, dedicated foreign minister. policy, it it is is believed that it it should should be led by dedicated foreign minister. Three, been more bare where it Three, Pakistan Pakistan has has been more open open and and consistent consistent in in laying laying bare where it is take, and what are inveterate is right right now, now, what what direction direction it it wants wants to to take, and what are the the most most inveterate roadblocks it is is navigating. the country’s National Security Dr. roadblocks that that it navigating. As As the country’s National Security Advisor, Advisor, Dr. Moeed Yusuf has to Pakistan’s Pakistan’s publicity From Moeed Yusuf has added added aa scholarly scholarly flair flair to publicity endeavors. endeavors. From giving an an interview interview to to Indian Indian journalist, Thapar, to addressing U.S. U.S. think think giving journalist, Karan Karan Thapar, to addressing tanks, publicized how to tanks, Dr. Dr. Yusuf Yusuf has has publicized how Pakistan Pakistan is is adjusting adjusting itself itself in in response response to aa fast-evolving fast-evolving global that is global order order that is full full of of new new threats threats and and lucrative lucrative avenues avenues of of development. development. Engaging the Experts, Looking to the Future Owing to its strategic location, Pakistan is not impervious to the vagaries of geopolitics. Over the past seven decades, Pakistan has been embroiled in firefighting. Resultantly, planning for the future has suffered. That said, the Khan government

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 33 has taken a series of steps that indicate its willingness to think strategically and big so as to recalibrate the course of its foreign policy commensurate with changing regional and global environments. With a view to seeking scholarly, researchladen advice on the country’s foreign policy, the Prime Minister constituted an Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs in 2018. Headed by the foreign minister, the Council comprises retired diplomats and some of Pakistan’s foremost experts on foreign, security, and strategic affairs. Meetings of the Council take place on a regular basis, allowing a candid exchange of views between scholars and practitioners, something that was never done in the past. Commenting on the utility of PM’s Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, ace nuclear scholar and one of the members of the Council, Rabia Akhtar, says: Surrounded by acrimonious neighbours and located in a strategicallyimportant position, Pakistani policymakers are forced to resort to firefighting at the cost of spending the required time, effort, and bandwidth on long-term, strategic planning. The Advisory Council was constituted in a bid to expand the basket of options for the government. Experts like the ones part of the Council, free from official constrictions, can think big and out of the box on a host of issues and challenges that Pakistan faces and is likely to face going forward. Liaison between policymakers and academicians is critical to chalking out coherent, forward-looking policies. It is important to devise a robust mechanism through which our ideas, inputs, and recommendations travel all the way up and down the decision-making hierarchy. Initiatives and bodies like this will promote policy-driven research on Pakistan’s foreign relations while enabling the government to look beyond the horizon to counter threats and pounce on opportunities.109 Initiatives like this are emblematic of the fact that the government is cognizant of the need to bridge the gulf between policy makers and scholars. This has been a problem that, over the years, has contributed toward stasis and inflexibility in meeting complex foreign policy predicaments. In addition to that the divide between policy makers and the public was glaring. In order to involve people from diverse backgrounds and take their ideas in a global landscape dictated by the information revolution, Foreign Minister Qureshi launched FM Connect. The first of its kind, direct channel of communication paved the way for direct communications between the foreign minister and members of the academia, business community, media, entertainment industry, and the civil society.110 All this is ostensibly being done to provide the government with a host of ideas, both conventional and unconventional, to navigate myriad quandaries in a globalized and technologically advanced world. The establishment of the Strategic Policy Planning Cell (SPPC) is another manifestation of the government’s intent to bring in intellectual rigor in the process of policy formulation. The SPPC is the intellectual hub and acts as a think tank for the Prime Minister. It is mandated to provide the Prime Minister with evidence-based policy input on beyond-the-horizon issues.111 The National Security Division,

34 Syed Ali Zia Jaffery under which the SPPC works, is the body that has created a symbiotic policy connection between all things related to security and the country’s foreign policy. That the SPPC deals with a compendium of security challenges that require an effective foreign policy is one of the reasons why its place within the country’s foreign policy apparatus is crucial. Civil–Military Coordination In his interactions with think tanks112 and the media, Khan has repeatedly and vociferously stated that the military has stood by his decisions, and all steps that he has taken are in-line with his party’s manifesto.113 Analyzing Khan’s tenure so far, one finds no instance where the government and the military clashed with each other. Healthy civil–military relations have led to a consensus on decision-making during crucial moments. For instance, close, real-time coordination between the military and the government gave shape to a firm, restrained, and responsible crisis behavior by Islamabad during the Pulwama–Balakot crisis. The response was dictated by Khan’s concerns about unbridled escalation and the unanimous desire to terminate a nuclear-tinged crisis.114 The message from both the government and the military during and after the crisis was unambiguous and without contradictions. What is discernible is the unified stand of the military and the government over ways to deal with the boiling Kashmir issue after India’s August5 gambit. An expected rift over what course of action to take after India’s brazenness in Kashmir has, so far, not afflicted civil–military relations under Khan. Moreover, Khan was able to extend an olive branch to India and, without any resistance, went ahead with opening the Kartarpur Corridor for Sikhs living in India and around the world. Rather than be plagued by fissures and mounting tensions, civil–military ties under Khan have been typified by an increased reliance on expertise and institutional memory and the realization that security dimensions are attached to foreign policy issues. This arrangement has been and will be vital in enabling Khan and his government to take strides in the foreign policy domain going forward. Experts, however, observe that the balance is shifting in favor of the military.115 They argue that there is no such thing as civil–military harmony, when the civilian government is subservient to, and sidelined by, the all-powerful military.116 However, a reexamination of PTI’s manifesto, Khan’s own opinions on foreign relations, and the direction that his government has taken reveals no aberration. In the absence of concrete evidence, it is difficult to argue that the military, especially the Pakistan Army, has cajoled Khan into taking decisions that he did not want to take. Economic Outreach and the Look Africa Initiative One of the distinguishing features of the current government’s foreign policy has been a commitment to strengthening economic security. In that regard, economic diplomacy has become a lynchpin, something which is in-line with the ruling party’s manifesto.117 The idea behind vigorously pursuing economic diplomacy is to

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 35 leverage Pakistan’s diplomatic relations to advance its economic interests.118 Starting in 2020, three envoys’ meetings on economic diplomacy have been chaired by Foreign Minister Qureshi. Addressing the third envoys’ meeting, Qureshi noted the shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics and stressed “the importance of economic diplomacy as a key component of modern diplomatic practice.”119 In a bid to further streamline and boost economic diplomacy, PM Khan launched the Economic Outreach Initiative. Comprising the Economic Outreach Apex Committee and the Economic Outreach Coordination Group, the initiative aims to synergize inter-ministerial tasks with a view to optimizing resource utilization, exploring comparative advantages in key countries, and meeting economic diplomacy-related targets.120 The success of the Economic Outreach Initiative is contingent upon the cohesiveness and continued coordination between key ministries. According to Khan, one of the objectives of this body is to identify exportpropellants and tap into them in order to tread the path toward self-reliance.121 It is apparent that the Khan government is convinced that there exists a two-way connection between the state of the economy and the country’s diplomatic clout. Since 2018, the complementarity between economics and diplomacy has been used as an essential cog in this government’s schemas on foreign policy. It is in this context that Islamabad has once and for all decided to wade into Africa. According to Khan, the African continent would be a priority area in Pakistan’s foreign policy while lamenting the country’s lackluster ties with the very continent in yesteryears.122 Pakistan’s push in Africa is economics and trade-driven. Launched in 2017, the Look Africa Initiative has been given impetus by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. Aimed at expanding trade and building connectivity between Pakistan and African countries, the Look Africa Policy Initiative has taken center stage in Pakistan’s economic diplomacy campaign. Dubbed the “Continent of the Future,” Africa has elicited the attention of Pakistani policy makers. In 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized an Envoys’ Conference in Africa. Bringing together Pakistani envoys posted in Africa, officials of relevant ministries, and traders, the conference explored ways to deepen economic, political, social, and cultural ties with African countries.123 Reflective of the government’s urgency in gaining a foothold in Africa, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce jointly hosted the Pakistan–Africa Trade Development Conference in Nairobi, Kenya. The conference brought together hundreds of participants from 21 African countries, business delegations from Pakistan, and government officials, allowing them the opportunity to discuss the potential for taking business-to-business and government-to-government relations to the next level.124 Sharing his thoughts on Pakistan’s initiatives in Africa, Honorary Consul of Uganda in Pakistan, Awais Raoof said: Pakistan’s decision to strengthen ties with African countries and increase its footprint in Africa is a step in the right direction, and one that will open up a big basket of opportunities for the country. With its rich resources and strategic location, Africa provides Pakistan multiple conduits for strategic and economic connectivity. Iwould like to see the government seriously follow-up

36 Syed Syed Ali 36 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery Jaffery

on two things things in to on two in the the short-term: short-term: healthcare healthcare diplomacy diplomacy and and education education so so as as to leave a soft imprint in Africa. At the strategic level, Pakistan’s best bet is to leave a soft imprint in Africa. At the strategic level, Pakistan’s best bet is to work tandem with which already theatre big big time. time. work in in tandem with China, China, which already is is in in the the African African theatre Policy consistency would be of this essence, if Pakistan wants to fully take Policy consistency would be of this essence, if Pakistan wants to fully take 125 advantage of Africa’s potential. advantage of Africa’s potential.125 Two bode well with African Two subsequent subsequent developments developments bode well for for Pakistan’s Pakistan’s relations relations with African countries. One, despite the devastation wrought upon by COVID-19, Pakistan– countries. One, despite the devastation wrought upon by COVID-19, Pakistan126 Two, Pakistan, following following up to Africa trade volume volume increased. Africa trade increased.126 Two, Pakistan, up on on its its decisions decisions to open missions in six African countries in 2019, decided to open a resident mission open missions in six African countries in 2019, decided to open a resident mission 127 in in the the strategically strategically located located Djibouti. Djibouti.127 To sum it up, Pakistan has plucked paradigm that that is To sum it up, Pakistan has plucked out out aa new new paradigm is guiding guiding its its forfor eign policy: economic security. The lens has germinated the need for strategically eign policy: economic security. The lens has germinated the need for strategically aligning the way foreign aligning economics economics with with diplomacy diplomacy and and changing changing the way the the country’s country’s foreign policy is conducted. The Khan government, mindful of the significance of policy is conducted. The Khan government, mindful of the significance of scholschol arly whole-of-government arly input, input, research, research, and and institutional institutional harmony, harmony, has has devised devised aa whole-of-government approach with foreign policy challenges. approach in in order order to to effectively effectively grapple grapple with foreign policy challenges. That said, experts are skeptical about Pakistan’s ability to become become aa geoeconomic That said, experts are skeptical about Pakistan’s ability to geoeconomic power. Pakistan’s political power. Writing Writing on on the the state state of of Pakistan’s political economy economy as as aa real real hurdle hurdle in in the the country’s push toward geoeconomics, Arif Rafiq argues: “Given their predatory country’s push toward geoeconomics, Arif Rafiq argues: “Given their predatory behavior, Pakistan’s the gains from aa modest behavior, Pakistan’s elite elite are are likely likely to to cannibalize cannibalize the gains from modest economic economic opening, preventing them from reaching common Pakistanis. Elite opening, preventing them from reaching common Pakistanis. Elite capture capture could could 128 even Pakistan’s geoeconomic pivot aa non-starter.” On the other even render render Pakistan’s geoeconomic pivot non-starter.”128 On the other hand, hand, forfor mer diplomat Maleeha Lodhi asserts that “if Pakistan wants to pursue a geoeconommer diplomat Maleeha Lodhi asserts that “if Pakistan wants to pursue a geoeconom ics policy in in any way it it has to transform ics policy any meaningful meaningful way has to transform its its economy, economy, ensure ensure aa stable stable 129 political environment and reorder its internal priorities and budget allocations.” political environment and reorder its internal priorities and budget allocations.”129 Quite rightly, the real challenge for the Khan government would be to Quite rightly, the real challenge for the Khan government would be to ensure that the country’s economic profile is filled with the requirements of ensure that the country’s economic profile is filled with the requirements of aa geoeconomics-heavy foreign policy policy toolkit. toolkit. Indeed, the Khan geoeconomics-heavy foreign Indeed, the Khan government government can can rightly boast an economic turnaround, as widely acknowledged by international rightly boast an economic turnaround, as widely acknowledged by international financial pandemic has financial institutions, institutions, especially especially at at aa time time when when the the COVID-19 COVID-19 pandemic has ravrav 130 aged economies. However, the economy can ill-afford boom and bust cycles aged economies.130 However, the economy can ill-afford boom and bust cycles if if it wants to be used used as the factor factor critical for Pakistan it wants to be as the critical to to creating creating more more space space for Pakistan in in the the foreign policy domain. foreign policy domain.

Conclusion Conclusion This foreign policy policy under under the the governThis chapter chapter has has carefully carefully delved delved into into Pakistan’s Pakistan’s foreign govern ment of Imran Khan. It has been observed that the country’s foreign policy pri priment of Imran Khan. It has been observed that the country’s foreign policy orities have found a new anchor in economic security, which cannot be achieved orities have found a new anchor in economic security, which cannot be achieved without without regional regional connectivity connectivity and and conflict-resolution. conflict-resolution. The The latter latter is is critical critical to to peace peace and stability. With these objectives in mind, the Khan government has engaged and stability. With these objectives in mind, the Khan government has engaged with friends and with countries that helped with friends and foes, foes, solidifying solidifying partnerships partnerships with countries that helped or or are are likely to help Islamabad realize these goals. The Khan-led government has shown likely to help Islamabad realize these goals. The Khan-led government has shown the to draw that are the prospect prospect of the capacity capacity to draw redlines redlines with with countries countries that are harming harming the of or or

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 37 outright subverting efforts aimed at ushering in peace and harmony to lay the groundwork for economic connectivity and integration. Besides, the conduct of foreign policy has undergone a change, as evidenced by enhanced publicity; the establishment of interactive conduits; civil–military synchronization; and a newfound interest in long-term, strategic thinking. All these signal an end to torpor that had long stifled Pakistan’s ability to maneuver its way so as to advance its vital interests. With all this echoing Khan’s party manifesto and his own predilections on foreign relations, it is noteworthy to state that the leadership variable is an important determinant of Pakistan’s evolving foreign policy. All this does not mean that the minefields for the Khan government are being removed. Turmoil in Afghanistan will have a direct, deleterious effect on Pakistan’s commitment to increasing its economic security while also deteriorating its even otherwise tumultuous ties with Afghanistan and the United States. An inflexible India is a big elephant in the room that Pakistan has to deal with. Last but not least, a weak economy would continue to throw a plethora of problems at the Khan government, especially given that it looks forward to establishing an inexorable, positive connection between foreign policy and the economy.

Notes Notes 1 “Oral History History Interview Interview with Shamshad Ahmad Former ForFor 1 “Oral with Ambassador Ambassador Shamshad Ahmad Khan, Khan, Former eign Secretary Secretary of of Pakistan,” Pakistan,” Pakistan 5, 2020, 2020, http://pakistanpolitico. eign Pakistan Politico, Politico, April April5, http://pakistanpolitico. com/__sakinterview/. com/__sakinterview/. 2 “Cricketer “Cricketer of of the Year-1983: Imran Imran Khan,” www.espncricinfo.com/wis 2 the Year-1983: Khan,” Espncricinfo, Espncricinfo, www.espncricinfo.com/wis denalmanack/content/story/154467.html. denalmanack/content/story/154467.html. 3 Imran Khan’s Khan’s Mission Build Cancer Inspired aa South African Boy,” 3 “How “How Imran Mission to to Build Cancer Hospital Hospital Inspired South African Boy,” The News, 21, 2020, 2020, www.thenews.com.pk/latest/703830-how-imran-khanswww.thenews.com.pk/latest/103830-how-imran-khansThe News, August August21, mission-to-build-cancer-hospital-inspired-a-south-african-boy. mission-to-build-cancer-hospital-inspired-a-south-african-boy. 4 Who Shape Imran Khan Khan Foundation, Foundation, 4 “Namal “Namal College: College: Shaping Shaping Those Those Who Shape the the Future,” Future,” Imran www.imrankhanfoundation.org.pk/about-ikf/namal-college/. www.imrankhanfoundation.org.pk/about-ikf/namal-college/. 5 Imran Imran Khan, Personal History (London: Bantam 84. 5 Khan, Pakistan: Pakistan: A APersonal History (London: Bantam Press, Press, 2011), 2011), 84. 6 6 Ibid., Ibid., 113. 113. 7 “Khan: “Khan: Pakistan Pakistan Should Should Reject U.S. Aid,” CNN, May14, May 14, 2011, 2011, www.youtube.com/ 7 Reject U.S. Aid,” CNN, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=YhHGlI1Dspk. watch?v=YhHGlI7Dspk. 8 “Imran “Imran Khan Khan to to US: US: We Want Your Your Money,” Money,” HARDtalk, September 26, 2011, 2011, 8 We Don’t Don’t Want HARDtalk, September26, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9600544.stm. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9600544.stm. 9 Staurt Staurt Jeffries, Jeffries, “Interview: “Interview: Imran Imran Khan: Khan: ‘America ‘America Is Is Destroying Destroying Pakistan. We’re Using 9 Pakistan. We’re Using Our 8, 2011, OurArmy Army to to Kill Kill Our OurOwn OwnPeople People with withTheir TheirMoney,” Money,” The The Guardian, Guardian, September September118,2011, www.theguardian.com/global/2011/sep/18/imran-khan-america-destroying-pakistan www.theguardian.com/global/2011/sep/18/imran-khan-america-destroying-pakistan.. 10 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 with Imran Khan,” Center for Strategic Strategic& International Studies, Studies, Janu11 “ADiscussion “A Discussion with Imran Khan,” Centerfor & International Janu ary 24, 2008, 2008, www.csis.org/events/discussion-imran-khan. www.csis.org/events/discussion-imran-khan. ary24, 12 Imran Imran Khan, “An Open Open Letter-From Obama,” Forbes, Janu 12 Khan, “An Letter–From Pakistan-To Pakistan–To President President Obama,” Forbes, January 29, 2009, ary29, 2009, www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinions-con www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinions-con tributors_0129_imran_khan.html?sh=2639ef036a6c. tributors_0129_imran_khan.html?sh=2639ef036a6c. 13 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Markey, No No Exit Exit from from Pakistan Pakistan America’ America’ss Tortured 14 Daniel Daniel S. S. Markey, Tortured Relationship Relationship with with IslamaIslama bad (New (New York: York: Cambridge Cambridge University University Press, 16. bad Press, 2013), 2013), 16. 15 Prime Prime Minister’s Office, “The “The Road to Naya Pakistan: PTI Manifesto 2018,” 2018,” 55, 55, 15 Minister’s Office, Road to Naya Pakistan: PTI Manifesto https://pmo.gov.pk/documents/manifesto-pti.pdf. https://pmo.gov.pk/documents/manifesto-pti.pdf.

38 Syed SyedAli 38 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery Jaffery 16 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 “Imran Full,” Al Al Jazeera, Jazeera, July26, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/ 18 “Imran Khan’s Khan’s Speech Speech in in Full,” July 26, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/ news/2018/7/26/imran-khans-speech-m-full. news/2018/7/26/imran-khans-speech-in-full. 19 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 “Imran “Imran Khan, Smriti Irani& Irani & Anoushka Shankar: HT Summit 2013,” 2013,” Dai 20 Khan, Smriti Anoushka Shankar: HT Leadership Leadership Summit Dailymotion, December7, 2013, www.dailymotion.com/video/x1asfxk. lymotion, December 7, 2013, www.dailymotion.com/video/x1asfxk. 21 “To “To The The Point: Thapar Exclusive Exclusive Interview Interview With With Pak Cricketer Imran Imran Khan,” 21 Point: Karan Karan Thapar Pak Cricketer Khan,” India Today, 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJB1S6mcp-E. www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJB1S6mcp-E. India Today, December12, December 12, 2015, 22 Prime Office, “PTI “PTI Manifesto 2018,” 54–55. 54-55. 22 Prime Minister’s Minister’s Office, Manifesto 2018,” 23 “Imran “Imran Khan’s Khan’s Speech,” Speech,” Al 23 Al Jazeera. Jazeera. 24 Khawar Ghumman, “Protests “Protests Not CPEC, PTI Chief Assures Chinese Envoy,” 24 Khawar Ghumman, Not Against Against CPEC, PTI Chief Assures Chinese Envoy,” Dawn, June 21, 2017, Dawn, June21, 2017, www.dawn.com/news/1290877/protests-not-against-cpec-ptiwww.dawn.com/news/1290877/protests-not-against-cpec-ptichief-assures-chinese-envoy. chief-assures-chinese-envoy. 25 Andrew Small, “Returning “Returning to to the the Shadows: Shadows: China, China, Pakistan, and the the Fate Fate of of CPEC,” CPEC,” 25 Andrew Small, Pakistan, and The German German Marshall of the the United United States, September 23, 2020, 42, www. The Marshall Fund Fund of States, September23, 2020, 42, www. gmfus.org/publications/returning-shadows-china-pakistan-and-fate-cpec. gmfus.org/publications/returning-shadows-china-pakistan-and-fate-cpec. 26 Prime Minister’s Minister’s Office, Manifesto 2018,” 26 Prime Office, “PTI “PTI Manifesto 2018,” 32. 32. 27 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 55. 28 Ibid., 55. 29 “Imran “Imran Khan’s Khan’s Speech,” Speech,” Al 29 Al Jazeera. Jazeera. 30 Ajay Bisaria Bisaria Meets Meets Imran Him Cricket 30 “Envoy “Envoy Ajay Imran Khan, Khan, Gifts Gifts Him Cricket Bat Bat Signed Signed by by Indian Indian Team,” Team,” India Today, August 10, 2018, India Today, August10, 2018, www.indiatoday.in/india/story/envoy-ajay-bisariawww.indiatoday.in/india/story/envoy-ajay-bisariameets-imran-khan-gifts-him-cricket-bat-signed-by-indian-team-1311183-2018-08-10.. meets-imran-khan-gifts-him-cricket-bat-signed-by-indian-team-1311183-2018-08-10 31 “Modi “Modi Phones Phones Imran Says ‘Ready ‘Ready to Era of of Ties Ties with Pakistan’: 31 Imran Khan, Khan, Says to Enter Enter New New Era with Pakistan’: PTI,” July 30, 2018, www.dawn.com/news/1423857. PTI,” Dawn, Dawn, July30, 2018, www.dawn.com/news/1423857. 32 “PM “PM Khan Khan Responds Responds to ‘in Positive Positive Spirit’ Spirit’ to Resume Talks, Talks, Resolve Resolve All Issues,” 32 to Modi Modi ‘in to Resume All Issues,” Dawn, September 20, 2018, 2018, www.dawn.com/news/1434062. Dawn, September20, www.dawn.com/news/1434062. 33 Sana Sana Ali, “Timeline: Events Up to Feb 2019 Combat,” 33 Ali, “Timeline: Events Leading Leading Up to the the Feb 2019 Pak-India Pak-India Aerial Aerial Combat,” Dawn, February 27, 2020, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1536224. Dawn, February27, www.dawn.com/news/1536224. 34 “Article “Article 370: 370: What What Happened Kashmir and and Why Why It 5, 34 Happened with with Kashmir It Matters,” Matters,” BBC, BBC, August August5, 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708. 35 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery, After India India and Pakistan Clash Kash35 Syed Syed Ali Jaffery, “What “What Happens Happens After and Pakistan Clash Over Over Kash mir?” The National October 28, 2019, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ mir?” The National Interest, Interest, October28, what-happens-after-india-and-pakistan-clash-over-kashmir-91681. what-happens-after-india-and-pakistan-clash-over-kashmir-91681. 36 “Watch: “Watch: ‘If ‘If We We Get Get Orders Orders from from Parliament . . .’: Army Chief Gen Gen Naravane on PoK,” PoK,” 36 Parliament ...’: Army Chief Naravane on Hindustan Times, Hindustan Times, January11, January 11, 2020, 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDf1qGtH3Oo. www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDf1qGtH3Oo. 37 “ ‘This “ ‘This Is the Beginning’: PM Imran Imran Inaugurates Inaugurates Kartarpur Corridor on on Historic Day’,” 37 Is the Beginning’: PM Kartarpur Corridor Historic Day’,” Dawn, November November9, www.dawn.com/news/1515830. Dawn, 9, 2019, 2019, www.dawn.com/news/1515830. 38 Baqir Sajjad Syed, Syed, “Pakistan, “Pakistan, India India Agree on LoC Ceasefire,” Dawn, 26, 38 Baqir Sajjad Agree on LoC Ceasefire,” Dawn, February February26, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1609468. 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1609468. 39 Kallol Bhattacherjee and and Suhasini Suhasini Haider, Haider, “Analysis “Analysis || Backchannel Played 39 Kallol Bhattacherjee Backchannel Diplomacy Diplomacy Played Its in India, India, Pakistan Pakistan Decision Decision to to Cease Cease Fire LoC,” The The Hindu, 26, Its Part Part in Fire Along Along LoC,” Hindu, February February26, 2021, 2021, www.thehindu.com/news/national/analysis-indications-that-india-and-pakistanwww.thehindu.com/news/national/analysis-indications-that-india-and-pakistanhave-been-in-back-channel-talks/article33935351.ece. have-been-in-back-channel-talks/article33935351.ece. 40 “Balakot “Balakot Incident ‘Dangerous MilitaryAdventurism to Win Win Polls’,” Polls’,” The The Express Tribune, 40 Incident ‘Dangerous Military Adventurism to Express Tribune, January 18, 2021, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2280399/will-continue-exposing-indiashttps://tribune.com.pk/story/2280399/will-continue-exposing-indiasJanuary18, belligerent-designs-for-pakistan-says-pm-imran. belligerent-designs-for-pakistan-says-pm-imran. 41 “ ‘Irrefutable “ ‘Irrefutable Evidence’: Evidence’: Dossier Dossier on on India’s India’s Sponsorship Sponsorship of of State State Terrorism Terrorism in in Pakistan 41 Pakistan Presented,” 14, 2020, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1590333. Presented,” Dawn, Dawn, November November14, www.dawn.com/news/1590333. 42 “India “India Is IS to Stir Sectarianism Sectarianism in in Pakistan: Imran Khan,” The CorrespondCorrespond 42 Is Backing Backing IS to Stir Pakistan: PM PM Imran Khan,” The ent.pk, ent.pk, January11, January 11, 2021, 2021, www.thecorrespondent.pk/2021/01/11/india-is-backingwww.thecorrespondent.pk/2021/01/11/india-is-backingis-to-stir-sectarianism-in-pakistan-pm-imran-khan/. is-to-stir-sectarianism-in-pakistan-pm-imran-khan/.

Pakistan’ Under Imran 39 Pakistan’ss Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Under Imran Khan Khan 39 43 Warns India Against ‘False Attacks in Kashmir,” Voice America, 43 “Pakistan “Pakistan Warns India Against ‘False Flag’ Flag’ Attacks in Kashmir,” Voice of ofAmerica, December 21, 2020, 2020, www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-warns-indiaDecember21, www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-warns-indiaagainst-false-flag-attacks-kashmir. against-false-flag-attacks-kashmir. 44 Ayaz Gul, PM: Normalizing Normalizing Ties Would Be to Kash Kash44 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan “Pakistan PM: Ties with with India India Would Be ‘Betrayal’ ‘Betrayal’ to miri,” Voice of of America, May 30, 2021, 2021, www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/ miri,” Voice America, May30, www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/ pakistan-pm-normalizing-ties-india-would-be-betrayal-kashmiris. pakistan-pm-normalizing-ties-india-would-be-betrayal-kashmiris. 45 Not Restore with India India Until Delhi Reverses Its Decision Decision on Kash45 “Pak “Pak Would Would Not Restore Ties Ties with Until Delhi Reverses Its on Kash mir: Imran Imran Khan,” Khan,” The The Tribune, Tribune, June30, June 30, 2021, mir: 2021, www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/ www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/ pak-would-not-restore-ties-with-india-until-delhi-reverses-its-decision-on-kashmirpak-would-not-restore-ties-with-india-until-delhi-reverses-its-decision-on-kashmirimran-khan-276353?ref=epaper. imran-khan-276353?ref=epaper. 46 Amy Kazmin and Farhan Farhan Bokhari, “Imran Khan Pakistan Would 46 Amy Kazmin and Bokhari, “Imran Khan Warns Warns Pakistan Would Retali Retaliate Against Times, February 19, 2019, ate Against Indian Indian Attack,” Attack,” Financial Financial Times, February19, 2019, www.ft.com/ www.ft.com/ content/0ef7d9c0-3436-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5. content/0ef7d9c0-3436-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5. 47 “All “All Wars One Knows They Lead: PM Khan,” 47 Wars Are Are Miscalculated, Miscalculated, No No One Knows Where Where They Lead: PM Khan,” Dawn, Dawn, 27, 2019, February February27, 2019, www.dawn.com/news/1466364. www.dawn.com/news/1466364. 48 No Mistake’: Will Get Befitting Response 48 “ ‘Make “‘Make No Mistake’: India India Will Get Befitting Response If If It It Conducts Conducts False-Flag False-Flag OperOper ation, PM Imran Says,” Says,” Dawn, 20, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1596882. ation, PM Imran Dawn, December December20, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1596882. 49 “Dossier “Dossier on on Indian Indian Sponsorship Sponsorship of of Terrorism.” Terrorism.” 49 50 Aamir Latif, Latif, “Pakistani India Must Must Face Face Justice Anadolu Agency, 50 Aamir “Pakistani PM: PM: India Justice for for ‘Terrorism’,” ‘Terrorism’,”AnadoluAgency, November 14, 2020, www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistani-pm-india-must-faceNovember14, 2020, www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistani-pm-india-must-facejustice-for-terrorism/2043990#. justice-for-terrorism/2043990#. 51 No Longer Longer Buying Buying India’s India’s Terrorism Narrative on 51 “World “World No Terrorism Narrative on Pakistan Pakistan ‘Blindly’: ‘Blindly’: Qureshi,” Qureshi,” Dawn, October 12, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1584683. Dawn, October12, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1584683. 52 Karan Karan Thapar, Thapar, “Full “Full Text: Text: Interview Interview with with Imran Imran Khan’s Khan’s NSA on Kashmir, Uighurs, 52 NSA on Kashmir, Uighurs, Jadhav, 2020, https://thewire.in/south-asia/ Jadhav, Terror Terror and and Talks,” Talks,” The The Wire, Wire, October15, October 15, 2020, https://thewire.in/south-asia/ interview-imran-khan-nsa-moeed-yusuf-pakistan. interview-imran-khan-nsa-moeed-yusuf-pakistan. 53 “Dossier “Dossier on on Indian Indian Sponsorship Sponsorship of of Terrorism.” Terrorism.” 53 54 54 Kunal Kunal Gaurav, Gaurav, “Modi “Modi Govt Govt Ensured Ensured Pakistan Pakistan Is Is Retained Retained on on FATF FATF Grey Grey List, List, Says Says Jaishankar,” Hindustan Times, July18, July 18, 2021, Jaishankar,” Hindustan Times, 2021, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ modi-govt-ensured-pakistan-remained-on-fatf-grey-list-says-jaishankar-10162660 modi-govt-ensured-pakistan-remained-on-fatf-grey-list-says-jaishankar-10162660 8739423.html. 8739423.html. 55 “India “India Opposes Opposes CPEC CPEC as as It on Territorial Territorial Integrity, Says Official,” Official,” Business 55 It Encroaches Encroaches on Integrity, Says Business Standard, June 27, 2018, www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/indiaStandard, June27, 2018, www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/indiaopposes-cpec-as-it-encroaches-on-territorial-integrity-says-official-118062700319_1. opposes-cpec-as-it-encroaches-on-territorial-integrity-says-official-118062700319_1. html. html. 56 “Interview “Interview with on Kashmir.” Kashmir.” 56 with Imran Imran Khan’s Khan’s NSA NSA on 57 Maleeha Dawn, May3, 57 Maleeha Lodhi, Lodhi, “Terms “Terms of of Engagement,” Engagement,” Dawn, May 3, 2021, 2021, www.dawn.com/ www.dawn.com/ news/1621681/terms-of-engagement. news/1621681/terms-of-engagement. 58 Abdul Basit, Hostility: Diplomat’s Diary on Pakistan-India and More 58 Abdul Basit, Hostility: A ADiplomat’s Diary on Pakistan-India Relations Relations and More (Karachi: Lightstone Publishers, Publishers, 2021), 2021), 280. (Karachi: Lightstone 280. 59 Ayaz Gul, “Trump “Trump Hails Growing US-Pakistan Ties During Voice of of 59 Ayaz Gul, Hails Growing US-Pakistan Ties During Khan Khan Meeting,” Meeting,” Voice America, January 21,2020, www.voanews.com/usa/trump-hails-growing-us-pakistanAmerica, January21, 2020, www.voanews.com/usa/trump-hails-growing-us-pakistanties-during-khan-meeting. ties-during-khan-meeting. 60 “Text “Text of of Remarks President Donald Trump and and Prime Prime Minister Minister Imran at 60 Remarks by by President Donald Trump Imran Khan Khan at White The News, July 23, 2019, 2019, www.thenews.com.pk/latest/502379-text-ofwww.thenews.com.pk/latest/502379-text-ofWhite House,” House,” The News, July23, remarks-by-president-trump-and-prime-minister-imran-khan-at-white-house. remarks-by-president-trump-and-prime-minister-imran-khan-at-white-house. 61 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 David David Sterman, Sterman, “Pakistan “Pakistan Set Set to to Mark Mark One One Year Year with with No Strikes: Is Is the the 62 No U.S. U.S. Drone Drone Strikes: War Over?” New America, America, July3, www.newamerica.org/international-security/ War Over?” New July 3, 2019, 2019, www.newamerica.org/intemational-security/ blog/pakistan-set-mark-one-year-no-us-drone-strikes-war-over/#:~:text=July%20 blog/pakistan-set-mark-one-year-no-us-drone-strikes-war-over/#:~:text=July%20 3%2C%202019,the%20campaign%20began%20in%202004. 3%2C%202019,the%20campaign%20began%20in%202004. 63 Army aa Terrorist 63 Kamran Kamran Yousaf, Yousaf, “US “US Declares Declares Balochistan Balochistan Liberation Liberation Army Terrorist Group,” Group,” The The Express Tribune, July2, July 2, 2019, 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2004785/1-us-declareshttps://tribune.com.pk/story/2004785/1-us-declaresExpress Tribune, bla-terrorist-outfit. bla-terrorist-outfit.

40 Syed Syed Ali 40 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery Jaffery 64 Declan Walsh, Bullets, Three 64 Declan Walsh, “ACIA “A CIA Spy, Spy, aa Hail Hail of of Bullets, Three Killed Killed and and aa US-Pakistan US-Pakistan DiploDiplo matic The Guardian, Guardian, February 20, 2011, February20, 2011, www.theguardian.com/world/2011/ www.theguardian.com/world/2011/ matic Row,” Row,” The feb/20/cia-agent-lahore-civilian-deaths. feb/20/cia-agent-lahore-civilian-deaths. 65 Nick Paton Walsh, Walsh, “Pakistan “Pakistan Official: Official: NATO Kills 26 26 Pakistani Pakistani Soldiers,” Soldiers,” CNN, CNN, 65 Nick Paton NATO Attack Attack Kills November26, November 26, 2011, 2011, https://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/26/world/meast/pakistan-attack/ https://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/26/world/meast/pakistan-attack/ index.html. index.html. 66 Relations in the Biden Era: A AConversation with Moeed 66 “U.S.–Pakistan “U.S.-Pakistan Relations in the Biden Era: Conversation with Moeed Yusuf,” Yusuf,” The The Wilson Center, Center, January21, January 21, 2021, 2021, www.wilsoncenter.org/event/us-pakistan-relationswww.wilsoncenter.org/event/us-pakistan-relationsWilson biden-era-conversation-moeed-yusuf. biden-era-conversation-moeed-yusuf. 67 “Inauguration “Inauguration Day: Pakistan PM PM Imran Imran Khan Khan Wishes US President Biden,” Khaleej 67 Day: Pakistan Wishes US President Biden,” Khaleej Times, January20, January 20, 2021, www.khaleejtimes.com/world/americas/inauguration2021, www.khaleejtimes.com/world/americas/inaugurationTimes, day-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-wishes-us-president-biden. day-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-wishes-us-president-biden. 68 Imran “Imran Khan: Peace Is Is Within Within Reach Reach in in Afghanistan. Hasty InternaInterna 68 Imran Khan, Khan, “Imran Khan: Peace Afghanistan. A AHasty Withdrawal Would Unwise,” The The Washington Washington Post, September 26, 2020, tional 2020, tional Withdrawal Would Be Be Unwise,” Post, September26, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/26/imran-khan-peace-is-within-reachwww.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/26/imran-khan-peace-is-within-reachafghanistan-hasty-international-withdrawal-would-be-unwise/. afghanistan-hasty-international-withdrawal-would-be-unwise/. 69 Baqir Sajjad Syed, Syed, “FO “FO Defends Defends CPEC CPEC After Criticism,” Dawn, 23, 69 Baqir Sajjad After Alice Alice Wells’ Wells’ Criticism,” Dawn, May May23, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1559080. 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1559080. 70 Adnan Aamir, “Pakistan Alarmed Sharing Pact,” Pact,” Nikkei 70 Adnan Aamir, “Pakistan Alarmed by by US-India US-India Information Information Sharing Nikkei Asia, November November2, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ Asia, 2, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ Pakistan-alarmed-by-US-India-information-sharing-pact. Pakistan-alarmed-by-US-India-information-sharing-pact. 71 US Climate to 71 Sana Sana Jamal, Jamal, “Pakistan “Pakistan Responds Responds to to US Climate Summit Summit Snub Snub with with Commitment Commitment to Environment,” Gulf News, March 29, 2021, Environment,” Gulf News, March29, 2021, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakihttps://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-responds-to-us-climate-summit-snub-with-commitment-to-environ stan/pakistan-responds-to-us-climate-summit-snub-with-commitment-to-environ ment-1.78194822. ment-1.78194822. 72 Anwar “Blinken, Qureshi Qureshi discuss discuss Afghan situation,” Dawn, July 10, 2021, 72 Anwar Iqbal, Iqbal, “Blinken, Afghan situation,” Dawn, July10, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1634193. www.dawn.com/news/1634193. 73 Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan, “Pakistan, US Sustain Pace Pace in in Bilateral Cooperation,” Dawn, 73 Anwar Iqbal, US Agree Agree to to Sustain Bilateral Cooperation,” Dawn, July 31,2021, July31, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1637887. www.dawn.com/news/1637887. 74 “Remarks “Remarks by President Biden on on the the Way Way Forward Forward inAfghanistan,” in Afghanistan,” The The White White House, 74 by PresidentBiden House, April 14, 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/ April14, 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/ remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/. remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/. 75 Mark MazzettiandJulian Barnes, “C.I.A. New Approach Approach in Afghani75 Mark Mazzetti and Julian E. E. Barnes, “C.I.A. Scrambles Scrambles for for New in Afghani The New York Times, Times, June6, June 6, 2021, 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/06/06/us/politics/ stan,” The www.nytimes.com/2021/06/06/us/politics/ stan,” New York cia-afghanistan-pakistan.html. cia-afghanistan-pakistan.html. 76 Aisha Mahmood, “Pakistan “Pakistan Will Compromise on on Its Its Sovereignty Sovereignty for forAny Country: 76 Aisha Mahmood, Will Never Never Compromise Any Country: PM Imran,” Imran,” Business Business Recorder, Recorder, June30, 2021, www.brecorder.com/news/40104025/ www.brecorder.com/news/40104025/ PM June 30, 2021, pakistan-will-never-compromise-on-its-sovereignty-for-any-country-pm-imran. pakistan-will-never-compromise-on-its-sovereignty-for-any-country-pm-imran. 77 Khan Fears Fears ‘Civil No Peace Peace Deal Deal in Afghanistan,” Al Al Jazeera, Jazeera, 77 “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s Khan ‘Civil War’ War’ If If No in Afghanistan,” June 21, 2021, June21, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/21/pakistan-imran-khan-axios-afgha www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/21/pakistan-imran-khan-axios-afgha nistan-uighurs. nistan-uighurs. 78 Imran Khan, “Imran “Imran Khan: Khan: Pakistan Pakistan Is Ready to to Be Partner for for Peace Peace in in Afghani 78 Imran Khan, Is Ready Be aa Partner Afghanistan, but but We We Will Will Not U.S. Bases,” The Washington Washington Post, June 21, 2021, 2021, stan, Not Host Host U.S. Bases,” The Post, June21, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/21/afghanistan-pakistan-imran-khanwww.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/21/afghanistan-pakistan-imran-khanpeace-security-cooperation-us/. peace-security-cooperation-us/. 79 Ejaz Haider, “Dealing “Dealing with Biden Administration,” The Friday Times, April 30, 79 Ejaz Haider, with the the Biden Administration,” The Friday Times, April30, 2021, 2021, wwwthefridaytimes.com/dealmg-wi1h-the-biden-admmistration/. www.thefridaytimes.com/dealing-with-the-biden-administration/. 80 Zalmay Khalilzad, “Full “Full Committee Committee Hearing: on Afghanistan,” United 80 Zalmay Khalilzad, Hearing: U.S. U.S. Policy Policy on Afghanistan,” United States Committee on on Foreign 27, 2021, 2021, www.foreign.senate. www.foreign.senate. April27, States Senate Senate Committee Foreign Relations, Relations, April gov/hearings/us-policy-on-afghanistan-042721. gov/hearings/us-policy-on-afghanistan-042721. 81 Syed Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, Jaffery, “The “The Intra-Afghan Intra-Afghan Dialogue Good News for Pakistan-US 81 Ali Zia Dialogue Is Is Good News for Pakistan-US Relations,” The Diplomat, September21, Relations,” The Diplomat, September 21, 2020, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/ https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/ the-intra-afghan-dialogue-is-good-news-for-pakistan-us-relations/. the-intra-afghan-dialogue-is-good-news-for-pakistan-us-relations/.

Pakistan’ Under Imran 41 Pakistan’ss Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Under Imran Khan Khan 41 82 Pakistan’s Gwadar Nation, July27, 82 “Afghan “Afghan Transit Transit Trade Trade Via Via Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Port Begins,” Begins,” The The Nation, July 27, 2020, 2020, https://nation.com.pk/27-Jul-2020/afghan-transit-trade-via-pakistan-s-gwadarhttps://nation.com.pk/27-Jul-2020/afghan-transit-trade-via-pakistan-s-gwadarport-begins. port-begins. 83 Naveed Siddiqui, Everything Possible to Reduce Reduce Violence 83 Naveed Siddiqui, “Pakistan “Pakistan Will Will Do Do Everything Possible to Violence in in Afghanistan, Says PM PM Imran Imran on on Maiden Kabul Visit,” Visit,” Dawn, 19, 2020, Afghanistan, Says Maiden Kabul Dawn, November November19, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1591240. www.dawn.com/news/1591240. 84 Ministry of Affairs, “Shared Between Islamic Afghani84 Ministry of Foreign Foreign Affairs, “Shared Vision Vision Between Islamic Republic Republic of of Afghani stan and and Islamic Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Pakistan, to to Support Support Peace Peace and and Stability Stability in in Both stan Republic of Both Countries and and the the Wider 19, 2020, Countries Wider Region,” Region,” November November19, 2020, http://mofa.gov.pk/sharedhttp://mofa.gov.pk/sharedvision-between-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-and-islamic-republic-of-pakistanvision-between-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-and-islamic-republic-of-pakistanto-support-peace-and-stability-in-both-countries-and-the-wider-region/. to-support-peace-and-stability-in-both-countries-and-the-wider-region/. 85 Naveed Siddiqui, “Pakistan “Pakistan Says Says Troops Troops Responded Responded to at Chaman Chaman Bor 85 Naveed Siddiqui, to Afghan Afghan Fire Fire at Border Dawn, July31, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1572170/ www.dawn.com/news/1572170/ der ‘Only ‘Only in in Self-Defence’,” Self-Defence’,” Dawn, July 31, 2020, pakistan-says-troops-responded-to-afghan-fire-at-chaman-border-only-in-selfpakistan-says-troops-responded-to-afghan-fire-at-chaman-border-only-in-selfdefence. defence. 86 Ayaz Gul, Afghan Border Border Fence Fence Nearly Nearly Complete,” 86 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan “Pakistan Says Says Afghan Complete,” Voice Voice of ofAmerica, America, Dec ember,4,2020, www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-says-afghan-borderDecember, 4,2020,www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-says-afghan-borderfence-nearly-complete. fence-nearly-complete. 87 Najibullah Lalzoy, Khan Confrontation Khaama 87 Najibullah Lalzoy, “Ghani, “Ghani, Khan Confrontation Over OverTaliban Taliban in inTashkent,” Tashkent,” The TheKhaama Press, July 17, 2021, Press, July17, 2021, www.khaama.com/ghani-khan-confrontation-over-taliban-inwww.khaama.com/ghani-khan-confrontation-over-taliban-intashkent-46346/. tashkent-46346/. 88 Neither Responsible Responsible for Nor Are Are We We Their 88 “Pakistan “Pakistan Neither for Taliban, Taliban, Nor Their Spokespersons: Spokespersons: PM PM Imran,” July 29, 2021, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1637578. Imran,” Dawn, Dawn, July29, www.dawn.com/news/1637578. 89 “Afghanistan: “Afghanistan: Taliban Taliban Continue Continue Attacks on Three Three Major Cities,” BBC, 1, 89 Attacks on Major Cities,” BBC, August August1, 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58040141. www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58040141. 2021, 90 Amira Jadoon, “The “The Evolution Evolution and and Potential Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban 90 Amira Jadoon, Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” The United United States ofPeace, 12, 2021, Pakistan,” The States Institute Institute of Peace, May May12, 2021, www.usip.org/publi www.usip.org/publi cations/2021/05/evolution-and-potential-resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan. cations/2021/05/evolution-and-potential-resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan . 91 Small, Small, “Returning “Returning to to the Shadows,” 42. 91 the Shadows,” 42. “Review Report: Report: CPEC, CPEC, aa Transformation Transformation in in Motion,” 92 Rabia 92 Rabia Akhtar, Akhtar, “Review Motion,” Pakistan Pakistan Polit Politico, ico, September26, September 26, 2020, 2020, http://pakistanpolitico.com/review-report-cpec-a-transfor http://pakistanpolitico.com/review-report-cpec-a-transfor mation-in-motion/. mation-in-motion/. 93 “Pakistan, “Pakistan, China China Committed Committed to to Taking Taking CPEC CPEC to Umar,” The The News, 93 to New New Heights: Heights: Asad Asad Umar,” News, December13, 2020, www.thenews.com.pk/print/757910-pakistan-china-committedwww.thenews.com.pk/print/757910-pakistan-china-committedDecember 13, 2020, to-taking-cpec-to-new-heights-asad-umar. to-taking-cpec-to-new-heights-asad-umar. 94 Syed Syed Irfan Raza, “CPEC “CPEC Focus Focus Must on Job Job Creation, Creation, Agriculture: Imran,” Dawn, 94 Irfan Raza, Must Be Be on Agriculture: Imran,” Dawn, October9, October 9, 2018, 2018, www.dawn.com/news/1437770. www.dawn.com/news/1437770. 95 “Pakistan “Pakistan Has Taken $6.5Billion $6.5 Billion Loan Loan from from China China in in July-April: July-April: Report,” 95 Has Taken Report,” Business Business Today, May23, May 23, 2019, Today, 2019, www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/pakistan-haswww.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/pakistan-hastaken-65-billion-loan-from-china-in-july-april-report/story/349611.html. taken-65-billion-loan-from-china-m-july-april-report/story/349611.html. 96 “AConversation “A Conversation with Prime Minister Minister Imran Khan of of Pakistan,” Pakistan,” Council Council on on Foreign 96 with Prime Imran Khan Foreign Relations, September 23, 2019, 2019, www.cfr.org/event/conversation-prime-ministerwww.cfr.org/event/conversation-prime-ministerRelations, September23, imran-khan-pakistan-0. imran-khan-pakistan-0. 97 Shahbaz Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan Pays $1b Saudi Saudi Loan,” The Express Tribune, August 6, 97 Rana, “Pakistan Pays Back Back $1b Loan,” The Express Tribune, August6, 2020, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2258238/pakistan-pays-back-1b-saudi-loan. 2020, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2258238/pakistan-pays-back-1b-saudi-loan. 98 Mehtab Haider, News, January1, 98 Mehtab Haider, “Pak-China “Pak-China FTA FTA Phase-II Phase-II Comes Comes into into Effect,” Effect,” Geo Geo News, January 1, 2020, 2020, www.geo.tv/latest/264968-pak-china-fta-phase-ii-comes-into-effect. www.geo.tv/latest/264968-pak-china-fta-phase-ii-comes-into-effect. 99 Nazish and Nadia Mukhtar, “China “China Pakistan Pakistan Free Trade Agreement Phase 2: 2: 99 Nazish Afraz Afraz and Nadia Mukhtar, Free Trade Agreement Phase APreliminary Analysis,” The Pakistan Business Business Council for Develop DevelopA Preliminary Analysis,” The Pakistan Council and and Consortium Consortiumfor ment 2020, www.pbc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/Preliminary-Anal www.pbc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/Preliminary-Anal ment Policy Policy Research, Research, 2020, ysis-of-Pak-China-FTA-Phase-II.pdf. ysis-of-Pak-China-FTA-Phase-II.pdf. 100 “Pak-China Doubled Under (CPFTA-II),” Cpecinfo.com, 100 “Pak-China Bilateral Bilateral Trade Trade Volume Volume Doubled Under (CPFTA-II),” Cpecinfo.com, January 2, 2020, accessed January24, January 24, 2021, January2, 2020, accessed 2021, http://cpecinfo.com/pak-china-bilateralhttp://cpecinfo.com/pak-china-bilateraltrade-volume-doubled-under-cpfta-ii/. trade-volume-doubled-under-cpfta-ii/.

42 Syed Syed Ali 42 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery Jaffery 101 Is Main Mainly Under 101 “China “China Is Main Contributor Contributor of of FDI FDI in in Pakistan, Pakistan, Mainly Under CPEC,” CPEC,” Cpecinfo. Cpecinfo. com, August 21, 2020, com, August21, 2020, http://cpecinfo.com/china-is-main-contributor-of-fdi-in-paki http://cpecinfo.com/china-is-main-contributor-of-fdi-in-paki stan-mamly-under-cpec/#:~:text=China's%20foreign%20direct%20investment%20 stan-mainly-under-cpec/#:~:text=China's%20foreign%20direct%20investment%20 in,respectively%20during%20the%20July%202020. in,respectively%20during%20the%20July%202020. 102 Syed Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, Jaffery, “Making “Making Sense Sense of of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Change Change of of Tone Tone with with 102 Ali Zia Saudi Arabia,” The National September 14, 2020, https://national Saudi Arabia,” The National Interest, Interest, September14, 2020, https://national interest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/making-sense-pakistan%E2%80%99s-change-toneinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/making-sense-pakistan%E2%80%99s-change-tonesaudi-arabia-168877. saudi-arabia-168877. 103 Islamuddin Sajid, “China, “China, Pakistan Kabul, Taliban Taliban Efforts for Talks,” Talks,” 103 Islamuddin Sajid, Pakistan Praise Praise Kabul, Efforts for Anadolu Agency, Agency, August August22, Anadolu 22, 2020, 2020, www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-pakis www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-pakis tan-praise-kabul-taliban-eflbrts-for-talks/1949621. tan-praise-kabul-taliban-efforts-for-talks/1949621. 104 “China “China Hails Hails Pakistan’s Efforts Against Terrorism,” Daily September 11, 11, 104 Pakistan’s Efforts Against Terrorism,” Daily Pakistan, Pakistan, September 2020, https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/n-Sep-2020/china-hails-pakistan-s-effortshttps://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/11-Sep-2020/china-hails-pakistan-s-efforts2020, against-terrorism. against-terrorism. 105 “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s Economic Future Is China, Says Says Imran 105 Economic Future Is Now Now Linked Linked to to China, Imran Khan,” Khan,” Business Business Standard, September4, 2020, www.business-standard.com/article/international/paki Standard, September 4, 2020, www.business-standard.com/article/international/paki stan-s-economic-future-is-now-linked-to-china-says-imran-khan-120090400055_1. stan-s-economic-future-is-now-linked-to-china-says-imran-khan-120090400055_1. html. html. 106 Rabia Akhtar, Akhtar, “Kashmir: ANuclear Pakistan Horizon, Horizon, 73, 106 Rabia “Kashmir: A Nuclear Flashpoint,” Flashpoint,” Pakistan 73, no. no. 11 (2020). (2020). 107 “Navigating “Navigating Pakistan’s Security Challenges,” Challenges,” Atlantic Council, August 10, 107 Pakistan’s National National Security Atlantic Council, August10, www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/navigating-pakistans-national-security-chal 2020, 2020, www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/navigating-pakistans-national-security-chal lenges/. lenges/. 108 “RSS “RSS Ideology Ideology of of Hindu Hindu Supremacy Supremacy Will Lead to Suppression of of Muslims Muslims in in India and 108 Will Lead to Suppression India and to Targeting Targeting of of Pakistan,” 11, 2019, 2019, www.dawn.com/news/1499293. to Pakistan,” Dawn, Dawn, August August11, www.dawn.com/news/1499293. 109 Rabia Akhtar, Akhtar, Interview Interview by by Author, Author, January14, 109 Rabia January 14, 2021. 2021. 110 “Qureshi “Qureshi Introduces ‘FM Connect’,” Connect’,” Business 19, 2019, 110 Introduces ‘FM Business Recorder, Recorder, November November19, 2019, www. www. brecorder.com/news/545611. brecorder.com/news/545611. 111 Politico Interview Interview with with Moeed Moeed Yusuf,” Pakistan Politico, Politico, December December21, 111 “Pakistan “Pakistan Politico Yusuf,” Pakistan 21, 2019, http://pakistanpolitico.com/pakistan-politico-interview-with-moeed-yusuf/. http://pakistanpolitico.com/pakistan-politico-interview-with-moeed-yusuf/. 2019, 112 “One Year Year In: In: A Conversation with with Pakistani Prime Minister 112 “One AConversation Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Imran Khan,” Khan,” United States Institute Institute of Peace, July23, 2019, www.usip.org/events/one-yearUnited States of Peace, July 23, 2019, www.usip.org/events/one-yearconversation-pakistani-prime-minister-imran-khan. conversation-pakistani-prime-minister-imran-khan. 113 Amir “Army Never Pressure Over Over Foreign Foreign Policy, 113 Amir Wasim, Wasim, “Army Never Put Put Pressure Policy, Appointments: Appointments: PM,” PM,” Dawn, November November2020, Dawn, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1592997. www.dawn.com/news/1592997. 114 “All “All Wars 114 Wars Are Are Miscalculated.” Miscalculated.” 115 ArifRafiq,“ThePakistanArmy’sBeltandRoadPutsch,”ForeigwPolicy,August26,2020, 115 Arif Rafiq, “The PakistanArmy’s Belt and Road Putsch,” Foreign Policy,August26, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/the-pakistan-armys-belt-and-road-putsch/. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/the-pakistan-armys-belt-and-road-putsch/. 116 Stephanie Stephanie Findlay and Farhan “Pakistan’s Imran Sidelined by 116 Findlay and Farhan Bokhari, Bokhari, “Pakistan’s Imran Khan Khan Sidelined by Mili Military During Coronavirus Outbreak,” Outbreak,” Financial Times, April 25, 2020, 2020, www.ft.com/ www.ft.com/ tary During Coronavirus Financial Times, April25, content/686714d7-ae05-431d-a13d-1966153be151. content/686714d7-ae05-431d-a13d-1966153be151. 117 Prime Office, “PTI “PTI Manifesto 55. 117 Prime Minister’s Minister’s Office, Manifesto 2018,” 2018,” 55. 118 Ministry of Foreign “Press Release,” Release,” October October 1, 1, 2020, 2020, http://mofa.gov.pk/ 118 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Affairs, “Press http://mofa.gov.pk/ press-release-346/. press-release-346/. 119 Ministry of Foreign Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Minister’s Minister’s Virtual Virtual Meeting on Economic Economic DiploDiplo 119 Ministry of Affairs, “Foreign Meeting on macy with with Pakistani Pakistani Envoys Envoys in in African Countries,” Press January 6, 2021, macy African Countries,” Press Release, Release, January6, 2021, http://mofa.gov.pk/foreign-ministers-virtual-meeting-on-economic-diplomacy-withhttp://mofa.gov.pk/foreign-ministers-virtual-meeting-on-economic-diplomacy-withpakistani-envoys-in-african-countries/. pakistani-envoys-in-african-countries/. 120 “PM’s “PM’s Economic Outreach Initiative Initiative Kicks Off,” Business October 3, 2020, 120 Economic Outreach Kicks Off,” Business Recorder, Recorder, October3, 2020, www.brecorder.com/news/40023406/pms-economic-outreach-initiative-kicks-off. www.brecorder.com/news/40023406/pms-economic-outreach-initiative-kicks-off. 121 “Prime “Prime Minister Imran Khan Chaired Meeting Meeting of of the Committee on on Economic 121 Minister Imran Khan Chaired the Apex Apex Committee Economic Outreach at at Islamabad,”Media Today, January7, January 7, 2021, 2021, www.mediaonlinetoday.com/ www.mediaonlinetoday.com/ Outreach Islamabad,” Media Today, prime-minister-imran-khan-chaired-meeting-of-the-apex-committee-on-economicprime-minister-imran-khan-chaired-meeting-of-the-apex-committee-on-economicoutreach-at-islamabad/. outreach-at-islamabad/.

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 43 122 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Africa to Be New Focus of Foreign Policy: Imran,” Dawn, November29, 2019, www.dawn.com/news/1519460. 123 Ibid. 124 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Minister’s Visit to Kenya,” Press Release, February1, 2020, http://mofa.gov.pk/foreign-ministers-visit-to-kenya/. 125 Awais Raoof, Interview by Author, January15, 2021. 126 “Pakistan’s Trade with Africa Reaches $4.18bn in 2020: Razak Dawood,” The Nation, December27, 2020, https://nation.com.pk/27-Dec-2020/pakistan-s-tradewith-africa-reaches-dollar-4-18bn-in-2020-razak-dawood. 127 Sana Jamal, “Pakistan to Open Diplomatic Mission in Djibouti,” Gulf News, December31, 2020, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-to-opendiplomatic-mission-in-djibouti-1.76208693. 128 Arif Rafiq, “Pakistan’s Geoeconomic Delusions,” Foreign Policy, April5, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/05/pakistans-geoeconomic-delusions/. 129 Maleeha Lodhi, “Not by Words Alone,” Dawn, June14, 2021, www.dawn.com/ news/1629274/not-by-words-alone. 130 “IMF Revises Up Pakistan’s Real GDP Growth Rate to 3.9%,” The Express Tribune, July28, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2312600/imf-revises-up-pakistansreal-gdp-growth-rate-to-39.

3 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? Samee Lashari

Introduction The shift in international politics is a glaring reality. American century being over and a sprinting rush to the twenty-first century great power competition shows the shaking up of the structure of international order. Such a competition has been intensified by the erstwhile weaker but now rising powers in regions across the globe. Indicators, such as the growing use of state-patronized violence on the one hand and large-scale mass resistance to it on the other, decentralization of global processes of production, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction and military technology, show that the world politics is transforming quickly to embrace new alliances and blocks. The rise of new powers in international relations transforms the dynamics of bargaining rules wherein states find new opportunities to accumulate further power and exhibit their desired roles in international relations. The notion of the rise and fall of powers in world politics has an essential reference to nation-states. The nation-state, Iargue, remains the principal actor of world politics. The glare of contemporary globalization could not diminish its stature since it could not offer a tenable alternative to the principality of the state as a constituent factor in the making of their own existence acceptable. It remains the pillar of social engineering, generator of identity, builder of nationhood, architect of economic prosperity, and regulator of interclass relations. Whereas globalization did affect its exclusivity in international economy, it could not, and perhaps would never, seize political control over an individual. Whereas the shift in power at great power level is not paradigmatic, such transformation is much conspicuous at the Middle Power level. The rise of China has become a cliché in contemporary international politics discourse. In fact, it has been argued that “An era of unprecedented unipolarity has come to an end as China’s rise has changed the underlying distribution of power in the international system.”1 Broadening this transformation beyond China has produced an organizational term named as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).2 The democratization of G-7/G-8 has led to G20, a more inclusive and welcoming group of both the established industrialized economies and military powers.3 Simultaneously, the rise of China and its various economic and security ventures in Asia and Africa have pushed the need for counter-initiatives such DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-4

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 45 as Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad– an informal dialogue mechanism between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States– with an apparent push to convert it into an alliance.4 In the case of South Asia, Indian economy has modernized, and it is increasingly becoming a new economic epicenter. The nuclear proliferation has been unstoppable as India, Pakistan, and North Korea have successfully tested nuclear weapons. These and several other political, strategic, and economic transformations have provided an ample opportunity to several erstwhile poor or developing countries to claim a higher Middle Power status in international politics.

Defining Middle Power The idea of Middle Power in international politics is a product of post-war international institutional arrangements. Right after the end of the World War II, in 1946, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King demanded a role of what he called “Middle Powers” like Canada in international order. Since then, the concept has become a part of IR lexicon though we are still far away from having any widely accepted definition of the concept. Various scholars have tried to define it using arbitrary and, to an extent, auxiliary indicators. In doing so, the concept has been termed as “small state” and “medium power” as well. The dearth of a definitional consensus is indicated by the fact that almost every research work spends a considerable effort trying to define the concept. More than three decades ago, Mares (1988) defined a global hierarchical structure based on distribution of resources and divided the countries into great, secondary, middle, and small powers. Middle Powers, according to him, were countries possessing “enough resources so that in an alliance with a small enough number of other states that they are not merely “price takers,” they can affect the system.”5 About two-anda-half decades later, Wang and French use the literal interpretation of “middle” when they argue that Middle Powers are “countries that are neither at the apex nor the bottom of the international power structure.” It means that their power is not definitive enough to “exert decisive influence on major issues of international security and economy.” However, they are not weak enough “to be unable to protect themselves from the undesirable impacts of other countries’ actions.” They conclude that Middle Powers “have considerable resources and capabilities but are not dominant in international relations.”6 Similarly, Jordaan defines it as a country that is “neither great nor small in terms of their power, capacity and influence and exhibits the capability to create cohesion and obstruction toward global order and governance.”7 Andrew Carr argues that there are three definitional categories of a Middle Power: position (material or quantifiable factors such as population, human development index, gross domestic product, military strength, geographic location, strategic significance, and so on), behavior, and identity (the assertion of the policy makers and leadership to demand a significant role in international affairs).8 In terms of behavioral dimension, Carr relies on the definition provided by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal who argue that that Middle Powers are

46 Samee Lashari countries exhibiting “tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems,... to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy.”9 Carr, however, accepts the shortcomings of these definitional parameters. For example, while he claims Australia as being one of the Middle Powers, he agrees that it does not meet some of the conditions of position as it lacks formidable population. He also claims that only top 20 countries of the world can be included in this club of Middle Powers, something that can easily be challenged. In the next pages, Itry to refine this definition. Lack of a definitional consensus promotes self-serving list of countries to be included in the category of Middle Powers. Over the years, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) have been mentioned as a new group of rising powers in the world system. Another set of countries includes Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA).10 In some studies, countries comprising G20 minus great powers are considered as the Middle Powers.11 M. Islam discusses new Emerging Global Organizations and Groups (EGOs/EGGs) that include, beyond BRICS and MIKTA, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) or Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa (CIVETs).12 The countries mentioned in these lists indicate the apparent changes in the distribution of power beyond Europe on the one hand and institutionalized approaches to reform global governance structure on the other. Given that scholars have used arbitrarily defined criteria to identify and explicate the concept of Middle Power in International Relations (IR), it is entirely difficult to use anyone or to create a new criterion without a controversy. This chapter, nevertheless, adopts the second approach by creating a rather encompassing criterion to define the concept of Middle Power in international system. It relies on two basic principles. The first principle is that self-identification as a Middle Power is an important prerequisite in any country’s foreign policy behavior. Identity formation, with its realization, in turn, is a conscious process through which a country’s leadership and political class evaluate various factors, both historical and contemporary, to reach a conclusion claiming a much more visible position in international system. Such an identification is necessary to embrace the nature of the new role the state in question is demanding and is confidently willing to play. It may also require evaluation and advocacy of expectations from the global system and a pursuit of recognition, elaboration of such responsibilities, and an explicit willingness to fulfill these tasks in international politics. Identity as a variable in international politics relies on explanations provided by revisionist approaches. Revisionist theories are the ones that question the “given” nature of contemporary structure of IR, yearn to peer into historical processes that contributed to this structure, and ask for a critical evaluation of this structure by looking into historical processes and exposing its genesis. These theories include, among others, Marxist Tradition, Social Constructivism, Postcolonialism, Feminism, and Green Theory. Any effort to explain the difference in behaviors of states based on self-identification, therefore, requires peering into national

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 47 ideational-cum-evolutionary factors, domestic historical–political resources, historical geo-political features, and opportunities created through self-projection or generated by the dynamic transformations in regional as well as international institutional structures, among others. Acountry behaves like a Middle Power because its representative leadership believes being a Middle Power. Robert W. Cox, for example, agrees that there is no one criterion to label a country as Middle Power, though he counts middle-range material capabilities as an essential factor. He argues that a country may be considered a Middle Power if it has an ability to stand a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the world system. Additionally, he argues that such a country needs a behavioral input as well; a country may be considered Middle Power when its political leadership start perceiving it as such and start portraying it at the international level. It happens most when hegemonic world orders dwindle, thus paving ways for the rise of new global economic relations. AMiddle Power is, he argues, “a role in search of an actor.”13 This role, in other words, is fulfilled by those actors who aspire for such understanding of a country and yearn for such acknowledgement in international politics. Andrew Cooper, for example, argues that “Middle Power identity is enhanced by domestic political incentives to both elevate and nuance their location in the global system.”14 Similarly, Wang and French argue that a country believing in itself as a Middle Power behaves differently than others who do not, especially when it comes to aspiring much more and visible participation in global governance.15 For Middle Powers, part of the quest for identity and a desire for its acknowledgement is driven by a willingness to become a “good international citizen.” Gareth J. Evans, the former Australian foreign minister (1988–1996), advocated the idea of “good international citizenship” based on blending various elements of idealism and realism and converted them into a central pillar of his foreign policy approach.16 Agood international citizen, according to Evans and Grant, is a Middle Power country that plays a cementing and facilitating role strengthening international order set by the great powers, promotes harmony among the states, and reforms international system to turn it into a more representative and democratic. Middle Powers, they argue, however, develop, maintain, and must exercise their leverage over the great powers to refine international system serving their own national interests. Importantly, they believe that Middle Powers do not command hard power but must rely and increase their soft power to persistently pursue their narrowly defined “like-minded” interests.17 Linklater believes that there are various dimensions of good international citizenship: collective responsibility for the maintenance of international order, respecting the equal sovereignty of other states, permitting the growth of global cosmopolitanism, and the right of self-determination.18 In other words, countries claiming Middle Power status must exhibit a good citizenship record based on these indicators. Abenevolent Middle Power is the one that embraces role extended to it by the powers that are in

48 Samee Lashari international international system system and and therefore therefore claims claims greater greater acknowledgement acknowledgement and and symbolic symbolic recognition. recognition. Andrew understanding of Power wherein Andrew Carr’s Carr’s definitional definitional understanding of Middle Middle Power wherein he he menmen tions factors–- position, position, behavior, behavior, and tions three three factors and identity– identity - is is an an encompassing encompassing definidefini tion since to theoretical theoretical foundations foundations of both tion since it, it, without without any any regard regard to of IR, IR, combines combines both 19 realist and constructivist approaches. However, I disagree with this definition realist and constructivist approaches.19 However, I disagree with this definition in in one one crucial crucial manner. manner. The The sources sources of of construction construction of of identity identity of of any any country country are are both and material. material. Behavioral Behavioral transformations, arguably, are are the both ideational ideational and transformations, arguably, the by byproduct of of aa varying combination of of these In similar similar circ*mstances, circ*mstances, product varying combination these two two factors. factors. In one country behaves differently than others because of its identity one country behaves differently than others because of its identity and and material material capability. The first and foremost important factor is the ideational understanding capability. The first and foremost important factor is the ideational understanding of being aa Middle the sources the material of being Middle Power. Power. Second, Second, the sources of of the material capabilities capabilities may may vary immensely; some countries are the center of global politics because vary immensely; some countries are the center of global politics merely merely because of their strategic because of their of their strategic locations locations whereas whereas others others may may carry carry significance significance because of their immensely valuable resources such as geographic size, population size, agriculimmensely valuable resources such as geographic size, population size, agricul tural sector, natural natural resources, resources, industrial production, and and so so on. on. All All these factors, tural sector, industrial production, these factors, put together, matter to country in global political political structure. structure. When When aa put together, matter to position position aa country in global country to be be aa Middle country perceives perceives to Middle Power Power and and its its indicators indicators of of material material power power subsub stantiate these claims, it becomes relatively easy to advance global objectives stantiate these claims, it becomes relatively easy to advance global objectives of of widespread acknowledgement. acknowledgement. widespread The therefore, is that aa country Middle Power The second second principle, principle, therefore, is that country claims claims aa Middle Power status status primarily when its identity corresponds with its national resources primarily when its identity corresponds with its national resources of of material material power. Amoral A moral claim claim of of Middle Power status status per se is is unsustainable unsustainable in long power. Middle Power per se in the the long run if if there no material material support support to substantiate it. it. Realist/neo-realist Realist/neo-realist as as well well as as run there is is no to substantiate idealist/neoliberal scholars have emphasized the role of material power capabiliidealist/neoliberal scholars have emphasized the role of material power capabili ties in the policy behavior of aa country. country. E. Carr argues argues that “morality ties in the foreign foreign policy behavior of E. H. H. Carr that “morality is the product of power,” “politics cannot be divorced from power,” “power is the product of power,” “politics cannot be divorced from power,” “power is is always always an an essential essential element element of of politics,” politics,” and and “no “no ethical ethical standards standards are are applicable applicable 20 to between states.” Hans Morgenthau Morgenthau stated that power power was was the to relations relations between states.”20 Hans stated that the immeimme diate aim and an end in itself for all the states. He argues that since the to diate aim and an end in itself for all the states. He argues that since the desire desire to attain a maximum of power is universal, all nations must always be afraid that attain a maximum of power is universal, all nations must always be afraid that their the power their own own miscalculations miscalculations and and the power increases increases of of other other nations nations might might add add up up to an inferiority for themselves which they must at all costs try to avoid (p.192). to an inferiority for themselves which they must at all costs try to avoid (p. 192). According to John believe that power is According to John Mearsheimer, Mearsheimer, “Realists “Realists believe that power is the the currency currency 21 of international politics.” Neorealists pay particular attention to the of international politics.”21 Neorealists pay particular attention to the relative relative sigsig nificance foreign policy behaviors. The nificance of of determinants determinants influencing influencing states’ states’ foreign policy behaviors. The most most 23 significant the distribution Layne,22 Waltz, and significant among among them them is is the distribution of of capabilities. capabilities. Layne,22 Waltz,23 and 24 Mearsheimer argue that the distribution of capabilities creates hierarchical strucMearsheimer24 argue that the distribution of capabilities creates hierarchical struc ture based on From aa neolibture in in international international politics politics based on relative relative power power of of the the states. states. From neolib eral perspective, power is an essential element to establish Kantian eral perspective, power is an essential element to establish Kantian “democratic “democratic peace”; to prepare times collective) peace”; liberal liberal states states have have to prepare for for successful successful (and (and many many aa times collective) defense against non-liberal aggressors. Even in cases where hegemonic defense against non-liberal aggressors. Even in cases where hegemonic wars wars may may be seen as rarest incidents, small-scale wars in the periphery are a recurrent be seen as rarest incidents, small-scale wars in the periphery are a recurrent phephe 25 nomenon They, nomenon for for which which liberal liberal states states must must remain remain ready ready to to deal deal with. with.25 They, therefore, therefore, are not oblivious of the dynamics of power politics in the world and are not oblivious of the dynamics of power politics in the world and “maintain “maintain aa

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 49 26 healthy for conflicts with authoritarian In whereas healthy appetite appetite for conflicts with authoritarian states.” states.”26 In other other words, words, whereas realists/neorealists are pessimistic about the prospects of cooperation because realists/neorealists are pessimistic about the prospects of cooperation because states have primary interest in survival and security in an environment of anarchy, states have primary interest in survival and security in an environment of anarchy, suspicion, with the the role in interstate interstate suspicion, and and mistrust, mistrust, neoliberals neoliberals agree agree with role power power plays plays in relations but are optimistic that economic ventures, starting from technical relations but are optimistic that economic ventures, starting from technical coopcoop eration, build trust trust among the states, eration, can can build among the states, and and they they can can cooperate cooperate on on security security issues issues as well. argue that international institutions institutions can can play as well. Neoliberal Neoliberal institutionalists institutionalists argue that international play aa significantly important role in facilitating cooperation in areas where states find significantly important role in facilitating cooperation in areas where states find 27 Realists argue that international institutions reflect substantial absolute interests. substantial absolute interests.27 Realists argue that international institutions reflect the dynamics of of power power politics and act act as as policy for great great powers. powers. the dynamics politics and policy tool tool for The preoccupation of neo-versions of both status-quo theories The preoccupation of neo-versions of both status-quo theories of of IR IR with with syssys tem factors as independent variables affecting foreign policy choices of tem factors as independent variables affecting foreign policy choices of states, states, however, faces some Neoclassical realists, while agreehowever, faces some limitations. limitations. Neoclassical realists, for for example, example, while agree ing to neorealist understanding of interstate system, add domestic factors plauing to neorealist understanding of interstate system, add domestic factors as as plau sible determinants of foreign policy behavior of states. They argue that when sible determinants of foreign policy behavior of states. They argue that when facing policy choices– both constraints take facing foreign foreign policy choices - both constraints and and opportunities– opportunities - states states do do take into account international system. However, their choices do reflect unit-level facinto account international system. However, their choices do reflect unit-level fac tors such as domestic political structure, state–society relation, strategic culture, tors such as domestic political structure, state-society relation, strategic culture, 28 and the making perceptions of Whereas and role role of of history history in in the making of of perceptions of political political leadership. leadership.28 Whereas they disagree about the relative significance of domestic factors in shaping they disagree about the relative significance of domestic factors in shaping foreign foreign policy of that these factors are policy of aa country, country, they they do do agree agree that these factors are important important and and should should not not be ignored particularly when the variance variance in to international international be ignored particularly when explaining explaining the in response response to challenges. challenges. Neoliberal theorists agree that states principal founding founding stones internaagree that states are are principal stones of of interna Neoliberal theorists tional political system and are indeed rational actors seeking maximization tional political system and are indeed rational actors seeking maximization of of their interests. However, whereas whereas neorealists their interests. However, neorealists emphasize emphasize relative relative gains gains as as the the most most important believe that that state toward absolute important area area of of focus, focus, neoliberals neoliberals believe state looks looks toward absolute gains: gains: 29 they are more concerned with what they are getting out of a deal. For Middle they are more concerned with what they are getting out of a deal.29 For Middle Power then, international provide aa utilitarian to Power countries, countries, then, international institutions institutions provide utilitarian support support to facilitate, build, and cement cement cooperation cooperation among among the states. Though Though their focus facilitate, build, and the states. their focus is trade cooperation, is economic economic and and trade cooperation, states states do do look look into into how how such such maneuverings maneuverings elevate their position in international system. Therefore, it is reasonable elevate their position in international system. Therefore, it is reasonable to to claim claim that a fast-developing state may still claim Middle Power status if it has an that a fast-developing state may still claim Middle Power status if it has an organic organic indigenous identity, possesses possesses considerable indigenous identity, considerable leverage leverage in in outstanding outstanding regional regional and and global economic and security issues, and can exhibit excellent diplomatic global economic and security issues, and can exhibit excellent diplomatic and and negotiating to get player in negotiating skills skills to get acknowledgement acknowledgement of of aa responsible responsible player in the the system. system. Whereas we can variety of Whereas we can indicate indicate aa variety of characteristics characteristics contributing contributing into into the the realireali zation of a Middle Power status, it nevertheless is reasonable to argue that not zation of a Middle Power status, it nevertheless is reasonable to argue that not every be able for every country country may may be able to to satisfactorily satisfactorily meet meet all all such such characteristics. characteristics. Carr, Carr, for example, acknowledges that whereas Australia meets some of the crucial prereqexample, acknowledges that whereas Australia meets some of the crucial prereq uisite uisite indicators indicators of of national national power– power - GDP, GDP, military military size, size, and and defense defense spending– spending - it it 30 does lack population size; several other countries have larger population does lack population size; several other countries have larger population sizes. sizes.30 Spero that though though Middle Middle Powers Powers may the use Spero argues argues that may exhibit exhibit lower lower capacity capacity of of the use of force as compared to great powers, they still matter a lot in the system because of force as compared to great powers, they still matter a lot in the system because “the facing Middle the “the challenges challenges facing Middle Power Power leaderships leaderships play play an an integral integral role role within within the

50 Samee Lashari international system for utilizing capabilities and influencing great power security dilemmas.”31 In an anarchic international political structure, struggle to maintain a formidable power causes several tensions between the rising Middle Powers and established great powers, which, grappling with an ever-prevalent concern about their status, may perceive any rising power as an exacerbated threat. Therefore, we can argue that the ranking of countries along the lines of power as measured in terms of material capability and resources is an essential prerequisite in establishing interstate identities and their acknowledgement by their allies as well as adversaries. Simultaneously, it is more about self-realization of such status and an earnest effort to get such a claim acknowledged in a wider manner to justly become a Middle Power country in international system.

Pakistan as a Middle Power Country Studying Pakistan as a Middle Power country is a relatively new topic. Though the country has been a major regional power during the Cold War, it nevertheless faced several setbacks impeding its rise in the ranking of Middle Powers. Writing in 1988, Bernard Wood included Pakistan as one of the Middle Power countries not because of its economic performance but because of its “special regional or global importance.”32 The Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2020, an index using eight indicators of power– economic resources, military capability, resilience, future trends, diplomatic influence, economic relationships, defense networks, and cultural influence – ranks Pakistan as the 15th power in Asia. However, the index emphasizes that the country is “underachiever” and “exerts less influence in the region than expected given its available resources.”33 Middle Power Initiative, a project of Basel Peace Office, does not consider Pakistan and India as the Middle Power countries because they have armed themselves with nuclear weapons, a factor that, when evaluated through leading theories of International Relations, nullifies the whole effort.34 Pakistan is also a member of the G24, a sub-group of the G77 group created in the early 1970s, to represent and safeguard interests of the developing world in international monetary, development, and financial governance fora. In 2005, Goldman Sachs coined a term “Next 11” or N-11, a list of countries including Pakistan that “could potentially have a BRIC-like impact in rivalling the G7.”35 However, this report shows Pakistan lagging behind than other countries of comparatively smaller population size, geographic size, natural resources, or military capacity. Moreover, various scholars have also included Pakistan as a Middle Power country. Vandamme argues that while Pakistan can hardly fit into the current categories of middlepowermanship due to its poor economic and development performances, it is one of the nine nuclear states and is– at least– in the top 20 armies of the world. Consequently, the military factor in Pakistan places the country into the category of middle powers, while its economic capacities and weight would rather identify it as a small power.36

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 51 Ebert and Blarel consider Pakistan as a “secondary regional power” in South Asia.37 This categorization follows Ebert and Flemes’s definition that maintains that secondary regional powers are countries “that are most capable to compete for regional leadership, and thus their (non-)followership is critical for regional cooperation.”38 While one may disagree with this categorization, it certainly is an indicative of the comparative power dynamics in South Asia. These and other endeavors of ranking countries rely, primarily, upon the material capabilities, a factor that this study considers significant but ranks it after the first and foremost factor: self-identification. Material indicators of power, both military and economic, are important and cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, when we look at the foreign policy behavior of countries from Middle Power point of view, we see that many countries do not claim such status despite having higher rankings on indicators such as the ones mentioned by the Lowy Institute. Some other countries, while performing low on these indicators, claim Middle Power status and strive to be acknowledged as such. The reason, Iargue, is based in their self-identification that, in turn, is embedded in an organic worldview that claims a powerful presence in international political affairs. The identity of being an un-ignorable power in international community was embedded deep in the state ideology of Pakistan even before the country itself came into being. According to this official perspective, Muslims of Indian SubContinent, despite being just little over one-fifth of the whole population, secured a separate homeland because they were a nation even before they had a country. Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, built upon the loose yet inspiring identity of religion and demanded a separate homeland. Addressing All India Muslim League annual meeting in Lahore in 1940, he rejected the idea of Muslims being a minority in India, claimed that they in fact were “a nation by any definition” and that peaceful coexistence among the “major nations in India” was possible only through “dividing India into autonomous national states.”39 Later on, this meeting was called as being a decisive milestone in the history of the region– it led to the partition of India. According to Hussain, Muslim cultural nationalism, with Islam as the central core of its sociocultural reality, had a religious and not a secular base. Jinnah used the force of Islam to mobilize the Muslim community, and as the elites and masses could identify with Islam, the state-to-be could not have come into existence without it. The creation of a Muslim nation was necessary in theory to perverse Islam, but in actuality it could only be done through the creation of Pakistan for the Muslim minority. Jinnah negotiated Pakistan by identifying Islam with Pakistan. (p.29) Therefore, he argues further, “the process of Islamicization [of the struggle] was the key to the Pakistanization of the ideological state” (emphasis added).40 Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan’s military dictator in the 1980s and the strongest official force so

52 Samee Lashari far to Islamize the judicio-political system of the country, stated in an interview in 1981 with The Economist that “Pakistan is, like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.”41 Indicating greater similarities between Israel and Pakistan as two religiously inspired ideological states, Faisal Devji called Pakistan a “Muslim Zion state.”42 Zia’s comments are important even today because Pakistan falls back on its official ideological positions whenever it refers to the politics of the Greater Middle East. One of the corollaries of adopting a universal understanding of religion as the basis of national identity was adopting a sense of belongingness to the whole Muslim population living anywhere in the world. Alan Waites argues that “This ideology of the ‘Two Nation Theory’ from its inception was more compelling as a determinant of ‘external’ relations for Muslims than it was for internal issues.”43 After independence, Jinnah referred to territorial and political issues being faced by the Muslim countries. This included rejecting the strong rejection of the establishment of Israel; Pakistan supported Palestinians in their quest for a just and honorable two-state solution. Being the first post-war Muslim majority country, Pakistan supported independence movements of Indonesia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and other countries.44 It was one of the reasons that the country was able to establish cordial relations with these post-colonial countries. In doing so, it relied upon the principality of religion as its individual cultural specificity and rejected, or at least relegated, any notion of secularism as the foundation of its identity. This official ideological perspective is not widely accepted though. Ayesha Jalal argued that Islam was not the driving force for the creation of Pakistan. She, rather, called Jinnah as the “sole spokesman,” someone who personified the idea of Pakistan– a country that he “in fact did not really want” – without explaining it and the territorial limits of the proposed sovereign state to anyone else including his party leaders, workers, and even the masses.45 This later on created several issues as competing identities such as ethnicity and economic interests intervened to weaken and eventually disintegrate the state. Critics argue that Jinnah was a secular politician, and he “often said different things to different audiences,”46 thus leaving his successors “uncertain about, or hostile to, his understanding of the role of Islam in defining the nation’s constitutional foundations.”47 Arguments have also been made questioning the role of Islam in the making of Pakistan.48 Nevertheless, the state embraced religion as the foundational stone and a guide to its conduct in international politics. The first constitutional document– the Objective Resolution– idealized Islam and Islamic political principles such as sovereignty belonging to Allah, the power being exercised by the constituent assembly as a delegated one, and a pledge to establish an Islamic society. The constitutions of 1956 and 1962, while declaring Islam as the religion of the state, kept this resolution as the preamble and a guiding document. The 1973 constitution has been extensively Islamized. For example, it “defines” Muslim and forbids any nonMuslim to become the head of the state. It guarantees provision of “Islamic way of life” as the responsibility of the state, enforces compulsory Islamic education

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 53 in schools, promotion of “fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity,” and declares that “no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.” The state officially celebrates all religious holidays, festivals, and mournings. The state tangibly espouses religious education schools, enforces religious code of conduct over non-Muslims, and many a times fails to implement the safety and security of religious minorities. The collective outcome of these steps is that Islam in Pakistan is the most powerful social and cultural identity. Though it has rarely converted into political power, it has had mobilized the massive support power to claim significant legal victories. The state co-opts this support to achieve its domestic as well as foreign policy objectives. Domestically, Pakistan utilizes this ideological foundation to counter divergent ethnic, sectarian, and racial identities. Externally, Pakistan turns it into a springboard to claim to be a so-called fort of Islam, thus a true global representative of Middle Eastern, Central Asian, Southeast Asian, and North African Muslim majority countries. Following this ideological approach, of which the military establishment believed itself to be a champion, Pakistan developed an aggressive and resilient posture to its regional competitor India. Albeit several setbacks, including, most significantly, the disintegration of the country in 1971 and increasing gap between the two economies, Pakistan claims parity with India and rejects any great-power-politics to belittle its status in the region and beyond. Pakistan utilized its Islamic identity to aggrandize its role in international politics by aggressively promoting its defense and foreign policy in the region and beyond. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the country disintegrated but survived because of global interests in the region.49 Starting in the 1980s, with the help of the United States, Pakistan utilized its Islamic identity to play a frontline role in a full-scale proxy war in Afghanistan against the-then Soviet Union.50 Taking into consideration its India fear factor and its claim of political-strategic parity with its archrival, coupled with a self-proclaimed role model posture of the Muslim world, Pakistan flouted international pressure and tested nuclear weapons in 1998. After few years, it exported nuclear technology to other countries including Iran and North Korea.51 In the 1990s, when the country was slapped with sanctions from Washington, it promoted a low-scale yet continuous violence in Kashmir to engage and entrap Indian strategic power there. Simultaneously, it promoted Jihadi organizations as a second defense line abetting national security in the case of any external aggression, primarily from India. Perhaps the most significant reflection of Pakistan’s self-proclaimed identity of a major player in international politics is evident in its demand of an equal treatment as extended to India. Though Pakistan acknowledges that India is bigger in geographic and population size and possesses stronger and robust economic base, it still is least willing to accept a relegated positional standing in the region. Starting with the 1980s, using educational indoctrination of pan-Islamism and its practical application in Afghan Jihad in the 1980s and in Kashmir in the 1990s, Pakistan tried to ossify its ideological approach toward its position in the world. During this process, the state propagated to the domestic audience a national identity as of a pluralistic young society, credible regional power, and a leader of

54 Samee Lashari the Muslim world. The volatile nature of regional strategic maneuvering enabled Pakistan to justify its ideological understanding to the world; world peace could not have been achieved without acknowledging the crucial geostrategic power of Islamabad. However, it needs to be reminded that the social construction of religion-based national identity of Pakistan, considered imperative to checkmate divergent ethnic and regional identities, required Islamabad to play a vital role in regional and global politics, arguably beyond its rational capacity. In this quest, the state relegated national significance of industrialization and economic growth; condoned its short-term political stability; sacrificed socioeconomic modernization; tolerated an increasingly deficient and corrupt bureaucratic structure; propitiated political corruption; and reneged from ensuring educational, health, business, and income securities to its burgeoning young population. The state focused on its external existential challenges and diverted its meager fiscal resources to strengthen its national defense. To the decision-makers in Islamabad, the practical manifestation of this socially and consciously constructed ideological approach meant to push the country to adopt a realist approach to regional and global politics: the country must possess an indispensable and impregnable national defense structure. One of the consequences of this approach can be seen in the fact that Pakistan is a major reason Indian status in international political, economic, and military ranking is eclipsed and relegated. From a realist perspective, Pakistan’s foreign policy behavior can be explained as an effort to balance its power with that of Indian power by calculating its gains and losses in a relative manner. Though Pakistan does acknowledge the mammoth size and power of India as compared to its own, it has shown a resilience to sacrifice every other interest to keep competing against India and dragging it into regional problems, thus frustrating its aspirations of a supra-regional power and its global acknowledgment. For example, throughout the 1990s, when India restructured and liberalized its economy on neoliberal capitalist lines to achieve much higher growth rates, Pakistan kept Indian military of almost its own size– about 700,000–900,000 personnel– entrapped in a low-profile yet active conflict of Kashmir. Aslow bleeding of Indian army, killing almost 4,600 soldiers during 1989–2002, was meant for more financial than human losses, and the total killings reached above 40,000 according to Indian official estimates and above 80,000 according to nonofficial estimates.52 In Afghanistan, during the 1990s, Pakistan remained adamant to international pressure and pursued its policy options almost independently; it supported the rise of Taliban and lobbied for their acknowledgement in the world.53 In May1998, the country rejected unprecedented international pressure and conducted a successful test of its nuclear weapons, citing it as a befitting response to Indian nuclear tests conducted two weeks earlier. The political leadership across the spectrum highlighted the fact that the milestone made Pakistan the first Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons. It, however, does not mean that the endeavor to prioritize territorial security and integrity as the most significant national objective and promoting and patronizing religious radicalism and militancy as a strategy went unaccounted. The state paid

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 55 quite a heavy price of its relying upon Islamist and militant groups as a tool of “second defense line.” The corollary of promoting Jihad as an ideological outfit of global Islamism– despite the fact that it fit well with the state-sponsored identity– emerged in the form of sectarian violence, rise of non-state actors, introduction of drug culture, weaponization of society, and overall palpable decimation of social fabric. During the 1980s, a mushroom growth of Madrassahs provided a mass recruiting opportunity of the state-sponsored non-state Jihadi actors involved in Afghan Jihad. In the 1990s, Pakistan used these outfits to corner India in Kashmir. Simultaneously, the country did become a breeding ground of Taliban fighting in Afghanistan and an epicenter of global terrorism providing sanctuaries and training opportunities to international non-state actors. Therefore, after 9/11, when the country had to rescind its open support to Jihadi organizations and to reverse proxy engagement in Kashmir, the consequences were a mass resistance to de-radicalization. After 9/11 attacks, Pakistan adopted a pragmatic approach wherein it did not rip apart the legacy of religious ideology as a base of its existence. Rather, it has adopted a three-pronged strategy. First, it distinguished between extremely radicalized and open anti-state actors and went on a war against them. The defense establishment received heavy losses including attacks on its top leadership. However, the state showed its resilience to curb their power, eliminate them from population centers, and establish its writ in areas such as Swat. Second, it streamlined state-allied religious elements by brokering a formula of sharing political power with an objective to assuage their sociopolitical concerns. It soothed radical religious elements by rejecting international pressure to amend or eliminate blasphemy laws, protesting caricaturing of Prophet Muhammad, and denying any link between Islam as a religion and terrorism as its political tool. It also sponsored efforts to modernize proliferating madrassahs or religious schools by instilling contents of science and technology in their syllabus. Third, there is an apparent persistent effort to modernize the idea and identity of Pakistan through pluralizing the concept. The changing realities of post-9/11 global politics were taken quite seriously in Islamabad. The state actors in Islamabad are fast reaching a conclusion to pragmatically reevaluate the role of Islam in Pakistan’s national identity. Lately, the state has endeavored to broaden its interpretation of Islam as a key converging factor by emphasizing its sociocultural dimensions. The state has patronized minority religious tourism by constructing and improving infrastructural projects of Hindus and Sikhs. There has been a visible effort to condemn and confront religious bigotry, especially against minorities including Ahmadis. The notion of religious purity has increasingly been diverted to social services. The periphery and peripheral issues have streamlined, with an increasing emphasis on the part of the state and its institutions to celebrate ethnic, social, cultural, and religious diversity. Internationally, though Pakistan addressed concerns of its role in regional conflicts by renouncing terrorism as well as cross-border terrorism, undergrounding its support to Afghan Taliban, and cooperating with Washington and international forces to fight against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, it did not compromise on

56 Samee Lashari its national interests such as keeping India out of Afghan conflict, advancing its nuclear and missile program, staying strong during almost a year-long India– Pakistan military standoff in 2001–02, signing a very crucial friendship treaty with China in 2005, and initiating a multi-billion dollar investment project called China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan’s efforts to maintain a relatively robust, people-based, and ideological outlook could not be stalled in the wake of changing regional and global political dynamics. Pakistan and Indicators of Material Power: I argue that a self-realized and self-proclaimed middle power status needs to be substantiated through material capabilities and their utilization at regional and international levels to secure perceived interests in a successful manner. Amiddle power may not have an exceptionally successful policy execution rate because even great powers such as the United States have failures on their record. Middle powers, however, do possess maneuvering power; they define their interests, adopt various strategies including alliances, and perform better than several other states whenever challenged. While measuring state power, a 2005 RAND corporation study looked at three levels: “(1) resources or capabilities, or power-in-being; (2) how that power is converted through national processes; (3) and power in outcomes, or which state prevails in particular circ*mstances.” It argues further those states are “capability containers” but they “need to convert material resources into more usable instruments, such as combat proficiency.” It, however, emphasizes that policy makers are most concerned about the power in outcomes.54 They, in other words, are concerned about the utilitarian value of power as a tool in foreign policymaking. The leading statistical indicators of Pakistan are appreciable by any given standard. The country has a population of 212million people, almost nine times more than the population of Australia, Canada, Norway, and several other countries ranked as Middle Powers. Almost 75percent of the population is below 40years.55 In terms of natural resources, Pakistan possesses world’s second largest salt mines. It has world’s fifth largest copper and gold reserves; second largest coal deposits; and other mineral deposits such as of marble, granite, zinc, and bauxite worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Pakistan estimates to possess about 20trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves and another 100trillion cubic feet of shale gas reserves. These estimates have been calculated based on evaluation of only 4percent of country’s landmass.56 Moreover, according to a 2013 report by the US Energy Information Administration, Pakistan has more than 9billion barrel of shale oil recoverable through available technology.57 Additionally, the country is a site of one of the oldest human civilizations, Indus Valley, and is part of Indo-Gangetic Plain, one of the most fertile farming regions in the world. Primarily it is because of an immense carrying capacity of this fertile landmass that Indian Subcontinent, despite being a half of the size of the United States, is home to world’s 20percent population. Additionally, Pakistan’s industrial output

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 57 in worth $38.33billion, in 2018 2018 was was worth $38.33 billion, an an increase increase of of about about 4.88percent 4.88 percent as as compared compared to 2017 economic year. According to the World Bank, the per capita income to 2017 economic year. According to the World Bank, the per capita income went went 58 up from from $576 up $576 in in 2000 2000 to to $1,482 $1,482 in in 2018. 2018.58 Having that, it it is true that that Pakistan’s Having said said that, is true Pakistan’s economic economic indicators indicators are are not not compacompa rable to European or Southeast Asian countries. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan is rable to European or Southeast Asian countries. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan is considered underperforming as to its potential. For considered underperforming as compared compared to its potential. For example, example, the the councoun try has to invest in human been unable to educate its try has failed failed to invest in human development. development. It It has has been unable to educate its growing human resource. Literacy rate is less than 50percent, and a vast majority growing human resource. Literacy rate is less than 50 percent, and a vast majority of virtually unskilled. to UNICEF, UNICEF, of young young so-called so-called literate literate people people is is virtually unskilled. According According to about population of about 22.8million 22.8 million children children aged aged 5–16, 5-16, about about 44percent 44 percent of of the the population of 59 this age group, are out of school; it is the second highest number in the world. this age group, are out of school; it is the second highest number in the world.59 Similarly, the 2017 estimates by the World Bank show that infant mortality rate Similarly, the 2017 estimates by the World Bank show that infant mortality rate in Pakistan is world and worse than in Pakistan is 52.10, 52.10, 26th 26th in in the the world and worse than several several least-developed least-developed 60 countries of Africa and South America. Additionally, Pakistan countries of Africa and South America.60 Additionally, Pakistan has has eighth eighth highest highest stunted worse than than Afghanistan, stunted growth growth rate rate of of under-5years under-5 years old old children, children, worse Afghanistan, EthioEthio 61 pia, and Rwanda. Overall, Healthcare Access and Quality (HAQ) Index pia, and Rwanda.61 Overall, Healthcare Access and Quality (HAQ) Index ranks ranks 62 Pakistan Pakistan at at 154th 154th out out of of 195 195 countries. countries.62 The between Pakistan’s Pakistan’s natural The origins origins of of contradictions contradictions between natural resources, resources, economic economic potential on the one hand and dismaying social sector performance the other potential on the one hand and dismaying social sector performance on on the other hand and its claim of being an indispensable Middle Power of the world hand and its claim of being an indispensable Middle Power of the world lie, lie, pripri marily, in two two factors: factors: geostrategic marily, in geostrategic location, location, and and military military capabilities. capabilities. Pakistan Pakistan is in the the most the world. world. It is the the gateis located located in most geostrategically geostrategically mobile mobile area area of of the It is gate way to Central Asia, the home of so-called Great Game. It is the frontline way to Central Asia, the home of so-called Great Game. It is the frontline state state in in an an active active great-power great-power military military conflict conflict in in Afghanistan Afghanistan since since the the last last 45years, 45 years, including the US the last to two two including the US War War on on Terror Terror since since the last two two decades. decades. It It is is adjacent adjacent to nuclear rival powers, India and China. The changing dynamics in the politics nuclear rival powers, India and China. The changing dynamics in the politics of of Indian tensions in in South beyond resulting in Indian Ocean, Ocean, US–China US-China tensions South China China Sea Sea and and beyond resulting in the so-called “return of bipolarity” in international politics, and China–Pakistan the so-called “return of bipolarity” in international politics, and China-Pakistan relations the wake the country relations in in the wake of of CPEC CPEC elevate elevate the the geostrategic geostrategic significance significance of of the country in an unprecedented manner. Additionally, adjacent to Pakistan is Iran, in an unprecedented manner. Additionally, adjacent to Pakistan is Iran, one one of of the most important players in Middle Eastern politics of oil, ideology, and war. the most important players in Middle Eastern politics of oil, ideology, and war. This Pakistan’s strategic the defense This geographic geographic link link and and Pakistan’s strategic role role in in the defense of of Saudi Saudi Arabia Arabia add another complex dimension and thus provide a significant prominence add another complex dimension and thus provide a significant prominence in in the the region. There is perhaps no other country in the world with such conspicuously region. There is perhaps no other country in the world with such conspicuously precarious Pakistan is precarious geostrategic geostrategic significance. significance. Arguably, Arguably, Pakistan is inevitably inevitably dragged dragged into into aa strategic competition involving global powers and their immensely strategic competition involving global powers and their immensely significant significant interests. interests. It volatile strategic with active It is is primarily primarily Pakistan’s Pakistan’s volatile strategic location, location, coupled coupled with active regional conflicts and an eternal animosity to India, which left Islamabad regional conflicts and an eternal animosity to India, which left Islamabad with with no but to to excel in developing its own no choice choice but excel more more in developing its own defensive defensive military military capabilicapabili ties than than catering to the the needs young population population and ties catering to needs of of its its young and decaying decaying social social sector. sector. Global Firepower Index, a ranking system that does not take into account nuclear Global Firepower Index, a ranking system that does not take into account nuclear capability, the 10th in the the world, world, capability, ranks ranks Pakistan Pakistan as as the 10th most most powerful powerful military military power power in better than better than Turkey Turkey (11th), (11th), Italy Italy (12th), (12th), Germany Germany (15th), (15th), Indonesia Indonesia (16th), (16th), Spain Spain 63 (18th), Australia (19th), Israel (20th), and Canada (21st). The country possesses (18th), Australia (19th), Israel (20th), and Canada (21st).63 The country possesses

58 Samee Lashari the sixth largest standing military force of over 900,000 personnel out of which around 637,000 are on active duty.64 According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Pakistan possesses 100–120 nuclear weapons.65 The country is considered to be the fastest growing nuclear capability state in the world, expanding its production capacity at such a scale that “may lead to significant increases in the size of their nuclear weapon inventories over the next decade.”66 In response to India’s “Cold Start Doctrine,” Pakistan developed tactical nuclear weapons, a move that has brought the chances of nuclear war in South Asia to a significantly low threshold level.67 Pakistan possesses a large number of indigenously produced as well as China-made tanks, armored fighting vehicles, long-range multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), frigates, submarines, and coastal defense crafts. It has recently been modernizing its military capabilities. With the help of China, and in response to the Pressler Amendment from the United States in the 1990s, it developed its own fighting lightweight multirole combat aircraft named jet JF-17 Thunder. Pakistan currently has included about 120 Block-1 JF17s. It has also inducted double-seated JF-17 Block II aircraft designed specifically for training purposes. The Block-III version of JF-17 is said to be compatible with French-made Rafael recently obtained by India.68 Despite economic challenges, Pakistan has consistently prioritized military modernization to be the most vital national interest. Lacking a conventional capability to deliver nuclear weapons, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pakistan started developing its own missile program. Currently, Pakistan has an array of short- and medium-range nuclear warhead carrying ballistic missiles with ranges varying between 60 kilometers (Nasr) to 2,750 kilometers (Shaheen-III), covering all of India, Middle East including Red Sea, Central Asia, and some parts of Russia and Eastern Europe. Pakistan also developed land-based and air-launched nuclear-capable cruise missiles with range between 350 and 700 kilometers. However, in 2017, Pakistan tested first submarine-launched nuclear-capable missile Babur III with a range of 450 kilometers, thus defying lack of strategic-depth and achieving nuclear triad and a survivable “second-strike capability” in the event of any nuclear war in South Asia. Defense officials in Pakistan, however, do not share news about the undergoing missile modernization projects. Arguably, there is a lot more going on behind the scenes than is known officially. Keeping in context the discourse of identity and material capabilities, when we look at the foreign policy behavior of Pakistan, we see it as a country that takes pride in being an important player in international politics, more than its due share. This behavior is understandable since a part of behavioral indicators of Middle Power countries is that they “typically adopt an activist style in that they interfere in global issues beyond their immediate concern” (Jordaan, 2003: 167). Throughout its history of over 70years, Pakistan faced an apparently insurmountable challenge of defending itself against an adversarial power, India. Put together, three factors – self-perceived identity as the most significant country in the Muslim world, a nuclear power and formidable strategic player in international politics, and dealing with Indian challenge– produce a foreign policy decision-making structure in the country where national defense and territorial

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 59 integrity displace every other consideration, including socioeconomic development and industrialization. Therefore, when explaining Pakistan’s behavior as a Middle Power, it is important to keep the drivers of behavior in context. In the case of other Middle Powers such as Australia, Canada, and European countries, they include economic development, socio-political stability, and infrastructural maturity. In the case of non-European countries, such as South Korea and South Africa, indicators include fast developing economies. In the case of Pakistan, however, it is ideology, geography, military power, young population, and natural resource potential. Gen. (R) Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff, explained the role of strategic considerations in foreign policy behavior as follows: Pakistan’s military strategy is, of course, a part of its integrated national strategy. It is basically a response to its threat perception. There is, however, the additional consideration of military power as a prestige factor in the region, in relations with the Muslim world, and as an active participant in worldwide coalition and peacekeeping arrangements. Pakistan’s threat perception is based on a consideration of the evolving situation in Afghanistan, Iran’s military power, offensive political and military pressures from India, and extremism and terrorism (emphasis added).69 This is an example of how identity and material capabilities merge to produce a distinct foreign policy behavior affecting regional and extra-regional peace and crisis resolution.

Conclusion This chapter analyzed theoretical discourse pertaining to Middle Powers in the world. There is no general consensus as to which factors, and in what percentage, must be put together to measure the power of a country to label it as a Middle Power. Ihave also mentioned that there are two essential indicators that can turn a country into a Middle Power: its identity or self-realization of being a Middle Power, supported by its material capabilities. Together, they must produce a foreign policy behavior that shows that the country behaves like a Middle Power and has the capability to act as a Middle Power. Areview analyzing Pakistan on these basic indicators helps us understand the country and its ranking in international system better. Pakistan is a Middle Power because of two principal reasons: it has a strong identity and ideological standpoint that helps it to view itself as a strong regional power with indispensable value to great powers. Using its ideological foundations and its geostrategic significance, Pakistan built a formidable military power and used it to successfully advance its national interests. During the Cold War, it allied with Western world and participated in military agreements such as SEATO and CENTO. During the 1980s, it participated in the hot war of Afghanistan, facilitated USSR disintegration, and bought time to build its nuclear weapons.

60 Samee Lashari In the 1990s, when it faced economic sanctions, it developed an indigenous “second defense line” of Mujahideen to replicate its experience of Afghanistan in Kashmir to engage India in a low scale but costly violence. In the wake of September11 attacks, it became a frontline state, non-NATO major ally and reaped the benefits of increased military cooperation with the United States. Since 2013, Pakistan has broadened its multilateral strategic engagement with China by initiating CPEC to build its communication infrastructure, modernize its industry and agriculture, and become a considerably significant player in emerging Sino-American greatpower competition. It is a Middle Power in itself and is recognized as such by the decision makers in the most powerful countries around the world.

Notes 1 Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostrategic Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 1. 2 Ray Kiely, The BRICS, US Decline and Global Transformations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 3 Juha Jokela, The G-20: APathway to Effective Multilateralism? (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2011), No. 125. 4 Ashok Rai, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2 (Quad 2.0): ACredible Strategic Construct or Mere ‘Foam in the Ocean’?” Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 14, no. 2 (2018): 138–48. 5 David Mares, “Middle Powers Under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement,”International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1988): 458. 6 Hongying Wang and Erik French, “Middle Range Powers in Global Governance,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 6 (2013): 985. 7 Eduard Jordaan, “The Emerging Middle Power Concept: Time to Say Goodbye?” South African Journal of International Affairs 24, no. 3 (2017): 395–412. 8 Andrew Carr, “Is Australia a Middle Power? ASystemic Impact Approach,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): 70–84. 9 Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim R. Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993). 10 Mo Jongryn, “Introduction: G20 Middle Powers (MIKTA) and Global Governance,” in MIKTA, Middle Powers, and New Dynamics of Global Governance: The G20’s Evolving Agenda, ed. Mo Jongryn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 11 Christian Downie, “One in 20: The G20, Middle Powers and Global Governance Reform,” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 7 (2016): 1493–510. 12 M. Islam, “BRICS, MIKTA, SCO and IBSA: Emerging Global Organizations and Groups: AParadigm Shift for New World Order,” Adam Akademi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 9, no. 2 (2019): 471–90. 13 Robert W. Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order,” International Journal 44, no. 4 (1989): 823–62. 14 Andrew Cooper, “Squeezed or Revitalised? Middle Powers, the G20 and the Evolution of Global Governance,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 6 (2013): 963–84. 15 Wang and French, “Middle Range Powers in Global Governance,” 987. 16 Andrew Linklater, “What Is a Good International Citizen?” in Ethics and Foreign Policy, ed. Paul Keal (Canberra: Australian National University, 1992), 21–39. 17 Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1995). 18 Linklater, “What Is a Good International Citizen,” 21–43. 19 Carr, “Is Australia a Middle Power?” 72. 20 E. H. Carr, Twenty Years Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan& Co. Ltd, 1946), 63.

Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 61 21 John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77. 22 Christopher Layne, “Kant or Can’t: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 5–49. 23 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 24 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton& Company, 2014). 25 Charles W. Kegley, “Introduction,” in Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York: StMartin’s Press, 1994), 8. 26 Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in Theories of International Relations, eds. Scott Burchill etal., 5th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 27 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 28 Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 29 Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (1991): 1303–20. 30 Carr, Twenty Years Crisis 1919–1939, 72. 31 Joshua B. Spero, “Great Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Middle Power Bridging,” Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 1 (2009): 147. 32 Bernard Wood, The Middle Powers and the General Interest (Ottawa: The NorthSouth Institute, 1988), 17. 33 The Lowe Institute Asia Power Index, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/ pakistan/. 34 Basel Peace Office, www.baselpeaceoffice.org/article/middle-powers-initiative. 35 Goldman Sachs, BRICs and Beyond (ebook) 2007, www.goldmansachs.com/insights/ archive/BRICs-and-Beyond.html. 36 Dorothée Vandamme, “The Case of Pakistan: Middlepowermanship as a Role,” in Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century New Theories, New Cases, eds. Tanguy Struye de Swielande, etal. (New York: Routledge, 2019), 173. 37 Hannes Ebert and Nicolas Blarel, “Power, Territory, and Learning: Explaining Pakistan’s Persistent Contestation,” in Regional Powers and Contested Leadership, eds. Hannes Ebert and Daniel Flemes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 247. 38 Hannes Ebert and Daniel Flemes, “Regional Leadership and Contestation: Strategic Reactions to the Rise of the BRICS,” in Regional Powers and Contested Leadership, eds. Hannes Ebert and Daniel Flemes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 2. 39 Government of Pakistan, Address by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah at Lahore Session of Muslim League, March1940 (Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publishing, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1983), 5–23, accessed November20, 2020, www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/ pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_1940.html. 40 Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Kent, England: Wm Dawson& Sons Ltd. 1979), 29. 41 The Economist, December12, 1981, 48. 42 Faisal Devji, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 43 Alan Whaites, “Political Cohesion in Pakistan: Jinnah and the Ideological State,” Contemporary South Asia 7, no. 2 (1998): 182. 44 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947–2019: AConcise History, 5th ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2020), 19–21.

62 Samee Lashari 45 Ayesha Jalal, Sole Spokesman: Spokesman: Jinnah, Jinnah, the Muslim League League and and the Demand for for 45 Ayesha Jalal, The The Sole the Muslim the Demand Pakistan (Cambridge, UK: UK: Cambridge Cambridge University University Press, 1985), 57. 57. Pakistan (Cambridge, Press, 1985), 46 Christine Christine C. C. Fair, to the the End: The Pakistan Way of of War War (New (New York: York: 46 Fair, Fighting Fighting to End: The Pakistan Army’ Army’ss Way Oxford 2014), 68. Oxford University University Press, Press, 2014), 68. 47 Farzana Sheikh, Sheikh, Making of Pakistan (New York: York: Oxford Oxford University Press, 47 Farzana Making Sense Sense of Pakistan (New University Press, 2018), 5. 2018), 5. 48 Hamza Alavi, Alavi, “Social Forces and the Making Making of Economic and and 48 Hamza “Social Forces and Ideology Ideology in in the of Pakistan,” Pakistan,” Economic Political Weekly 37, 37, no. 51 (2002): (2002): 5119–24. 5119-24. Political Weekly no. 51 49 Dennis Kux, The The United United States 1947-2000: Disenchanted (Balti 49 Dennis Kux, States and and Pakistan, Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies Allies (Baltimore, MD: Hopkins University 2001), 199–206. more, MD: The The John John Hopkins University Press, Press, 2001), 199-206. 50 Steve Steve Coll, Coll, Ghost Ghost Wars: Wars: The The Secret of the the CIA, CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin 50 Secret History History of Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, Laden, the Soviet to September 10, 2001 2001 (New (New York: York: Penguin Books, 2004). From From the Soviet Invasion Invasion to September10, Penguin Books, 2004). 51 Feroz Hassan Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: Making of Pakistani Bomb Bomb (Stanford, 51 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The The Making of the the Pakistani (Stanford, CA: CA: Stanford University University Press, 360. Stanford Press, 2012), 2012), 360. 52 Sumantra Sumantra Bose, ofConflict, Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 52 Bose, Kashmir: Kashmir: Roots Roots of Paths to Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, University Press, 2003), 2003), 4. 4. 53 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game Game in in Central Central Asia (New 53 Ahmed Rashid, Islam, Oil and the New Great Asia (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, Publishers, 2002), 2002), 26–30. 26-30. York: I.B. Tauris 54 Measuring National National Power Power (Santa Monica, CA: 54 Gregory Gregory Treverton Treverton and and Seth Seth Jones, Jones, Measuring (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 2005), ix. ix. RAND Corporation, 55 National of Population Population Studies, Studies, Pakistan and Health 55 National Institute Institute of Pakistan Demographic Demographic and Health Survey, Survey, 2017-18 (Islamabad: (Islamabad: Government Government of of Pakistan, Pakistan, 2019), 24. 2017–18 2019), 24. 56 Drazen Jorgic, “Pakistan “Pakistan to to Offer Offer Gas Gas Fields Fields to to Foreign Offi 56 Drazen Jorgic, Foreign Explorers, Explorers, Investors: Investors: Official,” Reuters, March 11,2019, cial,” Reuters, March11, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-energy-gas/pakis www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-energy-gas/pakis tan-to-offer-gas-fields-to-foreign-explorers-investors-official-idUSKBN1QT0D0. tan-to-offer-gas-fields-to-foreign-explorers-investors-official-idUSKBN1QT0D0. 57 U.S. Energy Information Technically Recoverable Oil and 57 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Administration, Technically Recoverable Shale Shale Oil and Shale Shale of 137 137 Shale in 41 41 Countries Countries Outside Outside the the Gas Resources: Gas Resources: An An Assessment Assessment of Shale Formations Formations in United States (Washington, DC, 2013), United States (Washington, DC, 2013), 8. 8. 58 World World Bank 58 Bank Data, Data, https://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan. https://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan. 59 www.unicef.org/pakistan/education. 59 www.unicef.org/pakistan/education. 60 Bank Data. Data. 60 World World Bank 61 IndexMundi, “Prevalence of of Stunting, Stunting, Height Height for for Age (% of of Children Children Under 5) – 61 IndexMundi, “Prevalence Age (% Under 5) Country Ranking,” Ranking,” www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SH.STA.STNT.ZS/rankings. Country www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SH.STA.STNT.ZS/rankings. 62 Nancy Fullman the Healthcare Access and 62 Nancy Fullman etal., et al., “Measuring “Measuring Performance Performance on on the Healthcare Access and Quality Quality Index for 195 195 Countries Countries and and Territories Territories and and Selected Selected Subnational Subnational Locations: Sys Index for Locations: A ASystematic from the Global Burden Burden of of Disease Study 2016,” The Lancet 391 tematic Analysis Analysis from the Global Disease Study 2016,”The Lancet391 (June2, 2018): 2245. (June 2, 2018): 2245. 63 Global Global Firepower www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 63 Firepower Index, Index, www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp. 64 Alfred Joyner, “How “How Strong Strong Is Is Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Military?” 28, 2018, 64 Alfred Joyner, Military?” Newsweek, Newsweek, November November28, 2018, www.newsweek.com/how-strong-pakistans-military-1235091. www.newsweek.com/how-strong-pakistans-military-1235091. 65 SIPRI SIPRI Country Country Profile, 65 Profile, www.sipri.org/research/armaments-and-disarmament/nuclearwww.sipri.org/research/armaments-and-disarmament/nuclearweapons/world-nuclear-forces/pakistan. weapons/world-nuclear-forces/pakistan. 66 2019: Armaments, Armaments, Disarmament Disarmament and 66 SIPRI, SIPRI, “SIPRI “SIPRI Yearbook Yearbook 2019: and International International Security: Security: Summary,” www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf, 10. Summary,” www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf, 10. 67 Tughral Tughral Yamin, Yamin, “Tactical “Tactical Nuclear (TNW) The Pakistani Perspective,” IPRI 67 Nuclear Weapons Weapons (TNW) – The Pakistani Perspective,” IPRI Journal XV, no. 22 (Summer 2015): 28–43. Journal XV, no. (Summer 2015): 28-43. See See also also Jaganath Jaganath Shankran, Shankran, “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s Battlefield Risky Solution Solution to to an an Exaggerated Exaggerated Threat,” Threat,” International Battlefield Nuclear Nuclear Policy: Policy: A ARisky International Security 39, no. no. 33 (Winter (Winter 2014/15): 118-51. Security 39, 2014/15): 118–51. 68 Franz-Stefan Gady, Block III III Fighter Fighter Jet Makes Maiden 68 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s JF-17 JF-17 Block Jet Makes Maiden Flight,” Flight,” The Diplomat, January 6, 2020, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/pakistans-jf-17https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/pakistans-jf-17The Diplomat, January6, block-iii-fighter-jet-makes-maiden-flight/. block-iii-fighter-jet-makes-maiden-flight/. 69 Karamat, “Missile Acquisition by by Pakistan: Military Strategic 69 Jehangir Jehangir Karamat, “Missile Acquisition Pakistan: Military Strategic Imperatives,” Imperatives,” South 11, no. (2004): 170. 170. South Asian Asian Survey Survey 11, no. 22 (2004):

4 The Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan An Analysis Ejaz Hussain

Overview Foreign policy is a core component of a country’s grand strategy through which “national interests” are disseminated and, to an extent, realised internationally.1 Regardless of the territorial and demographic size of a country, no nation-state can survive sans foreign policy. Nonetheless, there is a considerable variance in the nature, character, and conduct of foreign policy comparatively. For instance, the foreign policy determination and implementation are democratically oriented in liberal democracies such as the United States (US) and Germany whereas foreign policy contours are dubiously determined in “defective democracies” and “autocracies.”2 Put differently, foreign relations of industrially and democratically advanced countries are deliberated in parliament which, as per democratic theory, is institutionally regarded as a supreme body with the legal and normative prerogative to legislative for and, on the behalf of, society whose input on a given foreign policy issue is usually taken into account. To the contrary, however, foreign policy is though theoretically made by parliament in a “defective” democracy such as Pakistan, it is operationally influenced by supra-parliamentary institutions.3 Moreover, in autocracies, the role, if any, of parliament is rendered irrelevant by non-parliamentary institutions such as militaries and monarchies ─ which dominate such states both institutionally as well as structurally. Pakistan’s case is very peculiar in the sense that it has never been a liberal democracy. It rather oscillates between being defective democracy and an autocracy. In the immediate context of Independence (August1947), Pakistan was dominated by a supra-parliamentary institution, namely, the civil bureaucracy, which appointed its rank and file on topmost positions such as governor-general. Having controlled the country politically and administratively, the civil bureaucracy also shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy particularly towards the United States. Though the early political leadership had already hinted at preferring the capitalist over the communist bloc,4 the political class miserably failed to invoke its agency vis-à-vis the civil bureaucracy which ruled the roost till late 1950s. Importantly, the military, another bureaucratic organisation, remained a junior partner, to say the least, with its civil counterpart because by mid-1950s, the then Commanderin-Chief (C-in-C) of Pakistan army, General Ayub Khan, got appointed as the DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-5

64 Ejaz Hussain minister of defence on account of his cordial relations with Iskander Mirza. The latter had served in the British military and civil bureaucracy and, post-Partition, assumed powerful positions such as minister of defence, governor-general, and, after the 1956 Constitution, the country’s first president.5 Ayub’s input and role were crucial in Pakistan’s decision to sign Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States in May1954. Afew months later, Pakistan joined the USled Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and, a year later, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Ayub became absolutely powerful on account of 1958 martial law. After the toppling of a tutelar civil government along with disgraceful exit of Iskander Mirza from presidency, the Ayub-led military assumed direct control of politics, administration, and foreign policy of Pakistan.6 Little wonder, Khan visited the United States and made his country a closer partner of the United States vis-à-vis communist USSR. Consequently, Pakistan received American military aid and hardware which helped with military modernisation. However, Pakistan’s war with India in 1965 impacted bilateral relations since the United States did not rescue the former as per its expectations. Thus, in the post-war period, the Ayub regime started tilting towards China whose relations had already deteriorated with India owing to the 1962 war.7 China remained relevant during the Yahya years when Pakistan played a crucial role in the US–China rapprochement. Pakistan, it seems, focused to balance its ties with the United States by cultivating close defence partnership with China. Hence, China–Pakistan defence and military cooperation strengthened under the civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whereas US–Pakistan relations were at its low ebb ─ Pakistan quit both SEATO and CENTO by the 1970s. Besides, Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistan in the said period remained very hostile, while its relations with key Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia gained strategic confidence.8 Nonetheless, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 invited American wrath coupled with the Saudi money and ideology and Pakistan’s logistical support. Contextually, US–Pakistan relations saw an upward curve tactically. Strategically, however, Islamabad remained a close partner of Beijing whose role though was miniscule in the Afghan War. Moreover, Pakistan remained preoccupied with India in the 1980s, that is Siachen Glacier. However, the Geneva Accords (1988) paved a way for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Consequently, US–Pakistan transactional partnership was over, and bilateral relations witnessed a downward trend in the immediate post-Cold War period. For example Pakistan faced “nuclear sanctions” during the 1990s.9 On the other hand, China– Pakistan relations flourished in military-strategic terms. Though during this decade of defective democracy, the civil leadership, particularly Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, attempted to control the country’s foreign policy vis-à-vis India, Afghanistan, and the United States. However, they remained constrained due to political instability, institutional imbalance, and lack of vision to deal with a powerful military.10 Ironically, Sharif had a tussle with the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Pervez Musharraf, who topped his government in a coup in October1999.11

Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 65 Under Musharraf, the military played a pivotal role in making Pakistan’s foreign policy. Tactically, US–Pakistan relations improved once again. Moreover, China– Pakistan relations remained intact strategically. However, India remained a top security threat in military calculations. In addition, Afghanistan was linked with India where the latter’s influence increased in the post-Taliban period. Besides, Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Malaysia remained cordial. However, Iran–Pakistan ties could not improve owing largely to mutual mistrust.12 What can be deduced from the foregoing is that Pakistan’s foreign policy had clearly tilted towards the United States in 1950s. However, in mid-1960s, Pakistan pursued close strategic relations with China in order to balance out the United States. With the latter, Pakistan though cooperated in the 1980s and 2000s, the scale of such interaction was military in character and transactional in nature. Overall, US–Pakistan relations can be termed tactical whereas China–Pakistan relations are strategic in orientation. In the last 75years, Pakistan’s topmost foreign policy agenda centred around Indian security threat. The former tried to counter India through its bilateral relations with the United States, China, and other countries such as Saudi Arabia. Even in multilateral organisational arrangements such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and even the United Nations, Pakistan remained preoccupied with India. As far as the Muslim world is concerned, Pakistan projected itself as a leading Muslim state with comparative strength in military capability and human resources. Indeed, Pakistan has taken a pro-Palestine stance since 1948 whereas more Arab countries normalised relations with the latter in 2020.13 How does Pakistan conduct its foreign policy in the contemporary context (post-Musharraf period)? What role does the military have in the formulation and operationalisation of foreign policy? What role do the non-military institutions such as parliament play in this respect? What are the main foreign policy objectives of Pakistan in the current context, and which sort of strategies are being adopted to pursue it? These are crucial questions which this study is focusing on theoretically and empirically. However, before theoretical considerations are outlined, it is pertinent to review the existing literature on the subject in order to find missing links and gaps in theory and practice.

Existing Works and Its Weaknesses There is an abundance of work done on Pakistan’s foreign policy. The majority of the literature falls under, what this study has termed, the geostrategic accounts. Geostrategic scholars ─ from within the country, region, and beyond ─ take a security-centric view of Pakistan’s foreign policy. They argue that Pakistan assumed a significant military role in the (post-)Cold War period due to its geographical location. Moreover, India is highlighted as being a major threat to the country’s existence. The Kashmir issue remains a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Unless it is resolved, Pakistan geostrategically remains vulnerable to India. Despite its emphasis on geostrategy and its impact on foreign policy, the geostrategic accounts have overlooked domestic variables and the way

66 Ejaz Hussain they Moreover, they they make they influence influence foreign foreign policymaking. policymaking. Moreover, make no no clear clear distinction distinction between defence and foreign policy. In addition, the actors which make foreign between defence and foreign policy. In addition, the actors which make foreign 14 policy are not comprehensively singled out in terms of their agency. policy are not comprehensively singled out in terms of their agency.14 The their part, The structural structural studies studies have, have, on on their part, highlighted highlighted historical historical events events in in the the making and operationalisation of foreign policy. The scholars in this category making and operationalisation of foreign policy. The scholars in this category argue the state that determines the course argue that that it it is is the the structure structure of of the state of of Pakistan Pakistan that determines the course of of its its foreign relations. Pakistan inherited structural elements such as low-performing foreign relations. Pakistan inherited structural elements such as low-performing parliament, bureaucracy, aa disciplined parliament, aa well-organised well-organised civil civil bureaucracy, disciplined military, military, and and sociosocio 15 Nevertheless, economic classes ─ that shape up foreign policymaking. economic classes — that shape up foreign policymaking.15 Nevertheless, despite despite its its significance significance to to explain explain state state formation formation and and implication implication of of post-colonial post-colonial politipoliti cal economy, these studies have underestimated actors, agency, cal economy, these studies have underestimated actors, agency, and and context. context. In which was was quite popular In another another study study grounded grounded in in “systems” “systems” approach, approach, which quite popular in comparative politics in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, Patnaik in comparative politics in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, Patnaik has has applied to the the case where he tested hypotheses applied this this approach approach to case of of Pakistan Pakistan where he tested hypotheses at at five five levlev els els of of aggregation: aggregation: idiosyncratic, idiosyncratic, societal, societal, governmental, governmental, regional regional systemic, systemic, and and systemic. The collective decisions makers in his model are the president, prime systemic. The collective decisions makers in his model are the president, prime minister, beliefs sysminister, and and the the foreign foreign minister. minister. Moreover, Moreover, cognition cognition style style and and the the beliefs sys 16 tems of the foreign policy decision makers are also given importance. Nonethetems of the foreign policy decision makers are also given importance.16 Nonethe less, foreign policy, policy, this less, despite despite systemic systemic analysis analysis of of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s foreign this study, study, it it is is posited, posited, has ignored the very political system of Pakistan. The denominations of president, has ignored the very political system of Pakistan. The denominations of president, prime foreign minister prime minister, minister, and and foreign minister as as real real decision decision makers makers in in the the context context of of Pakistani politics are partly true, to say the least; the foreign minister denomiPakistani politics are partly true, to say the least; the foreign minister denomi nation was merely the role the governor-general nation was merely instrumental. instrumental. Moreover, Moreover, the role of of the governor-general in in the early period is not analysed at all. Importantly, the institutional the early period is not analysed at all. Importantly, the institutional roles roles of of civil civil bureaucracy, military, parliament are bureaucracy, military, and and parliament are ignored ignored in in terms terms of of their their impact impact on on forfor eign policy. Also, the analysis is empirically limited to the 1947–1971 period. eign policy. Also, the analysis is empirically limited to the 1947-1971 period. Another which is termed as Another category category of of literature, literature, which is termed as Islamicist Islamicist works, works, has has solely solely focused on the “Islam” factor in the making not only of Pakistan but also focused on the “Islam” factor in the making not only of Pakistan but also of of its its foreign policy. Thus, examples are cited from the post-independence period where foreign policy. Thus, examples are cited from the post-independence period where Pakistan bilateral relations Pakistan not not only only established established bilateral relations with with Islamic Islamic Iran, Iran, Turkey, Turkey, Saudi Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia but also supported a few Muslim countries from North North Arabia, and Indonesia but also supported a few Muslim countries from 17 Africa One wonders if Africa diplomatically. diplomatically.17 One wonders if Islam/religion Islam/religion was was the the main main factor factor in in determining Pakistan’s foreign policy, why did Pakistan fail to maintain determining Pakistan’s foreign policy, why did Pakistan fail to maintain good good ties Even currently, ties with with Afghanistan Afghanistan in in 1947 1947 and and later later in in the the 1970s 1970s and and 2000s? 2000s? Even currently, Pakistan’s foreign policy is tilted towards Saudi Arabia than Turkey, Pakistan’s foreign policy is tilted towards Saudi Arabia than Turkey, Malaysia, Malaysia, or or Iran Iran owing owing to to material material than than religious religious considerations. considerations. Similarly, perspective has the ‘identity Similarly, the the identity identity perspective has emphasised emphasised on on the ‘identity construction’ construction’ projects based on the secular and the sacred, in India and Pakistan, projects based on the secular and the sacred, in India and Pakistan, respectively. respectively. In both countries’ perceived, during In this this respect, respect, both countries’ ruling ruling elites elites perceived, during 1989–99, 1989-99, security security threat through the prism of Kashmir owing to their their emotive preoccupations with with threat through the prism of Kashmir owing to emotive preoccupations 18 respective ideologies grounded in secularism and religiosity. Despite the applirespective ideologies grounded in secularism and religiosity.18 Despite the appli cation to conduct cation of of post-structuralist post-structuralist methodology methodology to conduct comparative comparative analysis analysis of of the the perceptions of foreign policy elite of India and Pakistan, these studies paid perceptions of foreign policy elite of India and Pakistan, these studies paid little little attention to historical fact of the matter the Pakistani attention to historical facts. facts. The The fact of the matter is is since since partition, partition, the Pakistani elite instrumentalised religion in order to pursue non-emotive interests. Moreover, elite instrumentalised religion in order to pursue non-emotive interests. Moreover,

Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 67 the Pakistani elite, arguably, carries a more liberal-secular than religious outlook as far as foreign policy formulation is concerned. This is the reason the county has established diplomatic relations with major powers such as the United States and China which are regarded as non-Muslim and secular countries. Last but not the least, Pakistan’s foreign policy has been analysed from a legal perspective as well. In this respect, Kashmir issue and Indus Waters Treaty (1960) are discussed at length in light of international law.19 However, these works have not touched upon internal variables in the making and implementation of foreign policy in Pakistan. Similarly, an ethnic account has oversimplified the complexities of politics, state, and foreign policy in Pakistan. The simple argument put forth is that the Punjabis, being a large ethnicity, are makers and shakers of foreign policy.20 Empirically, no effort is made to identify actors such as political parties, civil bureaucracy, and the military that might have a role in foreign policymaking. Ironically, this account has also overlooked the institutional composition and internal dynamics of, for example, the military where non-Punjabis such as Pashtuns have also dominated the officer cadre in a given context. Having reviewed the existing literature on Pakistan’s foreign policy, the following weaknesses are identified. First, the majority of the studies are securitycentric. It though makes sense since the Pakistani elite would have felt insecure from India which is larger in size, resources, and conventional military capability. However, doing so, these studies have ignored economic and cultural dimensions of foreign policy. Second, with a minor exception of only two studies ─ one by Patnaik and the other by this author21 ─ all other works are of empirical nature where theory is neglected. Third, the majority of these existing accounts have privileged structure/culture and have, thus, demoted actors, agency, material interests, and context. At the end, none of these studies has analysed the role of the military vis-à-vis foreign policy in Pakistan. The present study is, thus, an attempt to fill the identified gaps both theoretically and empirically. The conceptual and methodological considerations of the study are outlined in the following section.

Conceptual and Methodological Considerations Theory is a higher form of knowledge which helps explain empirical puzzles. There are different theoretical and methodological traditions in social sciences such as historicism, positivism, and post-positivism. Epistemologically, political science, as a discipline, has broadly been influenced by studies centred around comparative politics, political economy, and International Relations (IR).22 As a subfield of IR, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) evolved in the wake of Second Word War and gained further academic currency in the 1980s onward. Currently, FPA has consolidated itself in terms of having its own “ground,” models, and theories ─ which are applied by researchers and, to an extent, decision-makers, for gaining useful insights of otherwise complex empirical facts.23 Moreover, various levels/unit of analysis have been postulated by scholars where a certain model/theory is applied to measure foreign policy behaviour of decision-makers. At the individual level, personality analysis of, for example, a

68 Ejaz Hussain world leader such as an American and/or Chinese president is conducted through various techniques. Similarly, at the group level, small and large group dynamics are analysed with a focus on highlighting the intricacies of bureaucratic politics which influence foreign policymaking particularly in a crisis situation. Cultural, national identity and domestic politics are other levels to measure their effects on actors that make foreign policy. In pure theoretical terms, FPA has embraced and empirically enriched mainstream IR theory which epistemologically is contested in terms of structure–agency debate.24 Hence, structure-oriented theories such as neorealism have overemphasised the structure of international system which constraints state behaviour. From a Marxist perspective, capitalist structures shape the very formation of a state and its operational mechanism. Overall, the structural accounts are historicist, holistic, and generic in orientation and analysis.25 Consequently, actors, agency, and context are compromised in foreign policy analysis. Importantly, non-structural theories such as social constructivism analyse foreign policy in terms of its preoccupation with ideas, identities, and discourses; these have also demoted agency and materially oriented preferences of stakeholders.26 The present study, grounded in Hudsonian view of actors and agency, conducts an actor-specific analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the contemporary context.27 It, thus, assumes actors to be human decision-makers and not the abstraction of states as such ─ though, indubitably, states exist as abstract categories which are established, promoted, and referred to by decision-makers while making and implementing foreign policy. Moreover, taking useful conceptual clues from rational choice institutionalism, institutions, such as the military, are assumed to be rational actors having an inherent conception of cost–benefit analysis.28 In other words, decision-makers assumed as actors possess both agency (make things happen) and rationality (utility maximisation). While applying these assumptions to foreign policy decision-makers in Pakistan, it is posited that the military along with other actors/stakeholders such as civil bureaucracy, that is Foreign Office, and parliament invokes its agency in foreign policymaking and implementation. Nonetheless, the military’s preference prevails in a given political and strategic context where non-military actors fumble or fail to mark their agencies. Conceptually, thus, this study conducts, in the following sections, a theory-guided analysis of the military and foreign policy in contemporary Pakistan. Methodologically, this research is qualitative in nature. In terms of data sources, both primary sources, that is interviews, and secondary sources, that is books, journals articles etc., are collected and analysed for a conceptually and empirically rigorous analysis.29

The Military and Foreign Policy During 2008–2013 As discussed earlier in the chapter, Pakistan’s politics was dominated by the Musharraf-led military since October1999. Having being engulfed with the consequences of arbitrary actions, he imposed the so-called “emergency” on 3 November2007 to reshuffle political set-up for his political survival but in vain.30 Later in the year, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani became the COAS. With the preceding

Military and Foreign in Pakistan 69 Military and Foreign Policy Policy in Pakistan 69

as the study as aa point point of of reference, reference, the study now now turns turns to to explain explain Pakistan’s Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy policy during 2008–2013 in light of the proposed conceptual framework during 2008-2013 in light of the proposed conceptual framework grounded grounded in in agency theory of agency theory of FPA. FPA. Empirically, Empirically, however, however, major major political political developments developments are are cited to set the actors the military cited in in order order to set the the strategic strategic context context in in which which the actors especially especially the military frames its preferences and invokes agency to impact the country’s foreign frames its preferences and invokes agency to impact the country’s foreign policy policy in in various various ways. ways. To begin with, the 2008 People’s Party Party (PPP) To begin with, on on account account of of the 2008 election, election, Pakistan Pakistan People’s (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) formed a coalition government and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) formed a coalition government at the federal federal level. Both the tandem to to replace Pervez Musharat the level. Both the parties parties acted acted in in tandem replace Pervez Mushar raf, who had already lost institutional support as the president of raf, who had already lost institutional support as the president of Pakistan. Pakistan. HavHav ing powers of president in political context, ing assumed assumed powers of president in aa changed changed political context, Asif Asif Ali Ali Zardari, Zardari, 31 while Musharraf responsible wife’s death. while invoking invoking his his agency, agency, held held Musharraf responsible for for his his wife’s death.31 Moreover, he started exposing the political role of the military. In this respect, his Moreover, he started exposing the political role of the military. In this respect, his video-conference with an journalist in video-conference with an Indian Indian journalist in November2008, November 2008, where where he he vowed vowed 32 to curtail the military role in the country’s foreign policy, is a case in point. to curtail the military role in the country’s foreign policy, is a case in point.32 Moreover, he met with his counterpart, President Hamid Karzai, in Kabul in JanuMoreover, he met with his counterpart, President Hamid Karzai, in Kabul in Janu ary2009, where the bilateral cooperaary 2009, where the two two sides sides reflected reflected willingness willingness to to enhance enhance bilateral coopera 33 tion for for counterterrorism. Importantly, few months, both Zardari tion counterterrorism.33 Importantly, within within aa few months, both Zardari and and Karzai had a detailed meeting with the then US President Barack Obama in the Karzai had a detailed meeting with the then US President Barack Obama in the 34 White House where peace prospects in Afghanistan were discussed trilaterally. White House where peace prospects in Afghanistan were discussed trilaterally.34 Noticeably, President Zardari seemed to have reflected his interest in, if not conNoticeably, President Zardari seemed to have reflected his interest in, if not con trol over, Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy through such visits and with regional trol over, Pakistan’s policy through such visits and meetings meetings with regional and global leaders which seemingly preferred civilian than military and global leaders which seemingly preferred civilian than military leadership leadership of of Pakistan in the post-Musharraf period. Pakistan in the post-Musharraf period. Little wonder that Little wonder that the the American American military military and and civilian civilian officials officials including including PresiPresi dent Obama strongly urged, in various policy pronouncements, the Pakistani dent Obama strongly urged, in various policy pronouncements, the Pakistani military military to to “do “do more” more” in in the the global global “war “war on on terror.” terror.” Contextually, Contextually, the the Enhanced Enhanced Partnership with with Pakistan Pakistan Act ─ which which is the KerryKerry– Partnership Act of of 2009 2009 — is commonly commonly called called the Lugar-Berman Act ─ was enacted which committed to provide 7.5billion US$ in Lugar-Berman Act — was enacted which committed to provide 7.5 billion US$ in non-military aid to Pakistan over a 5-year period. non-military aid to Pakistan over a 5-year period. The was made to pressurise Pakistani army The Kerry–Lugar-[Berman] Kerry-Lugar-[Berman] law law was made to pressurise the the Pakistani army [military] to deliver more for the US in its war against terrorist [military] to deliver more for the US in its war against terrorist outfits outfits in in Afghanistan reflected the between [the] US and Afghanistan .. .. .. It It obviously obviously reflected the mistrust mistrust between [the] US and Pakistan. Pakistan. The The Obama Obama Administration Administration wanted wanted to to directly directly communicate communicate with with [President] Zardari and the civil government which was controlled by him, [President] Zardari and the civil government which was controlled by him, regarding where the regarding AfPak AfPak [Afghanistan-Pakistan] [Afghanistan-Pakistan] where the military military remained remained on on the the forefront policy making... targeted by by curforefront of of [foreign] [foreign] policy making . . . The The military military was was targeted cur tailing the military this [respect]. He had tailing the military aid... aid . . . and and Zardari Zardari had had aa role role in in this [respect]. He had visited Afghanistan and the US and developed personal relations with visited Afghanistan and the US and developed personal relations with people people 35 in in power power over over there. there.35 The became aa talk talk of the town Pakistan. The The Kerry–Lugar-Berman Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act Act became of the town in in Pakistan. The majormajor ity of the media houses termed it anti-military. The political opposition maligned ity of the media houses termed it anti-military. The political opposition maligned the for harming Pakistan’s interests through such the civil civil government government for harming Pakistan’s interests through such legislation. legislation.

70 Ejaz Hussain The The popular popular opinion opinion seemed seemed divided divided too. too. Nonetheless, Nonetheless, Zardari Zardari and and associates associates took it differently. took it differently. They viewed it the Obama fulfill the They viewed it solely solely as as an an act act of of the Obama Administration Administration to to fulfill the American strategic objectives in the [South Asian] region... Pakistani American strategic objectives in the [South Asian] region . . . Pakistani polipoli ticians policy making the US ticians cannot cannot influence influence policy making in in the US which which is is regarded regarded as as the the superpower of the day. However, since the law favoured civilian economic superpower of the day. However, since the law favoured civilian economic assistance provided the parties and assistance and and democracy, democracy, it it provided the pretext pretext to to anti-PPP anti-PPP parties and 36 media groups to malign it for ulterior motives. media groups to malign it for ulterior motives.36 On President Zardari Zardari projected working for for the On his his part, part, President projected himself himself as as aa democrat, democrat, working the larger interest of the country, and not pursuing personal goals. In this respect, larger interest of the country, and not pursuing personal goals. In this respect, he he often often cited cited the the repeal repeal of of the the infamous infamous Article Article 58(2)(b) 58(2)(b) of of the the 1973 1973 Constitution Constitution by the which reduced the presidential powers including by the parliament parliament in in 2010, 2010, which reduced the presidential powers including the the 37 appointment of service chiefs. The passage of the 18th Constitutional appointment of service chiefs.37 The passage of the 18th Constitutional AmendAmend ment to the ment sent sent aa strategic strategic signal signal to the military military that that its its role role in in politics politics is is not not needed. needed. The PPP and the PML-N were on the same page despite their political The PPP and the PML-N were on the same page despite their political differdiffer ences the past. but did ences in in the past. The The military military leadership leadership took took it it seriously seriously but did not not express express its its resentment peculiar circ*mstances, resentment in in aa reactive reactive manner. manner. Rather Rather under under [those] [those] peculiar circ*mstances, the the institution to focus things such institution preferred preferred to focus on on other other things such as as governance governance and and mitigating mitigating 38 security from the border with with Afghanistan. security challenges challenges emanating emanating from the Western Western border Afghanistan.38 As far as the security matters were concerned, the civil government and As far as the security matters were concerned, the civil government and the the military vision to former Federally Federally military had had aa different different vision to counter counter insurgency insurgency in in the the former 39 Administered However, tensed relations between the Administered Tribal Tribal Area Area (FATA). (FATA).39 However, given given tensed relations between the government and the military, and in a bid to internationally be seen as pro-peace government and the military, and in a bid to internationally be seen as aa pro-peace party, though reluctantly, to cooperate the military this party, the the PPP PPP opted, opted, though reluctantly, to cooperate with with the military in in this 40 respect. Importantly, to further appease the institution, the government extended respect.40 Importantly, to further appease the institution, the government extended the tenure of the same year.41 the tenure of General General Kayani Kayani as as COAS COAS the same year.41 However, before the PPP government could focus However, before the PPP government could focus on on its its development development agenda, agenda, it it tussled again with the Kayani-led military over the fallout of the Abbottabad tussled again with the Kayani-led military over the fallout of the Abbottabad OperOper 42 ation that killed killed Osama bin Laden Laden on May2011. Contextually, the (in)famous ation that Osama bin on 2 2 May 2011.42 Contextually, the (in)famous 43 Memogate scandal surfaced which widened the chasm between the Memogate scandal43 surfaced which widened the chasm between the government government and Pakistan’s ambassador the United United States, and the the military. military. The The latter latter held held that that Pakistan’s ambassador to to the States, Husain Haqqani who was a PPP man, wrote the memo to the Obama Husain Haqqani who was a PPP man, wrote the memo to the Obama AdministraAdministra tion to rescue tion to rescue the the civil civil government government against against aa looming looming coup. coup. The The government, government, on on its part, posited that it was engulfed in the crisis by Mansoor Ijaz whom former its part, posited that it was engulfed in the crisis by Mansoor Ijaz whom the the former termed was taken taken to the Supreme by Zardari’s termed as as anti-Zardari. anti-Zardari. The The matter matter was to the Supreme Court Court by Zardari’s archrival, Nawaz Sharif. Consequently, on 12 June2012, the Memogate archrival, Nawaz Sharif. Consequently, on 12 June 2012, the Memogate CommisCommis sion to the the Supreme for sion submitted submitted its its report report to Supreme Court, Court, holding holding Haqqani Haqqani responsible responsible for 44 authoring the memo. Though the Zardari team survived the Memogate scandal, authoring the memo.44 Though the Zardari team survived the Memogate scandal, it weaknesses both both politically politically and For instance it surely surely exposed exposed its its weaknesses and institutionally. institutionally. For instance the judiciary and, to an extent the military, preferences started prevailing vis-à-vis the judiciary and, to an extent the military, preferences started prevailing vis-a-vis governance governance and and security. security. Two other too preoccupied Two other issues, issues, in in 2011, 2011, too preoccupied the the civil civil government government and and the the milimili tary domestically and internationally. First being, in January2011, Raymond tary domestically and internationally. First being, in January 2011, Raymond

Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 71 Davis, an American official, shot two Pakistanis dead in Lahore. The incident went viral extra-regionally. Raymond was arrested and remanded by the police on the instructions of local courts. Initially, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani and the Interior Minister Rehman Malik doubted Raymond enjoyed diplomatic immunity. On its part, the US government through its embassy in Islamabad claimed the accused held diplomatic protection. The matter further reflected on the disturbed ties, on the one hand, between the Pakistani military and the United States and, on the other, between the two countries despite civil government’s’ efforts to keep it warm. Nonetheless, with the involvement of high-level US officials including the Secretary of State who urged the Pakistani military to play its part, the matter was resolved through negotiations in terms of payment of blood money of 2.3million US$ to the deceased’s families.45 The second issue occurred on 26 November2011 at Salala, a Pakistani army check post on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border where 24 security personnel were killed and 12 injured in a US-led NATO attack. “This is an attack on Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty,” said the governor of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.46 The incident worsened US–-Pakistan relations which already stood at its lowest ebb in recent history. The Pakistani military, while invoking its agency, prevailed over the civilian actors including the civil government and ensured an end to NATO supply lines to Afghanistan that passed through Pakistan. If US–Pakistan relations were off the hook, China–Pakistan relations remained on the track. President Zardari paid multiple visits to China in his 5-year tenure. From the Chinese side, Premier Li Keqiang visited Pakistan in May2013, when the Zardari-led government was about to complete its tenure.47 China–Pakistan relations have realised “factors of durability” over the seven decades.48 The contemporary warmth in bilateral relations was witnessed under Pervez Musharraf and carried over by Zardari in tandem with the military leadership since unlike US–Pakistan relations, there was no irritants involved in Islamabad–Beijing relations. Thus, both the sides signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to enhance bilateral trade and strategic cooperation.49 Besides, Pakistan’s relations with key Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates remained stable where civil and military leadership paid official visits. Indeed, Pakistan– Saudi relations are defence-oriented, where the wide-ranging role of the Pakistani military is manifested through close defence cooperation.50 However, Pakistan– Iran relations during this period gained some limelight with visits of President Zardari to resume discussions on the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline. Operationally, however, the two countries could not get over mutual misgivings grounded in strategic mistrust.51 In a nutshell, though the Zardari-led political dispensation tried to control the country’s foreign policies towards India, Iran, Afghanistan, and, above all, the United States, the military’s powerful position could not be replaced with civilian decision-making. Indeed, being weaker politically and administratively, the civil government opted to appease the military in the matters of foreign policy too. After the PPP tenure was completed, an interim government run the government affairs including the conduct of general election held in May2013. Resultantly,

72 Ejaz Hussain the PML-N formed government in the Centre and Punjab. Pakistan Tehreek-eInsaf (PTI), the political party of cricket-turned-politician Imran Khan, could only form provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The PPP was relegated to Sindh only ─ and it formed a coalition government in Balochistan much later.52 The following section analyses Pakistan’s foreign policy during 2013–18 with a focus on the military in terms of assessing its role in the making and implementation of foreign policy.

The Military and Foreign Policy During 2013–2018 Nawaz Sharif, for the third time, assumed the office of prime minister of Pakistan in June2013. As per his governance style of the 1990s, Sharif acted confidently and smartly vis-à-vis the military. He, on the one hand, desired to control the military and, on the other, treated it in a way that reflects non-interference in the military’s internal matters. Empirically, then, in the context of India–Pakistan skirmishes at the Line of Control (LoC) since early 2013, Sharif did not disagree with the military’s old idea of establishing a national security council. Unsurprisingly, the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) was established in August2013.53 Interestingly, in the past, both the PPP and the PML-N confronted such proposals. On the other hand, however, Prime Minister Sharif kept the portfolio of foreign minister with himself in order to operationalise his foreign policy ideas. For example, during his previous slots as prime minister, he attempted to make peace with India despite the military’s disapproval. Such a mindset was expressly manifested during Sharif’s participation in the inaugural ceremony of India’s newly elected right-wing politician, Narendra Modi. “The military certainly did not like the idea of appeasing India which has fought with Pakistan, and confronted the country diplomatically and economically, for example, in recent years in Afghanistan.”54 Arguably, Sharif desired to commercially normalise Pakistan’s relations with India for a number of factors. First, being a businessman, trade linkage with a neighbouring country, which is less than 30 kilometers from Sharif’s business center located in and around Lahore, looked rational. Second, trade relations as such provide business and investment incentives to other stakeholders too, including the military.55 Third, since the prime minister intended not to organisationally meddle with the military, the latter was not expected to outmaneuver the civil government through, for example, threat of a coup. Moreover, to win over the military’s trust for ensuring his political survival, Nawaz Sharif along with other parliamentarians legislated the military courts for counterterrorism in January2015. Moreover, under the National Action Plan (NAP), apex committees, which included top representatives from the civil–military divide, were established which institutionally enhanced the military’s role in governance.56 As regards Pakistan’s relations with China, the latter’s President Xi Jinping paid an extraordinary visit to Pakistan in April2015 where the two countries signed the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).57 The CPEC is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Regarding CPEC’s concept, the civil and military

Military and Foreign in Pakistan 73 Military and Foreign Policy Policy in Pakistan 73

leadership the same leadership were were on on the same page page since since China China is is Pakistan’s Pakistan’s strategic strategic partner. partner. However, as far as CPEC’s economic and security dimensions However, as far as CPEC’s economic and security dimensions were were concerned, concerned, their former desired to deploy their choices choices diverged. diverged. The The former desired to deploy civil civil law law enforcement enforcement instiinsti tutions such as the police to ensure law and order in the regions tutions such as the police to ensure law and order in the regions which which hosted hosted different whereas the terrordifferent CPEC CPEC projects projects whereas the latter latter opposed opposed such such aa strategy, strategy, given given terror ism incidences particularly in Balochistan and, hence, preferred military security ism incidences particularly in Balochistan and, hence, preferred military security for the CPEC. the military for the CPEC. Nonetheless, Nonetheless, the military agency agency prevailed prevailed in in strategic strategic interaction interaction with the civilians, and the federal and provincial governments with the civilians, and the federal and provincial governments agreed agreed to to accord accord an an 58 institutional role to the military along with civil law enforcement. institutional role to the military along with civil law enforcement.58 China–Pakistan by the the military China-Pakistan relations relations were were consolidated consolidated by military in in the the 1960s. 1960s. The The relations were nourished in the subsequent decades with military’s relations were nourished in the subsequent decades with military’s input input and and efforts. the United United States efforts. When When the States ditched ditched Pakistan Pakistan in in the the Cold Cold War War and and later later in in the the 1990s, was China that helped with military 1990s, it it was China that helped Pakistan Pakistan with military hardware hardware and and economic economic assistance... power. Pakistan assistance . . . China China is is an an emerging emerging [super] [super] power. Pakistan is is part part of of China’s China’s OBOR [One Belt, One Road] through CPEC. Its security can only be ensured by OBOR [One Belt, One Road] through CPEC. Its security can only be ensured by Pakistan’s armed forces since CPEC boarders with Afghanistan, which is unstaPakistan’s armed forces since CPEC boarders with Afghanistan, which is unsta ble...[And] to its Port project where ble . . . [And] Iran Iran is is suspicious suspicious of of CPEC CPEC due due to its Chabahar Chabahar Port project where India has has invested invested too.59 India too.59 What be posited view of the military What can can be posited in in view of the the aforementioned aforementioned is is that that the military assumes assumes itself as a major stakeholder as far Pakistan’s foreign policy itself as a major stakeholder as far Pakistan’s foreign policy is is concerned. concerned. It, It, thus, the civil with India thus, distrusts distrusts the civil government(s) government(s) normalising normalising with India and/or and/or AfghaniAfghani stan pursuing ties ties with, United States stan and and pursuing with, for for example, example, the the United States when when the the institution institution thinks otherwise. Interestingly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif though thinks otherwise. Interestingly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif though visited visited the the United breakthrough United States States multiple multiple times times during during 2013–2017 2013-2017 could could not not ensure ensure aa breakthrough 60 in To week-long visit visit of in the the tensed tensed US–Pakistan US-Pakistan relations. relations.60 To the the contrary, contrary, aa week-long of COAS COAS General Raheel Sharif to the United States in November2015 melted the ice, General Raheel Sharif to the United States in November 2015 melted the ice, and the two bilateral confidence and the two sides sides reassured reassured bilateral confidence and and cooperation cooperation especially especially over over 61 Afghanistan. Afghanistan.61 Similarly, though Sharif personal relations with the the Saudi Similarly, though Sharif enjoyed enjoyed close close personal relations with Saudi monmonarchs, it was the Raheel-led military which decided on the key areas bilateral archs, it was the Raheel-led military which decided on the key areas of of bilateral engagement. Here, it becomes pertinent Pakistan’s disagreement engagement. Here, it becomes pertinent to to mention mention Pakistan’s disagreement with with Saudi Arabia over the Yemen war. Saudi Arabia over the Yemen war. Pakistan’s were already border. From Pakistan’s armed armed forces forces were already deployed deployed on on its its Western Western border. From aa military perspective, it was not in a position to fight another war and, that too, military perspective, it was not in a position to fight another war and, that too, outside the country. Moreover, since 9/11 Pakistan is incrementally improvoutside the country. Moreover, since 9/11 Pakistan is incrementally improv ing key country ing its its [defense] [defense] ties ties with with Turkey... Turkey . . . Iran Iran is is also also another another key country in in the region. region. By foreign wars, wars, we than the By fighting fighting foreign we will will only only make make more more enemies enemies than friends. the friends. [However], [However], despite despite lowering lowering of of relations relations with with the the Saudis Saudis and and the 62 Emiratis in that context, military-tomilitary ties remained intact. Emiratis in that context, military-tomilitary ties remained intact.62 The foregoing reflects vividly on the military The foregoing reflects vividly on the military agency agency and and institutional institutional rationration ality as far Pakistan’s foreign policy is concerned. The non-military ality as far Pakistan’s foreign policy is concerned. The non-military intuitions intuitions including failed to to device including the the Foreign Foreign Office Office could could not not invoke invoke its its agencies agencies and and failed device any strategy to counterbalance military agency. Rather than neutralising any strategy to counterbalance military agency. Rather than neutralising the the

74 Ejaz Hussain military’s influence in foreign policy as Nawaz Sharif reflected in his initial days, he remained in hot waters on account of Dawn Leak and Panama Papers.63 These episodes destroyed the little bit trust the military might have in his person. After all, he was able to survive as a person and family in the 1999 coup when he secretly negotiated his exit from Pakistan to Riyadh, and later, to London. Moreover, his peace overtures to India further antagonized the institution. Thus, without a coup which Sharif tried to prevent through appeasem*nt as discussed earlier, he was dismissed from office on charges of moral misconduct through a judicial verdict in 2016.64 His political pick, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, became the premier to complete the PML-N’s tenure in office. In the following section, the military and foreign policies are analysed in the current context (2018-present), conceptually and empirically.

The Military and Foreign Policy in the Current Context General elections were held in Pakistan in July2018. Resultantly, Imran Khan’s PTI formed a simple-majority government in the Centre, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab. In Balochistan, the PTI made a coalition government with the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP). However, in Sindh, Pakistan People’s Party formed the government with a simple majority. Khan, through his various statements and actions in office, generated an impression of his being on the same page with the military on politics and foreign policy.65 As far as foreign policy is concerned, the civil–military leadership is apparently on the same page. However, the Bajwa-led military took the lead, as will be analysed in this section, to determine the contours of Pakistan’s foreign affairs towards, for example, China, Turkey, England, Saudi Arabia, and, above all, the United States. To begin with, an economic element was added into China–Pakistan relations through CPEC. However, the Khan government initially fumbled at managing foreign policy with Beijing. On 10 September2018, the Financial Times (London) published a report on CPEC in which Razak Dawood, advisor for commerce and investment to the federal government, quoted to having said that the: [C]hinese companies received tax breaks, many breaks and have an undue advantage in Pakistan; this is one of the things we’re looking at because it’s not fair that Pakistan companies should be disadvantaged... I think we should put everything on hold for a year so we can get our act together... Perhaps we can stretch CPEC out over another five years or so.66 The aforementioned statement impacted China–Pakistan relations vis-à-vis CPEC in the short run. Dawood would have expressed his opinion for political point-scoring by criticising the PML-N, which is archrival of the PTI. Nonetheless, the anti-CPEC/BRI lobbies, from within the region and beyond, twisted it to suit their own designs. Contextually, the Khan government engaged with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), too, for obtaining loans. Such anti-BRI lobbies, while relying on conspiracy theories, hinted at the deteriorating effects of

Military and Foreign in Pakistan 75 Military and Foreign Policy Policy in Pakistan 75

CPEC for socioeconomic the CPEC for socioeconomic development development in in Pakistan Pakistan and, and, instead, instead, projected projected the rosy role of the IMF whose bailout packages were conditional to the US suprosy role of the IMF whose bailout packages were conditional to the US sup67 port. In words, such voices predicted predicted aa fallout port.67 In other other words, such voices fallout in in China–Pakistan China-Pakistan relations relations and further improvement in US–Pakistan relations. and further improvement in US-Pakistan relations. On the Chinese been resentful to the the fact that On its its part, part, the Chinese side side would would have have been resentful due due to fact that Dawood’s critical take on CPEC affected the BRI negatively. As a crucial comDawood’s critical take on CPEC affected the BRI negatively. As a crucial com ponent the BRI value economically ponent of of the BRI framework, framework, CPEC CPEC carried carried high high value economically as as well well as as discursively. Any public displeasure on CPEC would mean a criticism of the Belt discursively. Any public displeasure on CPEC would mean a criticism of the Belt and for China. and Road Road Initiative Initiative for China. For For damage damage control, control, COAS COAS General General Qamar Qamar Javed Javed Bajwa paid a visit to China to diffuse any misunderstanding within Bajwa paid a visit to China to diffuse any misunderstanding within one one week week of of the Later in year, Prime the said said statement. statement. Later in the the year, Prime Minister Minister Imran Imran Khan Khan himself himself met met with the Chinese to clear with the Chinese authorities authorities and and tried tried to clear away away any any negativity negativity generated generated in in the preceding months. Moreover, Khan visited China for two more times, thus, the preceding months. Moreover, Khan visited China for two more times, thus, building on partnership building on mutual mutual confidence, confidence, economic economic cooperation, cooperation, and and strategic strategic partnership 68 On its part, the military leadership has been between the two countries. between the two countries.68 On its part, the military leadership has been interactinteract ing with its ing with its Chinese Chinese counterpart counterpart regularly. regularly. The The former, former, while while marking marking its its agency, agency, has the establishment has attained attained an an institutional institutional role role in in CPEC CPEC through through the establishment of of CPEC CPEC Authority by the Khan government with other Authority by the Khan government in in strategic strategic collaboration collaboration with other civilian civilian 69 stakeholders the PML-N the PPP. stakeholders including including elements elements of of the PML-N and and the PPP.69 As far as Pakistan’s foreign policy towards the United States the As far as Pakistan’s foreign policy towards the United States is is concerned, concerned, the 70 Trump Administration pronounced to cut off military aid for Pakistan. This might Trump Administration pronounced to cut off military aid for Pakistan.70 This might have Pakistan. However, However, if have shocked shocked the the civil–military civil-military leadership leadership in in Pakistan. if seen seen globally, globally, this looked like a common feature of the US foreign policy under Trump where this looked like a common feature of the US foreign policy under Trump where relations with, for example, NATO countries were antagonised, too, on account relations with, for example, NATO countries were antagonised, too, on account of of preferring the American preferring the American interests interests above above any any other other considerations. considerations. However, However, since since Pakistan key stakeholder the Pakistan is is aa key stakeholder in in ensuring ensuring peace peace and and stability stability in in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, the US officials engaged with the Pakistani authorities especially the military. Little US officials engaged with the Pakistani authorities especially the military. Little wonder Prime Minister wonder that that in in July2019, July 2019, COAS COAS General General Bajwa Bajwa accompanied accompanied Prime Minister Khan to the United States. The former met with key officials of the Khan to the United States. The former met with key officials of the Trump Trump AdminAdmin istration istration and and discussed discussed Afghanistan Afghanistan affairs affairs at at length. length. Unsurprisingly, Unsurprisingly, then, then, PakiPaki 71 stan been aa key Since stan has has been key member member of of the the quadrilateral quadrilateral group group on on Afghanistan. Afghanistan.71 Since the the United States withdrawn from from Afghanistan United States has has militarily militarily withdrawn Afghanistan in in September2021, September 2021, it it urged Pakistan to work with the former to ensure a negotiated settlement of politiurged Pakistan to work with the former to ensure a negotiated settlement of politi cal post-withdrawal. Pakistan, for its was cal authority authority in in Afghanistan Afghanistan post-withdrawal. Pakistan, for its own own interests, interests, was 72 in agreement with the United States in this respect. in agreement with the United States in this respect.72 Besides the United States key country whom both both Besides the United States and and China, China, another another key country with with whom the civil government and the military pursued warm relations was Saudi Arabia. the civil government and the military pursued warm relations was Saudi Arabia. Little that Crown Bin Salman was accorded Little wonder wonder that Crown Prince Prince Mohammed Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) (MBS) was accorded aa warm warm welcome welcome in February2019. Both the countries signed an MoU to in February 2019. Both the countries signed an MoU to propro mote trade and investment. The Saudis hinted at investing about 20billion mote trade and investment. The Saudis hinted at investing about 20 billion US$ US$ 73 in However, situational jolted the the bilateral bilateral relations in Pakistan. Pakistan.73 However, situational shocks shocks jolted relations in in recent recent years. In December2019, Prime Minister Khan was about to take part Kuala years. In December 2019, Prime Minister Khan was about to take part in in Kuala Lumpur Summit on the invitation of his Malaysian counterpart, DrMahathir Lumpur Summit on the invitation of his Malaysian counterpart, Dr Mahathir Mohammad. was supposed to see Mohammad. Khan Khan was supposed to see Turkish Turkish President President Recep Recep Tayyip Tayyip Erdogan Erdogan who had regularly visited Pakistan in the recent past. However, at who had regularly visited Pakistan in the recent past. However, at eleventh eleventh hour, hour,

76 Ejaz Hussain Khan postponed his Malaysia visit to please MBS-led Saudi Arabia.74 Second, in August2020, Saudi Arabia, as per media reports, pressurised Pakistan to pay back 1billion US$ Saudi loan on a short notice. Reactively, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi issued a sharply worded statement. He said, I am once again respectfully telling the OIC that a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers is our expectation. If you cannot convene it, then I’ll be compelled to ask the PM [Prime Minister Imran Khan] to call a meeting of the Islamic countries that are ready to stand with us on the issue of Kashmir and support the oppressed Kashmiris.75 However, before bilateral relations were jeopardised, the military authorities prevented it from further deterioration through institutional engagement with its Saudi counterpart since military-to-military relations have been very cordial over the decades. Importantly, COAS General Bajwa visited the Kingdom ahead of Khan’s visit in May2021.76 Arguably, this highlights military agency in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy even in the current context. In the aftermath of this crucial visit of the COAS, a former general, Bilal Akbar, has been appointed as Pakistan’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia. This further reflects on the weak agency of the civil government as well as civil bureaucracy, that is Foreign Office. Arguably, even the role of foreign minister has been overshadowed by the portfolio of National Security Advisor (NSA), currently held by Moeed Yusuf, who is arguably more dynamic and carries the confidence of the military. Last but not the least, under the Khan government, Pakistan’s relations with India remained confrontational in character. Since India’s unilateral revocation of Article 370 and 35A in August2019, Kashmir issue has assumed centrality in Pakistan’s extra-regional diplomacy.77 Since the country is constrained by international obligations of, for example, Financial Action Task Force (FATF), it is rationally avoiding a military solution.78 Besides, the current civil–military leadership seems not in a mood to establish formal ties with Israel outrightly despite the recent spree of Arab countries which established diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv in 2020. Nonetheless, in order to counter India and its regional allies, it is probable that the military may think of ways to engage with Israel informally.79

Notes 1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed., revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton (New York: McGraw-Hill Education), 3–17. 2 Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 33–58. 3 Aurel Croissant, “From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 156–78. 4 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947–2019: AConcise History, 5th ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2020), 12–16.

Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 77 5 Humayun Mirza, From Plassey to Pakistan: The Family History of Iskander Mirza, the First President of Pakistan (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1999), 139–83. 6 Mirza, From Plassey to Pakistan, 219–38. 7 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: APolitical Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 118–85. 8 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: AReappraisal, 3rd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2021), 94–98. 9 Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 178–204. 10 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947–2019, 256–58. 11 Ejaz Hussain, Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2013), 290–328. 12 Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence (New York: I.B. Tauris& Co. Ltd), 195–225. 13 Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 218. 14 See Mushtaq Ahmad, “Kashmir in the United Nations,” Pakistan Horizon 4, no. 4 (1951): 217–32; Khalid Bin Sayeed, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests,” Asian Survey 4, no. 3 (1964): 746–56; W. Norman Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 179–86; Rasul Bux Rais, China and Pakistan: APolitical Analysis of Mutual Relations (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1977), 21–40; Shirin Tahir Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Prager Publishers, 1982), 1–26; M. S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan: 1947–1958 (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984), 64–90; Raghunath Ram, “Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan: From Tashkent to Bangladesh War,” International Studies 23, no. 1 (1986): 39–62; Robert J. Mcmahon, “United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947–1954,” The Journal of American History 75, no. 3 (1988): 812–40; S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 210–15; Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: AStudy of Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 1–19; Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 2–22; Satyabrat Sinha, “The Strategic Triangle: India-China-Pakistan,” China Report 40, no. 2 (2004): 221–25; A. Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 1–9; Ijaz Khan, “Pakistan’s Post September11 2001 Afghan Policy Shift: Impact on Pak-India-Afghan Geopolitics,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 42, no. 5 (2007): 461–75; Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 169–99; Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Relations Including Details of the Kashmir Framework (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 77–86; Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1–25; Talat Farooq, US-Pakistan Relations: Pakistan’s Strategic Choices in the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 2016), 1–4; Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, vii, 9–19; see Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947–2019, xi, 17–18. 15 Feroz Ahmed, Aijaz Ahmad, and Eqbal Ahmad, “Pakistan, Bangladesh, India: 1970– 1973,” MERIP Reports 16 (1973): 6–11; Vladimir Moskalenko, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey 14, no. 3 (1974): 267–78; Iftikhar H. Malik, “The Afghanistan Crisis and the Rediscovery of the Frontline State,” Asian Survey 42, no. 1 (2002): 204–12; Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 1–50.

78 Ejaz Hussain 16 Sudhansu Kumar Patnaik, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2005), 13–74. 17 S. A. M. Pasha, Islam in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Global Media Publications, 2005), 11–50. 18 Smruti S. Pattanaik, Elite Perceptions in Foreign Policy: Role of Print Media in Influencing India-Pakistan Relations, 1989–1999 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), 168–78. 19 Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An International Law Perspective (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), 1–50; Ijaz Hussain, Dimensions of PakistanIndia Relations (Lahore: Heritage Publications, 2006), 227–73; see also, Ijaz Hussain, Indus Waters Treaty: Political and Legal Dimensions (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017), 215–72. 20 Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1947–1994 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 121–57. 21 Patnaik, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 13–74; see also, Ejaz Hussain, “Politics and Foreign Policy in Pakistan,” in State and Foreign Policy in South Asia, eds. Jivanta Schöttli and Siegfried O. Wolf (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2010), 271–301. The latter study developed a rational choice model to analyse Pakistan’s foreign policy from 1947 till 2010. However, its empirical thrust revolved around domestic politics in which the military intervened (in)directly. The current study, to the contrary, takes an actorcentric view of foreign policy in contemporary Pakistan which was not covered by the previous account. 22 Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2018), 55–76. 23 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield, 2014), 3–35. 24 Ibid. 25 Jill Steans, Lloyd Pettiford, Thomas Diez, and Imad El-Anis, An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes, 3rd ed. (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 76–98. 26 Ibid., 184–99. 27 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 3–35. 28 Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, eds. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 23–38. 29 Ariadne Vromen, “Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches,” in Theory and Methods in Political Science, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 249–66. 30 Hussain, “Politics and Foreign Policy in Pakistan,” 290–328. 31 Asad Hashim, “Bilawal Bhutto blames Musharraf for Benazir’s Death,” Aljazeera, December29, 2017, accessed May15, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/bila wal-bhutto-blames-musharraf-benazir-death-171228072102606.html. 32 Sanjeev Miglani, “Pakistan’s Zardari: ALittle Bit Pakistani and a Little Bit Indian,” Reuters, November26, 2008, accessed April25, 2018, http://blogs.reuters.com/ pakistan/2008/11/26/pakistans-zardari-a-little-bit-pakistani-and-a-little-bit-indian/. 33 “Zardari Goes to Kabul Today,” Dawn, January6, 2009, accessed May28, 2021, www. dawn.com/news/337545/zardari-goes-to-kabul-today. 34 Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “Pakistani President Tries to Assure U.S. on Taliban,” The New York Times, May5, 2009, accessed June1, 2021, www.nytimes. com/2009/05/06/world/asia/06policy.html. 35 Interview with a serving officer of Pakistan Army, January18, 2021, Islamabad. 36 Interview with a PPP member, May13, 2021, Lahore. 37 “18th Amendment and Education,” Dawn, October11, 2010, accessed June2, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/570524.

Military and Foreign in Pakistan 79 Military and Foreign Policy Policy in Pakistan 79 38 Army, March6, 2021, Islamabad. Islamabad. 38 Conversion Conversion with with aa retired retired colonel colonel of of Pakistan Pakistan Army, March 6, 2021, 39 Shahzad Shahzad Akhtar, “Fighting for for the Military Action and Governance Governance in in the Tribal 39 Akhtar, “Fighting the FATA: FATA: Military Action and the Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” in Perspectives on Contemporary Contemporary Pakistan: Governance, Develop Areas of Pakistan,” in Perspectives on Pakistan: Governance, Development and Environment, eds. Ali and Routledge, 2020), 2020), ment and Environment, eds. Ghulam Ghulam Ali and Ejaz Ejaz Hussain Hussain (London: (London: Routledge, 33-44. 33–44. 40 Raza Raza Rumi, “Charting Pakistan’s Security Policy,” Policy,” Unites Unites States of 40 Rumi, “Charting Pakistan’s Internal Internal Security States Institute Institute of Peace, Special Report 368, May2015, www.usip.org/sites/ Peace, Special Report 368, May 2015, accessed accessed June7, June 7, 2021, 2021, www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/SR368-Chartmg-Pakistans-Internal-Security-Policy.pdf. default/files/SR368-Charting-Pakistans-Internal-Security-Policy.pdf. 41 “Gen[eral] “Gen[eral] Kayani Gets Three Three Year Year Extension,” The Express Tribune, July22, July 22, 2010, 41 Kayani Gets Extension,” The Express Tribune, 2010, accessed https://tribune.com.pk/story/30093/gen-kayani-gets-threeaccessed June9, June 9, 2021, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/30093/gen-kayani-gets-threeyear-extension/. year-extension/. 42 Hannah Hannah Strange, Strange, “US “US Raid Raid That That Killed Laden Was Was ‘an ‘an Act of War’, Says Pakistani 42 Killed Bin Bin Laden Act of War’, Says Pakistani Report,” The www.telegraph.co.uk/ Report,” The Telegraph, Telegraph, July9, July 9, 2013, 2013, accessed accessed June12, June 12, 2021, 2021, www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10169655/US-raid-that-killed-bin-Laden-was-an-actnews/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10169655/US-raid-that-killed-bin-Laden-was-an-actof-war-says-Pakistani-report.html. of-war-says-Pakistani-report.html. 43 From NRO NRO to Dawn, January16, 43 “Timeline: “Timeline: From to Memogate,” Memogate,” Dawn, January 16, 2012, 2012, accessed accessed June19, June 19, 2021, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/688541. www.dawn.com/news/688541. 44 Sidrah Sidrah Moiz Moiz Khan, Khan, “Memogate: “Memogate: Commission’s Commission’s Report Says Haqqani Memo,” 44 Report Says Haqqani Authored Authored Memo,” The Express Tribune, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/ https://tribune.com.pk/ The Express Tribune, June12, June 12, 2012, 2012, accessed accessed June24, June 24, 2021, story/392485/memogate-commissions-report-claims-haqqani-au1hored-memo/. story/392485/memogate-commissions-report-claims-haqqani-authored-memo/. 45 Josh Josh Rogin, “Who Paid Paid the the ‘Blood ‘Blood Money’ Money’ to to Set Set Raymond Raymond Davis Davis Free?” Free?” Foreign 45 Rogin, “Who Foreign Pol Policy, March16, icy, March 16, 2011, 2011, accessed accessed June29, June 29, 2021, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/16/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/16/ who-paid-the-blood-money-to-set-raymond-davis-free/. who-paid-the-blood-money-to-set-raymond-davis-free/. 46 Iftikhar Iftikhar Firdous, “24 Soldiers Soldiers Killed in NATO on Pakistan Check Post,” Post,” The The 46 Firdous, “24 Killed in NATO Attack Attack on Pakistan Check Express Tribune, November26, https://tribune.com.pk/ Express Tribune, November 26, 2011, 2011, accessed accessed July3, July 3, 2021, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/ story/297979/nato-jets-attack-checkpost-on-pak-afghan-border. story/297979/nato-jets-attack-checkpost-on-pak-afghan-border. 47 “Chinese “Chinese Premier Premier in in Pakistan, Pakistan, Praises Praises Ties,” Ties,” Dawn, 22, 2013, 2013, accessed accessed July5, July 5, 47 Dawn, May May22, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1012968/chinese-premier-in-pakistan-praises-ties. www.dawn.com/news/1012968/chinese-premier-in-pakistan-praises-ties. 2021, 48 Ghulam Ghulam Ali, China-Pakistan Relations: Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford Oxford Uni 48 Ali, China-Pakistan Relations: A AHistorical Analysis (Karachi: University Press, Press, 2017), 2017), 213-35. versity 213–35. 49 “Chinese “Chinese Premier in Pakistan, Pakistan, Praises Praises Ties.” Ties.” 49 Premier in 50 Zahid Zahid Shahab Shahab Ahmed and Shahram Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Pakistan Caught Caught Between Iran and and 50 Ahmed and Akbarzadeh, “Pakistan Between Iran Saudi Arabia,” Contemporary South 28, no. (2020): 336–50. 336-50. Saudi Arabia,” Contemporary South Asia Asia 28, no. 33 (2020): 51 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Syed Syed Ali Shah, “2018, “2018, aa Troubled Troubled Year Year for for Balochistan’s Balochistan’s Politics,” Politics,” Dawn, 52 Ali Shah, Dawn, Decem December 31, 2018, 2018, accessed accessed July13, July 13, 2021, ber31, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1454671. www.dawn.com/news/1454671. 53 to Be Be Reconstituted National Security,” Dawn, August August22, 53 “DCC “DCC to Reconstituted as as Committee Committee on on National Security,” Dawn, 22, 2013, accessed July15, July 15, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1037613/dcc-to-be-reconstituted2013, accessed 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1037613/dcc-to-be-reconstitutedas-committee-on-national-security. as-committee-on-national-security. 54 Army officer, 54 Interview Interview with with aa serving serving Army officer, June12, June 12, 2021, 2021, Islamabad. Islamabad. 55 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military ed. (London: (London: 55 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inc.: Inside Inside Pakistan's Pakistan’s Military Military Economy, Economy, 2nd 2nd ed. Pluto Press, 131-49. Pluto Press, 2017), 2017), 131–49. 56 Amir Wasim, to Function Dawn, March March31, 2019, 56 Amir Wasim, “Military “Military Courts Courts Cease Cease to Function Today,” Today,” Dawn, 31, 2019, accessed July18, July 18, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1472947. accessed 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1472947. 57 Ejaz Ejaz Hussain, Hussain, “China–Pakistan “China-Pakistan Economic Economic Corridor: Corridor: Will Will It It Sustain Sustain Itself?” Itself?” Fudan 57 Fudan Journal of Humanities and and Social Social Sciences Sciences 10, no. 22 (2017): For aa detailed Journal ofthe the Humanities 10, no. (2017): 145–59. 145-59. For detailed analysis of of China–Pakistan China-Pakistan relations, see Ghulam Ghulam Ali, China-Pakistan Relations: analysis relations, see Ali, China–Pakistan Relations: A Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford Oxford University University Press, Press, 2017). 2017). AHistorical Analysis (Karachi: 58 Belt 58 Ejaz Ejaz Hussain, Hussain, “CPEC: “CPEC: Governance Governance and and Security Security Challenges– Challenges - Implications Implications for for the the Belt and Road Road Initiative,” Initiative,” Chinese Chinese Political 4, no. (2019): 135–47. 135-47. and Political Science Science Review Review 4, no. 11 (2019): 59 Conversation Conversation with with aa retired retired officer officer of of Pakistan July 17, 2018, 59 Pakistan Air Air Force, Force, July17, 2018, Islamabad. Islamabad. 60 Arrives in US on Dawn, October21, 2015, accessed 60 “Nawaz “Nawaz Arrives in US on Four-Day Four-Day Visit,” Visit,” Dawn, October 21,2015, accessed July22, July 22, 2021, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1214403. www.dawn.com/news/1214403.

80 Ejaz Hussain 61 Anwar Iqbal, “Pentagon ‘Grateful’ for Army Chief’s Visit,” Dawn, November17, 2015, accessed July24, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1220253. 62 Conversation with a retired Army officer, May15, 2021, Islamabad. 63 For a detailed academic analysis of Dawn Leak and Panama Papers, see Ejaz Hussain, “Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil-Military Relations and Governance in Contemporary Pakistan,” in Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan: Governance, Development and Environment, eds. Ghulam Ali and Ejaz Hussain (London: Routledge, 2020), 73–94. 64 Haseeb Bhatti, “Nawaz Sharif Steps Down as PM After SC’s Disqualification Verdict,” Dawn, July28, 2017, accessed July28, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1348191. 65 Ismail Dilawar and Iain Marlow, “Imran Khan Says Pakistan [Civil] Govt and Military Are on Same Page, Want to Mend Ties with India,” The Print, November28, 2018, accessed August2, 2021, https://theprint.in/politics/imran-khan-says-pakistan-govtand-military-are-on-same-page-want-to-mend-ties-with-india/156145/. 66 “Pakistan Rethinks Its Role in Xi’s Belt and Road Plan,” Financial Times, September9, 2018, accessed August6, 2021, www.ft.com/content/d4a3e7f8-b282-11e899ca-68cf89602132. 67 Ejaz Hussain, “Will Change in Government Affect China–Pakistan Economic Corridor? The BRI, CPEC and the Khan Government: An Analysis,” Chinese Journal of International Review 1, no. 2 (2019): 1–19. 68 Ejaz Hussain, “Here’s What to Expect from PM Khan’s Third Visit to China,” Naya Daur, October7, 2019, accessed August10, 2021, https://nayadaur.tv/2019/10/hereswhat-to-expect-from-pm-khans-third-visit-to-china/. 69 Waqas Ahmed, “Senate Passes CPEC Authority Bill,” The Express Tribune, May28, 2021, accessed August12, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2302115/senate-passescpec-authority-bill. 70 Memphis Barker, “US Military Confirms $300Million Cut in Aid to Pakistan,” The Guardian, September2, 2018, accessed August15, 2021, www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/sep/02/us-military-confirms-300m-cut-in-aid-to-pakistan. 71 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Imran Khan’s US Visit Is for Home Audience. Bajwa’s Army Will Do the Real Talking,” The Print, July16, 2019, accessed August18, 2021, https:// theprint.in/opinion/imran-khans-us-visit-is-for-home-audience-bajwas-army-will-dothe-real-talking/263450/. 72 “On Afghanistan, Pakistan Walks Tightrope of Optimism and Caution,” Aljazeera, August28, 2021, accessed August9, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/28/ on-afghanistan-pakistan-walks-tightrope-of-optimism-and-caution. 73 Abid Hussain, “Pakistan Rolls Out Red Carpet for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed,” BBC, February17, 2019, accessed August29, 2021, www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-47255560. 74 “PM Imran Khan Cancels Malaysia Trip After Saudi Arabia Visit,” The News, December17, 2019, accessed August30, 2021, www.thenews.com.pk/print/ 584675-pm-imran-khan-cancels-malaysia-trip-after-saudi-arabia-visit. 75 Ejaz Hussain, “Jolted, but not in jeopardy: Are Pakistan-Saudi Arabia ties entering a new phase?,” The News, August16, 2020, accessed August31, 2021, www.thenews. com.pk/tns/detail/700521-jolted-but-not-in-jeopardy. 76 Arwa Ibrahim, “Pakistani Prime Minister Khan Visits Saudi Arabia to Reset Ties,” Aljazeera, May7, 2021, accessed September1, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/7/ hld-pakistani-premiers-visit-to-saudi-to-reset-bilateral-ties. 77 Ejaz Hussain, “Indian Unilateralism in Kashmir: Regional (in)stability and Options for Pakistan,” Naya Daur, August6, 2019, accessed September2, 2021, https://nayadaur. tv/2019/08/indian-unilateralism-in-kashmir-regional-instability-and-options-for-paki stan/.

Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 81 78 “Pakistan to Remain on FATF Grey List,” Dawn, June25, 2021, accessed September4, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1631409. 79 Michael Kugelman, “Will Pakistan Capitalize on a New Opportunity to Work with Israel?” The National Interest, January20, 2021, accessed September7, 2021, https://national interest.org/feature/will-pakistan-capitalize-new-opportunity-work-israel-176738.

Taylor St Francis Taylor & Francis Croup httpyVtay lora ndfra nc i s.com

Part II

Operationalization

Taylor St Francis Taylor & Francis Croup httpyVtay lora ndfra nc i s.com

5 China–Pakistan A Decade of Transformation in Diplomacy, 2010–2020 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad-van der Zwan and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra Introduction Pakistan–China diplomatic ties have deepened significantly over the last decade. There has been a multi-faceted transformation in the Sino-Pakistani relations across economic, political, and diplomatic fronts. More Chinese professionals, projects, and products are seen in Pakistan and vice versa. This chapter is an in-depth analysis of the socio-political aspects of the relationship over the past decade. It examines three phases of this relationship, organized according to the ruling political parties of Pakistan: Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The various aspects of diplomacy are examined with a focus on how Chinese investment and financial assistance evolved to become the focal point of the diplomatic ties. The chapter aims to examine both sides of the coin and gather rhetoric from the Chinese and Pakistani perspectives to provide a more holistic view of the evolution of SinoPakistani diplomacy. The three phases of Sowing the Seed (PPP), Accelerated Growth (PML-N), and Reaping the Benefits (PTI) are discussed at length. Both political and economic aspects of these different phases are discussed to analyse the way forward. To conclude, a synopsis of the net result for both the countries is given– termed as a positive or negative handprint of the Sino-Pakistani diplomatic relations. Pakistan, being a parliamentary democracy with a multi-party system, has the following major political parties: Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N), Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q), Pakistan Tehreek-eInsaf (PTI), Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Awami National Party, Jamiat Ulema-eIslam (F), and Muttahida Qaumi Movement, among others. In the PPP regime, from 2008 to 2013, the Pakistan–China relationship flourished as multiple economic and military deals were signed. Both governments had a mutually beneficial agenda in mind to enhance economic development and trade ties. Although this strengthening of the diplomatic relationship came with great benefits, there were some hesitations and criticisms as well. The complex security situation in Pakistan and gaining the trust of the Chinese investors were a few of them. Overall, the period of the Sino-Pakistani diplomacy under the PPP leadership laid the groundwork for the great boom in the diplomatic relationship which was DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-7

86 Gul-i-Hina Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya 86 Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Kamal Nagra Nagra

manifested the later years. The the Pakistan– manifested in in the later years. The new new multidimensional multidimensional phase phase of of the PakistanChina was on breadth to to the China partnership partnership was on the the horizon, horizon, offering offering more more depth depth and and breadth the diplomatic relations. diplomatic relations. In the second phase, with from 2013 the SinoIn the second phase, with the the PML-N PML-N leadership leadership from 2013 to to 2018, 2018, the SinoPakistani ties deepened even further. The iconic MoU for CPEC was signed, Pakistani ties deepened even further. The iconic MoU for CPEC was signed, and and many plans were were envisioned under the the Chinese vision of Belt many other other plans envisioned under Chinese global global vision of the the Belt and both countries their and Road Road Initiative Initiative (BRI). (BRI). Throughout Throughout 2013–2014, 2013-2014, both countries expanded expanded their cooperation on a variety of energy and infrastructure projects. These developcooperation on a variety of energy and infrastructure projects. These develop ments their own ments also also came came with with their own sets sets of of criticisms criticisms and and controversies, controversies, especially especially on on the question of transparency and equitable distribution of resources for the CPEC the question of transparency and equitable distribution of resources for the CPEC projects. the developmenprojects. In In Pakistan, Pakistan, many many questioned questioned the the uneven uneven allocation allocation of of the developmen tal benefits of the CPEC projects among the least developed provinces. tal benefits of the CPEC projects among the least developed provinces. In with the PTI government, In 2018, 2018, with the newly-elected newly-elected PTI government, the the scales scales of of the the SinoSinoPakistani diplomacy also witnessed a shift. Some of the CPEC projects of Phase I, Pakistani diplomacy also witnessed a shift. Some of the CPEC projects of Phase I, as by the previous PML-N PML-N government, back burner burner while as initiated initiated by the previous government, moved moved to to the the back while the the terms the CPEC projects. the new new government government renegotiated renegotiated the terms and and conditions conditions of of the CPEC projects. Later the Sino-Pakistani found aa new footing with Later in in 2019, 2019, the Sino-Pakistani relations relations found new footing with numerous numerous projects being resumed the CPEC Phase II. projects being resumed and and proceeded proceeded under under the CPEC Phase II. The The start start of of 2020 2020 had economies worldwide grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic, and had economies worldwide grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic, and some some of Both countries to find find ways ways to to resume of the the CPEC CPEC projects projects were were on on aa halt. halt. Both countries had had to resume operations and rescale the dynamics. The next section deals with the analysis operations and rescale the dynamics. The next section deals with the analysis of of the the PPP the Sino-Pakistani Sino-Pakistani diplomacy diplomacy under under the PPP leadership. leadership.

Part the Seed: Part I: I: Sowing Sowing the Seed: The The Politics Politics and and Economics Economics of of Pak–China Pak-China Diplomacy Diplomacy under under Pakistan Pakistan People’s People’s Party Party (PPP): (PPP): 2010–2013 2010-2013 At the start the decade At the start of of the decade in in 2010, 2010, Pakistan Pakistan Peoples Peoples Party Party (PPP), (PPP), aa center-left center-left political party, had the reigns led by Asif Ali Zardari as the President political party, had the reigns led by Asif Ali Zardari as the President of of Pakistan. Pakistan. Zardari following the the assassination Zardari came came into into power power on on September9, September 9, 2008, 2008, following assassination of of his former twice twice Prime Prime Minister Minister Benazir Benazir Bhutto his wife wife and and the the former Bhutto in in 2007 2007 during during her her political the 2008 political rally rally ahead ahead of of the 2008 General General Elections. Elections.11 Bhutto’s democratic political agenda public support, Bhutto’s democratic political agenda had had considerable considerable public support, and and Pakistan could move beyond the eight years of military rule under General Pakistan could move beyond the eight years of military rule under General MushMush arraf. However, Benazir’s Benazir’s tragic period of arraf. However, tragic assassination assassination led led the the country country to to aa period of chaos, chaos, uncertainty, and political turmoil. The PPP, now led by Zardari, won the uncertainty, and political turmoil. The PPP, now led by Zardari, won the majority majority seats National Assembly, seats in in the the National Assembly, and and formed formed the the coalition coalition government. government. This This elecelec toral outcome brought defeat to Musharraf’s rule. toral outcome brought defeat to Musharraf’s rule. With political backdrop, backdrop, the the newly Zardari With this this political newly elected elected PPP PPP leader leader Asif Asif Ali Ali Zardari became the president and made his first international state visit to China in became the president and made his first international state visit to China in OctoOcto ber2008. bilateral ties ber 2008.22 Although Although China China and and Pakistan Pakistan have have enjoyed enjoyed strong strong bilateral ties historihistori cally, with the the Chinese Hu Jintao cally, Zardari’s Zardari’s discussions discussions with Chinese President President Hu Jintao heralded heralded aa new new era this era and and sowed sowed the the seeds seeds for for aa stronger stronger Sino-Pakistani Sino-Pakistani partnership. partnership.33 During During this visit, 11 agreements were signed on economic cooperation, infrastructure provisit, 11 agreements were signed on economic cooperation, infrastructure pro jects, agriculture, telecommunications with focus on bilateral jects, agriculture, and and telecommunications with aa focus on enhancing enhancing bilateral

China–Pakistan 87 trade, which was around $7billion aiming to be around $15billion by 2010.4 These agreements signalled China’s increased interest in Pakistan and its economic growth. The bilateral benefits of these agreements were enormous. While China looked at Pakistan as a gateway to the Arabian Sea, Pakistan took it as an economic opportunity. This deepening of ties with China came at a critical time for Pakistan amidst its flailing economy, increasing inflation, looming debt repayments, and flared up relations with the United States in the aftermath of the air raids.5 China’s support and enhanced development cooperation helped Pakistan to open up investment opportunities for potential Chinese investors which could not only boost the economy but also reduce the trade deficits. At the economic level, although Pakistan’s GDP growth rate stood at 4.99percent in 2008,6 the bilateral trade volume for both countries rose to $6.98billion ushering in a new height for the trade relations. China became Pakistan’s first import and eighth export market.7 Moreover, according to the Economic and Commercial Office of the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, by 2008, the Chinese companies’ contract value in Pakistan was $16.5billion whereas the Chinese investment in Pakistan was up to $1.07billion. The economic uplift allowed both countries to expand their economic cooperation further, enabling the Chinese businesses to work in diverse fields in Pakistan, more job creation, and better infrastructure for Pakistan to develop more industries. This contributed towards a positive impact in the Sino-Pakistani diplomacy with mutually benefitting agreements and the presence of political will in Pakistan as well as in China. Nevertheless, these agreements came with concerns and worries from both sides. Security was a key point of discussion. Pakistan was newly emerging from tackling the extremist threats, and China was seeing signs of militant groups and extremism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Hence, China emphasized enhancing joint efforts on combating counterterrorism, especially after the bomb blasts by the militant groups in 2009 in Xinjiang.8 China was grappling with its fight against ‘three forces’ (三个势力) of ‘separatism, extremism and terrorism and finding ways to curb the activities of Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. As some links of these activities were also found in the restive border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Pakistani government geared its efforts to conduct joint military exercises, share intelligence, and deepen its relations with China on countering terrorism.9 These events solidified the joint military cooperation between the two countries even more. It was partially due to the deteriorating security situation with the U.S. air raids and the capture of Osama bin Laden in 2011.10 Also, partly because China and Pakistan were facing the same threat of terrorism in their regions hence, the urgency of fighting against the militancy provided them the united front to increase their diplomatic engagement. Thus, contemporary SinoPakistani relations are multifaceted and comprehended as an intertwined maze of various aspects including politics, economics, and security. Given this economic and geopolitical landscape, the PPP leadership was faced with the challenge of reassuring the Chinese about business feasibility and investment in Pakistan while tackling the internal instabilities of the nation. In 2010,

88 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra Zardari attempted to address the provincial disparities by adopting the 18th Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan along with the ‘7th National Financial Commission (NFC) Award’ which provided more autonomy to the provinces.11 The removal of the concurrent list, abrogation of the presidential powers to dissolve parliament, and greater provincial autonomy were a few of the significant changes. This NFC Award allowed the federal government to allocate 10percent more revenue to the provinces and allowed the revenue distribution formula to include other factors rather than just based on population.12 The new horizontal distribution of resources formula included 82percent population, 10.3percent poverty, 5 percent revenue collection efforts, and 2.7 percent inverse population density13 catering to relatively fair distribution. This constitutional amendment also paved a path towards more decentralization and fiscal federalism in Pakistan.14 This domestic political environment allowed economic ties with China to grow as Zardari frequently visited China and the PPP forged new levels of diplomacy in their subsequent years. Besides the Sino-Pakistan nuclear program and mutual defense and military cooperation to fight terrorism,15 six new deals were signed16 covering areas such as telecommunications, energy, agriculture, infrastructure, engineering, IT, mining, hydroelectric dam projects, and the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway.17 With the Chinese constructing the Gwadar Port in Balochistan, the plans for progressing on the National Trade Corridor (NTC) were also on the table. This corridor included a 4,000-km network of highways including the Karakoram Highway linking China through the Khunjerab Pass down to Gwadar Port in Balochistan.18 These plans indicated China’s long-term interests in Pakistan and subsequently aided the relation to flourish into an economic and strategic partnership. This period of diplomacy also saw the Gwadar Port to be a vital dimension. Gwadar, being the largest deep-sea port, situated on the Arabian Sea, near to the Strait of Hormuz serves as an ideal gateway for energy, oil, and trade supplies linking China to the rest of the region.19 The Gwadar Port construction was completed by the Chinese in 2007 during the Musharraf period, but the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) won the bidding for its management.20 However, later, PSA withdrew from the agreement in 2013, and the contract for the construction and operation of the port was given to China’s Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC).21 Thus, Gwadar Port became a focal force shaping the trajectory of the Pakistan–China relations. Alongside this emergent strategic partnership, the economic cooperation was also strengthened by signing thirty-five new MoUs and inaugurating the Pakistan– China Friendship Centre. The year 2011 was declared to be the ‘Pakistan–China Friendship Year’ marking 60years of diplomatic relations. From the grand welcome of Zardari at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to continue the legacy of China–Pakistan friendship as started by the Bhutto family, the PPP turned every stone to maintain the ‘all-weather’ friendship and cement the old ties with China.22 The endurance of the diplomatic ties has been observed during the consequent years at various levels of engagement between the two countries.

China–Pakistan 89 Overall, the period the Sino-Pakistani the PPP PPP (2010–2013) Overall, the period of of the Sino-Pakistani diplomacy diplomacy under under the (2010-2013) laid grounds for the great boom in the diplomatic relationship which laid grounds for the great boom in the diplomatic relationship which manifested manifested in in the years. The phase of Pakistan–China partnerthe later later years. The new new multidimensional multidimensional phase of the the Pakistan-China partner ship the Sino-Pakistani ship was was on on the the horizon. horizon. The The next next section section examines examines the Sino-Pakistani relations relations under the leadership of a newly elected PML-N government. under the leadership of a newly elected PML-N government.

Part Part II: II: Accelerated Accelerated Growth: Growth: The The Politics Politics and and Economics Economics of of Pak-China Pak-China Diplomacy Diplomacy under under Pakistan Pakistan Muslim Muslim League League (N) (N) (PML-N): (PML-N): 2013–2018 2013-2018 Pakistan Muslim League League (N) political party’s victory Pakistan Muslim (N) – - aa center-right center-right political party’s sweeping sweeping victory 23 in the 2013 General Elections brought Nawaz Sharif as the new Prime Minister. in the 2013 General Elections brought Nawaz Sharif as the new Prime Minister.23 The new regime of the Sharif brothers– Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister and The new regime of the Sharif brothers - Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister and Shehbaz Minister of Punjab24 – readily the lead Shehbaz Sharif Sharif as as the the Chief Chief Minister of Punjab24 readily took took the lead on on scalscal ing up the the economy. two agendas ing up economy. The The PML-N PML-N leadership leadership had had two agendas in in mind: mind: economy economy 25 and The turned and energy energy crisis crisis as as per per their their political political manifesto. manifesto.25 The Sharif Sharif government government turned to the ‘all-weather friend’ China for furthering the investment opportunities to the ‘all-weather friend’ China for furthering the investment opportunities and and 26 infrastructure The victory was promisinfrastructure development. development.26 The news news of of Sharif’s Sharif’s electoral electoral victory was promis ing for Beijing business-oriented leader vigour to ing for Beijing as as they they saw saw aa trusted trusted business-oriented leader with with aa vigour to 27 deliver and whom they can trust. This introduced a new dynamic in the Sinodeliver and whom they can trust.27 This introduced a new dynamic in the SinoPakistani relations the economic Pakistani relations and and aa further further deepening deepening of of the economic ties. ties. During the visit visit of Premier Li Li Keqiang During the of Chinese Chinese Premier Keqiang to to Pakistan Pakistan on on May24, May 24, 2013, 2013, aa joint statement was issued on deepening the comprehensive strategic cooperation joint statement was issued on deepening the comprehensive strategic cooperation 28 between the This the basis basis for the China–Pakistan between the two two countries. countries.28 This laid laid the for the China-Pakistan Economic Economic Corridor (CPEC). This plan was further solidified during Nawaz Sharif’s Corridor (CPEC). This plan was further solidified during Nawaz Sharif’s state state visit to to China Both countries MoU on the visit China in in July2013. July 2013. Both countries signed signed an an MoU on ‘Cooperation ‘Cooperation for for the 29 Long-term Plan on the CPEC.’ The Sharif-led government regarded the CPEC Long-term Plan on the CPEC.’29 The Sharif-led government regarded the CPEC to be be aa ‘game Pakistan’s development to ‘game changer’ changer’ for for Pakistan’s development and, and, hence, hence, established established aa new new 30 China cell in the office to monitor progress. This aligned with China cell in the office to monitor progress.30 This aligned with China’s China’s global global plans, pivoting pivoting towards towards heavy plans, heavy investment investment in in infrastructure infrastructure of of Asia Asia and and abroad abroad and and 31 charting out a regional connectivity roadmap later to be known as the The charting out a regional connectivity roadmap later to be known as the BRI. BRI.31 The BRI been evolving Europe, and BRI outreach outreach has has been evolving across across Asia, Asia, Europe, and Africa, Africa, and and more more councoun tries have signed on since its launch in 2013. Under China’s BRI, Pakistan tries have signed on since its launch in 2013. Under China’s BRI, Pakistan has has been aa vital vital component. been component. The The initial initial CPEC CPEC investment investment of of an an estimated estimated $46billion $46 billion in been the the largest for Pakistan.32 Pakistan.32 This in cost cost has has been largest infrastructure infrastructure package package for This depicted depicted the essence and permanence of the Sino-Pakistani relations and led to an the essence and permanence of the Sino-Pakistani relations and led to an era era of of accelerated growth for Pakistan with Chinese support. accelerated growth for Pakistan with Chinese support. The is defined regional connectivity framework covering The CPEC CPEC is defined as as the the regional connectivity framework covering over over aa 3000-km projects connecting Kashgar in 3000-km network network of of infrastructure infrastructure and and energy energy projects connecting Kashgar in Xinjiang, China, Balochistan, Pakistan, via the Pass.33 Xinjiang, China, to to Gwadar Gwadar in in Balochistan, Pakistan, via the Khunjerab Khunjerab Pass.33 This the trade, trade, This corridor corridor aims aims to to establish establish energy energy and and logistic logistic hubs hubs and and enhance enhance the industrial, and agricultural cooperation between China and Pakistan. For Pakiindustrial, and agricultural cooperation between China and Pakistan. For Paki stan, this corridor not only provided the country with a much-needed stimulus stan, this corridor not only provided the country with a much-needed stimulus for economic but also for the for economic development development but also allowed allowed for the ‘regional ‘regional integration, integration, sociosocio economic development, interoperability, harmonized development economic development, interoperability, harmonized development and and effective effective

90 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra management of its resources.’34 As the official narrative regards CPEC to be a ‘win-win cooperation,’ this corridor also aims to benefit China’s energy security significantly by providing an alternate and relatively shorter land trade route than its existing 12,900km sea route from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca to China’s eastern ports.35 The solid economic foundation provided by CPEC enabled both countries to expand their cooperation on a variety of energy and infrastructure projects throughout 2013–2014. For CPEC projects, a Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was established to review the progress with its secretariats in Beijing and Islamabad.36 The Sino-Pakistani diplomacy strengthened further with President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Pakistan on April20–21, 2015, where he was warmly welcomed at Rawalpindi airbase upon his arrival. Later in the Joint Session of Parliament, Prime Minister Sharif’s speech reinforced this friendship further when he described it as: ‘[...]good neighbours, close friends, dear brothers, and trusted partners.’37 This partnership yielded the signing of 51 MoUs38 and the official launch of CPEC with a ‘1 + 4’ pattern of economic cooperation in four areas namely, energy, infrastructure, Gwadar port, and industrial cooperation.39 The CPEC Phase Iwas kicked off with some ‘Early Harvest’ projects focusing on the energy sector due to Pakistan’s pressing energy deficit. The initial projects with an estimated cost of $34billion were decided on including the construction of coal-fired power plants, hydropower plants, and solar and wind-power plants. The remaining CPEC investment was allocated towards infrastructure projects, railways, and Gwadar Port construction.40 During 2016–2017, most of the ‘fast-track’ energy priority projects reached their financial close by 2016, some even before their expected date, while others were initiated or nearing their completion. The enthusiasm for heightened Sino-Pakistani relations was also well-received by the public. At the launch of CPEC, 82percent of Pakistanis had a favourable opinion of China according to the Pew Research Centre poll.41 However, some controversies arose regarding the proposed CPEC ‘routes’ and its different alignments: Northern, Western, Central, and Eastern routes.42 Some distributive concerns were raised regarding the Western route as it passes through impoverished regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan that need the development benefits of the Chinese investment. However, more emphasis was given to the Eastern route passing through already developed Punjab areas.43 The political leaders from other provinces criticized the Punjab-favoured alignment and allocation and demanded the routes to be redesigned to benefit the smaller provinces and neglected communities.44 Nonetheless, the Sharif government was able to mitigate the issues by bringing all concerned political parties to discuss at the All Parties Conference (APC) and generate political consensus.45 Additionally, the inclusion of the provincial Chief Ministers in the JCC46 catered to some of those provincial concerns.47 The long-term plan for CPEC signed in 2017 had three 5-year phases. The Phase I ‘Early harvest’ projects were indicated to be completed by 2018, while other short-term projects were to be completed by 2020. The next two phases included medium-term and long-term projects aimed for 2025 and 2030, respectively. The

China–Pakistan 91 energy and infrastructure developments were at the core of the CPEC Phase Iprojects, whereas the Phase II projects focused more on establishing the industrial cooperation and socioeconomic development in Pakistan. The domestic political change especially with the change in government in 2018 and the partisan dynamics primarily contributed towards the determination of the second phase projects among other things. The final CPEC phase would build upon this variety of cooperation frameworks including agriculture, technology, and tourism. By April2017, the total CPEC portfolio was estimated to be $62billion,48 and by 2018, the initiated and completed CPEC projects already reached $18.9billion in cost.49 This post-CPEC period of Sino-Pakistani diplomacy showed signs of an economic boost for Pakistan. Within the first 5years, CPEC projects created 51,000 direct jobs in the road infrastructure sector, out of which 48,000 jobs were specifically for local Pakistanis.50 In 2017–2018, Pakistan’s GDP increased by 5.8percent, the highest rate recorded in the past 13years, the annual FDI grew from $650million to $2.2billion, and per capita annual income rose from $1,334 to $1,641.51 Furthermore, this phase brought an influx of Chinese expatriates in Pakistan as well as cross-border mobility for students and workers traveling to China and vice versa.52 Under PML-N’s leadership, the CPEC continued to thrive as planned with some delays, which is to be expected for such a vast scale megaproject. From attending the BRI Forum in 2017 to collaborating with the Chinese counterparts, the PML-N government manifested closer ties with China than any other predecessors.53 However, Nawaz Sharif’s resignation after the Supreme Court’s disqualification due to the Panama corruption case charges and the rising opposition from the PTI leader moved the country into uncertain territory. Beijing too was wary of how the situation will unfold.54 Aprospective change in government made China reluctant to agree to new projects as those would have to be renegotiated with the new administration55 Although 2018 began with good news of Gwadar Free Zone completion, the future direction of the Pakistan–China relations and the CPEC relied heavily on the upcoming elections of July2018.56

Part III: Reaping the Benefit: Politics and Economics of Pak-China Diplomacy under Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI): 2018–2020 The General Elections of 2018 brought Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)’s leader Imran Khan on the political scene as he took office as the prime minister on August18.57 The success of a cricketer-turned-politician heralded a new direction for the country. On a promise of providing a clean government while rejecting the status quo and dynastic politics, Khan rose to power on an anti-corruption platform and to bring social justice and accountability to Pakistani politics. With Sharif behind bars and the new leader with Naya (new) Pakistan agenda, the CPEC priorities did not align well with the PTI’s primary token of the electoral victory of transforming governance and social services, etc.58 The CPEC priorities of

92 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra energy and infrastructure development were evidently low on PTI’s agenda. This had implications for the Sino-Pakistani future partnership trajectory: China had to navigate new dynamics with the PTI-led government which took the form of the military being the main interlocutor of the China–Pakistan relationship.59 The vast level of Chinese engagement during CPEC’s early years indicated that both countries could harness this mega-scale economic development plan; however, with the new PTI regime, the initial expectation of grand change happening in Pakistan started to fade relatively. Consequently, the Sino-Pakistani relations levelled back to where they were before the launch of CPEC.60 Another reason is that the CPEC was closely knitted with the developmental vision of Sharif’s government, but it seemed to have slowed down with Khan’s political agendas. In late 2018, anti-CPEC rhetoric emerged within the government. The commerce advisor Adbul Razak Dawood raised concerns regarding the unfair tax breaks given to the Chinese companies under CPEC and proposed a year-off and to renegotiate the terms of CPEC.61 This did not sit well with the anti-PTI parties within Pakistani as well as in the Chinese circles.62 On the one hand, Khan had to maintain the popular legitimacy by keeping his anti-corruption narrative and, hence, the reluctance in proceeding with the CPEC speed. On the other hand, his administration lacked experience in policy implementation at this vast level and did not fathom the long-term perspective of the Pakistan–China relations.63 The Chinese counterparts were uncertain about the deliverables on the continuity of CPEC. As CPEC is tied to the broader BRI global plan, it could not be stalled when immense geopolitical and strategic considerations were at stake. This also coincided with Pakistan’s decision to negotiate the IMF loan with the United States for its international debt payments.64 According to the State Bank of Pakistan, the country had a $10billion financing gap, and it required the IMF bailout package.65 The critics of the BRI and CPEC spun this under the ‘debttrap’ diplomacy highlighting that Pakistan, in the face of excruciating debt, had to borrow money from the United States for its repayments. Although Dawood’s early anti-CPEC statement and ensuing BRI criticism in general, created resentment in Beijing, the military being a strong stakeholder attempted to neutralize the negative effects in due time. The Chief of Army Staff visited China and reassured the continuation of CPEC projects.66 Later, in November2018, Khan’s participation in the China International Import Expo (CIIE) ahead of the 8th JCC meeting eased the relationship and reinforced the new government’s commitment to CPEC.67 The Sino-Pakistani relations found a new footing when Khan visited China for the Second Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in April2019 and met with the Chinese leadership. The second phase of China–Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the upgradation of the Mainline-1 railway, and the construction of Rashakai SEZ were the highlights of the discussion among other things.68 Enhancing trade ties also gave an impetus to both sides for maintaining the existing momentum of Sino-Pakistani diplomacy. With the establishment of the CPEC Authority in Islamabad through the Presidential Ordinance in October2019, it became the vital institution to navigate the

China–Pakistan 93 CPEC trajectory, oversee the effective implementation, and find new drivers of growth.69 However, it also provided more space for the military in the decisionmaking as the CPEC Authority was initially chaired by a retired Army general.70 These evolving dynamics suggest that Pakistan is transitioning to a weak-civilian and strong military-state hybrid regime type.71 At the economic level, the Sino-Pakistani collaboration on CPEC brought significant progress with its second phase. During the 9th JCC meeting, both sides highlighted the CPEC achievements. As the Phase Iprojects were aimed at removing major economic bottlenecks in the infrastructure and energy sector, the deliverables can be regarded as being substantial. Out of the total projects, ten Gwadar-related projects worth $1.37billion were completed. Atotal of 17,045 MW of electricity was generated with nine projects completed and generating 5,320 MW of electricity, whereas eight projects are under construction for producing 4,470 MW energy, and four are planned projects with a production capacity of 2,544 MW. Moving into the CPEC Phase II, the aim is to focus on industrial cooperation which centres upon the construction and operationalization of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Three out of the total nine SEZs have already been under process as Rashakai, M3 Faisalabad, and Dhabeji Special Economic Zone are in the final stages. For the socioeconomic development, the projects catered to the provisions of drinking water, medical equipment for hospitals, agriculture tools and equipment, vocational school upgradation, and smart classroom project to name a few.72 Though for absorbing the benefits of the CPEC industrialization to a fuller extent, Pakistan would need to improve various dimensions of ‘human capital, rural connectivity, and business environment to attract foreign direct investment’73 and to bring about the reforms needed. At the political level, all these new developments under PTI leadership seem to suggest that it was time for Khan’s government to tap on to the full potential of CPEC and to reap the benefits of its predecessor’s development efforts– an example of moving in this direction was Khan’s support for the single-party state and the Chinese government’s handling of the Uyghur issue. However, the geopolitical dynamics vis-à-vis the United States and India and the economic fallout due to the Coronavirus outbreak had serious implications on finding a new equilibrium in the China–Pakistan relations.74 During Pakistan’s initial wave of COVID-19 infections in March and April2020, China not only provided immense support to Pakistan in terms of healthcare equipment, teams of medical doctors, and training assistance but also helped in combating the locust attack in Pakistan. The initial Chinese support included 30,000 masks, 1,000 protective goggles, long shoes, and 1,000 protective suits for fighting against the locust attack in Pakistan during the pandemic.75 Later on, during Pakistan’s second and third waves, China was the first nation to donate an initial 1.2million doses of vaccines.76 Although Pakistan has continued to purchase and receive COVID-19 vaccinations through the COVAX program, China has continuously supplemented this by donating and prioritizing Pakistan with multiple batches of vaccines.77 China also committed to supporting Pakistan to develop its mechanisms of producing the COVID-19 vaccines at scale.78

94 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra Thus, Pakistan’s President Arif Alvi’s visit to Beijing in March2020 amidst the coronavirus outbreak stood as a sign of solidarity between the two nations. As Pakistan’s economy was hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic, it hoped to revisit some of the terms of its purchasing agreements with the independent power producers for two CPEC projects– Sahiwal and Port Qasim.79 Regarding the CPEC continuity, despite some delays in its progress due to the coronavirus outbreak, the CPEC projects have been resumed. Gwadar is reaching its final stages; the Lahore Metro Orange Line reached completion and started its operation; the motorway upgrades connecting Quetta to the Karakoram Highway, the ML-1 railway line upgrades, and some hydroelectric power projects are also progressing well.80 The timely completion of the projects under the CPEC Phase II is a top priority for both countries as the CPEC progress can also enable Pakistan to overcome the impact of the ongoing Coronavirus pandemic.81 However, it must also be understood that Pakistan’s fiscal crisis and account deficit do not allow for the full-scale version of CPEC, as previously envisioned under the PML-N government, to be financially feasible under the current circ*mstances.82 Thus, the ‘rescaling’ or ‘recalibration’ of the CPEC is necessary. Only time can tell how adeptly the current PTI government will be able to manage the long-term implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economic growth, the CPECinduced process of industrialization, and the foreign debt repayments. Besides the pandemic recovery fallout, the significant task for the PTI regime will be to maintain the reconfigured equilibrium for the CPEC projects and continue this established pace of the deepened Sino-Pakistani diplomacy.

Conclusion An analysis conducted in this chapter allows us to trace the progression of the Pakistan–China relationship over the past decade. While chalking out various phases of Sino-Pakistani diplomacy, this analysis enables us to understand the evolving dynamics of the relationship concerning the three ruling parties in Pakistan. The three phases– Sowing the Seed (PPP), Accelerated Growth (PML-N), and Reaping the Benefits (PTI) – depicted that each Pakistani government had demonstrated the political will to boost the relationship with China. Despite its tumultuous path and numerous challenges, the net gains for both countries have been positive. On the Pakistani side, the growth and investment projects have provided much-needed relief to the struggling economy. Moreover, China’s presence and support as a strong and reliable partner have allowed Pakistan to leverage its position at the geopolitical and the international front. For China, Pakistan has also played a crucial role to help realize the BRI by paving new trade routes as well as providing open market access for Chinese products. In conclusion, an overall positive handprint on the economic and political dimensions of Sino-Pakistani diplomacy has been observed. The aspects which contributed to this positive handprint have been a significant improvement in the economic development of Pakistan, an enhanced investment portfolio for Pakistan with diverse business opportunities, increased consumer choice for products

China–Pakistan 95 and services in both countries, and a new nexus of power in Asia rooted in the mutually beneficial relationship between China and Pakistan. Despite myriad hurdles and setbacks– such as the renegotiation of terms, a change in government, and a global pandemic– the relationship between China and Pakistan has continued to grow. There is evidence of the Sino-Pakistani solidarity on both the political fronts– with China publicly backing Pakistan, as well as on the economic front with the CPEC projects resuming its operations, and a multibillion-dollar loan to Pakistan. The continuation and the implementation of the CPEC projects stand as a testament to the fact that both countries are determined to continue this pace of the relationship and to flourish the Sino-Pakistani diplomacy further.

Notes Notes 1 Hussain, The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto Bhutto (New 1 Yasir Yasir Hussain, The Assassination of Benazir (New Delhi: Delhi: Epitome Epitome Books, Books, 2008). 2008). Rizwan Zeb, Zeb, “Pakistan–China “Pakistan-China Relations: Relations: Where Where They They Go Go from from Here?” UNISCI Dis 22 Rizwan Here?” UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. no. 29 45–58. cussion Papers, 29 (May2012): (May 2012): 45-58. 3 For For historical account of of the the relationship relationship see see Ghulam Ghulam Ali, China-Pakistan Relations: 3 historical account Ali, China–Pakistan Relations: A Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford Oxford University University Press, Press, 2017). 2017). AHistorical Analysis (Karachi: 4 Zardari’s State New Horizons Bilateral Strategic “President Zardari’s State Visit Visit to to China China to to Open Open up up New Horizons for for Bilateral Strategic 4 “President Partnership,” Chinese Embassy, accessed January4, January 4, 2021, 2021, http://pk.chineseembassy. http://pk.chineseembassy. Partnership,” Chinese Embassy, accessed org/eng/zbgx/t517674.htm. org/eng/zbgx/t517674.htm. 5 Zardari Is Is Cozying to China,” 5 Ishaan Ishaan Tharoor, Tharoor, “Why “Why Pakistan's Pakistan's Zardari Cozying Up Up to China,” Time, Time, October17, October 17, 2008, 2008, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1851332,00.html. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1851332,00.html. 6 “Real “Real Growth Growth Rates Rates of of GDP GDP at at Constant Constant Basic Basic Prices of2005-06,” of 6 Prices of 2005–06,” Pakistan Pakistan Bureau Bureau of Statistics (Government Pakistan, n.d.), n.d.), www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//tables/ www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//tables/ (Government of of Pakistan, Statistics national-accounts/Table-6.pdf. national-accounts/Table-6.pdf. 7 “Briefings “Briefings on on China-Pakistan China-Pakistan Bilateral Bilateral Economic Economic and and Trade Trade Cooperation Cooperation in in 2017,” 2017,” 7 Ministry of Peoples Republic Republic of 2018, http://english. Ministry of Commerce Commerce Peoples of China, China, October12, October 12, 2018, http://english. mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/lanmubb/ASEAN/201810/20181002795331.shtml. mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/lanmubb/ASEAN/201810/20181002795331.shtml. 8 Jian Jian Yang Yang and and Rashid Rashid Ahmed Siddiqi, “About “About an an ‘All-Weather’ ‘All-Weather’ Relationship: Security 8 Ahmed Siddiqi, Relationship: Security Foundations of Journal of Foundations of Sino-Pakistan Sino-Pakistan Relations Relations Since Since 9/11,” 9/11,” Journal of Contemporary Contemporary China China 20, no. 71 71 (2011): (2011): 563–79. 563-79. 20, no. 9 Rashid Rashid Ahmad “Pakistan and and China: China: Cooperation Cooperation in in Counter-Terrorism,” Counter-Terrorism,” Stra 9 Ahmad Khan, Khan, “Pakistan Strategic Studies 32/33 tegic Studies 32/33 (2012): (2012): 70–78. 70-78. 10 Rosheen Rosheen Kabraji, The China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Alliance: (Chatham 10 Kabraji, The Alliance: Rhetoric Rhetoric and and Limitations Limitations (Chatham 2012), www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/1212 House, House, 2012), www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/1212 pp_kabraji.pdf. pp_kabraji.pdf. 11 Mohammad Mohammad Waseem, Waseem, “Pakistan: “Pakistan: A Majority-Constraining Federalism,” Federalism,” India Quar 11 AMajority-Constraining India Quarterly 67, 67, no. no. 33 (2011): (2011): 213–28. 213-28. terly 12 Khalid and Nusrat Hussain, Federalism in Pakistan: Implications 12 Iram Iram Khalid and Nusrat Hussain, “Financial “Financial Federalism in Pakistan: Implications for for Centre-Province Relations,” Relations,” Journal ofPolitical Studies 25, 25, no. no. 11 (2018). (2018). Centre-Province Journal of Political Studies 13 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Amendment of Pakistan, 14 For For further further detailed detailed analysis analysis of of the the 18th 18th Amendment of the the Constitution Constitution of of Pakistan, see Mohammad Mohammad Waseem, Waseem, Federalism in Pakistan (Lahore: Forum of Federations, see Federalism in Pakistan (Lahore: Forum of Federations, 2010); “A Step Towards Towards Inclusive Federalism in in Pakistan? Pakistan? The The 2010); Katharine Katharine Adeney, Adeney, “AStep Inclusive Federalism Politics of the 18th Amendment,” The Journal ofFederalism Federalism 42, 42, no. no. 44 (2012): (2012): 539–65. 539-65. Politics of the 18th Amendment,” The Journal of 15 “President “President Zardari’s.” 15 Zardari’s.” 16 “China, “China, Pakistan Ink 66 Deals,” Deals,” Beijing July 8, 2010, www.bjreview.com/head 16 Pakistan Ink Beijing Review, Review, July8, 2010, www.bjreview.com/head line/txt/2010-07/08/content_283814.htm. line/txt/2010-07/08/content 283814.htm.

96 Gul-i-Hina Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya 96 Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Kamal Nagra Nagra 17 Socialist 17 Vilani Vilani Peiris, Peiris, “Zardari’s “Zardari’s Visit Visit Strengthens Strengthens Pakistan-China Pakistan-China Relations,” Relations,” World World Socialist Web Site, July 22, 2010, 2010, www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/07/paki-j22.html. www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/07/paki-j22.html. Web Site, July22, 18 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Filippo Boni, Pakistan: A ACase 19 Filippo Boni, “Civil–Military “Civil-Military Relations Relations in in Pakistan: Case Study Study of of Sino-Pakistani Sino-Pakistani Relations and the of Gwadar,” Gwadar,” Commonwealth& Commonwealth & Comparative Comparative Politics 54, no. no. 44 Relations and the Port Port of Politics 54, (2016): 498–517. 498-517. (2016): 20 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Syed Syed Irfan Irfan Raza, Raza, “China “China Given Given Contract Contract to to Operate Operate Gwadar Gwadar Port,” Port,” Dawn, February 18, 21 Dawn, February18, 2013, www.dawn.com/news/786992/china-given-contract-to-operate-gwadar-port . 2013, www.dawn.com/news/786992/china-given-contract-to-operate-gwadar-port. 22 President Zardari Zardari in 2010, 22 Shahid Shahid Javed Javed Burki, Burki, President in China: China: Cementing Cementing Old Old Ties, Ties, July10, July 10, 2010, www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/media/isas_papers/ISAS%20Insights%20 www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/media/isas_papers/ISAS%20Insights%20 107%20-%20Email%20-%20President%20Zardari%20in%20China%20-%20 107%20-%20Email%20-%20President%20Zardari%20in%20China%20-%20 Cementing%20Old%20Ties.pdf. Cementing%20Old%20Ties.pdf. 23 Maham Hameed, “Correction: “Correction: The The Politics of the the China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Economic Economic CorriCorri 23 Maham Hameed, Politics of dor,” Palgrave Communications 4, (July 2018). dor,” Palgrave Communications 4, no. no. 11 (July2018). 24 PML-N’s biggest biggest voter base is Province of 24 PML-N’s voter base is from from the the Province of Punjab. Punjab. 25 “Manifesto,” PML-N, last modified modified 2018, 2018, https://pmln.org/delivery/manifesto/. 25 “Manifesto,” PML-N, last https://pmln.org/delivery/manifesto/. 26 Boni, “Civil-Military Relations Relations in in Pakistan,” 499. 26 Boni, “Civil–Military Pakistan,” 499. 27 Andrew Small, Pakistan, and 27 Andrew Small, “Returning “Returning to to the the Shadows: Shadows: China, China, Pakistan, and the the Fate Fate of of CPEC,” CPEC,” The German German Marshall ofthe the United United States, September 3, 2020, 2020, www.gmfus.org/ The Marshall Fund Fund of States, September3, www.gmfus.org/ publications/returning-shadows-china-pakistan-and-fate-cpec. publications/returning-shadows-china-pakistan-and-fate-cpec. 28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Affairs, accessed 28 “Pakistan “Pakistan and and China China Diplomatic Diplomatic Relations,” Relations,” Ministry of Foreign accessed January 6, 2021, 2021, http://mofa.gov.pk/pakistan-and-china-diplomatic-relations/. January6, http://mofa.gov.pk/pakistan-and-china-diplomatic-relations/. 29 Ministry of Foreign of the the People of China, China, accessed accessed January6, January 6, 29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Affairs of People’sS Republic Republic of 2021, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml. 2021, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml. 30 Javed Javed Malik, “Nawaz Sharif’s Sharif’s Landmark Landmark Visit Visit to to China,” China,” Pakistan Today, July15, July 15,2013, 30 Malik, “Nawaz Pakistan Today, 2013, www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/07/15/nawaz-sharifs-landmark-visit-to-china/. www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/07/15/nawaz-sharifs-landmark-visit-to-china/. 31 For further Initiative (BRI), Actions on 31 For further details details on on the the Belt Belt and and Road Road Initiative (BRI), see, see, “Vision “Vision and and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt Belt and and 21st-Century 21st-Century Maritime Maritime Silk Silk Road,” The Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Road,” The National Commission, People’ of China, China, https:// National Development Development and and Reform Reform Commission, People’ss Republic Republic of https:// en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/202002/P020200228350122318527.pdf. http://eng en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/202002/P020200228350122318527.pdf.http://eng lish.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm. lish.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm. Belt and Road Road Portal: Belt and Portal: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/86739.html. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/86739.html. 32 Pakistan Trade Route,” 32 Saeed Saeed Shah Shah and and Jeremy Jeremy Page, Page, “China “China Readies Readies $46Billion $46 Billion for for Pakistan Trade Route,” The Wall Wall Street 17, 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-unveilThe Street Journal, Journal, April April17, 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-unveilbillions-of-dollars-in-pakistan-investment-1429214705. billions-of-dollars-in-pakistan-investment-1429214705. 33 “Long-Term Plan for Economic Corridor 33 “Long-Term Plan for CPEC CPEC (2017–2030),” (2017-2030),” China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Official Official Website (Ministry of of Planning, 2017), accessed accessed January January 7, 7, 2021, (CPEC) Website (Ministry Planning, 2017), 2021, http://cpec.gov.pk/long-term-plan-cpec. http://cpec.gov.pk/long-term-plan-cpec. 34 34 China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Economic Economic Corridor Corridor (CPEC) (CPEC) Official Official Website, Website, accessed accessed January January 7, 7, 2021, http://cpec.gov.pk/messages/10. 2021, http://cpec.gov.pk/messages/10. 35 “Pakistani President President Asif Sojourn to China,” Vivekananda Vivekananda 35 “Pakistani Asif Ali Ali Zardari’s Zardari’s Another Another Sojourn to China,” International Foundation, Foundation, accessed International accessed January4, January 4, 2021, 2021, www.vifindia.org/Pakistaniwww.vifindia.org/PakistaniPresident-Asif-Ali-Zardari-another-Sojourn-to-China. President-Asif-Ali-Zardari-another-Sojourn-to-China. 36 Hasan Rizvi, “The “The China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Economic Economic Corridor: Corridor: Regional Cooperation 36 Hasan Askari Askari Rizvi, Regional Cooperation and Development,” Strategic Strategic Studies Studies 34/35, and Socio-Economic Socio-Economic Development,” 34/35, no. no. 4/1 4/1 (Winter (Winter 2014 2014 and and Spring 2015). 2015). Spring 37 For the full text text of of Nawaz Sharif’s speech, speech, see see www.dawn.com/news/1177312/ www.dawn.com/news/1177312/ 37 For the full Nawaz Sharif’s full-text-of-pm-nawaz-speech-at-joint-session-of-parliament-during-xi-jinping-visit . full-text-of-pm-nawaz-speech-at-joint-session-of-parliament-during-xi-jinping-visit. 38 Irfan Haider and and Mateen “Economic Corridor Corridor in in Focus Focus as as Pakistan Pakistan China China Sign Sign 38 Irfan Haider Mateen Haider, Haider, “Economic 51 MoUs,” MoUs,” Dawn, June 21, 2017, 2017, www.dawn.com/news/1177109. www.dawn.com/news/1177109. 51 Dawn, June21, 39 Plan for 39 “Long-Term “Long-Term Plan for CPEC CPEC (2017–2030),” (2017-2030),” CPEC, CPEC, Official Official Website, Website, accessed accessed JanuJanu ary 7, 2021, 2021, http://cpec.gov.pk/long-term-plan-cpec. http://cpec.gov.pk/long-term-plan-cpec. ary7,

China–Pakistan 97 40 the Ministry Planning Develop Develop40 For For detailed detailed overview overview of of the the CPEC CPEC projects, projects, see see the Ministry of of Planning ment and and Special Special Initiatives Initiatives Commission, Commission, Government Government of of Pakistan, Pakistan, CPEC CPEC Portal, Portal, ment http://cpec.gov.pk/. http://cpec.gov.pk/. 41 Indicators Database,” Pew Research Research Center's Attitudes Project Project (Pew 41 “Global “Global Indicators Database,” Pew Center's Global Global Attitudes (Pew Research Centre, March23, March 23, 2020), last modified modified March 23, 2020, accessed January7, January 7, Research Centre, 2020), last March23, 2020, accessed 2021, 2021, www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/24/country/pk. www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/24/country/pk. 42 Northern route Khunjerab pass. pass. The Western route 42 The The Northern route starts starts via via the the Khunjerab The Western route enters enters Balochistan Balochistan via Dera Dera Ismail Khan to to Gwadar. Gwadar. The The Central Central route passes from from Dera Dera Ismail Khan to to via Ismail Khan route passes Ismail Khan Gwadar. The The Eastern Eastern route through central central Punjab and Sindh Sindh provinces. Gwadar. route passes passes through Punjab and provinces. Also Also see Economic Corridor,” see Rizvi, Rizvi, “The “The China–-Pakistan China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” 11. 11. 43 Arif “The China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” United United States of 43 Arif Rafiq, Rafiq, “The Economic Corridor,” States Institute Institute of Peace, 13, 2017, www.usip.org/publications/2017/10/china-pakistan-eco Peace, November November13, 2017, www.usip.org/publications/2017/10/china-pakistan-eco nomic-corridor. nomic-corridor. 44 Ejaz Ejaz Hussain, Hussain, “Will “Will Change Change in in Government Government Affect China-Pakistan Economic Cor 44 Affect China–Pakistan Economic CorThe BRI, CPEC and and the Khan Government: Government: An Chinese Journal of ridor? The ridor? BRI, CPEC the Khan An Analysis,” Analysis,” Chinese Journal of International 1, no. (2019). International Review Review 1, no. 22 (2019). 45 Irfan Irfan Haider, “Nawaz Chairs Chairs APC to Allay China-Pak Corridor Corridor Fears,” Fears,” Dawn, 13, 45 Haider, “Nawaz APC to Allay China-Pak Dawn, May May13, 2015, 2015, www.dawn.com/news/1181714. www.dawn.com/news/1181714. 46 was established with its 46 The The Joint Joint Cooperation Cooperation Committee Committee (JCC) (JCC) was established in in 2013 2013 with its secretariats secretariats in the Development and and Reform Reform Commission Commission (NDRC) (NDRC) in in Beijing, China, and and in the National National Development Beijing, China, the Ministry of of Planning, Planning, Development, and Reforms in Islamabad, the Ministry Development, and Reforms in Islamabad, Pakistan. Pakistan. 47 47 Boni, Boni, “Civil–Military “Civil-Military Relations Relations in in Pakistan,” Pakistan,” 500. 500. 48 Salman Salman Sidiqqui, Sidiqqui, “CPEC “CPEC Investment Investment Pushed Pushed from from $55b $55b to to $62b,” $62b,” The The Express Trib 48 Express Tribune, April 12, 2017, une, April12, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1381733/cpec-investment-pushedhttps://tribune.com.pk/story/1381733/cpec-investment-pushed55b-62b. 55b-62b. 49 “Embassy “Embassy of of People’s People’s Republic Republic of of China China in in Islamabad,” Islamabad,” Chinese Chinese Embassy, 49 Embassy, http:// http:// pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/CPEC/t1625940.htm. pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/CPEC/t1625940.htm. 50 Five Years Review,” The Express Tribune, May5, 50 Tang Tang Mengsheng, Mengsheng, “Past “Past Five Years of of CPEC CPEC in in Review,” The Express Tribune, May 5, 2019, 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1966455/past-five-years-cpec-review-2. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1966455/past-five-years-cpec-review-2. 51 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Afshan Subohi, Influence Outpaces Dawn, January22, 52 Afshan Subohi, “Chinese “Chinese Influence Outpaces Influx,” Influx,” Dawn, January 22, 2018, 2018, www. www. dawn.com/news/1384511. dawn.com/news/1384511. 53 “PM, “PM, Chief Chief Ministers Ministers Travel Travel to China to and Road Road Forum,” May 12, 53 to China to Attend Attend Belt Belt and Forum,” Dawn, Dawn, May12, 2017, www.dawn.com/news/1332660. www.dawn.com/news/1332660. 2017, 54 “Pakistan PM PM Nawaz Sharif Resigns Verdict,” BBC 54 “Pakistan Nawaz Sharif Resigns After After Panama Panama Papers Papers Verdict,” BBC News, News, July 28, 2017, 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40750671. July28, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40750671. 55 to the Pakistan, and Fate of 55 Small, Small, Returning Returning to the Shadows: Shadows: China, China, Pakistan, and the the Fate of CPEC. CPEC. 56 Mengsheng, Mengsheng, “Past “Past Five Five Years Years of of CPEC CPEC in in Review.” Review.” 56 57 Asad Hashim, Hashim, “Imran “Imran Khan Elected as as Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Prime Prime Minister,” Minister,” Al 57 Asad Khan Elected Al Jazeera, Jazeera, August17, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/17/imran-khan-elected-as-paki www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/17/imran-khan-elected-as-paki August 17, 2018, stans-prime-minister. stans-prime-minister. 58 “PTI “PTI Manifesto,” Manifesto,” Https://Pmo.gov.pk/Documents/Manifesto-Pti.pdf (PTI, 2018). 2018). 58 Https://Pmo.gov.pk/Documents/Manifesto-Pti.pdf (PTI, 59 Small, Small, Returning Returning to the Shadows: Shadows: China, China, Pakistan, and the the Fate of CPEC. cPeC. 59 to the Pakistan, and Fate of 60 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Farhan Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Rethinks in Xi’s and Road Road Plan,”Financial Times, 61 Bokhari, “Pakistan Rethinks Its Its Role Role in Xi’s Belt Belt and Plan,” Financial Times, September9, www.ft.com/content/d4a3e7f8-b282-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132. September 9, 2018, 2018, www.ft.com/content/d4a3e7f8-b282-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132. 62 Hussain, Hussain, “Will “Will Change Change in in Government Government Affect China - Pakistan Pakistan Economic Economic Corridor?” Corridor?” 62 Affect China– 12. 12. 63 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Shahbaz Shahbaz Rana, “Pakistan Knocks Knocks at at IMF IMF Door Default,” The The Express Trib 64 Rana, “Pakistan Door to to Avoid Avoid Default,” Express Tribune, October8, October 8, 2018, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1821091/2-much-drama-pti-govthttps://tribune.com.pk/story/1821091/2-much-drama-pti-govtune, announces-approach-imfbailout-package/. announces-approach-imfbailout-package/. 65 Ibid. 65 Ibid.

98 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra 66 Hussain, “Will Change in Government Affect China–Pakistan Economic Corridor?” 12. 67 “PM Arrives in Shanghai to Attend China International Import Expo (CIIE),” The News, November4, 2018, www.thenews.com.pk/latest/389613-pm-arrives-inshanghai-to-attend-china-international-import-expo-ciie. 68 Ibid. 69 Mariana Baabar, “CPEC Authority Established Through Presidential Ordinance,” Geo News, October8, 2019, www.geo.tv/latest/250407-cpec-authority-establishedthrough-ordinance. 70 Siegfried O. Wolf, “Development Versus Democracy? The CPEC and Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan,” in The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. Contemporary South Asian Studies (Cham: Springer, 2020). 71 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Hybrid ‘Civilian–Military’ Government Weakens Democracy,” East Asia Forum, January21, 2020, www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/01/21/ pakistans-hybrid-civilian-military-government-weakens-democracy/. 72 “Energy: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Official Website,” ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Ministry of Planning, 2019), http://cpec.gov. pk/energy. 73 Nasir Iqbal, “CPEC: Phases and Challenges,” The News, January3, 2020, www.the news.com.pk/print/592658-cpec-phases-and-challenges. 74 “Pakistan’s Khan Backs China on Uighurs, Praises One-Party System,” Al Jazeera, July21, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/2/pakistan-imran-khan-china-uighurs. 75 Shafqat Ali, “Imran Khan Has Stabilised Economy, Outgoing Chinese Envoy,” The Nation, September18, 2020, https://nation.com.pk/19-Sep-2020/imran-khan-hasstabilised-economy-outgoing-chinese-envoy. 76 “China Gifts Pakistan 1.2Million COVID-19 Vaccine Doses,” The Diplomat, February4, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/china-gifts-pakistan-1-2-million-covid19-vaccine-doses. 77 Asif Shahzad, “Pakistan Receives 500,000 Vaccine Doses from China, Doubling Available Supply,” Reuters, March17, 2021, www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-pakistan-vaccine-idUSKBN2B925F. 78 “Pakistan, China Stand Together in Fight Against COVID-19,” Global Times, June25, 2021, www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1227070.shtml. 79 Khaleeq Kiani, “Pakistan Urges China to Soften Terms for Power Deals,” Dawn, April16, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1549299. 80 Small, Returning to the Shadows: China, Pakistan, and the Fate of CPEC. 81 Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “CPEC 2.0: Full Speed Ahead,” The Diplomat, September10, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/cpec-2-0-full-speed-ahead/. 82 Small, Returning to the Shadows: China, Pakistan, and the Fate of CPEC.

6 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations From Uncertainty and Confrontation to Optimism Muhammad Azam Although Afghanistan and Pakistan often claim to have friendly relations, an undercurrent of irreconcilable differences has persisted and resulted in periods of conflicts and cooperation. The historical origin of this friction lies in the Durand Line– that is the 2,611-kilometre long boundary that separates the two countries. It was demarcated in 1893 between the then Afghan ruler Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan and the British India.1 After the British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Afghanistan refused to accept it as an international border with Pakistan. This study endeavours to analyse the various aspects of the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship, including differences; sources of conflict and cooperation; the cultural, historic and ethnic bonds, the impact of the role of regional and global political factors and the security challenges. A common religion and a large number of Pashtuns living on the both sides of the Durand Line are the basic factors that create a sense of brotherhood among the people of the two countries. However, as Pakistan applied for the UN membership as a new member, Hosayn Aziz, the then Afghan representative to the United Nations, on 30 September1947 cast the only vote against Pakistan’s application. Nevertheless, barely 1 month later, on 20 October, the vote was rescinded, and it was hoped that bilateral discussions would lead to an understanding between the two countries.2 Officials of both sides held talks in Karachi and exchanged ambassadors in February1948.3 Finding no favourable reception to its territorial claims, Afghanistan brought forth the idea of ‘Pashtunistan,’ comprising the Pakistani territories: the frontier states of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Baluchistan and the Baluchistan states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Las Bela.4 Some analysts also ascribe Afghanistan’s espousal of Pashtunistan to its domestic or national considerations.5 Another reason of conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan was their joining the opposite security blocks during the 1950s in the backdrop of the Cold War. Pakistan joined the US-led capitalist block and signed defence pacts with the United States. Afghanistan, on the other hand, sided with the USSR and India. Both Moscow and New Delhi backed Kabul on its dispute with Pakistan via-a-vis the Durand Line issue.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-8

100 Muhammad Azam

The Idea of Pak–Afghan Confederation It is interesting to note that parallel with differences, there were discussions for the confederation of Pakistan and Afghanistan. There were different views about the origin and the development of the idea. It was first raised by the leader of the Ismaili sect, Agha Khan (1877–1957), the first president of All India Muslim League.6 The idea gained some momentum in the mid-1950s. Afghanistan showed even an interest in a defence pact with Pakistan. The idea of confederation gained momentum when at times the adverse propaganda of the Afghan media against Pakistan on the subject of Pashtunistan was lessened.7 Later, emphasis for the confederation came from Afghanistan. It had a rationale. At that time Pakistan was a close ally of the United States, so perhaps this might have been a proposal aired in Afghanistan based on the rationale that a close union with Pakistan was a way to acquire US aid to counteract Soviet influence in Afghanistan.8 On the other hand, according to some analysts, the idea of confederation was pushed forward by Colonel A.S.B. Shah, Pakistani ambassador to Kabul. He was a staunch supporter of closer relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.9 Among the promoters of the idea of a confederation of Afghanistan and Pakistan were Agha Khan, Afghan Foreign Minister Naim Khan (1953–1955), and Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Aslam Khattak. Reportedly, Afghan ambassador to the United States, Naim Khan, solicited American support to advance the idea. Aslam Khattak, a leading Pakistani diplomat and politician, had discussed the proposal with Afghan leader and Prime Minister Sardar Daoud Khan. Regarding Pakistan’s reaction, Khattak stated that he followed up the idea with the Prime Minister Husseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and his successor Firoz Khan Noon. As stated by Khattak, Noon responded, ‘We should have no difficulty accepting King Zahir Shah as the constitutional Head of State’ and President Iskandar Mirza ‘concurred with this.’10 The idea of confederation was expanded to include Iran. Delivering a speech in Quetta in August 1962, Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, for the first time publicly spoke about a confederation of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.11 He showed his willingness of binding three Muslim countries into a larger political system.12 He stated, ‘I will welcome a possible confederation of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.’13 However, in the same speech he made a few caustic references about Afghanistan’s refusal to accept the Durand Line as international frontier. This was probably to forestall any prompt and consequential deliberations on the proposal.14 Thus, the plan lingered with an outward show of goodwill. As subsequent events showed, there was no confirmation that it was seriously taken up by any of the governments involved.15 To understand what led to the idea of confederation, three key factors prompted were geographic proximity; religion; and history of linguistic, ethnic, cultural and political links. Generally, there was a tendency of compliance to political authority in these three nations. This increased the prospects of its acceptance. Asimilar tendency in the three countries’ world view towards the developed nations made them want to project a positive, cooperative image of themselves to potential

Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 101 donor nations. Likewise, common religion and historically long ethnic linkages further increased the prospects of unity. Parallel to this, there were several centrifugal forces which ultimately dominated and prevented any sort of confederation. Acting against the federation were tribal, regional, cultural, political, geographic and international factors. Intense particularistic attitudes are connected to regionalism, tribalism or ethnocentrism. ‘Pashtunistan’ was a manifestation of the pre-eminent ethnocentric trait.16 Furthermore, the contrasting ruling structures of a monarchy in Afghanistan and a quasi-presidential system in Pakistan presented political obstacles. There were at least two geographic factors that also stood in the way of any such confederation: the ‘empty triangle,’ that is the area lying between Karachi, Meshed and Khorramshahr, was ‘a zone of inaccessibility’ due to it being backwards with a lack of infrastructure; different levels of political, social and economic development in Pakistan and Iran vis-à-vis Afghanistan created an imbalance, and the remoteness of East Pakistan (which declared independence in 1971 and became Bangladesh) perturbed some Bengalis on the thought of a confederation in the west wing.17 Furthermore, global considerations, like Soviet interests in Afghanistan and Indian opposition, were other obstacles to any scheme that would ensure a stable relationship between the neighbouring countries.18 The fact that Afghanistan was receiving political, economic and military assistance from the USSR and Pakistan was getting the same from the United States put both countries in opposing camps. Moreover, Kabul’s hostility towards Pakistan was a serious impediment19 that had to be overcome for a confederation to eventuate. On the basis of these facts, some top leaders such as Chaudhry Mohammed Ali and Ayub Khan expressed their reservations about the idea of confederation. Country’s leading daily, Dawn, published editorials criticizing the plan.20 Pakistani leaders were suspicious why Afghanistan, which did not accept Pakistan’s boundary with it, readily accepted the idea of a confederation. The idea disappeared in the following decades.

Daoud Daoud Presidency Presidency and and Détente Detente with with Pakistan Pakistan During Zahir two contracting trends were During Zahir Shah’s Shah’s rule rule in in Afghanistan Afghanistan in in the the 1960s, 1960s, two contracting trends were noticed in its relations with Pakistan. Officially, Afghanistan government missed noticed in its relations with Pakistan. Officially, Afghanistan government missed no no opportunity opportunity of of avowing avowing support support for for Pashtunistan Pashtunistan and and officially officially rejecting rejecting the the Durand Line. In practice, however, relations remained normal. It was Durand Line. In practice, however, relations remained normal. It was obvious obvious from the fact fact that there were visa restrictions between the the two two countries from the that there were no no visa restrictions between countries and and that there was free movement of people across the border. that there was free movement of people across the border. A took place Daoud overthrew the monA shift shift in in relationship relationship took place as as in in July1973, July 1973, Daoud overthrew the mon archy and took power in his hands. This perturbed Pakistan because Daoud was archy and took power in his hands. This perturbed Pakistan because Daoud was 21 22 an and Given an avowed avowed ‘Pakistan-baiter’ ‘Pakistan-baiter’21 and ‘champion ‘champion of of the the Pashtunistan Pashtunistan cause.’ cause.’22 Given his tone, Daoud the Islamic his anti-Pakistan anti-Pakistan tone, Daoud did did not not even even attend attend the Islamic summit summit in in Lahore Lahore in in November1974. The mantra of Pashtunistan was amplified during this tenure.23 November 1974. The mantra of Pashtunistan was amplified during this tenure.23 However, the the confrontational Pakistan was However, confrontational policy policy with with Pakistan was economically economically damaging damaging for the land-locked Afghanistan whose trade depended Pakistan to for the land-locked Afghanistan whose trade depended on on Pakistan to aa great great extent. extent.

102 Muhammad Azam In the later years of Daoud’s presidency, Pakistan–Afghan relations began to improve. This change resulted due to changes in Daoud’s policy towards Pakistan. In fact, Afghan economy was rapidly deteriorating. Country’s reliance on the Soviet Union multiplied latter’s influence in the country. Daoud decided to reorient his foreign policy away from the USSR and mend fences with Pakistan. On the other hand, Soviets were also not happy with many of Daoud’s policies, especially his consolidation of power and independent foreign policy. In 1976, Daoud invited Zulfikar Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan for a 5-day visit (7–11 June). The tour was reciprocated by Daoud in August the same year. In June1977, when returning from a visit to Iran, Bhutto made a stopover in Kabul. In spite of drastic changes in Pakistan in the form of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military coup on 5 July1977, the détente between Islamabad and Kabul remained intact. General Zia paid a visit to Kabul in October the same year. Daoud reciprocated it. Both sides scheduled a second meeting in 1978 in Kabul to finalize matters pertaining to their bilateral relations. In the course of his interactions with Pakistani leaders, Daoud had indicated that he had altered his stand on the issue of Pashtunistan and was willing to negotiate adjustments in it.24 However, this second meeting never transpired. The communist Parcham Party led by Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin, who was the Head of the Khalq faction that had infiltrated the Afghan army, staged a coup on 27 April1978 (Karmal had earlier escaped to Russia, and Amin was under house arrest at the time). In what was called the Saur Revolution, Daoud and his family were arrested and assassinated on 28 April. However, in-fighting among the communist leaders of Afghanistan and the instability of the regime necessitated the USSR to send troops to occupy the country, oust Hafizullah Amin and install Babrak Karmal as president. On 26 December1979, Russian tanks entered Kabul.

Soviet Invasion, Civil War and the Taliban During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1988), Pakistan played an indispensable role in helping the Mujahideen (the Afghan resistance) to oust the Soviet troops. Pakistan’s response to the Soviet invasion was instinctive, expressing the ‘gravest concerns.’25 Its reaction to the invasion was two-fold. First, it enhanced pressure on the USSR on the diplomatic front. Second, it aided the Mujahideen on the battlefield. On the diplomatic front, Pakistan, with the support of several other countries, engaged the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the United Nations. Aspecial session of the foreign ministers of the OIC member states in Islamabad was held on 29 January1980 that suspended Afghanistan’s membership of the organization. Under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ banner, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on 14 January1980 seeking instant departure of the Soviet forces. Pakistan’s role in the conduct of Geneva talks– 12 sessions in total– and the conclusion of the Geneva Accords in April1988 were crucial. Pakistan’s resolve to buttress the Afghan resistance ‘was not only morally right but based on enlightened self-interest.’26 The Geneva Accords led to a (a) departure of Soviet troops, (b) ended US involvement without however any final

Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 103 settle and (c) the metamorphosis of the international war into a civil war which lasted for another decade. An unending civil war ensued. The Mujahideen fought against Najibullah’s communist regime which took over after Soviet departure and fell in April1992. Thereafter, a struggle for power among the various armed factions that had fought the Soviets started. Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbek factions of the Mujahideen, along with the groups of veterans like Hekmatyar and Rabbani, began fighting with each other to gain power. Due to the American disengagement, Pakistan had to deal with the refugee crisis on one hand and with the unfolding developments of the civil war in warravaged country on the other. Pakistan kept on backing the Afghan Mujahideen, particularly when they refused to join the communist regime in Kabul. In this scenario, regional powers including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and India assumed a greater role in Afghanistan. Regional politics, particularly the hostile relations between India–Pakistan, further complicated the Afghan imbroglio. In collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Iran, Pakistan attempted to bring peace to the embattled country. They facilitated two accords among the Afghan Mujahideen leaders in 1992 and 1994 which came to nothing due to fierce rivalry between them. AUS-initiated peace process equally failed in 1998 despite having started with ‘spectacular momentum.’27 The process brought five Taliban and nine Northern Alliance members across the negotiation table in Pakistan. But, then, suddenly, the Taliban attacked Takhar Province aborting the peace process.28 The civil war among the various factions can be said to have lasted from 1992 to 2001. From 1996 to 2001, there was a period of comparatively less uncertainty when the Taliban took over and ruled Kabul and other Pashtun areas. The Northern Alliance comprising mainly Tajiks and Uzbeks held the Panjshir Valley. This was not anywhere near an ideal situation for Pak–Afghan ties, but at least some form of governance began to function again. Pakistan is widely believed to have supported the Taliban in their speedy advances against the rival Mujahideen groups. The Rabbani regime (that the mediators managed to install for a short while), America and other critics held Pakistan responsible for Taliban’s victories, and they did not give due consideration to the other Mujahideen, as is asserted by former foreign minister of Pakistan, Abdul Sattar.29 After the Taliban captured Kabul in May1997, Pakistan immediately recognized their government. Pakistan considered it necessary on the following reasons: (a) In order to manage the everyday affairs in the war-torn country; (b) to process visas for travelers and (c) to open transit trade for land-locked Afghanistan.30 Unlike other governments in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime did not provoke Pakistan. No special benefit, however, accrued to Pakistan during the Taliban rule– even on the issue of the Durand Line. The policy of de-recognition of the Durand Line as the international boundary was never reviewed by them therefore tacitly the Taliban did not renounce Afghan claims on Pakistani territories. The extent of Pakistan’s influence over the Afghan Taliban may be gauged by the fact that they forthrightly turned down Pakistan’s request not to harm the Bamiyan Buddha statues and refused to sever their ties with al-Qaeda– that is they ‘paid

104 Muhammad Azam little heed to Pakistan’s suggestions.’31 Pakistan restricted formal relations with the Taliban regime and closed the Afghan banks when they were penalized by the UN Security Council in December2000 for destroying historical monuments. Former foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, once stated that developments since the 1990s have demonstrated that a Pakistani Minister’s inference that the Taliban were ‘our boys’ was a misconception and the notion of the Americans that the Taliban were Pakistan’s surrogates was a glaring gaffe.32 In Pakistan, many believe the Afghan Taliban were not any strategic asset. After their recapture of Kabul and other main cities in August2021, Pakistan has lucidly and publicly affirmed that it is not going to recognize the Taliban government unilaterally.33 After fleeing from Kabul, Ghani averred that approximately 15,000 fighters joined the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan, but both Pakistan and the United States repudiated it.34

9/11, Peace Efforts and Interference The 9/11 and the US War on Terror transformed Pakistan–Afghan ties in a dramatic way. The US invasion caused a repetition of several of the same issues that Pakistan as a neighbouring and frontline state faced at the time of the Soviet invasion during the 1980s such as a fresh influx of Afghan refugees; a security threat to its western boundary and a resultant huge pressure on its military to maintain law and order situation and pressure on its economy. At the time of the invasion, Pakistan had to make a ‘pivotal and courageous turn toward the United States.’35 It had to abandon the Taliban regime when the United States decided to bring them down for sheltering and shielding al-Qaeda leaders. As Pakistan’s military ruler accepted WoT (partially to gain Western legitimacy to his military regime), the country allowed the US forces to use its ports and air bases for logistics and supplies for the US-led coalition forces of NATO fighting in Afghanistan. As the United Nations initiated the process of setting up another government in December2001, Pakistan recommended ‘a fair representation’ for Pushtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks.36 In 2000s, several mechanisms for cooperation involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were instituted. These included meetings of foreign ministers, a Joint Economic Commission, the jirga peace process, a tripartite commission on refugees together with the UNHCR to oversee border security and cross-border violations.37 Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan during the early years of Karzai regime (2001 to 2014) were relatively less unpleasant. In 2004, for example, ‘a positive thrust’ was apparent at the time of Musharraf’s visit to extend felicitations on Karzai’s electoral success. Similarly, the start of the next year ‘marked a high point’ of the mutual relations on the occasion of Pakistan’s invitation to Karzai to be the guest of honour at the Pakistan Day parade on 23rd of March.38 Hamid Karzai referred to Pakistan as a ‘twin brother,’ ‘conjoined twins,’ ‘brother country,’ and ‘great friend.’39 However, in foreign relations, traditional attitudes have a habit of lingering and re-emerging when stakeholders perceive the need to reassert

Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 105 them. It did not take long for the ties to start becoming sour again. Karzai government banned Pakistani newspapers and websites alleging that they indulged in anti-Afghan propaganda. In reaction, Pakistan disallowed Afghan TV channels. In September2006, Karzai and Musharraf had a rancorous summit in President Bush’s presence. The extent of resentment ‘reached such alarming proportions’ that the Group of Eight (G-8) extended invitations to both of these countries to attend the foreign ministers’ meeting in Potsdam on 30 May2007 in order to bring them together.40 Taliban attacks in Afghanistan allegedly from safe havens in Pakistan and the hideouts of the Haqqani network hindered efforts for ‘trust building’ between the two states. Ashraf Ghani made positive gestures during his visit to Islamabad after securing his first term as the president, but these obstacles continued to mar relations.41 Operations carried out by Pakistan’s armed forces to clean out terrorists together with a rising number of American drone attacks in 2005 could not stop Taliban activities.42 Kabul and Islamabad had to continue efforts for years and years to bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. Before the formation of the High Peace Council, views on its composition were exchanged with Islamabad. In March2010, Karzai promised Pakistan a role in the proposal for ‘reconciliation and reintegration’ of the Afghan Taliban and pledged to take Pakistan into confidence in connection with any political arrangement with the Taliban. Radio Free Europe revealed that a Pakistani delegation had participated in the negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban delegates in Kabul in 2010.43 In 2010, Karzai felt it was important to have peace negotiations with the Taliban. The Taliban had two conditions: an immediate evacuation of all foreign troops and release of all Taliban prisoners. In 2012, Pakistan and Afghanistan concurred to set up a combined peace commission to make contact with the Afghan Taliban leaders in North Waziristan.44 Pakistan hosted the High Peace Council Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani in November2012 in Islamabad and thereafter set free several senior Taliban leaders held in Pakistan, because the Karzai government had been striving to obtain their release. According to media reports, on 30 December2012, four more Afghan Taliban prisoners were released, including former justice minister Mullah Nooruddin Turabi and former governor of Helmand Province, Abdul Bari. Twenty-six detainees were freed in two batches in 2012. However, relations between the Karzai government and Pakistan were filled with suspicion, and the United States kept asking the latter to ‘do more’ and get rid of safe havens in its territory. In fact, both the United States and Afghanistan had initially burned their boats as far as relations with the Taliban were concerned and now depended on Pakistan to bring them to the negotiating table. Karzai was not able to make any headway in talks with the Taliban, as the latter refused to recognize the government. As Ashraf Ghani became the president, Karzai was made Chairman of the High Peace Conference. In June2015, Pakistan brought the Afghan Taliban to Murree (a hill resort in Pakistan) to hold negotiations with the representatives of the Ghani regime. However, Kabul’s revelation that Taliban chief Mullah Omar had breathed his last in 2013 turned out to be a stumbling block for these negotiations, and the next

106 Muhammad Azam meeting that was to be held on 31 July2015 was cancelled. Pakistan warned that they would banish the Quetta Shura (the council of elders of the Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan) if they did not consent to restore the peace talks.45 Friends of Afghanistan backed up endeavours for ceasefire and settlement. Agathering of 22 countries on the platform of the Heart of Asia (HoA) met on 8 December2015 in Islamabad and laid stress on the vital importance of termination of hostilities in Afghanistan. The Afghan ambassador in Islamabad acknowledged Pakistan’s role in the ceasefire on the occasion of the religious holiday of Eid al-Fitr in 2018.46 Russia also stepped into the picture. On 9 November2018, a peace conference was arranged in Moscow that was attended by the Taliban, all the regional countries and the Central Asian Republics. This was the first time the Taliban sent a delegation to an international conference. The delegation was led by Stanikzai, and the Taliban conceded that there should be peace but insisted on the precondition of complete withdrawal of foreign troops. The Taliban did not recognize the US-backed Kabul regime, and their main demand was the US withdrawal. In 2019, the US opened direct negotiations with the Taliban in Doha. Pakistan was very much instrumental in arranging these talks. At the end, on 29 February2020, the United States concluded a watershed agreement with the Afghan Taliban. However, these were to be followed up with intra-Afghan peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government to arrive at a permanent settlement. During Karzai and Ghani regimes, Kabul and Islamabad continued to complain of interference by the other in their internal affairs despite their policy of non-interference. Afghanistan accused Pakistan of abetting the Afghan Taliban, and the latter held the former responsible for allowing India to fan insurgency in Balochistan, for planning other terrorist and sabotage activities and supporting Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan is vulnerable to attacks by militant organizations, including the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, having sanctuaries in Afghanistan.47 Moreover, four suspected agents of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghanistan’s secret agency, were captured from Pishin (near Quetta, Balochistan) in February2018.48 Troubles continued to hamper cooperation. Alleging ‘undue interference’ by the governor of Nangarhar Province, Pakistan closed its Jalalabad consulate in September2018. Afghan officials made allegations in August2018 that the Taliban’s attack on Ghazni was supported by Pakistani citizens. Two months later, Ghani contended that the latest assault in Kandahar was planned in Pakistan. Pakistan rejected the allegations.49 Such accusations and rejections were a routine matter. In March2019, Khan angered Ghani by proposing ‘an impartial interim government’ to hold free and fair elections, as he asserted that peace cannot return to the country otherwise.50 Violent activities along the border also continued. For example Pakistan claimed that it eliminated 50 Afghan soldiers on 7 May2017 in a cross-border exchange of fire, accusing Afghan border police for starting the skirmish. Eleven people lost their lives in border clashes on 15 July2018. Four Pakistani soldiers were slain in militant fire from Afghanistan on 14 September2019. APakistani

Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 107 soldier was killed by Afghan gunfire on 22 September2020. Afghanistan accused the Pakistan armed forces of firing a rocket into their territory that caused civilian casualties on 16 July2020. Border violence did not end in 2021, too, and several Pakistani troops were martyred in firing from across the border. Islamabad accused that over 5,000 anti-Pakistan militants was present in Afghanistan.51 There was danger even after Taliban’s taking control of Kabul, hence Islamabad was contemplating to close down the Chaman border in the early days of September2021.52 The Pak–Afghan boundary is regarded among the most dangerous ones in the world.53 In the run-up to Taliban’s recapture of Kabul on 15 August2021, a number of Afghan soldiers took refuge in Pakistan to escape the onslaught of Taliban.54 In the wake of the fall of Kabul, Pakistan rolled out historic evacuation operations in which hundreds of flights (400 till 28 August) took part bringing around 12,000 evacuees to Pakistan, including ISAF and NATO troops and Afghan and foreign civilians from 38 countries.55

Conclusion Cooperative relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are vitally important for both sides. Pakistan depends upon Afghanistan for access to Central Asia and Russia, while the latter is landlocked and critically depends upon the former for its trade. Several factors contribute towards friendly relations between the two countries. Both sides have historic, cultural, religious and ethnic bonds. The two nations had mutual struggle against imperialism first against the British Empire and later against the Soviet imperialism. The idea of Pakistan–Afghan confederation in fact reflected the desire of unity, although it could not be materialized. Both countries have mutual economic and trade interests vital to progress and development of their people. Pakistan believes that its support of the Afghans against Soviet occupation, its efforts for a peaceful transition at the time of the overthrow of the communist regime, its endeavours and cooperation with Karzai and Ghani administrations for bringing peace and stability and, above all, its opening up of the border for millions of Afghan refugees have been in line with the interests of the international community as well as for the goodwill of the Afghan people. While UNHCR facilitated voluntary repatriation of 4.4million Afghan refugees from 2002 to 2021, Pakistan still hosts well over 1.4million registered and many more unregistered Afghan refugees, residing in more than 0.2million households.56 Aspectre of refugees looms large once again after the withdrawal of US armed forces as the UN has warned of around 0.5million more Afghan refugees by the end of 2021.57 It is in the core interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan not to allow their territories to be used by militants or to serve the interests of imperialist states. It will also benefit the two nations to keep the border peaceful and favourable for international trade, conducted mainly through the Khyber and Chaman passes. Contrary to this, adverse and hostile relations between the two neighbours will negatively impact trade and the Afghan peace process. Anumber of factors are responsible

108 Muhammad Azam for this unwanted situation, including a huge trust deficit. Restoring the trust is not an easy task. The cardinal reason, however, behind these unfriendly relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the former’s perpetual refusal to accept the Durand Line as the Pakistan–Afghan border and claim on some Pakistani territories. The settlement of these issues is important for trouble-free relations. With dramatic changes with the advent of Taliban, it remains to be seen if the Taliban regime musters up enough strength to put a full stop to sparring over the Durand Line that has marred Pakistan–Afghan relations since the outset and driven the region into war and violence for decades. If done with, the two neighbours will benefit tremendously in the shape of materialization of multinational projects like Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Pipeline and Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission Project (CASA-1000) and enhancement of international trade with Central Asian states and beyond.

Notes Notes 1 Pakistan: of Borders Countries & Coastal Coastal 1 Pakistan: Map Map Showing Showing Length Length of Borders with with Neighbouring Neighbouring Countries& Line (Survey of of Pakistan, Pakistan, n.d.), Line (Survey n.d.), www.surveyofpakistan.gov.pk/SiteImage/Downloads/ www.surveyofpakistan.gov.pk/SiteImage/Downloads/ pakistan_showing_border_length.pdf. pakistan_showing_border_length.pdf. 2 “General “General Assembly Official Records, 92nd Plenary Plenary Meeting,” September 30, 30, 1947. 1947. 2 Assembly Official Records, 92nd Meeting,” September Cited in in S. S. M. M. Burke, Burke, Pakistan’ (London: Ely Cited Pakistan’ss Foreign Foreign Policy: Policy: An An Historical Historical Analysis Analysis (London: Ely House, 1973), 73. 73. House, 1973), 3 Arwin Rahi, “Afghanistan and and Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Oft-Ignored Oft-Ignored History (1947-1978),” The The 3 Arwin Rahi, “Afghanistan History (1947–1978),” Express Tribune, September10, September 10, 2020, 2020, http://tribune.com.pk/article/97165/afghanistanhttp://tribune.com.pk/article/97165/afghanistanExpress Tribune, and-pakistans-oft-ignored-history-1947-1978. and-pakistans-oft-ignored-history-1947–1978. 4 Burke, Pakistan’ 68-69. 4 Burke, Pakistan’ss Foreign Foreign Policy, Policy, 68–69. 5 Khurshid “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,” Relations,” Asian (1962): 5 Khurshid Hasan, Hasan, “Pakistan–Afghanistan Asian Survey Survey 2, 2, no. no. 77 (1962): 14-15, https://doi.org/10.2307/3023688. https://doi.org/10.2307/3023688. 14–15, 6 Department of State, State, “Outlook “Outlook for for Afghanistan,” in Foreign of the the United United 6 Department of Afghanistan,” in Foreign Relations Relations of States: vol. 11, 11, NIE 53-54 (Washington, (Washington, DC, DC, 1954). 1954). States: Diplomatic Diplomatic Papers, Papers, vol. NIE–- 53–54 7 “Report “Report of ofAfghan-Pakistani Confederation Plans,” Plans,” NSC (Central Intelligence Intelligence 7 Afghan–Pakistani Confederation NSC Briefing Briefing (Central Agency, 13, 1954), 1954), www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R0089 www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R0089 Agency, April April13, 0A000300010019-3.pdf. 0A000300010019-3.pdf. 8 “Foreign “Foreign Relations Relations of of the the United United States,” States,” 1493. 1493. 8 9 “Report “Report of of Afghan-Pakistani Confederation Plans.” Plans.” 9 Afghan-Pakistani Confederation 10 Muhammad Khan Khattak, Khattak, A Odyssey (Karachi: (Karachi: Oxford Oxford University 10 Muhammad Aslam Aslam Khan A Pathan Pathan Odyssey University Press, 2004), 100–03 100-03 cited cited in in Khurshid Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither Press, 2004), Mahmud Kasuri, Neither aa Hawk Hawk Nor Nor a a Dove: Dove: An ofPakistan’s Pakistan’s Foreign Foreign Policy, Policy, 1st 1st ed. ed. (Karachi: (Karachi: Oxford Oxford University University An Insider’ Insider’ss Account Account of Press, 2015), 502. 502. Press, 2015), 11 Louis Dupree, Dupree, “ASuggested “A Suggested Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Federation,” 11 Louis Federation,” Middle Middle East East Journal 17, no. (Autumn 1963): 1963): 394–95. 394-95. Journal 17, no. 44 (Autumn 12 Associated of Pakistan cited in in Dupree, 395. 12 Associated Press Press of Pakistan cited Dupree, 395. 13 Dupree, “A Suggested Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Federation,” 395. 13 Dupree, “ASuggested Federation,” 395. 14 Ibid., 394-95. 14 Ibid., 394–95. 15 “Foreign “Foreign Relations Relations of of the the United United States,” States,” 1493. 1493. 15 16 Dupree, “A Suggested Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Federation,” Federation,” 385–98. 385-98. 16 Dupree, “ASuggested 17 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 “Afghanistan–Pakistan “Afghanistan-Pakistan Merger,” Merger,” NSC (Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency, Octo 18 NSC Briefing Briefing (Central Agency, October 14, 1954), 1954), www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R0003000 ber14, www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R0003000 80015-6.pdf. 80015-6.pdf.

Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 109 19 “Report of Afghan–Pakistani Confederation Plans.” 20 Dupree, “ASuggested Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Federation,” 395. 21 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016): AConcise History, 4th ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017), 180. 22 Nirode Mohanty, America, Pakistan, and the India Factor (New York: Palgrave, 2013), 104. 23 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 498. 24 Rahi, “Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Oft-Ignored History.” 25 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 182. 26 Ibid., 214. 27 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 203. 28 Ibid. 29 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 209. 30 Ibid., 251. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 208. 33 Anwar Iqbal, “No Unilateral Recognition, Pakistan Assures US, Others,” Dawn, August19, 2021. 34 Anwar Iqbal, “US Refuses to Endorse Ghani’s Claim of Pakistan’s Role,” Dawn, September3, 2021. 35 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Arlington: RAND and National Defence Research Institute, 2005), 161. 36 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 297. 37 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 540–41. 38 Ibid. 39 “India ‘Close Friend’ but Pak ‘Conjoined Twin’ Says Afghanistan,” The Times of India, March11, 2010, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/india-closefriend-but-pak-conjoined-twin-says-afghanistan/articleshow/5672129.cms. 40 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 535. 41 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 301. 42 Harrison Akins, “Mashar Versus Kashar in Pakistan’s FATA: Intra-Tribal Conflict and the Obstacles to Reform,” Asian Survey 58, no. 6 (2018): 1136–59. 43 Dawn, October16, 2010. 44 “Dialogue with Taliban: Joint Commission for Afghan Peace,” The Express Tribune, July31, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/415279/dialogue-with-taliban-joint-com mission-for-afghan-peace. 45 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 303. 46 “Afghan Envoy Acknowledges Pakistan’s Role in Eid Ceasefire,” Dawn, July6, 2018, www.dawn.com/news/1418300. 47 Michael Kugelman, “Pakistan in 2016: Tensions with Neighbors, Turmoil at Home,” Asian Survey 57, no. 1 (February2017): 33–42. 48 “Security Forces Arrest Four Suspected NDS Operatives in Pishin,” Pakistan Today, February5, 2018, www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/05/security-forces-arrest-sus pected-nds-operatives-in-pishin/. 49 “Kandahar Attack: Pakistan Rejects Baseless Allegations of Afghanistan,” The News, October25, 2018, www.thenews.com.pk/print/385111-kandahar-attack-pakis tan-rejects-baseless-allegations-of-afghanistan. 50 Hasib Danish, “Afghanistan Recalls Envoy Over Khan Remark,” Voice of America, March27, 2019, www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/afghanistan-recalls-envoyover-khan-remark. 51 “5,000 Terrorists Posing Threat to Pakistan’s Security from Afghanistan: FO,” Dawn, June29, 2021.

110 Muhammad Azam 52 Munawer Azeem, “Chaman Border Being Closed Due to Threats: Minister,” Dawn, September3, 2021. 53 Philip Walker, “The World’s Most Dangerous Borders,” Foreign Policy, June24, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/24/the-worlds-most-dangerous-borders/. 54 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Pakistan Grants Refuge to 46 More Afghan Soldiers,” Dawn, July27, 2021. 55 Mohammad Asghar, “400 Flights Take Part in Evacuation from Afghanistan,” Dawn, August28, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1643039. 56 “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan” (United Nations High Commission for Refugees), accessed September4, 2021, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/pak. 57 AFP, “UN Warns of up to 500,000 More Afghan Refugees by Year-End,” Dawn, August28, 2021.

7 Indian Factor in Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali

Introduction Since its independence in August1947, the dominant agenda of Pakistan’s foreign policy was overshadowed by its quest for security from its archrival India, comparatively a superior economic and military power. There is a strong perception among the Pakistani ruling elites that India has never truly reconciled with the idea of the creation of Pakistan. This perception was further reinforced when India played a significant role in the separation of the Eastern part of Pakistan in 1971 that is now Bangladesh. Pakistan’s fixation on India has largely shaped Pakistan’s foreign relations, particularly towards its neighbour Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s irredentist claims on Pakistan’s north-western part and its close relations with India intensified Pakistan’s security apprehensions. Therefore, Islamabad has always sought a friendly regime in Kabul in order to avoid a situation of being sandwiched between the eastern and western neighbours. Pakistan has largely viewed Afghanistan from the Indian prism. This is perhaps due to Indian attempts to exploit Afghanistan’s long-held hostility towards Pakistan to its benefits. From 1947 to 1992, India provided unstinted support to every Afghan government that demonstrated hostility towards Pakistan. However, the situation changed in Pakistan’s favour when the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan and ruled it from 1996 to 2001. Islamabad’s support to the Taliban in turn helped alleviate its security concerns to a certain degree. The 9/11 terrorist events followed by American decision to invade Afghanistan dramatically changed the regional situation. Pakistan had to join the Americansponsored alliance formed to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to eliminate Al-Qaeda. Pakistan supported the US efforts in routing out the Taliban from Afghanistan but remained reluctant to provide wholehearted support in completely defeating the Taliban forces due to heavy Indian involvement in the post-9//11 settings in Afghanistan which Islamabad regarded as detrimental to its security. However, Pakistan’s cooperation was forthcoming when the United States started dialogues with the Afghan Taliban starting in the late 2010s. The Taliban inclusion in any governmental setup would significantly assuage Islamabad’s security concerns. Therefore, Pakistan has played a crucial role in facilitating the recent direct peace dialogue between the Afghan Taliban and the United DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-9

112 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali States. Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process has gained much international appreciation.

Pakistan’s Perennial Security Threat from India There is a common saying in international relations that you can choose your friends but not your neighbours. Pakistan and India share a long common border along with common history and cultural practices. However, most of their relations have been fraught with mistrust and hostility. Anumber of factors highlight the enduring rivalry between Islamabad and New Delhi. The ideological rivalry is vividly manifested in the poles-apart philosophical structure of Islam and Hinduism. As pointed out by S. M. Burke, “Centuries of dedication to such diametrically opposed systems as Islam and Hinduism could not but nurture an utterly different outlook on the outside world among their respective followers.”1 Therefore, the Pakistan security establishment has framed its rivalry with India as a civilizational one.2 Another cause of tension between the two countries is related with Pakistan’s fear of being inferior to India’s strategic and economic strength. As noted by Howard Wriggins, “However unjustified Indian leaders may have thought it, Pakistan’s overriding concern vis-à-vis India” is the “fear of India’s size, the size of its army... and fear compounded out of not infrequent public statements by prominent Indians regarding the tragedy of partition and reiterating the inherent unity of the subcontinent.”3 The partition process created a legacy of misperceptions and culture of distrust that added further complications to the relation between the two countries. Leo Rose and Richard Sisson pointed out, “Most of the political and social concepts that dominated the ideology and psychology of the narrow élites that controlled these two movements survived into the independence period and have not disappeared.”4 The persistence of the Kashmir dispute led to three major wars, a limited Kargil war in 1999, and three crises (Brass Tacks (1987), Kashmir uprising (1990) and a military standoff (2001–2) between India and Pakistan.5 The 1990 Kashmir uprising increased the tension between the two countries, which made Kashmir a nuclear flashpoint creating potential serious security threats for the region and internationally as well, as both were de-facto nuclear power states.6 Because of the long-standing hostility between the two countries, both pursued security policies with zero-sum attitude. The Kashmir conflict remains the stumbling block in the normalization of relations between the two countries.7 The Kashmir dispute owes its origin in the partition process, and the first war between both countries started over Kashmir in 1948. India’s occupation of Kashmir and its consistent refusals to honour United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to resolve the issue of Kashmir further augmented mistrust and hostility.8 Later in 1998, the Kashmir issue once again gained world-wide attention after two countries went nuclear as Kashmir emerged as the nuclear flash point creating real prospects of Pakistan– India tensions to rise with the possibility of nuclear use. To an expert on Kashmir

Pakistan’ Towards Afghanistan 113 Pakistan’ss Policy Policy Towards Afghanistan 113

conflict, that it to war war or conflict, “there “there is is no no guarantee guarantee that it will will not not lead lead to or military military adventures adventures involving the use involving nuclear nuclear deployment deployment and and possibly possibly the use of of aa nuclear nuclear weapon.” weapon.”99 Pakistan’s threat perception perception from from India between Pakistan Pakistan’s threat India intensified intensified rivalry rivalry between Pakistan and India in the post-September11 period when India blamed the and India in the post-September 11 period when India blamed the Pakistan-based Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad for Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad for carrying carrying out out aa terrorist terrorist attack attack on on 10 its parliament on December13, 2001. Subsequently, India called back its High its parliament on December 13, 2001.10 Subsequently, India called back its High Commissioner from Pakistan, broke air and and ground ground transport links with Pakistan Commissioner from Pakistan, broke air transport links with Pakistan and border and put put its its military military on on high high alert alert while while deploying deploying 750,000 750,000 troops troops along along the the border 11 Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said, “We cannot tolerate with Pakistan. with Pakistan.11 Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said, “We cannot tolerate such such attacks tolerance.”12 In attacks any any more. more. We We have have reached reached the the limits limits of of our our tolerance.”12 In response, response, Pakistan forces along border and Pakistan also also deployed deployed its its ground ground and and air air forces along its its eastern eastern border and alerted alerted 13 its naval forces in the Arabian Sea. General Musharraf in an interview its naval forces in the Arabian Sea.13 General Musharraf in an interview stated, stated, “I would like like to warn (New Delhi) against against any any precipitous precipitous action action by Indian “Iwould to warn (New Delhi) by the the Indian 14 government against Pakistan. This would lead to very serious repercussions.” In government against Pakistan. This would lead to very serious repercussions.”14 In addition, Pakistan denied any involvement in the terrorist attacks and pledged not addition, Pakistan denied any involvement in the terrorist attacks and pledged not to terrorism originating from its territory.15 While the nation to allow allow any any terrorism originating from its territory.15 While addressing addressing the nation on 12 12 January 2002, Musharraf condemned attacks attacks on on the the Indian Indian parliament and on January2002, Musharraf condemned parliament and vowed to take action against the violent groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba vowed to take action against the violent groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Musharaf and the the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Musharaf said said that: that: Pakistan forms and Pakistan rejects rejects and and condemns condemns terrorism terrorism in in all all its its forms and manifestations. manifestations. Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for terrorist Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activity activity anywhere anywhere in the organisation will allowed to to indulge indulge in in terrorism in the in the world. world. No No organisation will be be allowed terrorism in the 16 name name of of Kashmir. Kashmir.16 Amid the ongoing took place Amid the ongoing hostility, hostility, another another attack attack took place on on the the residential residential quarters quarters of Kaluchuk in May2002, of an an Indian Indian army army camp camp at at Kaluchuk in Jammu Jammu on on 14 14 May 2002, only only intensifying intensifying 17 the Indian Prime Minister the already already estranged estranged relations. relations.17 Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee Vajpayee warned, warned, “We “We will teach the perpetrators of the proxy war a lesson. Our forces are will teach the perpetrators of the proxy war a lesson. Our forces are standing standing like like rocks borders.”18 In Pakistan not than 50,000 rocks on on the the borders.”18 In response, response, Pakistan not only only removed removed more more than 50,000 troops from its border Afghanistan to to deploy deploy along along its its Eastern Eastern border with troops from its border with with Afghanistan border with India but also threatened the United States to vacate some of the air fields given to India but also threatened the United States to vacate some of the air fields given to 19 the United States for launching military operations in Afghanistan. The standoff the United States for launching military operations in Afghanistan.19 The standoff between India Pakistan could potentially affect the War between India and and Pakistan could potentially affect Pakistan’s Pakistan’s role role in in the War on Terror in Afghanistan. The United States dispatched US Deputy Secretary on Terror in Afghanistan. The United States dispatched US Deputy Secretary of of State, urge both both countries State, Richard Richard Armitage, Armitage, to to India India and and Pakistan Pakistan in in June2002 June 2002 to to urge countries 20 to to the the deteriorating Armitage’s visit helped to put put aa restraint restraint to deteriorating situation. situation.20 Armitage’s visit helped normalize normalize the relations between the two countries. the relations between the two countries. President to stop Kashmir were President Musharraf’s Musharraf’s actions actions to stop support support for for militancy militancy in in Kashmir were welcomed by New Delhi. For example after the May 2002 standoff, the Pakiwelcomed by New Delhi. For example after the May 2002 standoff, the Paki stani part of from Pakistan, Pakistan, stani government, government, as as part of restraining restraining the the Jihadi Jihadi forces forces operating operating from put restrictions on the United Jihad Council, an umbrella group of Kashmiri put restrictions on the United Jihad Council, an umbrella group of Kashmiri and and non-Kashmiri two leading non-Kashmiri Mujahideen Mujahideen factions, factions, including including two leading Jihadi Jihadi organizations, organizations, Hezb-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.21 Responding Hezb-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.21 Responding to to Pakistan’s Pakistan’s moves, Prime Minister Vajpayee took the Indian parliament into confidence moves, Prime Minister Vajpayee took the Indian parliament into confidence on on

114 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali 2 May 2003 to launch his “third and final” peace offering to Pakistan to hold “decisive talks” to resolve outstanding disputes between the two countries.22 On 6 January2004, President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee met during the SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) summit in Islamabad and pledged to resume the talks aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. Both leaders demonstrated optimism about “the resumption of the ‘Composite Dialogue’ that will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”23 Anumber of important Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) took place since both countries engaged in a peace process since January2004, but it was void of any progress on Kashmir dispute because Indian policies largely used the pretexts of the War on Terror to stifle and discredit the Kashmir’s movement for self-determination in the eyes of the international community.24 Both India and Pakistan pursued conflicting interests over the issue of War on Terror in the region as well as the future of Afghanistan. With no significant progress on resolving the Kashmir conflict, there has always been estranged relations between both countries.

Indo-Afghan Close Ties and Pakistan’s Security Apprehensions Because of the hostile relations between India and Pakistan, both countries have had a fierce competition to enhance their respective influence in Afghanistan. Excluding the Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, Afghanistan has largely displayed hostility towards Pakistan. The only state that had opposed Pakistan’s membership of the United Nations in 1947 was none other than Afghanistan. Hostility between the two countries further flared up when Afghanistan put forward its irredentist claims on Pakistan’s territory, in particular some parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KPK) and Baluchistan. Because of its enmity and particularly dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, India extended its wholehearted support to Afghanistan over Pashtunistan issue.25 It is important to mention that Pakistani Pashtun nationalists supported the Indian National Congress against the British Imperial rule. In addition, Pakistan’s Pashtun nationalists have invariably supported Afghan rulers. Pashtun’s historical cordiality with Afghanistan and the Indian National Congress made Pakistan suspicious of their intentions. India has always sought friendly relations with Afghanistan which is demonstrated with the signing of the “Friendship Treaty” in 1950. In addition, India had signed various agreements and protocols with pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan to promote mutual co-operation in an attempt to enhance its influence. Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, once said: Ever since India’s independence, we have grown closer to each other, for a variety of reasons. The long memory of our past was there, and the moment it was possible to renew them, we renewed them. And then came mutual interest, (our common hostility towards Pakistan) which is a powerful factor.26

Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 115 The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had provided Pakistan a unique opportunity to increase its influence in Afghanistan. With the Soviet intervention, Pakistan became a frontline state and served as a conduit for international arms and aid heading to the Mujahideen engaged in fighting the Soviets. India continued their unstinted support to the Soviet Union throughout its intervention in Afghanistan. With the support of Pakistan, the Mujahideen offered severe resistance ultimately forcing the Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988. In opposition to Pakistan’s support for the Mujahideen fighters, India supported the Communist government, until its demise in 1992. Even after the removal of Najibullah from power, India supported the first Mujahideen government, predominantly nonPashtun, and extended humanitarian and technical assistance. Pakistan, on the other hand, backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami whose inability to capture Kabul led Pakistan to shift its support to the newly emerged force known as the Taliban who proclaimed to end the ongoing civil strife in the country. In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and established Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan in most parts of the country. India opposed the Taliban regime because of its association with Pakistan and closed its embassy in September1996. In the meanwhile, the non-Pashtun groups opposed to the Taliban regime united to form the Northern Alliance and exercised their control over areas in the north of Afghanistan, adjacent to the Central Asian States of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Taliban and the Northern Alliance remained engaged in fighting even after the fall of Kabul to the former. Afghanistan became a theatre of a proxy war between Pakistan and India. In opposition to Pakistan’s support to the Taliban regime, India extended its support to the Northern Alliance by providing high-altitude warfare equipment worth $10million through its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and technical advice to the Northern Alliance.27 During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996–2001), India encouraged and supported the groups engaged in fighting against the Taliban. Moreover, India also developed close ties with the anti-Taliban countries such as Russia and Iran and also developed links with Central Asian States.

Pakistan’s Afghan Challenge in the Post-9/11 Security Environment The removal of the Taliban from power after the US invasion of Afghanistan offered India an opportunity to develop close ties with Afghanistan as during the Taliban rule India was completely out of its role in Afghanistan. MrJaswant Singh, the then Indian Foreign Affairs Minister, in his visit to the United States in October2001, marked the Taliban regime as illegitimate and conferred legitimacy on the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. In his television interview in Washington on 2 October2001, MrSingh said, India has never recognized the Taliban as a legitimate regime. We have continued to recognize the government of Afghanistan as represented by President Rabbani. They have formed the Northern Alliance... it should be the

116 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali effort of the international community now to strengthen the legitimate government of Afghanistan.28 Indian leaders perceived that the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has served Indian strategic objectives because the Taliban regime not only denied India any role in Afghanistan but also facilitated militants fighting against the Indian forces in India-held Kashmir.29 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced, “We are ready to work with the government and people of Afghanistan to ensure that Afghanistan will never again be hostage to, or become a haven for, terrorists.”30 Therefore, India not only wanted a friendly regime in Afghanistan to limit Pakistan’s influence but also wanted to retain a diplomatic and intelligence presence in order to monitor Pakistan’s activities within Afghanistan. India’s desire to build strategic and economic ties with the energy- rich states of Central Asia motivated cordial relations with Afghanistan, preferably a pro-Indian regime. In what Stephen Blank characterizes as a “great game” strategy, “India’s goals reflect the desire to control overland routes to maritime ports for Central Asian resources by denying both China and Pakistan the ability to threaten Indian assets in the region.”31 Navtej Sarna, spokesman for the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “We have strong bilateral relations with Afghanistan, and we want to help them rebuild their country. India also sees Afghanistan as a route to Central Asia.”32 Afghanistan would provide India access to Central Asian oil and gas resources and also to marginalize establishing a foothold in Pakistan’s neighbourhood.33 This posed a serious challenge for Pakistani security elites who invariably aimed at limiting Indian power in the region. Christine Fair testifies Pakistan’s security concerns, “Militarily and strategically, Central Asia is an important theatre for India. While India’s objectives in the region reflect interests that reach far beyond Pakistan, the fact remains that India is interested in countering Pakistan in this region.”34 India closely watched the removal of the Taliban regime in order to grasp any opportunity to make inroads in Afghanistan. India extended recognition to the interim government led by Hamid Karzai that was established as a result of the Bonn Conference held in December2001. The Karzai government was disproportionally represented by the Northern Alliance. Members of the Northern Alliance enjoyed a close relationship with India as the families of many Northern Alliance elites sought shelter in New Delhi during the Taliban rule. India reopened its embassy in Kabul and established consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad. To support to the new political administration in Afghanistan, India provided US$100million of reconstruction aid and established Indira Gandhi Children’s Hospital in Kabul.35 Afghanistan responded positively to the Indian moves– for example Masood Khalili, Afghanistan’s ambassador to India, said, “People in Afghanistan have long memories. They will not forget who was a friend and others, who supported and propped up the Taliban.” He added, “It’s natural that we will turn to India for assistance.”36 The new Afghan government largely viewed India as a natural ally. Since then, India has spent billions of dollars in various

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infrastructural infrastructural and and developmental developmental projects projects in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Therefore, Therefore, India, India, in in its its attempt to create a soft image, launched training programmes and extended attempt to create a soft image, launched training programmes and extended supsup port to deepen port in in health health and and developmental developmental sectors. sectors. This This enabled enabled India India to deepen its its roots roots in in Afghanistan, a development Pakistan was seriously concerned with. Afghanistan, a development Pakistan was seriously concerned with.

Pakistan’s Afghanistan Pakistan’s Policy Policy Responses Responses Towards Towards Afghanistan India factor in Pakistan’s policy India has has remained remained aa significant significant factor in Pakistan’s policy towards towards Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Pakistan’s decision to become a part of the war against terrorism been greatly Pakistan’s decision to become a part of the war against terrorism had had been greatly influenced by the Indian factor. For example, the then President General influenced by the Indian factor. For example, the then President General MushMush arraf Pakistan’s decision to joining joining US US War arraf cited cited India India as as aa major major reason reason for for Pakistan’s decision to War on on 37 Terror the Taliban, Terror against against the Taliban, its its former former allies. allies.37 Pakistan’s influence and its own in Pakistan’s strategy strategy was was to to counter counter Indian Indian influence and maintain maintain its own in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s motives in Afghanistan have largely been geostrategic– Afghanistan. Pakistan’s motives in Afghanistan have largely been geostrategic to to establish foothold in to counter counter security security threat threat from from India India and and to establish aa foothold in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Pakistani former President General Zia-ul-Haq once directed to the Pakistani former President General Zia-ul-Haq once directed to the head head of of the the military intelligence organization, ISI, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, that military intelligence organization, ISI, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, that “the “the water boil at temperature.”38 Traditionally, water [in [in Afghanistan] Afghanistan] must must boil at the the right right temperature.”38 Traditionally, PakiPaki stan viewed Afghanistan providing “strategic depth” – that it stan viewed Afghanistan providing “strategic depth” - that it could could withdraw withdraw its its forces forces into into Afghan Afghan territory territory in in the the case case of of an an Indian Indian military military advance. advance. The The Taliban Taliban rule Pakistan to rule in in Afghanistan Afghanistan helped helped Pakistan to achieve achieve that that strategic strategic depth. depth. According According to to former chief of ISI, General Hameed Gul, “Pakistan’s military leaders supported former chief of ISI, General Hameed Gul, “Pakistan’s military leaders supported the their goal by squeezing the Taliban Taliban to to attain attain their goal of of strategic strategic depth depth in in Afghanistan Afghanistan by squeezing out out the interests of other regional rivals including Iran and India and the forces of the interests of other regional rivals including Iran and India and the forces of the the 39 Northern Pakistan’s to avoid Northern Alliance.” Alliance.”39 Pakistan’s strategic strategic circles circles have have always always desired desired to avoid aa situation being sandwiched between its two hostile situation of of being sandwiched between its two hostile neighbours– neighbours - Afghanistan Afghanistan on border and border. on its its western western border and India India on on its its eastern eastern border. For friendly regime For these these strategic strategic reasons, reasons, Pakistan Pakistan always always wanted wanted aa friendly regime in in Afghanistan that could protect Islamabad interests. In the post-Soviet Afghanistan, Afghanistan that could protect Islamabad interests. In the post-Soviet Afghanistan, Pakistan to meddle in order to achieve in Pakistan continued continued to meddle in in Afghan Afghan affairs affairs in order to achieve its its interests interests in the best possible manner. Acivil war between different Mujahideen factions, folthe best possible manner. A civil war between different Mujahideen factions, fol lowed by the the withdrawal withdrawal of from Afghanistan, threatened lowed by of Soviet Soviet forces forces from Afghanistan, seriously seriously threatened Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan who Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan who proclaimed to end the civil strife provided solace to Pakistan’s strategic circles. proclaimed to end the civil strife provided solace to Pakistan’s strategic circles. Islamabad Islamabad decided decided to to support support the the Taliban Taliban against against groups groups who who “established “established close close links with the Indians” because the Taliban showed a remarkable links with the Indians” because the Taliban showed a remarkable “success “success in in suppressing Mujahideen commanders peace in suppressing unruly unruly Mujahideen commanders and and imposing imposing peace in and and around around Kandahar.”40 Kandahar.”40 Pakistan’s believed that the Taliban would serve best country’s Pakistan’s strategic strategic circles circles believed that the Taliban would serve best country’s interests. This led to actions– for example an Afghan cell was established interests. This led to actions - for example an Afghan cell was established in in the Interior to provide the Interior Ministry Ministry in in 1994 1994 to provide assistance assistance to to the the Taliban Taliban movement. movement. The The interior the ISI interior minister, minister, General General Babar, Babar, oversaw oversaw the ISI to to provide provide “transportation, “transportation, fuel, fuel, 41 communications equipment and advice” to the Taliban movement. Pakistan’s communications equipment and advice” to the Taliban movement.41 Pakistan’s support the Taliban was reinforced by several by helping support to to the Taliban was reinforced by several considerations. considerations. First, First, by helping the Taliban to gain control of Afghanistan, Islamabad expected to get to the Taliban to gain control of Afghanistan, Islamabad expected to get access access to

118 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali Central trade links. the Taliban Central Asia Asia to to establish establish trade links. Second, Second, Pakistan Pakistan perceived perceived the Taliban as as an anti-secular and an anti-Indian force because of their rigid Islamic beliefs, an anti-secular and an anti-Indian force because of their rigid Islamic beliefs, and and that would help to diminish threats from from its borders. that would help Pakistan Pakistan to diminish security security threats its western western borders. 42 Third, a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would provide Pakistan the “strategic Third, a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would provide Pakistan the “strategic depth” depth”42 in to protect border. Fourth, in order order to protect from from Indian Indian military military advances advances from from the the eastern eastern border. Fourth, aa Taliban-controlled friendly Afghanistan where Kash KashTaliban-controlled friendly Afghanistan could could provide provide aa “base “base where 43 miri militants could be trained.” Most of Pakistan’s strategic objectives miri militants could be trained.”43 Most of Pakistan’s strategic objectives were were well-served the Taliban territorial claims well-served under under the Taliban regime regime as as territorial claims from from Afghanistan Afghanistan were were largely was significantly largely withered, withered, and and India’s India’s influence influence was significantly decreased. decreased. It It is is important important to that the the Taliban the Durand Line.44 to mention mention that Taliban did did not not recognize recognize the Durand Line.44 The American invasion of Afghanistan followed by the overthrow the Taliban The American invasion of Afghanistan followed by the overthrow of of the Taliban government deprived Pakistan of a friendly regime in Kabul. After the government deprived Pakistan of a friendly regime in Kabul. After the removal removal of the Taliban from power, power, an Northern of the Taliban regime regime from an anti-Pakistan anti-Pakistan group group known known as as the the Northern Alliance got hold of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, with the support of US Alliance got hold of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, with the support of the the US military. This was called worst nightmare for Pakistan. One Pakistani newspamilitary. This was called worst nightmare for Pakistan. One Pakistani newspa per worst nightmare true with Northern Alliance per called called it it “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s worst nightmare has has come come true with Northern Alliance 45 control of Kabul,” whereas other mentioned “a strategic debacle control of Kabul,” whereas other mentioned “a strategic debacle for for the the army.” army.”45 Pakistan perceived the Northern Alliance control of power in Kabul negatively Pakistan perceived the Northern Alliance control of power in Kabul negatively and violation of the US US promises to protect and considered considered it it aa violation of the promises to protect Islamabad’s Islamabad’s interests interests in Afghanistan. in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Pakistan’s intensified after increasing Furthermore, Pakistan’s security security apprehensions apprehensions intensified after increasing Indian the post-9/11 time period. Pakistan felt Indian involvement involvement in in Afghanistan Afghanistan in in the post-9/11 time period. Pakistan felt 46 encircled, given cooperation and close ties between India and Afghanistan. encircled, given cooperation and close ties between India and Afghanistan.46 While talking about Indian presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan President Pervez While talking about Indian presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf very clear; further Musharraf said: said: “India’s “India’s motivation motivation in in Afghanistan Afghanistan is is very clear; nothing nothing further than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they (India) have consulates in Jalalabad than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they (India) have consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar? What their interest? than disturbing and Kandahar? What is is their interest? There There is is no no interest interest other other than disturbing 47 Pakistan, Pakistan, doing doing something something against against Pakistan.” Pakistan.”47 Pakistan also for creating territory using using Pakistan also alleged alleged India India for creating troubles troubles inside inside its its territory Afghanistan. Pakistan’s interior Afghanistan. On On 16 16 October2003, October 2003, Pakistan’s interior minister minister accused accused India India for for 48 sponsoring using their their intelligence sponsoring terrorism terrorism in in Pakistan Pakistan using intelligence presence presence in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan.48 Pakistani security officials expressed their apprehensions over Indian intelligence Pakistani security officials expressed their apprehensions over Indian intelligence presence presence in in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, “India’s “India’s activities activities have have less less to to do do with with humanitarian humanitarian aid and more to do with India’s top secret intelligence agency, the Research aid and more to do with India’s top secret intelligence agency, the Research and and 49 Analysis Pakistan consistently blamed that Analysis Wing Wing (RAW).” (RAW).”49 Pakistan consistently blamed that Indian Indian intelligence intelligence officials terrorist acts officials used used Afghans Afghans to to carry carry out out terrorist acts in in Pakistan. Pakistan. Pakistan also for establishing terrorist training training camps Pakistan also alleged alleged India India for establishing aa network network of of terrorist camps at different parts of Afghanistan, such as at the Afghan military base of Qushila at different parts of Afghanistan, such as at the Afghan military base of Qushila Jadid Kabul, at Jadid located located north north of of Kabul, at Gereshk Gereshk in in southern southern Helmand Helmand province, province, in in the the 50 Panjshir Panjshir Valley, Valley, and and at at Khahak Khahak and and Hassan Hassan Killies Killies in in western western Nimroz Nimroz Province. Province.50 In May2003, Pakistan accused India for sponsoring the local militants also known In May 2003, Pakistan accused India for sponsoring the local militants also known as as Pakistani Pakistani Taliban Taliban and and Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda militants militants in in Waziristan, Waziristan, an an agency agency which which is is part part of erstwhile known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) who staged of erstwhile known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) who staged 51 attacks According to Pakistan’s there attacks against against the the Pakistan Pakistan army. army.51 According to Pakistan’s media media reports, reports, there was ample evidence of India’s involvement through its consulates in Afghanistan was ample evidence of India’s involvement through its consulates in Afghanistan

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for province of for creating creating troubles troubles in in Pakistan’s Pakistan’s South-western South-western province of Baluchistan. Baluchistan. On On 13 August2004, Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Jam Muhammad Yousaf, stated 13 August 2004, Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Jam Muhammad Yousaf, stated that provided support that India India established established and and provided support to to 40 40 terrorist terrorist camps camps all all over over Baluch Baluch 52 territory through through its In territory its intelligence intelligence network network in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan.52 In another another statement, statement, Pakistan’s Minister of for Information talked about Pakistan’s Minister of State State for Information Senator, Senator, Tariq Tariq Azeem, Azeem, talked about the evidence of India providing arms to Akbar Bugti and Sardar Khair Bakhsh the evidence of India providing arms to Akbar Bugti and Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri, two local Baluchistan, to Pakistani Marri, two local leaders leaders of of Baluchistan, to engage engage in in attacks attacks against against the the Pakistani 53 security forces in the province. security forces in the province.53 Pakistani believed that Pakistani officials officials believed that India India in in collaboration collaboration with with Afghanistan Afghanistan involved in providing substantial support to the ongoing separatist involved in providing substantial support to the ongoing separatist movement movement in in Baluchistan. Adviser Minister on Baluchistan. Adviser to to the the Prime Prime Minister on Interior Interior Affairs, Affairs, Rehman Rehman Malik, Malik, briefed the the Senate Parliament) about briefed Senate (Upper (Upper House House of of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Parliament) about Indian Indian support support to the Baluch Liberation been engaged fighting since to the Baluch Liberation Army Army (BLA), (BLA), which which has has been engaged in in fighting since the 1970s for the liberation of Baluchistan. He noted, “India is now funding the 1970s for the liberation of Baluchistan. He noted, “India is now funding the the BLA Baluch terrorists BLA and and its its activities,” activities,” adding adding further further that that some some 4,000 4,000 to to 5,000 5,000 Baluch terrorists received training established various parts received their their training established in in camps camps located located in in various parts of of AfghanAfghan 54 istan. Rehman Malik with “documentary istan.54 Rehman Malik also also presented presented the the Senate Senate with “documentary proof” proof’ of of India and Afghanistan’s involvement in supporting terrorism in Baluchistan and India and Afghanistan’s involvement in supporting terrorism in Baluchistan and the former FATA.55 FATA.55 the former In addition, perceived that that the the US-India US–India strategic In addition, Pakistan Pakistan perceived strategic relationship relationship enhanced enhanced in the post-9/11 settings would undermine its regional strategic in the post-9/11 settings would undermine its regional strategic interests interests in in South South Asia. In October2008, India and the United States signed a civil nuclear strategic Asia. In October 2008, India and the United States signed a civil nuclear strategic deal the power balance entirely favour of the South deal that that shifted shifted the power balance entirely in in favour of India India in in the South Asian Asian 56 region. Earlier with the region.56 Earlier in in 2006, 2006, Pakistan Pakistan requested requested for for aa similar similar strategic strategic deal deal with the United States earlier in 2006, but it was declined. Therefore, the Pakistani security United States earlier in 2006, but it was declined. Therefore, the Pakistani security establishment establishment realized realized that that the the United United States States has has shifted shifted its its regional regional strategic strategic concon 57 sideration in favour of India. In addition, Pakistan’s view of US abandonment sideration in favour of India.57 In addition, Pakistan’s view of US abandonment of Pakistan’s approach of Afghanistan Afghanistan also also significantly significantly impacted impacted Pakistan’s approach towards towards the the TaliTali ban. The US policymakers publicly expressed their intention to cut the number ban. The US policymakers publicly expressed their intention to cut the number of of American troops in to hand to NATO. NATO. As American troops in Afghanistan Afghanistan and and to hand over over authority authority to As General General John John P. P. Abizaid, Abizaid, Head Head of of the the United United States States Central Central Command, Command, said said in in late late 2005, 2005, “it makes sense that as NATO forces go in, and they’re more in numbers, that “it makes sense that as NATO forces go in, and they’re more in numbers, that 58 we could drop some of the US requirements somewhat.” Some analysts argued we could drop some of the US requirements somewhat.”58 Some analysts argued that the Pakistani this statement that the Pakistani (and (and Afghan) Afghan) government government officials officials interpreted interpreted this statement as to Afghanistan. as an an expression expression of of the the US US lack lack of of commitment commitment to Afghanistan. The The then then Afghan Afghan regime vehemently viewed India as a strategic partner which in turn convinced regime vehemently viewed India as a strategic partner which in turn convinced the to protect protect Islamabad’s the Pakistani Pakistani government government officials officials to to support support the the Taliban Taliban to Islamabad’s 59 strategic interests. interests.59 strategic In this context, Pakistan mainly In this context, Pakistan mainly relied relied on on the the Afghan Afghan Taliban Taliban to to protect protect its its geogeo strategic interest in the region. General Musharraf acknowledged in an interview strategic interest in the region. General Musharraf acknowledged in an interview with The Guardian: with The Guardian: The the Taliban because Karzai’s was The ISI ISI cultivated cultivated the Taliban after after 2001 2001 because Karzai’s government government was dominated by non-Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group, and officials dominated by non-Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group, and officials who thought to favor India. for some who were were thought to favor India. Obviously Obviously we we were were looking looking for some groups groups

120 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali to Pakistan. That the intelligence to counter counter this this Indian Indian action action against against Pakistan. That is is where where the intelligence work comes in. Intelligence being in contact with Taliban groups. work comes in. Intelligence being in contact with Taliban groups. Definitely Definitely they be.60 they were were in in contact, contact, and and they they should should be.60 A journalist and Rashid, A prominent prominent journalist and aa close close observer observer of of Afghanistan, Afghanistan, Ahmed Ahmed Rashid, argued that Pakistan considered the Taliban to be the best bet against the converargued that Pakistan considered the Taliban to be the best bet against the conver gence the Northern Northern Alliance gence of of India India and and Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s interests interests during during the Alliance rule rule in in the the 61 post 9/11 period. Pakistan’s support to the Taliban primarily aimed at countering post 9/11 period.61 Pakistan’s support to the Taliban primarily aimed at countering growing presence and growing Indian Indian presence and influence influence in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. General General McChrystal McChrystal in in his September2009 report revealed Pakistan’s anxiety over Indian presence in his September 2009 report revealed Pakistan’s anxiety over Indian presence in Afghanistan the possible He stated: Afghanistan and and the possible negative negative impact impact over over the the region. region. He stated: Indian is increasing Indian political political and and economic economic influence influence is increasing in in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, includinclud ing significant development efforts and financial investment. ing significant development efforts and financial investment. In In addition, addition, the perceived by by Islamabad be pro-Indian. pro-Indian. the current current Afghan Afghan government government is is perceived Islamabad to to be While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian Indian influence to exacerbate tensions and influence in in Afghanistan Afghanistan is is likely likely to exacerbate regional regional tensions and encourencour 62 age age Pakistani Pakistani countermeasures countermeasures in in Afghanistan Afghanistan or or India. India.62 Pakistan in think of presence on both Pakistan in no no stretch stretch of of imagination imagination could could think of an an Indian Indian presence on both its borders. Hasan Hasan Askari Rizvi, aa Pakistani Pakistani foreign policy its eastern eastern and and western western borders. Askari Rizvi, foreign policy analyst, fought three three wars wars with analyst, said, said, “Pakistan, “Pakistan, which which has has fought with India, India, was was worried worried over over India’s which borders borders Pakistani territory” and India’s growing growing influence influence in in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, which Pakistani territory” and aa “growing for Pakistan.”63 Pakistan.”63 “growing influence influence of of India India in in Afghanistan Afghanistan creates creates problems problems for Therefore, Pakistan would be able tolerate India Therefore, Pakistan would never never be able to to tolerate India gaining gaining considerable considerable influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan felt being marginalized by the growing influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan felt being marginalized by the growing IndoIndo64 US political, military US relations relations in in political, military and and economic economic spheres. spheres.64 This Pakistan’s reluctance take This context context provides provides aa clear clear understating understating of of Pakistan’s reluctance to to take decisive actions against the Taliban, even though Pakistan was a US ally against decisive actions against the Taliban, even though Pakistan was a US ally against the war on freely admit that the war on terror. terror. Stephen Stephen P. P. Cohen Cohen noted, noted, “Pakistani “Pakistani officials officials freely admit that their main concerns in Afghanistan are Indian penetration (which would mean their main concerns in Afghanistan are Indian penetration (which would mean encirclement President Hamid encirclement for for Islamabad) Islamabad) and and Afghan Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s Karzai’s dependence dependence on New Delhi” adding further, “Given this strategic compulsion, on New Delhi” adding further, “Given this strategic compulsion, it it is is not not sursur prising that Pakistan tolerates, if it does not directly support, the Taliban; prising that Pakistan tolerates, if it does not directly support, the Taliban; it it has has 65 no than this Many no other other instrument instrument available available to to it it than this Pashtun Pashtun tribal tribal hammer.” hammer.”65 Many analysts that Pakistan’s was mainly analysts concurred concurred that Pakistan’s continued continued support support to to the the Taliban Taliban was mainly 66 motivated by its strategic calculations about India. According to motivated by its strategic calculations about India.66 According to an an analyst, analyst, “Pakistan’s fears are to develop “Pakistan’s fears are quite quite genuine. genuine. India’s India’s attempt attempt to develop its its influence influence in in Afghanistan is aimed at isolating Pakistan politically, diplomatically, Afghanistan is aimed at isolating Pakistan politically, diplomatically, and and milimili67 tarily.” Kabul increasing tarily.”67 Kabul increasing reliance reliance and and dependence dependence on on India India served served as as aa stumstum bling block in the way of cordial relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. bling block in the way of cordial relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Under the Taliban Under these these strategic strategic compulsions, compulsions, Islamabad Islamabad could could not not go go against against the Taliban forces, who have primarily represented the Pashtuns in Afghanistan sympathetic forces, who have primarily represented the Pashtuns in Afghanistan sympathetic 68 to Pakistan. Pakistan.68 to

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Pakistan’s Approach Towards the Current US–Taliban Peace Process In the late 2000s, the western interests in Afghanistan faded away, and they were looking for an exit strategy from Afghanistan. The United States was looking for a political settlement and reconciliation among Afghan warring groups, including the Afghan Taliban. In January2009, General David Petraeus suggested that “it’s not possible to solve the challenges internal to Afghanistan without addressing the challenges, especially in terms of security, with Afghanistan’s neighbours. Aregional approach is required.” Since then, the rhetoric of a regional approach has been articulated to find a peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict in the postNATO situation.69 In November2010, the NATO member countries signed a truce to handover the security of Afghanistan to Afghan national forces by the end of 2014. In June2011, President Obama also announced the US exit strategy to gradually withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Moreover, Obama confirmed the preliminary peace talks with the Afghan Taliban leadership.70 Since then, there was growing interest and competition among regional stakeholders in the endgame of Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to have a stable and peaceful Afghanistan with a pro-Islamabad government in Kabul after the US withdrawal. More specifically, Islamabad does not want an Afghan government that is closer to India. In addition to this, the Afghan High Peace Council presented a roadmap for the peace process in which five goals were planned in November2012: (1) the Taliban and other insurgent groups would renounce violence, including cutting ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups; (2) all insurgent groups would be converted into legitimate political groups; (3) these groups would recognize and operate within the boundaries of the Afghan constitution; (4) all disarmed and demobilized groups would be reintegrated into Afghanistan’s political space and co-exist with one another, where they could vie for political power in a peaceful manner through elections; and (5) the Afghan National Security Forces would be the sole legitimate security organ of the state, responsible for protecting Afghans and providing security for the country against internal and external threats.71 In this context, Pakistan saw an opportunity to have a greater role in the political settlement of Afghanistan by facilitating the reconciliation process with the Afghan Taliban on which Islamabad has mainly relied to protect its strategic interests despite international pressure in post-9/11.72 According to General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, “Pakistan sees the Taliban not as potential conquerors of Afghanistan but more of an anti-Indian asset in a post-NATO world.”73 Admiral Mike Mullen said that “Pakistan’s long-term goal was to use the Taliban as a ‘hedge’ to redress imbalance in regional power.”74 This meant that reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban has increased Islamabad’s relevance in the future government

122 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali in Kabul, whereas the role of India has decreased despite its billions of dollars investment in developmental projects and cooperation on security. More specifically, “any power-sharing arrangement accompanying a peace deal with Afghan Taliban would likely align with Pakistan’s vision of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan i.e. a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan.”75 After the US announcement of its exit strategy in 2011, there has been a shift in Pakistan’s approach to have a stable Afghanistan after the international forces left the country. Actually, Pakistan has experienced a severe blowback in the form of religious militancy and extremism due to its proxy wars in Afghanistan.76 As a result, a dangerous nexus emerged among Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Central Asian militant groups in the former FATA that has largely destabilized the northern part of Pakistan on the Pak–Afghan border areas.77 Therefore, there has been a realization in the Pakistani strategic circles that it is in the best interest of Pakistan to have a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. According to former KP Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti, “stability in KP and FATA is closely linked to stability in Afghanistan.” Since then, Pakistan has showed greater interests in the peace process in Afghanistan. During Afghan High Peace Council’s visit to Pakistan in 2012, Pakistan released nine Afghan Taliban leaders and handed over to Afghanistan, which was an old demand of the Afghan government. This initiative was appreciated by both Afghan officials and western diplomats based in Kabul. They believed that it would help in reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban to find a political settlement of the decade-long insurgency in the country. It was also seen as a shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan and a step towards a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. Salahuddin Rabbani, the Head of the Peace Council, called the Afghan Taliban release as a breakthrough in the reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban.78 Additionally, Pakistan has been blamed for all the wrongdoings by NATO forces in Afghanistan and failure of the Afghan government to establish its order in the country. Many saw Pakistan’s role as a spoiler that has severely affected Pakistan’s image in Afghanistan. Islamabad believed that its active role in the peace process and political settlement would improve its image both in Kabul and at international levels. Furthermore, China has been investing in its Belt and Road Initiative in which Pakistan is seeing a greater role due to its key geographic position which can connect energy-rich Central Asia, Afghanistan and Middle East. Nonetheless, stability in Afghanistan is a key for the Chinese initiative. In this scenario, Pakistan has played an active role in the reconciliation process to bring the Afghan Taliban into the negotiating table. Pakistan has hosted the peace talks with the Afghan Taliban and participated in other regional initiatives by China, Saudi Arab, Qatar and Russia to find a political settlement in the war-torn country. In October2018, Pakistan released Taliban central leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on the request of the government of Qatar to facilitate the US–Taliban direct peace talks in Doha where the Taliban political office is based.79 Mullah Baradar has played a significant part in the recently concluded peace talks between the United States and Afghan Taliban.

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In the United United States In February2020, February 2020, the States and and Afghan Afghan Taliban Taliban signed signed aa historical historical truce in Doha for bringing peace to Afghanistan after 18years truce in Doha for bringing peace to Afghanistan after 18 years of of conflict. conflict. The The United within 14 United States States and and its its allies allies have have agreed agreed “to “to withdraw withdraw all all troops troops within 14 months months if uphold the the deal.” President Trump been aa long if the the militants militants uphold deal.” President Trump said, said, “it “it had had been long and and hard journey in Afghanistan. It’s time after all these years to bring our people back hard journey in Afghanistan. It’s time after all these years to bring our people back 80 home.” This truce was was the home.”80 This peace peace truce the result result of of 14-month 14-month long long negotiating negotiating process process brokered and facilitated by Pakistan. It is important to note that Pakistan’s efforts brokered and facilitated by Pakistan. It is important to note that Pakistan’s efforts are by the United States are appreciated appreciated by the United States and and Western Western officials officials and and diplomats. diplomats. Nonetheless, the US–Taliban truce is which has brought Nonetheless, the US-Taliban truce is aa setback setback to to India, India, which has brought the Afghan Taliban at the centre of the future government in Afghanistan. the Afghan Taliban at the centre of the future government in Afghanistan. It It is is aa win of the Pakistani strategists to have a greater role in the political settlement win of the Pakistani strategists to have a greater role in the political settlement of before, India been sceptical of Afghanistan. Afghanistan. As As mentioned mentioned before, India has has always always been sceptical about about the the Afghan Taliban due to its close association with Pakistan. Subsequently, Afghan Taliban due to its close association with Pakistan. Subsequently, New New Delhi forces in to neutralize Delhi has has supported supported anti-Taliban anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan Afghanistan to neutralize or or isolate isolate the Taliban’s role in Afghanistan. The United States has also requested to the Taliban’s role in Afghanistan. The United States has also requested India India to support the US-Taliban US–Taliban deal support the deal and and start start negotiation negotiation with with the the Afghan Afghan Taliban. Taliban. To To neutralize the growing Pakistan in neutralize the growing role role of of Pakistan in Afghanistan, Afghanistan, Indian Indian leadership leadership may may reach out to the Afghan Taliban and establish a relationship with the outfit in reach out to the Afghan Taliban and establish a relationship with the outfit in 81 future. future.81 After the US—Afghan US—Afghan Taliban Biden After the Taliban truce, truce, the the newly newly US US elected elected President President Biden 82 announced that they will complete their mission in Afghanistan by August2021. announced that they will complete their mission in Afghanistan by August 2021.82 This means that Biden continued former President Trump’s policy towards This means that Biden continued former President Trump’s policy towards Afghanistan withdrew all US forces from Afghanistan by August2021. Afghanistan and and withdrew all US forces from Afghanistan by August 2021. The The Afghan Taliban termed it their victory against 20years US occupation Afghan Taliban termed it their victory against 20 years US occupation that that had had 83 started the post-9/11. started in in the post-9/11.83 Nonetheless, the victory victory of the Afghan will have Nonetheless, the of the Afghan Taliban Taliban will have negative negative fallout fallout on on Pakistan’s peace and security. Many radical groups in Pakistan will take Pakistan’s peace and security. Many radical groups in Pakistan will take inspirainspira tion which will to extremism tion from from the the Afghan Afghan Taliban Taliban which will lead lead to extremism and and radicalization radicalization in in the country. Also, a new influx of Afghan refugees will arrive Pakistan due the country. Also, a new influx of Afghan refugees will arrive to to Pakistan due to to humanitarian humanitarian crisis crisis in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan. More More importantly, importantly, many many anti-Pakistan anti-Pakistan eleele ments such as Pakistani Taliban based in Afghanistan have increased their terror terror ments such as Pakistani Taliban based in Afghanistan have increased their attacks Pakistani security forces in the former former tribal the Durand attacks on on Pakistani security forces in the tribal areas areas along along the Durand 84 Line. Line.84 In regional stakeholders to fill fill the by the In addition, addition, many many regional stakeholders will will try try to the vacuum vacuum left left by the United States in Afghanistan. India has reluctantly started to reach out to the United States in Afghanistan. India has reluctantly started to reach out to the Afghan Afghan Taliban Taliban in in Doha Doha in in September2020 September 2020 despite despite its its official official stance stance to to support support the primary objective protect its the Afghan Afghan government. government. The The primary objective of of India India is is to to protect its secusecu rity interests and investment in Afghanistan. More specifically, India wants that rity interests and investment in Afghanistan. More specifically, India wants that Afghanistan become aa major by harbouring KashmirAfghanistan would would not not become major security security concern concern by harbouring Kashmirbased militant Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.85 In based militant groups groups such such as as Jaish-e-Mohammed Jaish-e-Mohammed and and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.85 In addition, India believes that the US dependency on Pakistan will be be reduced addition, India believes that the US dependency on Pakistan will reduced folfol lowing which will provide her fill the the vacuum lowing its its withdrawal withdrawal which will provide her an an opportunity opportunity to to fill vacuum in Afghanistan by cooperating with the United States. India could use its in Afghanistan by cooperating with the United States. India could also also use its regional diplomacy by engaging Iran with the United States on the question regional diplomacy by engaging Iran with the United States on the question of of 86 Afghanistan.86 Afghanistan.

124 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali To up, Afghanistan will remain for To sum sum up, Afghanistan will remain aa major major source source of of security security concern concern for Pakistan despite the Afghan Taliban advancement in the country. In fact, the TaliPakistan despite the Afghan Taliban advancement in the country. In fact, the Tali ban takeover would create ban takeover of of Afghanistan Afghanistan would create security security concerns concerns as as extremism extremism and and Taliban militancy will spill over to the Pakistan’s western border areas KP and Taliban militancy will spill over to the Pakistan’s western border areas in in KP and Balochistan More importantly, Balochistan provinces. provinces. More importantly, India–US India-US cooperation cooperation in in Afghanistan Afghanistan would problems for Pakistan’s strategic would create create further further security security problems for Pakistan’s strategic and and regional regional interinter ests following the US drawdown from Afghanistan. ests following the US drawdown from Afghanistan.

Conclusion Conclusion Pakistan been accused providing safe to the Pakistan has has long long been accused of of providing safe havens havens to the Afghan Afghan Taliban Taliban from the international particular from playing litfrom the international community, community, in in particular from Washington, Washington, and and playing lit tle or conflicted role in the War on Terror as an ally of the United States. However, tle or conflicted role in the War on Terror as an ally of the United States. However, the the United United States States did did not not acknowledge acknowledge for for long long its its own own mistakes mistakes of of undermining undermining Pakistan’s mainly India-centric security interests which compromised Pakistan’s mainly India-centric security interests which compromised its its perforperfor mance against the War on Terror. However, recently, the US interests pulling mance against the War on Terror. However, recently, the US interests in in pulling out from Afghanistan with the provided out from Afghanistan and and initiating initiating dialogues dialogues with the Afghan Afghan Taliban Taliban provided an opportunity to Pakistan to secure its strategic interests. This opportunity an opportunity to Pakistan to secure its strategic interests. This opportunity has has not been unattended unattended so from the Pakistan played not been so far. far. This This is is evident evident from the fact fact that that Pakistan played an an active fair share However, there there is active role role for for aa fair share of of the the Taliban Taliban in in new new political political setup. setup. However, is possible blowback on Pakistan in the form possible blowback on Pakistan in the form of of extremism extremism and and radicalization radicalization in in the the case taking over Kabul. case of of the the Taliban Taliban taking over Kabul.

Notes Notes 1 S. S. M. Burke, Mainsprings ofIndian and Pakistani (Karachi: Oxford Oxford 1 M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Foreign Policies Policies (Karachi: University Press, 1975), 1975), 22. 22. University Press, 2 C. C. Christine Christine Fair, to the the End: The Pakistan Way of of War War (New (New York: York: 2 Fair, Fighting Fighting to End: The Pakistan Army’ Army’ss Way Oxford University University Press, Press, 2014). Oxford 2014). 3 Howard “The Balancing in Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Foreign Foreign Policy,” in Pakistan: 3 Howard Wriggins, Wriggins, “The Balancing Process Process in Policy,” in Pakistan: The Long View, ed. ed. Lawrence Ziring (Durham, (Durham, NC: University Press, 1977), The Long View, Lawrence Ziring NC: Duke Duke University Press, 1977), 303-4. 303–4. 4 Richard Sisson and and Leo Leo Rose, War and and the the Creation Creation of of 4 Richard Sisson Rose, War and Secession: Secession: Pakistan, Pakistan, India India and Bangladesh (Karachi: Oxford Oxford University Press, 1992), 1992), 35. 35. Bangladesh (Karachi: University Press, 5 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Rifaat Hussain, “The “The India-Pakistan Peace Process,” & Security 22, 6 Rifaat Hussain, India-Pakistan Peace Process,” Defense Defense& Security Analysis Analysis 22, no. (2006): 410. no. 44 (2006): 410. 7 Rashid Khan, “Pakistan-India “Pakistan-India Peace Process: An 7 Rashid Ahmad Ahmad Khan, Peace Process: An Assessment,” Assessment,” IPRI IPRI Journal Journal IX, (Winter 2009): 90. IX, no. no. 11 (Winter 2009): 90. 8 Ibid., 91. 8 Ibid., 91. 9 John John Thomson, Thomson, “Kashmir: “Kashmir: The The Most Dangerous Place Place in in the the World,” World,” in in Kashmir: 9 Most Dangerous Kashmir: New New Voices, New ed. W. S. Sidhu Sidhu (New (New Delhi: Viva Books Books Private Private Ltd., Ltd., Voices, New Approaches, Approaches, ed. W. P. P. S. Delhi: Viva 2007), 188. 2007), 188. 10 “India “India Has Reached Limit of Tolerance-Vajpayee,”Reuters, Tolerance-Vajpayee,”Reuters, December16, December 16, 2001. 10 Has Reached Limit of 2001. 11 Atul “India Recalls Recalls Envoy to Pak,” Pak,” The The Hindu, December 22, 2001. 2001. 11 Atul Aneja, Aneja, “India Envoy to Hindu, December22, 12 “India “India Has Reached Limit of TOLERANCE-VAJPAYEE.” TOLERANCE-VAJPAYEE.” 12 Has Reached Limit of 13 “Pakistani “Pakistani Daily Troops on on High High Alert Border,” BBC 13 Daily Reports Reports Troops Alert Along Along Indian Indian Border,” BBC Monitoring Monitoring South December 15, 2001. South Asia, Asia, December15, 2001.

Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 125 14 Anton La Guardia, “We Do Not Want a War, Says Pakistan,” The Daily Telegraph, December29, 2001. 15 “The Pressure Rises in Pakistan,” New York Times, December20, 2001; John F. Burns, “Pakistan Is Said to Order an End to Support for Militant Groups,” New York Times, January2, 2002. 16 Text of the speech is available at the official web site of the government of Pakistan, accessed November3, 2010, www.infopak.gov.pk. 17 Luv Puri, “Be Ready for Decisive Battle, PM Tells Jawans,” The Hindu, May23, 2002. 18 Ibid. 19 Hussain, “The India-Pakistan Peace Process,” 411. 20 Syed Nadzri, “Musharaf– Threat of Full-Scale India–Pakistan War Has Diminished,” New Straits Times, June8, 2002. 21 Ishtaiq Ahmad, “Securing Peace in South Asia,” Pakistan Vision 8, no. 2 (2007): 67. 22 “India to Appoint High Commissioner, Restore Air Links to Pakistan,” The Hindu, May3, 2003. 23 Qudssia Akhlaque, “Dialogue to Start Next Month: Joint Statement on Musharaf– Vajpayee Meeting,” Dawn, January7, 2004. 24 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “The Futute of India-Pakistan Peace Process Amid the War on Terror in Afghanistan,” IPRI Journal VII, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 56. 25 Sydney J Freedberg Jr, “The Kabul- New Delhi Axis,” National Journal 39, no. 19 (May12, 2007): 60. 26 As cited in Qadar Bakhsh Baloch and Abdul Hafeez Khan Niazi, “Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: ANew Imperialism in the Making,” The Dialogue III, no. 1 (2008): 17. 27 Perveen Swami, “The Terror Trajectory,” Frontline 18, no. 21 (October13–26, 2001). 28 “Jaswant Support to NA,” Times of India, October3, 2001. 29 Christine C. Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (April2009): 159. 30 Shah Imran Ahmed, “News Analysis: Indian Prime Minister’s Visit Promotes IndoAfghan Ties,” Xinhua News Agency, August30, 2005. 31 Stephen Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 2 (2003): 142. 32 Scott Baldauf, “India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor 95, no. 202 (September12, 2003): 2. 33 Baloch and Niazi, “Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan,” 17. 34 As cited in R. G. Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow: The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Alliance and the War in Afghanistan,” Asian Affairs: An American Review (2007): 164. 35 Sudha Ramachandran, “In Afghanistan, Pakistan's loss is India's gain,” Asia Times, February01, 2002. 36 Nirmala George, “Afghanistan Turns to India for Advice,” Associated Press, January16, 2002. 37 “President Musharaf’s Address to the Nation,” The News, September20, 2001. 38 Praveen Swami, “Covert Contestation,” Frontline 22, no. 19 (September10–23, 2005), accessed July25, 2010, www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2219/stories/2005092 3004503000.htm. 39 Mubashir Zaidi, “The Loss of Strategic Depth Can Be Attributed to the Unholy Shadow of the Foreign Office-Former ISI Chief, Hameed Gul,” Herald, December2001. 40 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 2000), 335. 41 Ibid. 42 As cited in Hussain, “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan: Continuity and Change,” 5. 43 Ibid.

126 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali 44 Fair, “Time for Sober Realism,” 159. 45 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), 68. 46 “India, Afghanistan and Pakistan in Between,” The Washington Times, September4, 2005. 47 J. N. Raina, “Is India Benign Role in Afghanistan Anti-Pakistan,” Asian Tribune 19, no. 266 (July27, 2008), accessed December19, 2009, http://asiantribune.com/ node/12407. 48 “Afghan Paper Rejects Pakistani Allegations on Terrorist Camps,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, October22, 2003. 49 Baldauf, “India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan,” 2. 50 Ibid. 51 Shaiq Hussain, “Pakistan to Ask India to Rein in Afghan Consulates,” Nation (Lahore), March18, 2006. 52 Jam Muhammad Yousaf, Balochistan CM Statement. See Herald (Karachi, Pakistan), September, 2004. 53 “Arms Supply to Bugti, Baloch Rebels to Be Taken Up with India, Afghanistan, Says Tariq Azeem,” Pakistan Press International Information Services, September05, 2006. 54 Pakistan Openly Accuses India, “Afghanistan of Supporting Secession Movement in Balochistan,” United News of Bangladesh, April23, 2009. 55 “Pakistan Interior Adviser Says India, Afghanistan Behind Baluch Unrest,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, April24, 2009. 56 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 156–57. 57 M. G. Weinbaum and J. B. Harder, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policies and Their Consequence,” Contemporary South Asia 16, no. 1 (2008): 36–37. 58 Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, “U.S. May Start Pulling Out of Afghanistan Next Spring,” New York Times, September14, 2005. 59 Gregory Treverton and Seth Jones, Measuring National Power (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 18. 60 “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s Backing for ‘Proxies’ in Afghanistan Must Stop,” The Guardian, February13, 2015, accessed October12, 2017, www. theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-proxies-afgha nistan-ghani-taliban. 61 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 86–87. 62 As cited in Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan’s Strategic Interests, Afghanistan and the Fluctuating U.S. Strategy,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (Fall–Winter 2009): 153. 63 Kamal Zaheer, “Karzai in India to Boost Ties, Pakistan Wary,” Reuters, April9, 2006. 64 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Era,” Carnegie Papers no. 72, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October2006), 12. 65 Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow,” 166. 66 Fair, “Time for Sober Realism,” 160. 67 Ibid., 159. 68 Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow,” 166. 69 Nishank Motwani and Srinjoy Bose, “Afghanistan: ‘Spoilers’ in the Regional Security Context,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 3 (2015): 269. 70 CFR report, The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999–2020, www.cfr.org/timeline/uswar-afghanistan. 71 Motwani and Bose, “Afghanistan,” 268. 72 Arshad Ali, “Endgame in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s New Approach, RSIS Commentaries,” RSIS, Singapore, No. 230/2012, www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1790-theendgame-in-afghanistan-pa/#.XYByYigzY2w.

Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 127 73 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2014), 189. 74 Ibid., 261. 75 Madiha Afzal, “Will the Afghan Peace Process Be Pakistan’s Road to Redemption?” Blog, Brookings, June25, 2020, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/25/ will-the-afghan-peace-process-be-pakistans-road-to-redemption/. 76 Michael Hughes, “Afghanistan’s Troika of Instability: Political Illegitimacy, StateBuilding and Pakistani Realolitik,” AMaster Degree Thesis Submitted to Johns Hopkins University, May2016, 95. 77 Zahid Hussain, “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: ARegional Perspective,” CIDOB Policy Research Paper (2011): 8. 78 Ali, “Endgame in Afghanistan.” 79 “Afghan Taliban Founder Mullah Baradar ‘Released’ by Pakistan,” Aljazeera, October25, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/afghan-taliban-founder-mullah-bara dar-released-pakistan-181025093128441.html. 80 “Afghan Conflict: US and Taliban Sign Deal to End 18-Year War,” BBC Report, February29, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443. 81 Umair Jamal, “Understanding Pakistan’s Take on India-Taliban Talks,” The Diplomat, May23, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/understanding-pakistans-take-onindia-taliban-talks/. 82 Zeke Miller and Aamer Madhani, “Biden Says U.S. War in Afghanistan Will End August31,” The Diplomat, July9, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/bidensays-u-s-war-in-afghanistan-will-end-august-31/. 83 “US completes Afghanistan withdrawal as final flight leaves Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August 30, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/30/us-completes-afghanistan-with drawal-as-final-flight-leaves-kabul. 84 Zahid Hussain, “The Demons of Conflict,” Dawn, Pakistan, July7, 2021 www.dawn. com/news/1633636/the-demons-of-conflict. 85 Abdul Basit, “Why Did India open a Backchannel to the Taliban?” Al-Jazeera, July 7, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/7/7/why-did-india-open-a-backchannelto-the-taliban. 86 Raja Mohin, “India Resists the Taliban Bandwagon,” Foreign Affairs, July25, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/25/india-afghanistan-taliban-blinken-jaishankarmodi-meeting-new-delhi-geopolitics-regional-order/.

8 Geopolitics, the Thucydides Trap, and the China– Pakistan–India Trilateral Rizwan Zeb

Introduction Of late, India is being projected as an emerging power house. Since the end of the Cold War and especially since the 1998 nuclear tests, New Delhi and Washington have forged a strong relationship.1 Jeffrey Garten included India in the list of ten emerging markets,2 it is one of the 17 middle powers as per Carsten Holbraad’s list,3 and Paul Kennedy et al. believe that India is one of the nine pivotal states of the world.4 At present, India is a close ally of the United States in the region and is projected by Washington as a balancer to the rising Chinese power in the region. Emphasizing this point, Condoleezza Rice, former American Secretary of State, argued that while India is not a great power at present, it has the potential to be one and that India would play a significant role in balancing China.5 American strategic planners envisage a role for India in monitoring and policing in the arc stretching from Aden, Singapore to Central Asia.6 Anumber of Indian strategic thinkers have stressed the need for India to work out its own Monroe Doctrine.7 In 2005, the United States and India signed a defense agreement. Within months, in March2006, both signed a nuclear cooperation agreement.8 The way Washington manipulated international and proliferation laws and regulations to accommodate India by doing a nuclear partnership deal with New Delhi, growing Indo-US strategic partnership, and the recent name change of Pacific command to the Indo-Pacific command are indications of Washington’s confidence in New Delhi’s ability as its strategic ally and to do its bidding in and around the region. At the same time, the challenge of a rising China is getting stronger and stronger for Washington. As the don of American strategic community Henry Kissinger has prophesized that a Sino-US clash is inevitable, one could argue that the Sino-US confrontation could be delayed but cannot be postponed. Not unless the geo-strategic prism through which both countries view each other is changed. The biggest lesson one can learn from Thucydides is that whenever an existing great power feels threatened to be displaced by an emerging one, it would result in a war.9 This logic is at play when it comes to US–China relations. In this coming clash, South Asia would play the most pivotal role. Apparently, both the United States and China have already picked their partners in this theatre: India for the United States and Pakistan for China. And herein lies a dilemma for New DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-10

The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 129 Delhi. Both China whereas the the United United Delhi. Both China and and Pakistan Pakistan are are its its immediate immediate neighbors, neighbors, whereas States is not. And its love hate relationship with China is operating under the States is not. And its love hate relationship with China is operating under the same same Thucydidesian far would US–India Thucydidesian logic. logic. At At the the same same time, time, it it is is not not clear clear how how far would the the US-India relations Delhi’s ambition far greater for it to relations converge converge as as New New Delhi’s ambition and and aspiration aspiration are are far greater for it to be content with the role of a deputy to the sheriff. be content with the role of a deputy to the sheriff. Historically, were regional Historically, all all great great powers powers were regional hegemon hegemon and and had had aa dominant dominant posiposi tion in their immediate neighborhood: neighborhood: India India is is neither. neither. At At present, present, it it has has problem tion in their immediate problematic with all atic relationship relationship with all of of its its South South Asian Asian neighbors. neighbors. Its Its standing standing in in the the region region could be gauged from the fact that Nepal, which is smaller and heavily could be gauged from the fact that Nepal, which is smaller and heavily reliant reliant on on India, New Delhi Delhi of territory. The Nepalese India, openly openly accused accused New of encroaching encroaching into into its its territory. The Nepalese 10 parliament parliament passed passed aa new new map map including including the the disputed disputed Indian Indian territories. territories.10 Pakistan, India’s proverbial twin, continues to have problematic relations Pakistan, India’s proverbial twin, continues to have problematic relations with with India. Despite being being militarily weak especially the conventional balIndia. Despite militarily weak especially in in the conventional military military bal ance, Pakistan has a demonstrated capability to maintain balance with India ance, Pakistan has a demonstrated capability to maintain balance with India and and arguably biggest impediment to its the region. arguably is is the the biggest impediment to its hegemonic hegemonic designs designs in in the region. With by virtue virtue of With the the rise rise of of its its military military might might and and global global standing standing by of US US support, support, beaming with confidence, New Delhi on more than one occasion boasted beaming with confidence, New Delhi on more than one occasion boasted of of its its capability of being able to militarily engage both China and Pakistan and achieve capability of being able to militarily engage both China and Pakistan and achieve its war preparedness preparedness planning planning is well known its objectives. objectives. India’s India’s two-front two-front war is too too well known to to the South Asia watchers. Few in India would go as far as to claim that the South Asia watchers. Few in India would go as far as to claim that India India is is fully trained, and fight aa 2 + 1 fully equipped, equipped, trained, and prepared prepared to to fight 2 + 1 (China, (China, Pakistan, Pakistan, and and the the Kashmiri freedom freedom fighters) war.11 Kashmiri fighters) war.11 This chapter overviews the This chapter overviews the recent recent developments developments in in Indo-China Indo-China relations relations and and Indo-Pakistan relations with a particular focus on the recent Indian military Indo-Pakistan relations with a particular focus on the recent Indian military concon frontations with Pakistan after frontations with China China in in the the Galwan Galwan Valley Valley in in June2020 June 2020 and and with with Pakistan after the Pulwama/ Balakot strikes in February2019 in which India claimed to have the Pulwama/ Balakot strikes in February 2019 in which India claimed to have 12 targeted training camp. This used targeted aa Jaish-e-Mohammed Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) (JeM) training camp.12 This overview overview is is then then used to critically examine India’s two-frontal war argument. to critically examine India’s two-frontal war argument. The three major parts: part part one The chapter chapter is is divided divided into into three major parts: one examines examines Indo-China Indo-China relations historically followed by the details regarding the fatal relations historically followed by the details regarding the fatal Galwan Galwan confrontaconfronta tion. tion. The The second second part part critically critically evaluates evaluates Indo-Pak Indo-Pak relations relations and and the the developments developments that the Pulwama/Balakot Pulwama/Balakot crisis. final section that led led to to and and during during the crisis. The The third third and and final section provides a critical analysis of this trilateral relationship with a particular provides a critical analysis of this trilateral relationship with a particular focus focus on on India’s India’s two-frontal two-frontal war war argument. argument.

Sino-India Hindi-Chini bhai Sino-India Relations: Relations: From From Hindi-Chini bhai bhai bhai to to Galwan Galwan Clash Clash India being friendly the 1950s when Nehru India and and China China started started off off as as being friendly states states during during the 1950s when Nehru was championing the non-aligned movement. Nehru’s socialist leanings was championing the non-aligned movement. Nehru’s socialist leanings and and belief that to play play aa major brought India belief that India India is is destined destined to major role role at at the the global global level level brought India and the time the Hindi-Chini Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai Bhai-Bhai (Indians and China China closer. closer. It It was was the time of of the (Indians and and ChiChi nese are brothers) and the Panjsheela (five principles of peaceful coexistence). nese are brothers) and the Panjsheela (five principles of peaceful coexistence). However, However, the the romance romance remained remained short short lived lived and and soon soon resulted resulted in in active active hostility hostility between the two countries which resulted in a border war in which was between the two countries which resulted in a border war in which India India was

130 Rizwan Zeb militarily humiliated by the Chinese army. Nehru never recovered from this. SinoIndian disagreement on the border demarcation was not new, but it was India’s socalled forward or aggressive policy that resulted in building army posts that led to border clashes. This border clash resulted in what is now called the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that is till today the border between the two countries. However, when Deng Xiaoping took over, China moderated its stance toward South Asia. Since then, India–China relations have improved a lot. Since the end of the Cold War, their relationship has further improved. The 1990s in particular had a promising start. Both sides signed an agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in 1993.13 The agreement signaled their resolve to move beyond the border issue. In 1996, both countries signed an agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas. As per the agreement, both sides agreed that those manning the border were not allowed to carry guns.14 By the turn of the century, the Chinese policy toward India was based on the following four considerations:15 1

The first and foremost compelling factor is the linkage between China’s strategic goals and foreign policy objectives. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) set the three tasks of modernization, national reunification, and safeguarding world peace while pursuing common development in the unipolar world dominated by the United States. For its economic development, as Premier Wen Jiabao put it, it needed stability around China. Peace in the periphery, especially normalization of ties with India became China’s top priority. 2 The second factor concerns the overall need felt by Beijing to respond to the perceived US regional strategy to contain China with the objective of constraining its rise. Growing US–India relations were viewed as being reminiscent to the US Cold War era strategy of containing the Soviet Union. By economically engaging India, China wanted to attract India toward its orbit. 3 The third factor pertains to the relevance of improvement in Sino-South Asian relations to New Delhi’s ties with East and South-East Asian nations. These states are important for China in terms of strategy, trade, markets, and resources. 4 Since 1994, the PRC became a net importer of oil. China, currently, imports one-third of its oil supplies, which account for as much as 7 per cent of the world oil demand at 5.46million barrels a day. India, on the other hand, imports as much as two-third of its oil needs, consuming about 2million barrels a day– which could increase to 7.4million barrels a day by 2025. Stability in relations with India, an Indian Ocean power, seems to give an assurance to China in the matter of security of oil transportation, considering the fact that the latter imports 50percent of its oil needs from the Middle East via the Indian Ocean, and 80 per cent of its total imports pass close to India’s southern coast through the Strait of Malacca.

The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 131 At present, there are a number of issues on which Sino-Indian interests converge such as terrorism and environmental degradation.16 Currently, India’s biggest trading partner is China.17 The figures for the year 2019 are telling. While India exported US$17.8billion worth of material to China, Chinese exports to India were worth US$74billion.18 At the same time, tension was brewing up for a while. For instance, India termed China as the primary factor behind its nuclear tests in May1998.19 Since the improvement of relations between the United States and India and the signing of the strategic partnership between the two, the fault lines between India and China became wider and glaring. However, one should ignore the fact that despite sharing short to medium term economic interests, both India and China view each other as long term rivals. Since its second nuclear tests in 1998 and seeking American alliance, India has been quite vocal about this fact. It is projecting itself as a balancer to the rising influence of China and that China is its major military rival and threat. General K. V. Krishna Rao, a former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, stated, “China is the real enemy not Pakistan. We are capable of finishing Pakistan with ease.” According to analysts, the Indian Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles Agni II, for instance– would primarily target China, though these missiles are also capable of attacking sites in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Central Asia as well as American bases in the Indian Ocean.20 India got more aggressive in its conduct since an ultra-Hindu Narendra Modi took over the helm of affairs in New Delhi after winning the national elections in May2014. The famous 56-inch chest was exclusively for posturing against Pakistan yet since 2017 crisis between the two at Doklam, India was perusing an aggressive policy bordering intentional probing. Several border skirmishes took place between China and India: Depsand in northern Ladakh (2013), Chumar in eastern Ladakh (2014), Doklam on Sino-Bhutan border (2017), and the Galwan (2020) are prime among these.21 Although India was quick to claim victory after the Doklam clash, the incident left several questions unanswered. According to the Indian strategic community, in a future confrontation, China might try to occupy a piece of Indian territory and then use it as a bargaining chip. Driven by this threat perception and overconfidence on its abilities led New Delhi to construct new roads, and it aimed at quick transportation and positioning of troops in the region especially the Darbuk Shyok Daulat Beg Oldie road. Although the changes made in the status of Kashmir were aimed at what in New Delhi is described as addressing the Pakistan problem, it adversely affected the Chinese interest in the region especially as Ladakh’s position was also altered due to the changes made in the Constitution.22 As per the change, Ladakh was made a union territory directly administrated by the center. In the new maps issued by New Delhi, Ladakh and Aksai Chin are shown as Indian territories. India’s strong opposition to China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and active participation in a military alliance against the increasing Chinese influence in the region indicated its

132 Rizwan Zeb confrontational policy. Alongside Australia and Japan, India is a key member in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad.23 Around end of May2020, reports of serious clashes started to appear in the media.24 The views are still divided on how exactly this started; however, how it ended is well documented. The clash that occurred in the Galwan Valley in eastern Ladakh on 15 June left 20 Indian soldiers dead.25 As a result of these clashes, China gained control of territories in the Galwan valley including the Patrol Point 14 and Pangong Tso claimed by India. Through Patrol Point 14, China is in a position to monitor and, if needed be, target an important road leading to Daulat Beg Oldie. This is strategically significant as it has an advance landing facility for C-130s. According to one observer of Sino-India relations, this is significant as China sent clear signals to India. One, we could have done more damage if we had used military-grade weapons; two, how will you (India) respond? India can either get its troops despite its losses to be better prepared with their own lethal rods and clubs or tell them to act as army troops and use weapons. If India does the first, it signals to PLA that it is not prepared to climb up the escalation ladder; if it does the second, PLA still has the advantage of escalation on its side. In other words, it continues to dominate the escalation dynamic, forcing the Indian army to either react to any escalation or stay at the same rung.26 Despite all this, Indian Prime Minister Modi known for his ultra-Hindu racist nationalist fervor simply denied that any such incident has taken place or that Chinese were in control of what used to be Indian territory.27 Astory in New York Times described Modi’s response as “mild, almost careful not to offend China.”28

Blood and Water Cannot Flow Together: India–Pakistan Relations, Pulwama Crisis, and Beyond India and Pakistan’s rivalry is well documented and is considered to be one of the most enduring rivalries in the world. Over the years, both countries have fought wars and attempted to make peace. Although in all such attempts, some progress was made, overall conflicts continued, and with the passage of time, the chances of peace further reduced. Since the nuclearization of India and Pakistan in 1998, both countries went through different trajectories. The Kargil conflict in 1999, just a year later, could be taken as a case that played a major role in it. Unlike Pakistan, India became the focus of global attention as a major power house confirming what one of India’s leading statesmen once said that there were two ways of joining the elite club– nuclear weapons and economic prosperity. The new century witnessed a major crisis between India and Pakistan after an attack on the Indian parliament resulted in a yearlong military standoff 2001–02. Though it ended without any military confrontation, it led to the most recent round of peace process between India and Pakistan. During the Musharraf–Manmohan time, both countries came close to resolving their issues, but certain developments and stiff

The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 133 opposition from the Hawkish elements in India halted and then eliminated this prospect.29 Hindu-nationalist BJP publicly accused Manmohan Singh of compromising Indian national interest by being too soft on Pakistan and A.K. Anthony, the then Defense Minister of India, of being a Pakistani agent. In the 2014 elections, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won and established its government. According to Lisa Curtis, in keeping with its track record and strong criticism of the Congress government’s peace initiative with Pakistan, BJP was clear that there was no chance of any meaningful progress in the peace process under Modi’s rule. Modi was quick to signal that terror and talks would be unacceptable to India.30 At the same time, an invitation was extended to the then Pakistani prime minister to attend his swearing-in ceremony. Nawaz Sharif attended the ceremony and extended an offer of working together for peace in the region. However, it led to nothing. The little progress that was made was stalled after the terror attack on Pathankot, a strategic air base of Indian Air Force (IAF) Western Air Command on January2, 2016. New Delhi, as per the established pattern, instantly pointed toward Pakistan for it and the unilaterally called off the forthcoming meeting between the foreign secretaries of the two countries. Reacting to the incident, Modi stated: “blood and water cannot flow together.”31 His Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar counseled to removing a thorn with a thorn.32 Prime Minister Modi also gave a go-ahead to the Indian Army to what New Delhi termed as the surgical strike.33 New Delhi claimed that Indian Special Forces crossed on to the Pakistani side of the line of control and successfully targeted several hideouts of the Kashmiri freedom fighters. It is still a contested claim. Islamabad strongly denied any such attack took place and arranged the Islamabad-based diplomatic fraternity’s visit to the area. Amore balanced view held by the South Asia watchers around the globe including Indians is that if any such attack did occur, it was not different from the attacks armies of both countries conducted against each other across the line of control (LoC). It is only that unlike in the past when it was left to the forces across the LoC, the Indian Prime Minister opted to use it to prove that his government was tougher than the Congress government toward Pakistan. However, soon after, New Delhi toned down its rhetoric to defuse the situation apparently under intense American friendly persuasion.34 Earlier in March2016, an Indian national Kulbhushan Yadav was arrested by Pakistani security services. It was soon known that Kulbhushan was a serving Commander in the Indian Navy and was stationed in Pakistan as an undercover operative of Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). During the interrogation, it was discovered that Commander Yadav was the mastermind of several subversive activities in the Pakistani provinces of Sindh and Balochistan. Another challenge for Prime Minister Modi surfaced on 14 February2019 that put him in a commitment dilemma. He claimed that India had conducted surgical strikes against Pakistan, and under his government blood and water would not flow together. The surgical strike was aimed at ending the so-called terror problem. It put him in a situation from which he could not retract in the case of another attack. He responded with a surgical strike and if that did not deter, what

134 Rizwan Zeb next February2019, young Kashmiri boy conducted next would would he he do? do? On On 14 14 February 2019, aa young Kashmiri boy conducted aa suisui cide attack against the Indian paramilitary forces’ convoy in the Indian cide attack against the Indian paramilitary forces’ convoy in the Indian Occupied Occupied Kashmir town of Pulwama.35 Adeadliest Kashmir (IOK) (IOK) town of Pulwama.35 A deadliest attack attack in in recent recent history, history, it it killed killed 44 44 Indian soldiers and wounded more than 70. This attack was a clear indication that Indian soldiers and wounded more than 70. This attack was a clear indication that Modi’s blood and policy had Kashmiris in Modi’s blood and guts guts policy had failed. failed. Kashmiris in the the IOK IOK were were still still strugstrug gling against the Indian rule. However, following an established crisis behavior, gling against the Indian rule. However, following an established crisis behavior, New Delhi immediately blamed Pakistan for being being behind behind the New Delhi immediately blamed Pakistan for the attack. attack. This This was was followed by public declarations that New Delhi would avenge this attack. followed by public declarations that New Delhi would avenge this attack. For For next were issued by the political and next 10 10 days, days, several several statements statements were issued by the political and military military leaderleader ship became obvious that Modi Modi who who was for ship to to this this effect, effect, and and it it became obvious that was campaigning campaigning for another term in the forthcoming elections would use this to once again demonanother term in the forthcoming elections would use this to once again demon strate tough man posture. Intense took place place between between the strate his his tough man posture. Intense artillery artillery exchanges exchanges took the two forces during February2019, broke two forces during the the intervening intervening days. days. On On 26 26 February 2019, New New Delhi Delhi broke the that the the Indian the Pakistani the news news to to the the world world that Indian Air Air Force Force had had aggressed aggressed into into the Pakistani territory and had targeted an alleged training camp of Jaish-e-Mohammed territory and had targeted an alleged training camp of Jaish-e-Mohammed in in Balakot the province province of Pakhtunkhwa. It was claimed Balakot in in the of Khyber Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It was claimed that that this this strike strike was pre-emptive strike was aa non-military non-military pre-emptive strike against against non-state non-state actors actors and and not not against against the published in India Today the state state of of Pakistan. Pakistan. In In aa report report published in the the India Today which which read read like like aa Tom Clancy political thriller, Modi and his National Security Advisor (NSA) Tom Clancy political thriller, Modi and his National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit training Ajit Doval Doval decided decided that that India India would would conduct conduct an an air air strike strike against against the the training camp. The report covered the whole event from deliberation to planning and camp. The report covered the whole event from deliberation to planning and to to the the 36 actual execution of the so-called strike. It was taken as a triumph and that it actual execution of the so-called strike.36 It was taken as a triumph and that it had had established established aa new new normal normal in in which which India India held held its its right right of of defense defense and and strike strike any any threat real or perceived anywhere. It was claimed that the strike was successful threat real or perceived anywhere. It was claimed that the strike was successful and that Indian Force has by completely and that Indian Air Air Force has achieved achieved its its objective objective by completely destroying destroying the the camp and killing several hundreds of people present there. Modi, his camp and killing several hundreds of people present there. Modi, his NSA, NSA, and and aa considerable the Indian believed that that considerable number number of of members members of of the Indian strategic strategic community community believed India could manipulate the space under the nuclear overhang to strike Pakistan India could manipulate the space under the nuclear overhang to strike Pakistan and that Pakistan Pakistan had that it time to to call and that had played played its its nuclear nuclear card card and and that it is is time call Pakistan’s Pakistan’s bluff. In the immediate wake of this attack, Pakistan’s guarded bluff. In the immediate wake of this attack, Pakistan’s guarded and and measured measured response taken as response was was taken as aa proof proof of of this. this. Islamabad place of to demIslamabad responded responded at at aa time time and and place of its its choosing. choosing. In In an an attempt attempt to dem onstrate its ability to strike Indian targets anywhere and ensure that the conflict onstrate its ability to strike Indian targets anywhere and ensure that the conflict did did not way that key Indian target not escalate, escalate, Islamabad Islamabad retaliated retaliated in in such such aa way that aa key Indian military military target was followed by by an batwas locked, locked, and and then then aa different different location location was was hit. hit. This This was was followed an air air bat tle. What is publicly known is that Pakistan Air Force used superior training tle. What is publicly known is that Pakistan Air Force used superior training and and performance, jammed the between Indian MiGs, and two performance, jammed the communication communication between Indian MiGs, and shot shot two of these down. was arrested by the of these down. Wing Wing Commander Commander Abhinandan Abhinandan ejected ejected and and was arrested by the Pakistani forces. Two days later, as another attempt not to escalate the crisis Pakistani forces. Two days later, as another attempt not to escalate the crisis and and as the arrested pilot unconditionally.37 unconditionally.37 as aa peace peace gesture, gesture, Islamabad Islamabad released released the arrested Indian Indian pilot However, this did not stop Modi from claiming victory and that Pakistan not However, this did not stop Modi from claiming victory and that had had Pakistan not released the IAF pilot, he would have unleashed his wrath against Pakistan by by released the IAF pilot, he would have unleashed his wrath against Pakistan waging a night of massacre (Qataal ke raat) by hitting it with missiles. This might waging a night of massacre (Qataal ke raat) by hitting it with missiles. This might be music but the be music to to his his own own and and his his Hindu-nationalist Hindu-nationalist supporters’ supporters’ ears, ears, but the facts facts on on the ground were very different; yet, Modi refused to read the writing on the wall. the ground were very different; yet, Modi refused to read the writing on the wall.

The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 135 Cynics that Modi Modi achieved what he wanted to to through through this Cynics argued argued that achieved what he wanted this episode– episode - aa second term by winning the Indian national elections. second term by winning the Indian national elections. Despite to achieve the stated there is Despite failing failing to achieve any any of of the stated objectives, objectives, there is no no guarantee guarantee that Modi would not be tempted to consider going for another round that Modi would not be tempted to consider going for another round whenever whenever it it is politically advantageous for him the domestic is politically advantageous for him on on the domestic front. front. And And militarily militarily striking striking Pakistan Pakistan is is not not the the only only way: way: Modi’s Modi’s India India is is targeting targeting Pakistan. Pakistan. For For quite quite some some time, as an upper riparian, it is using the river waters as a weapon against Pakitime, as an upper riparian, it is using the river waters as a weapon against Paki stan, bone of between stan, aa low low riparian. riparian. Recently, Recently, another another bone of contention contention has has emerged emerged between the two: CPEC. The reason for Indian opposition to CPEC is two-fold: the two: CPEC. The reason for Indian opposition to CPEC is two-fold: one, one, it it would give China that India considers its archrival a strong foothold in would give China that India considers its archrival a strong foothold in South South Asia to be be its backyard; second, because CPEC Asia that that India India claims claims to its strategic strategic backyard; second, because CPEC would would pass through through the Pakistani region pass the Pakistani region of of Gilgit-Baltistan Gilgit-Baltistan which which New New Delhi Delhi claims claims is is aa disputed area being the part of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, ironidisputed area being the part of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, ironi cally though, as per the New Delhi cally though, as per the same same UN UN resolutions resolutions that that New Delhi has has repeatedly repeatedly have have claimed to have become outdated and redundant. claimed to have become outdated and redundant. Although the domestic Although one one should should not not ignore ignore the domestic political political reasons reasons especially especially the the discontent of several political actors and elements on how successive discontent of several political actors and elements on how successive Indian Indian govgov ernments failed to the several to ernments and and leaders leaders failed to address address the several issues issues and and problems problems related related to Kashmir, it is also a fact that Modi’s decision to change the constitutional status Kashmir, it is also a fact that Modi’s decision to change the constitutional status of was motivated by his of the the Indian-occupied Indian-occupied Kashmir Kashmir was motivated by his aim aim to to solve solve the the Pakistan Pakistan 38 problem once and for all. In the process, he also ruffled the Chinese problem once and for all.38 In the process, he also ruffled the Chinese feathers. feathers. While whether it the problem, While it it is is still still not not clear clear whether it has has solved solved or or further further aggravated aggravated the problem, all indicators point to the latter. all indicators point to the latter. New Delhi’s complete New Delhi’s complete failure failure in in responding responding to to the the Chinese Chinese onslaught onslaught put put Modi Modi in another dilemma. How to maintain his tough guy image who has 56-inch in another dilemma. How to maintain his tough guy image who has 56-inch chest chest and He got Pakistan signaling and is is the the savior savior of of India? India? He got tougher tougher with with Pakistan signaling to to China China that that it it still still can can hurt hurt its its interest. interest. In In June2020, June 2020, New New Delhi Delhi instigated instigated aa process process of of reducreduc 39 ing the diplomatic by 50percent. This ing the diplomatic staff staff by 50 percent.39 This action action clearly clearly aimed aimed at at creating creating aa diplomatic row and diverting attention from domestic and regional failures. diplomatic row and diverting attention from domestic and regional failures. The The timing timing of of this this action action also also indicated indicated that that it it was was aa smoke smoke screen screen to to cover cover the the ongoing ongoing heavy-handed valheavy-handed crackdown crackdown in in Kashmir Kashmir and and what what had had happened happened in in the the Galwan Galwan val ley. Several questions were raised about India’s potential role as a balancer against ley. Several questions were raised about India’s potential role as a balancer against China this incident. biggest puzzle China in in the the wake wake of of this incident. The The biggest puzzle was was how how Modi’s Modi’s governgovern ment completely denied this ever happened. Modi and his national ment completely denied this ever happened. Modi and his national security security team team continued war mongering. they claimed that India take control continued its its war mongering. Now Now they claimed that India would would take control of of the Kashmir that is the Kashmir that is currently currently in in Pakistan’s Pakistan’s control. control. The The Indian Indian chief chief was was quoted quoted as that the was in position to to take the as saying saying that the Indian Indian army army was was ready ready and and was in aa position take over over the Kashmir under Pakistani control. It was also stated that India only needed 7 to Kashmir under Pakistani control. It was also stated that India only needed 7 to 10 10 days Pakistan.40 days to to decisively decisively defeat defeat Pakistan.40

Critical Appraisal: The Critical Appraisal: The Geopolitics Geopolitics of of Two Two Frontal Frontal Wars Wars and and India–Pakistan–China India-Pakistan-China Triangle Triangle4141 What be analyzed through different What is is currently currently happening happening in in South South Asia Asia can can be analyzed through different angles: India versus Pakistan, India versus China, or Pakistan–China partnership angles: India versus Pakistan, India versus China, or Pakistan-China partnership

136 Rizwan Zeb against India. By replacing one country with the other, the dynamics and response would remain the same. One look at New Delhi’s view of why it feels threatened from China and then replace India with Pakistan and China with India, one would still be reading from the same script. The competition between these countries become obvious if one looks at the latest defense spending of these countries. According to the authoritative SPIRI database, Pakistan spent US$11billion, India US$71, and China $261billions.42 According to one analyst, the amount China spent was enough to buy 777 Rafale aircraft. And all this is happening when South Asia continues to be one of the poorest regions in the world. In its geopolitical point scoring and overambitious power projection, India continues to boast that it can fight a two-frontal war. Until recently, the Indian military’s dissatisfaction with political leadership was not as visible as it was in the last few years. The turning point was the failure of the Indian political leadership to decisively counter the Pakistan problem after theIndian parliament attack,43 despite repeated plans by the government to retaliate. The commonly held view is that the lessons learnt during the stand-off, especially the time the Indian Army took from mobilization to reaching the positions gave birth to the Cold Start doctrine. Yet, the army’s “Cold Start” military doctrine has an often-overlooked dimension.44 Through this policy, the Indian military wanted to snatch the control of decision-making from the Indian political leadership. However, internal logistical and technological shortcomings as well as Pakistan’s response through the development of low yield nuclear weapons made it a very risky proposition. After assuming the position of the Chief of the Indian Army, General Bipin Rawatfrequently pushed for a more aggressive military stance in the IndoPacific.45 During his tenure as the IA chief, General Bipin Rawat issued several statements that are not only overly aggressive, provocative, and alarming, but also gratuitously reckless. While addressing a seminar at the New Delhi-based Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), General Rawatstated, “we have to be prepared for conflict on the northern and western borders,” adding “India cannot rule out the possibility of a two-front war with China and Pakistan despite having credible nuclear deterrence capabilities.”46 On Pakistan, there seems to be a consensus in the Indian defence establishment that it will remain an enemy state and continue to pose a threat to India whether the country is stable or not.47 During his address, General Rawat claimed that differences between India and Pakistan could not be reconciled. On China, General Rawat stated, as far as the northern adversary (China) is concerned, the flexing of muscles has started... taking over territory in a very gradual manner, testing our limits of threshold... is something we have to be wary about. Post-Doklam crisis, New Delhi believed such needling operations from China cannot be ruled out in the future, especially in the eastern Ladakh and eastern Arunachal Pradesh area. The Indian army, as echoed in General Rawat’s address,

The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 137 was was concerned concerned that that in in such such aa future future crisis crisis “Pakistan “Pakistan could could well well swing swing into into action action to take advantage of such situations when India was busy with problems the to take advantage of such situations when India was busy with problems on on the 48 China front.” This is the scenario that prompted the General to encourage New China front.”48 This is the scenario that prompted the General to encourage New Delhi to prepare for aa two-front two-front war. Delhi to prepare for war. One could argue that One could argue that as as the the chief chief of of aa professional professional army, army, it it is is General General Rawat’s Rawat’s job to war game all possible, probable, and improbable scenarios. true job to war game all possible, probable, and improbable scenarios. It It is is also also true that Rawat is not the only one who has talked of India’s need to prepare for a twothat Rawat is not the only one who has talked of India’s need to prepare for a twofront then chief Deepak Kapoor, Kapoor, front war. war. In In 2009, 2009, the the then chief of of the the Indian Indian Army, Army, General General Deepak argued that the Indian army must prepare for a two-front war at an army training argued that the Indian army must prepare for a two-front war at an army training command doctrine seminar. Since then, all Indian army chiefs have voiced command doctrine seminar. Since then, all Indian army chiefs have voiced simisimi 49 Yet, one provocative statement. lar lar opinions. opinions.49 Yet, one cannot cannot ignore ignore the the timing timing of of such such aa provocative statement. Although that New Delhi managed Although several several Indian Indian strategic strategic commentators commentators claim claim that New Delhi managed toend Doklamwith China on its terms, there is also a concern over to end Doklam with China on its terms, there is also a concern over the the implicaimplica 50 tions of future disputes. In the Indian tions of the the crisis crisis for for future disputes.50 In the Indian strategic strategic calculus, calculus, China China is is aa challenger to its leadership in the Indo-Pacific. One of the tools China uses challenger to its leadership in the Indo-Pacific. One of the tools China uses to undermine India’s the region Pakistan. This to undermine India’s role role in in the region is is Pakistan. This Sino-Pak Sino-Pak nexus nexus against against India has only strengthened with the implementation of transnational India has only strengthened with the implementation of transnational infrastrucinfrastruc 51 ture projects like Although, ture projects like the the CPEC. CPEC.51 Although, currently, currently, Pakistan Pakistan Army Army is is responsible responsible for the security of CPEC, according to New Delhi, the presence and for the security of CPEC, according to New Delhi, the presence and involvement involvement of be ruled will further of Chinese Chinese Army Army cannot cannot be ruled out. out. Such Such aa development development will further aggravate aggravate the situation for India. the situation for India. Is position to to fight fight aa two-front two-front war war with with China Is India India in in aa position China and and Pakistan? Pakistan? The The views of South Asian watchers are divided on this. However, in keeping with views of South Asian watchers are divided on this. However, in keeping with the two Pulwama/Balakot crisis between India the two recent recent crises: crises: Pulwama/Balakot crisis between India and and Pakistan Pakistan and and Galwan Valley between India and China clearly indicates this is a flawed Galwan Valley between India and China clearly indicates this is a flawed assumpassump tion to the least. least. The the Indian forces are tion to say say the The flaws flaws in in claims claims that that the Indian armed armed forces are capable capable of neutralizing Pakistan in an armed conflict were glaringly obvious of neutralizing Pakistan in an armed conflict were glaringly obvious even even prior prior to the Balakot crisis, but this beyond any to the Pulwama/ Pulwama/ Balakot crisis, but this crisis crisis has has almost almost proved proved it it beyond any doubt. Now take take aa scenario which both both China Pakistan are fighting aa war war doubt. Now scenario in in which China and and Pakistan are fighting with India. be its BrahMos cruise that can with India. One One of of India’s India’s assets assets could could be its new new BrahMos cruise missile missile that can 52 be used against multiple targets. Initially, India might have an advantage to be used against multiple targets.52 Initially, India might have an advantage due due to Chinese jets taking off from high-altitude airfields and subsequently delivering Chinese jets taking off from high-altitude airfields and subsequently delivering small Yet, how the Indian small payloads. payloads. Yet, how would would the Indian Air Air Force Force capitalize capitalize on on this? this? Moreover, Moreover, in the scenario of China and Pakistan coordinating their attacks, is in the scenario of China and Pakistan coordinating their attacks, is the the IAF IAF ready ready and equipped for such a large-scale military deployment? and equipped for such a large-scale military deployment? It that the Rafale It is is an an open open secret secret that the IAF IAF is is struggling. struggling. The The introduction introduction of of new new Rafale fighter planes could affect its operational preparedness in the future. Already, fighter planes could affect its operational preparedness in the future. Already, the the IAF France to to correct IAF requires requires more more Rafale Rafale aircraft aircraft than than it it is is slated slated to to get get from from France correct the deficit. fighter squadrons the deficit. How How many many operational operational fighter squadrons IAF IAF currently currently holds holds and and how how many is required remained a hotly debated topic. Notwithstanding the ageing many is required remained a hotly debated topic. Notwithstanding the ageing and and soon-to-be jets in in existing soon-to-be decommissioned decommissioned fighter fighter jets existing squadrons, squadrons, the the IAF IAF is is lagging lagging far behind behind its far its desired desired 45 45 squadrons squadrons of of fully fully operational operational fighters. fighters. Almost Almost half half of of the the existing ones will be decommissioned in the next 9years. Similar issues exist for existing ones will be decommissioned in the next 9 years. Similar issues exist for its helicopter fleet, mid-air refueling capability, and airborne surveillance capabilits helicopter fleet, mid-air refueling capability, and airborne surveillance capabil ity. with aa shortage ity. The The Indian Indian Army, Army, meanwhile, meanwhile, is is struggling struggling with shortage of of officers officers and and

138 Rizwan Zeb ammunition from similar ammunition problems. problems. The The navy navy is is also also suffering suffering from similar difficulties. difficulties. The The Armed Forces leadership is not happy about this and blames the Armed Forces leadership is not happy about this and blames the Indian Indian political political leadership the importance leadership for for not not granting granting national national security security the importance it it deserves. deserves. Admiral Admiral Sunil Lanba, Chief of Naval Staff, is onrecord saying “the way Sunil Lanba, Chief of Naval Staff, is on record saying “the way national national security security is being handled is is not not commensurate commensurate with the security security environment, environment, which which is is is being handled with the 53 extremely serious at the moment.” General Rawat has also stated that the miliextremely serious at the moment.”53 General Rawat has also stated that the mili tary was not getting getting enough enough funds for modernization. modernization. This the context context in which tary was not funds for This is is the in which the two-front two-front war statement should should be analyzed: aa chance chance for the Indian Indian military military the war statement be analyzed: for the to the case for aa concerted flex its its political political muscle muscle and and make make the case for concerted military military modernizamoderniza to flex tion campaign. tion campaign. The militaristic approach approach has has not not worked for India India to to resolve resolve its Pakistan or or The militaristic worked for its Pakistan China problem so far. There is hardly any chance of this happening in future. China problem so far. There is hardly any chance of this happening in future. There are are two two fundamental fundamental points points for New Delhi Delhi to to consider. consider. First, First, without an There for New without an understanding with with Pakistan Pakistan can can it it become dominant power power in in the the region? region? And And understanding become aa dominant can become aa regional friendly and can it it become regional hegemon hegemon without without first first having having aa friendly and secure secure neighborhood? At At the the moment, moment, all all south south Asian Asian states states have have problematic problematic relations relations neighborhood? with India. India. Second, not focusing on improving improving its its relations relations with with its neighbors, with Second, by by not focusing on its neighbors, it is leaving its strategic backyard open for arch rival rival China. China. Pakistan, Pakistan, BanglaBangla it is leaving its strategic backyard open for its its arch desh, and Nepal are actively engaged with China in several projects. China’s BRI desh, and Nepal are actively engaged with China in several projects. China’s BRI and CPEC are a reality, and South Asia is significant part of it. India needs to take and CPEC are a reality, and South Asia is significant part of it. India needs to take this reality into consideration and in its strategic calculation. The recent two crises this reality into consideration and in its strategic calculation. The recent two crises with two of be used used to to re-evaluate with two of its its most most important important neighbors neighbors should should be re-evaluate its its regional regional polices and choices. South Asia is increasingly becoming a hot theatre polices and choices. South Asia is increasingly becoming a hot theatre for for the the Indo-Chinese rivalry. This would not only have long-term implications for Indo-Chinese rivalry. This would not only have long-term implications for AsiaAsiaPacific would also the future future of be prudent Pacific security, security, it it would also decide decide the of India. India. It It would would be prudent for for New Delhi to rethink about its South Asia policy where it is losing ground to its New Delhi to rethink about its South Asia policy where it is losing ground to its rival the likelihood this rival China. China. However, However, the likelihood of of that that happening happening is is remote remote as as argued argued in in this chapter to the the Thucydidesian which Sino-India chapter primarily primarily due due to Thucydidesian logic logic under under which Sino-India relations relations are operating. While as per this logic, China would take every step to stop are operating. While as per this logic, China would take every step to stop India, India, aa rival emerging power to rise, it is India that has to ensure that its rise is not rival emerging power to rise, it is India that has to ensure that its rise is not halted. halted. So this objective for which which New So far, far, China China is is making making steady steady progress progress in in pursuit pursuit of of this objective for New Delhi blame. New New Delhi Delhi needs policy Delhi has has to to take take most most of of the the blame. needs to to have have aa foreign foreign policy rethink rethink and and have have aa more more South South Asia Asia friendly friendly outlook outlook especially especially toward toward Pakistan, Pakistan, its main challenger in the region and China’s strategic ally if it wants its main challenger in the region and China’s strategic ally if it wants to to achieve achieve aa favourable favourable standing standing among among its its South South Asian Asian neighbors neighbors and and eventually eventually rise rise as as aa major player. major player.

Notes Notes Disclaimer: The views views expressed expressed in in this chapter are are the the author's author's own. own. Disclaimer: The this chapter 1 John John W. W. Garver, Garver, “The “The Future of the the Sino-Pakistani Sino-Pakistani Entente Entente Cordiale,” Cordiale,” in in South 1 Future of South Asia Asia 202: Future and Alliances, ed. Michael Michael R. R. Chambers Chambers (Carlisle, (Carlisle, PA: PA: 202: Future Strategic Strategic Balances Balances and Alliances, ed. Strategic Studies Studies Institute, Institute, U.S. U.S. Army College, 2002), www.strategicstudiesinsti Strategic Army War War College, 2002), www.strategicstudiesinsti tute.army. mil/pdffiles/00105.pdf. tute.army.mil/pdffiles/00105.pdf. 2 Jeffrey Jeffrey E. Garten, The The Big Ten: The The Big and How They Will Will Change Change 2 E. Garten, Big Ten: Big Emerging Emerging Markets Markets and How They Our Lives (New York: York: Basic Basic Books, Books, 1997). 1997). Our Lives (New

The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 139 3 Hobraad, Middle Middle Powers Powers in International Politics Politics (London: 3 Carsten Carsten Hobraad, in International (London: Macmillan, Macmillan, 1984). 1984). 4 Robert Robert Chase, Chase, Emily Emily Hill Hill and and Paul Kennedy (eds.), (eds.), The The Pivotal New Frame 4 Paul Kennedy Pivotal States: States: A ANew Frameworkfor U.S. Policy in the the Developing World (New (New York: York: W.W. 1998). work for U.S. Policy in Developing World W.W. Norton, Norton, 1998). 5 Condoleezza National Interests,” Foreign Affairs, Affairs, January– 5 Condoleezza Rice, Rice, “Promoting “Promoting the the National Interests,” Foreign JanuaryFebruary 2000, 56. 56. February2000, 6 Bharat Bharat Karnad, Weapons & Indian (New Delhi: Delhi: Macmillan, 6 Karnad, Nuclear Nuclear Weapons& Indian Security Security (New Macmillan, 2002), 2002), 479. 479. 7 Ibid., Ibid., 446-83. 7 446–83. 8 Rizwan Rizwan Zeb, “India Rising: Do the Pakistani PerspecPerspec 8 Zeb, “India Rising: Do the Neighbors Neighbors Need Need to to Worry? Worry? A APakistani tive,” Journal of Political Science tive,” The The Journal ofPolitical Science XXVI, XXVI, nos. nos. 1& 1 & 22 (2007–08). (2007-08). 9 Graham Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Thucydides Trap,” Trap,” Foreign June 9, 2017, 9 Allison, “The Foreign Policy, Policy, June9, 2017, https://for https://for eignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/. eignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/. 10 Mohan, “Nepal passes new new map map including Indian territory,” territory,” 10 Geeta Geeta Mohan, “Nepal Parliament Parliament passes including disputed disputed Indian India Today, June13, June 13, 2020. India Today, 2020. 11 “Army “Army Prepared Prepared for for Two Two and and aa Half The Hindu, June 8, 2017. 11 Half Front Front War,” War,” The Hindu, June8, 2017. 12 Raj Raj Chengappa, Chengappa, “Balakot: “Balakot: How India Planned Planned IAF in Pakistan: Pakistan: An 12 How India IAF Airstrike Airstrike in An Inside Inside Story,” India Today, March 15, 2019, Story,” India Today, March15, 2019, www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/ www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/ story/20190325-balakot-airstrikes-pulwama-terror-attack-abhinandan-varthaman-nar story/20190325-balakot-airstrikes-pulwama-terror-attack-abhinandan-varthaman-nar endra-modi-masood-azhar-1478511-2019-03-15. endra-modi-masood-azhar-1478511-2019-03-15. 13 Complete Complete text of Agreement on the of Peace and Tranquility Tranquility along along the 13 text of Agreement on the Maintenance Maintenance of Peace and the Line of Actual Control in in the the India–China India-China Border September 7, 1993, 1993, www. www. Line of Actual Control Border Areas, Areas, September7, peacemaker.un.org. peacemaker. un.org. 14 Complete Complete text of the on Confidence Confidence Building Building Measures Measures in in the 14 text of the Agreement Agreement on the Military Military Field along the ofActual Control in in the Border Areas, 29, Field along the Line Line of Actual Control the India-China India–China Border Areas, November November29, 1996, www.peacemaker.un.org. 1996, www.peacemaker.un.org. 15 Amna Yusaf, “Sino-Indian “Sino-Indian Relations: for Pakistan,” Pakistan,” Paper Paper presented at 15 Amna Yusaf, Relations: Implications Implications for presented at the seminar on on Pakistan-China - 2011: 2011: Year Year of ofFriendship, Friendship, organized organized by by the the the seminar Pakistan–China Relations Relations– Institute of 2011, http://issi.org.pk/pub http://issi.org.pk/pub Institute of Strategic Strategic Studies, Studies, Islamabad, Islamabad, January11–12, January 11-12, 2011, lication-files/1299745166_57265659.pdf as as quoted quoted in in Rizwan Rizwan Zeb, “Pakistan-China lication-files/1299745166_57265659.pdf Zeb, “Pakistan–China Relations: Where They Go Go From From Here?” UNISCIPapers, no. 29 (May 2012): 54–55. 54-55. Relations: Where They Here?” UNISCI Papers, no. 29 (May2012): 16 Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Along the Line of Actual 16 Agreement on the the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control in in the the India-China September 7, 1993, 1993, https://peacemaker. Control India-China Border Border Areas, Areas, September7, https://peacemaker. un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_930907_Agreement%20on%20 un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_930907_Agreement%20on%20 India-China%20Border%20Areas.pdf. India-China%20Border%20Areas.pdf. 17 Zia Zia Haq, Haq, “From “From Infrastructure Infrastructure to to Hi-Tech: Hi-Tech: Mapping Mapping China’s China’s Large Large Trade Trade Footprint 17 Footprint in India,” Times, June June 19, 19, 2020, 2020, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ in India,” Hindustan Hindustan Times, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ mapping-china-s-large-trade-footprint-in-india/story-3fIpfOfG1BAN6JMRIboKoI. mapping-china-s-large-trade-footprint-in-india/story-3fIpfOfG1BAN6JMRIboKoI. html#:~:text=year's%20%24%2095.7%20billion.-,China%20is%20India's%20 html#:~:text=year's%20%24%2095.7%20billion.-,China%20is%20India's%20 largest%20trading%20partner%2C%20but%20the%20latter%20runs,China's%20 largest%20trading%20partner%2C%20but%20the%20latter%20runs,China's%20 share%20is%20just%203.2%25. share%20is%20just%203.2%25. 18 “India’s “India’s Trade Trade Deficit with China China Balloons Balloons to to aa Whooping $57 Billion,” 18 Deficit with Whooping $57 Billion,” Eurasia Eurasia Times, January January 23, https://eurasiantimes.com/indias-trade-deficit-with-chinaTimes, 23, 2020, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/indias-trade-deficit-with-chinaballoons-to-a-whooping-57-billion/. balloons-to-a-whooping-57-billion/. 19 “Nuclear “Nuclear Anxiety: Letter to Clinton on on the the Nuclear Testing,” The The New York 19 Anxiety: Indian’s Indian’s Letter to Clinton Nuclear Testing,” New York Times, May13, May 13, 1998. 1998. Also see; Jaswant Jaswant Singh, Singh, “Against “Against Nuclear Times, Also see; Nuclear Apartheid,” Apartheid,” Foreign Foreign Affairs, September–October1998. Affairs, September-October 1998. 20 Zeb, Zeb, “Pakistan–China “Pakistan-China Relations,” Relations,” 56. 56. 20 21 “Explainer: “Explainer: What’s Behind the Latest India–China India-China Tension?” Tension?” Dawn, May 29, 2020. 21 What’s Behind the Latest Dawn, May29, 2020. 22 Kashmir’s Special Raising Fears Fears of New York 22 “India “India Revokes Revokes Kashmir’s Special Status, Status, Raising of Unrest,” Unrest,” New York Times, Times, August 5, 2019; Kashmir’s Special Special Status, Status, “Raising “Raising Fears Fears of of Unrest,” Unrest,” August5, 2019; India India Revokes Revokes Kashmir’s The New York Times, Times, nytimes.com. The New York nytimes.com. 23 Is Poised Poised to to Become Anti-China Soon,” RAND 23 Derek Derek Grossman, Grossman, “The “The Quad Quad Is Become Openly Openly Anti-China Soon,” RAND Blog, July 28, 2020, Blog, July28, 2020, www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/the-quad-is-poised-to-becomewww.rand.org/blog/2020/07/the-quad-is-poised-to-becomeopenly-anti-china-soon.html. openly-anti-china-soon.html.

140 Rizwan Zeb 24 Places in Ladakh, Army Army Chief 24 Sushant Sushant Singh, Singh, “Chinese “Chinese Intrusions Intrusions at at 33 Places in Ladakh, Chief Takes Takes Stock,” Stock,” The Indian May 24, 2020. Chinese intrusions intrusions at at 33 places places in in Ladakh, Ladakh, Army The Indian Express, Express, May24, 2020. Chinese Army chief takes takes stock stock || India The Indian Indian Express. chief India News, News, The Express. 25 Image Appears Appears to Nail-Studded Rods Rods Used India-China 25 “Galwan “Galwan Valley: Valley: Image to Show Show Nail-Studded Used in in India-China Brawl,” June 18, 2020 :: Michael Michael Safi, and Helen Davidson, to Their Deaths as Fought and Helen Davidson, “Soldiers “Soldiers Fell Fell to Their Deaths as India India and and China’s China’s Troops Troops Fought With The Guardian, Guardian, June17, June 17, 2020, 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/ www.theguardian.com/world/2020/ With Rocks,” Rocks,” The jun/17/shock-and-anger-in-india-after-worst-attack-on-china-border-in-decades. jun/17/shock-and-anger-in-india-after-worst-attack-on-china-border-in-decades. 26 Ejaz Haider, Haider, “India’s Friday Times, 2020, www.thefri www.thefri 26 Ejaz “India’s China China Problem,” Problem,” The The Friday Times, June19, June 19, 2020, daytimes.com/indias-china-problem/. daytimes.com/indias-china-problem/. 27 “PMO “PMO Issues Issues Clarification Clarification Over Over Modi’s Comments That That No One Entered Ter 27 Modi’s Comments No One Entered Indian Indian Territory,” Tribune, www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/govt-issues-clarifiL ritory,” Tribune, June20, June 20, 2020, 2020, wwwtribuneindia.com/news/nation/govt-issues-clarif cation-on-pms-comments-that-no-one-entered-indian-territory-101837. cation-on-pms-comments-that-no-one-entered-indian-territory-101837. 28 Ajai Shukla, “How “How China China and and India Came to to Lethal Blows,” New York Times, Times, June19, June 19, 28 Ajai Shukla, India Came Lethal Blows,” New York 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/opinion/China-India-conflict.html. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/opinion/China-India-conflict.html. 29 “The “The Four-Point Four-Point Formula,” 1, 2009, 29 Formula,” Dawn, Dawn, August August1, 2009, www.dawn.com/news/915750/ www.dawn.com/news/915750/ 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The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 141 40 Is Ours, We Will MoS Road Road Transport Army Chief 40 “PoK “PoK Is Ours, We Will Get Get It: It: MoS Transport and and Former Former Army Chief V VK K Singh,” The The Economics Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ Singh,” Economics Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ pok-is-ours-we-will-get-it-mos-road-transport-and-former-army-chief-v-k-singh/ pok-is-ours-we-will-get-it-mos-road-transport-and-former-army-chief-v-k-singh/ articleshow/71820598.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_ articleshow/71820598.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_ campaign=cppst; Rahul Rahul Singh, Singh, “Will “Will Take Take Control Control of of PoK Govt Asks: Chief campaign=cppst; PoK If If Govt Asks: Army Army Chief General Manoj Manoj Naravane,” Times, January12, January 12, 2020, General Naravane,” Hindustan Hindustan Times, 2020, www.hindustantimes. www.hindustantimes. com/india-news/will-take-control-of-pok-if-govt-asks-army-chief-general-manoj-nar com/india-news/will-take-control-of-pok-if-govt-asks-army-chief-general-manoj-nar avane/story-ymvELBwzFqUkgZKpQkOhcO.html; Rahul Singh, “India “India Needs 7-10 avane/story-ymvELBwzFqUkgZKpQkOhcO.html; Rahul Singh, Needs 7–10 Days to to Defeat in War: War: PM Modi,” PM Modi,” Hindustan Times, January28, January 28, 2020, www. Days Defeat Pakistan Pakistan in Hindustan Times, 2020, www. hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-needs-7-10-days-to-defeat-pakistan-in-war-pmhindustantimes.com/india-news/india-needs-7-10-days-to-defeat-pakistan-in-war-pmmodi/story-IC3Gef8WxnjGNZKII2kA7H.html; Pankaj Mishra, Mishra, “Armchair “Armchair Generals Generals modi/story-IC3Gef8WxnjGNZKII2kA7H.html; Pankaj Are India Into Trouble,” Bloomberg, 7, 2019, www.bloomberg.com/ Are Marching Marching India Into Trouble,” Bloomberg, March March7, 2019, www.bloomberg.com/ opinion/articles/2019-03-07/are-india-s-think-tanks-promoting-conflict-with-pakistan. opmion/articles/2019-03-07/are-mdia-s-thmk-tanks-promotmg-conflict-with-pakistan. 41 Part Part of of this section draws draws from from an an article article “Can “Can India two frontal frontal war? war? that that 41 this section India fight fight two I wrote for for IAPS The article article can can be be found found in: in: https://theasiadialogue. Iwrote IAPS Dialogue. Dialogue. The https://theasiadialogue. com/2018/03/30/can-india-fight-a-two-front-war-with-china-and-pakistan/. com/2018/03/30/can-india-fight-a-two-front-war-wi1:h-china-and-pakistan/. 42 For For detail, detail, see see SIPRI SIPRI Military Military Expenditure Expenditure Database, www.sipri.org/databases/milex; 42 Database, www.sipri.org/databases/milex; also see see Mosharraf “India’s next attack is is coming,” coming,” The The News, June 23, 2020, also Mosharraf Zaidi, Zaidi, “India’s next attack News, June23, 2020, www.thenews.com.pk/print/676287-india-s-next-attack-is-coming.. www.thenews.com.pk/print/676287-india-s-next-attack-is-coming 43 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/13/newsid_3695000/369 43 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/13/newsid_3695000/369 5057.stm. 5057.stm. 44 Is India’s Indian Express, Express, September21, 2017, https:// 44 “What “What Is India’s Cold Cold Start Start Doctrine?” Doctrine?” Indian September 21, 2017, https:// indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-india-cold-start-doctrine-military-strategyindianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-india-cold-start-doctrine-military-strategyindia-pakistan-indian-armed-forces-4854019/?device=desktop. india-pakistan-indian-armed-forces-4854019/?device=desktop. 45 Bipin Rawat Rawat to to Be Be Next Next Army Army Chief, 45 “Lt “Lt Gen Gen Bipin Chief, Superseding Superseding Two Two Senior Senior Officers,” Officers,” The The Wire, December18, December 18, 2016, Wire, 2016, https://thewire.in/security/army-chief-bipin-rawat. https://thewire.in/security/army-chief-bipin-rawat. 46 “India “India Must Prepared for for Conflict Conflict on on Western and Northern General Rawat,” 46 Must Be Be Prepared Western and Northern Fronts: Fronts: General Rawat,” Business Standard, Standard, September6, 2017, www.business-standard.com/article/newswww.business-standard.com/article/newsBusiness September 6, 2017, ani/india-must-be-prepared-for-conflict-on-western-and-northern-fronts-generalani/india-must-be-prepared-for-conflict-on-western-and-northern-fronts-generalrawat-117090601319_1.html. rawat-117090601319_1.html. 47 47 Zeb, Zeb, “India “India Rising.” Rising.” 48 Rizwan Zeb, “Can India Fight aa Two-Front Two-Front War China and and Pakistan?” Pakistan?” The The 48 Rizwan Zeb, “Can India Fight War with with China Asia March 30, 30, 2018, 2018, https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/03/30/can-indiahttps://theasiadialogue.com/2018/03/30/can-indiaAsia Dialogue, Dialogue, March fight-a-two-front-war-with-china-and-pakistan/. fight-a-two-front-war-with-china-and-pakistan/. 49 “Wiki “Wiki Leaks Leaks Terms Terms Former Indian Army Chief General General Deepak Kapoor as as aa Geek,” Geek,” 49 Former Indian Army Chief Deepak Kapoor The Nation, 8, 2010, 2010, https://nation.com.pk/08-Dec-2010/wikileaksThe Nation, December December8, https://nation.com.pk/08-Dec-2010/wikileaksterms-former-indian-army-chief-general-deepak-kapoor-as-a-geek. terms-former-indian-army-chief-general-deepak-kapoor-as-a-geek. 50 James James Griffiths, Griffiths, “India, “India, China China Agree ‘Expeditious Disengagement’ of Doklam 50 Agree to to ‘Expeditious Disengagement’ of Doklam Bor Border Dispute,” CNN, August 29, 2017, der Dispute,” CNN, August 29, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/28/asia/indiahttps://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/28/asia/indiachina-brics-doklam/index.html. china-brics-doklam/index.html. 51 “The “The China–Pakistan China-Pakistan Economic Economic Corridor: Corridor: A View from from the Ground,” December 1, 51 AView the Ground,” December1, 2017 2017 www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-view-thewww.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-view-theground; reference, with ground; complete complete reference, with author, author, where where it it was was published. published. 52 “India “India Successfully Successfully Flight Tests Supersonic Supersonic Cruise Cruise Missile The Economics 52 Flight Tests Missile BrahMos,” BrahMos,” The Economics Times, March 22, 2018, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indiahttps://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indiaTimes, March22, successfully-flight-tests-supersonic-cruise-missile-brahmos/articleshow/63411447. successfully-flight-tests-supersonic-cruise-missile-brahmos/articleshow/634n447. cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. 53 “Dilemma “Dilemma of of aa Two-Front Two-Front War,” The Tribune, Tribune, July14, July 14, 2017, 2017, www.tribuneindia.com/ 53 War,” The www.tribuneindia.com/ news/archive/comment/dilemma-of-a-two-front-war-436191. news/archive/comment/dilemma-of-a-two-front-war-436191.

9 Conservative Administration in Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations Khurram Abbas

Introduction Elections of Islamic Republic of Iran are largely contested between two political fractions, that is moderates and conservatives. In February2020, Iran had held its 11th Parliamentary elections, and conservatives won over two-third seats.1 Almost 16 months later, Presidential elections were held in Iran, and, as expected, an ultra-conservative candidate won with securing a handsome majority of 61.95percent of votes.2 lower turnout, i.e, 42.6percent turnout in parliamentary elections in 2020 and 48.8percent turnout in presidential elections in 2021 helped conservatives to win these two elections consecutively. It is interesting to note that the lower turn out often favours conservatives to win elections. For instance the parliamentary elections of 1996 and 2000 witnessed 70percent turnout, which favoured moderates, while in 2004 and 2008 the turnout drastically reduced to 50percent and conservatives won both these elections. Conservatives came into power owing to failure of various domestic and foreign policies of Rouhani administration. The foremost reason is Iran’s failure to follow Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The moderates predominantly contested 2012 and 2016 elections anticipating normal relations with the United States and Western countries. The landslide victory of 2016 elections was manifestation of people’s desire for a standard quality life. However, Trump’s unilateral withdrawal and his subsequent ‘Maximum Pressure Campaign’ against Iran helped conservatives to convince public and state institutions that Rouhani’s approach was illusionary in practice and that the United States is not trustworthy.3 The killing of General Qasem Soleimani, Commander Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the US raid on 3rd January2020, was another severe blow on moderates’ popularity. The US hatred of the general public was further flared by conservatives. Rouhani administration’s ‘calculated response’ against the killing of General Soleimani was perceived as being naive in nature, and conservatives diverted their criticism to Rouhani and moderates.4 Likewise, Rouhani’s soft approach towards Arab countries was also not welcomed by conservatives and some state institutions. The internal atmosphere was not welcoming to this approach after the stampede of 2016 and subsequent burning of Saudi Embassy in Tehran.5 Iranian public was charged against Saudis. DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-11

Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 143 However, Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister of Iran, attempted to reengage Arabs, and his online meeting with Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Foreign Minister UAE, also raised concerns within Iranian establishment and public at large.6 Further, Guardian Council of Iran had barred 50percent candidates to contest elections majority of which belonged to reformist background including 90 elected members of former Majlis.7 In Tehran, 134 conservative candidates ran against 28 moderate candidates for the city’s 30 seats, which is the largest single bloc of seats of any place.8 The Guardian Council’s extraordinary rejections of reformist candidates illustrate Iranian institutions’ objective of seeing hardliners in power to reinforce hardline approach to regional and international security affairs. To sum up, the conservatives have come in to power after manipulating public’s hatred against the United States and Arab countries, and their voters would expect them to be tough while dealing with these countries. It is Iran’s political culture that the government in power wholeheartedly tries to fulfill its electoral slogans. Rouhani tried his best to normalize relationship with the United States and Western countries in 2012 as he had promised his voters of a quality life without international sanctions. The reengagement with the United States and Western countries could serve his purpose politically. Likewise, conservatives came in power after February2020 elections by promising to bring back Iran’s dignity and glory in the region.9 If conservatives strive to fulfill their promises, as Rouhani strived during his tenure, the overall Persian Gulf security environment would likely remain strained and bleak during the tenure of conservatives.

Basic Ingredients of Conservative Parliament and Presidents of Iran Totalitarianism out of conservative Parliament and presidents of Iran represent interesting case studies of personification of domestic and foreign policies. Their pendulum of behavioural swings on both sides of extremes makes them highly unpredictable, and, resultantly, their relationship with other countries remains inconsistent. Unlike many typical nation-states, Iran is not an industrial society owing to absence of typical industrial/capitalist characteristics. The informal social, cultural, and religious relationship dominates Iranian politics. Hence, the change of presidents and Conservatives being in the Parliament can lead to drastic domestic and foreign policy changes. Conservative presidents largely remained cynical to criticism. Though there are constant issues in Iran that are immune to criticism, such as personality of Supreme Leader and policies of IRGC, however, conservative governments further add red lines to mute critical voices within the country to consolidate their power. For instance during Ahmadinejad’s tenure, government added redlines which were largely undefined and termed many voices as being threats to Iran’s national security.10 This culture or practice discourages outflow of neutral information from Tehran, which creates an information vacuum for regional and international audiences. This gap has often been filled by country’s adversaries and

144 Khurram Abbas presented views of its defence presented pessimistic pessimistic views of Iranian Iranian intensions intensions and and exaggerated exaggerated its defence capabilities, which have led led to to suspicious suspicious environment. environment. capabilities, which have There ideological views views within within Iranian politics on foreign There are are two two extreme extreme ideological Iranian politics on foreign affairs. The office of Supreme Leader, IRGC, and conservatives categorically affairs. The office of Supreme Leader, IRGC, and conservatives categorically negate with the the Arab the United United States negate any any engagement engagement with Arab countries, countries, the States and and West. West. Ahmadinejad’s furious criticism of international political system and propagation Ahmadinejad’s furious criticism of international political system and propagation of Muslim countries by the of maltreatment maltreatment of of Muslim countries by the leading leading stakeholders stakeholders of of the the system system 11 were clear manifestation of his ideological leanings towards Ali Shariati. Howwere clear manifestation of his ideological leanings towards Ali Shariati.11 How ever, there is Forces’ to ever, there is another another group, group, known known as as ‘Resistance ‘Resistance Forces’ to revolutionary revolutionary idealideal ists. Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Rouhani led ists. Akbar Akbar Hashemi Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, and Hassan Hassan Rouhani led this group as presidents and tried to minimize the influence of revolutionary idealthis group as presidents and tried to minimize the influence of revolutionary ideal ists on on Iranian Iranian foreign foreign policy. policy. Though Though weak weak and and short short lived, lived, this this resistance resistance group group ists partially engaged Arab countries, the United States and West. The following partially engaged Arab countries, the United States and West. The following RafRafsanjani’s parallels on sanjani’s statement statement summarizes summarizes Iran’s Iran’s two two extreme extreme parallels on foreign foreign affairs. affairs. One wrong things things we the revolutionary was to One of of the the wrong we did did in in the revolutionary atmosphere atmosphere was to make make enemies. We We pushed pushed those those who could be neutral into into hostility hostility and and did did not not enemies. who could be neutral do anything anything to to attract attract those those who who could could become It is of the the new new do become friends. friends. It is part part of plan foreign policy behave in in aa way way not plan that that in in foreign policy we we should should behave not to to needlessly needlessly leave leave 12 ground to the enemy. ground to the enemy.12 The The aforementioned aforementioned ingredients ingredients primarily primarily change change the the regional regional and and international international security perceptions. The history history suggests suggests that that during during the the tenures tenures of of conservaconserva security perceptions. The tive governments, Iran’s relationship with Arab countries and the United tive governments, Iran’s relationship with Arab countries and the United States States drastically fiery statements drastically fell fell from from normalcy. normalcy. In In fact, fact, fiery statements radically radically changed changed regional regional security security outlook. outlook. For For instance instance Ahmadinejad’s Ahmadinejad’s statement statement to to wipe wipe out out Israel Israel from from the map of the world still haunts Iran. the map of the world still haunts Iran.

Pakistan–Iran Pakistan-Iran Relations: Relations: ABrief A Brief Overview Overview Pakistan ups and Pakistan and and Iran Iran have have witnessed witnessed aa series series of of ups and downs downs in in their their relationrelation ship be divided phases. The ship since since 1947. 1947. Their Their relationship relationship can can be divided into into three three major major phases. The first from 1947 first phase phase starts starts from 1947 and and ends ends on on 1979 1979 with with Islamic Islamic Revolution Revolution in in Iran. Iran. During this this phase, the two two countries countries enjoyed enjoyed aa cordial cordial relationship. relationship. They They had had During phase, the formed Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) (RCD) along along with Turkey. Iran Iran formed Regional Cooperation for Development with Turkey. helped wars with helped Pakistan Pakistan during during its its wars with India India in in 1965 1965 and and 1971. 1971. In In fact, fact, the the PakiPaki 13 stan’s military veterans used to consider Iran as its actual strategic depth. Both stan’s military veterans used to consider Iran as its actual strategic depth.13 Both countries were part of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central countries were part of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization Organization (CENTO) (CENTO) bloc. Pakistan and and Iran Iran shared shared American American security security Treaty bloc. Pakistan umbrella during 1950s and 1960s. umbrella during 1950s and 1960s. The the installation The ouster ouster of of Shah Shah of of Iran Iran and and the installation of of revolutionary revolutionary forces forces in in Iran Iran started aa new new era era of of relationship relationship between the two two countries. countries. Initially, Initially, Pakistan started between the Pakistan tried to to develop develop cordial cordial relationship relationship with with Islamic Islamic Republic. It remained remained neutral neutral tried Republic. It during Iran–Iraq War and to some extent supported Tehran. However, the during Iran-Iraq War and to some extent supported Tehran. However, the larger larger insecurity paradox along behaviour insecurity paradox along with with few few regional regional developments developments and and furious furious behaviour

Iran and Future ofPakistan-Iran 145 Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations Relations 145 of revolutionary revolutionary forces Pakistan away away from from Iran. Iran. This This era era witnessed witnessed aa of forces pushed pushed Pakistan significant turmoil in bilateral relationship between the two countries significant turmoil in bilateral relationship between the two countries mainly mainly due due to their their divergence divergence of of interests interests in Afghanistan. The The incident of Mezar-e-Sharif to in Afghanistan. incident of Mezar-e-Sharif further between the the two further intensified intensified hatred hatred and and misperceptions misperceptions between two countries. countries. FollowFollow ing the seizure seizure of of Mazar-e-Sharif, Taliban arrested arrested ten ten Iranian Iranian diplomats. diplomats. TehTeh ing the Mazar-e-Sharif, Taliban ran sought Pakistan’s help, and Islamabad tried to convince Taliban to hand ran sought Pakistan’s help, and Islamabad tried to convince Taliban to hand over over these to Tehran. those diplomats these diplomats diplomats to Tehran. However, However, Taliban Taliban claimed claimed that that those diplomats were were involved transfer to Hizb-e-Wahdat and killed them publiinvolved in in arms arms transfer to Tajiks Tajiks and and Hizb-e-Wahdat and killed them publi14 Tehran blamed that Islamabad could have done much more than it to cally. cally.14 Tehran blamed that Islamabad could have done much more than it did did to convince Taliban for the safety of Iranian diplomats. convince Taliban for the safety of Iranian diplomats. The phase starts from 2001 both countries found converThe third third phase starts from 2001 when when both countries once once again again found conver gence of interests. The American invasion in Afghanistan and Khatami’s gence of interests. The American invasion in Afghanistan and Khatami’s positive positive response its allies response to to the the United United States States and and its allies (including (including Pakistan) Pakistan) led led to to diplomatic diplomatic reconciliation between the two two countries. countries. Since Since then, then, despite despite fears, reluctance, reconciliation between the fears, reluctance, and internal pressures, pressures, both both countries and external external and and internal countries have have evolved evolved their their relationrelation ship. Misperceptions and Saudi influence dominated the initial years ship. Misperceptions and Saudi influence dominated the initial years of of this this era; era; however, both countries have gradually overcome of many issues concerning both however, both countries have gradually overcome of many issues concerning both countries’ trade, border border security, countries’ interests interests including including trade, security, and and Afghanistan Afghanistan affairs. affairs. Once Once considered rival ports, Gwadar and Chabahar are now officially sister ports.15 Iran considered rival ports, Gwadar and Chabahar are now officially sister ports.15 Iran today provides provides electricity to many border. today electricity to many towns towns of of Balochistan Balochistan along along its its border. Both into aa much Both countries countries are are now now engaged engaged into much more more complicated complicated relationship relationship where external players such as Saudi Arabia and the United where external players such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, States, geopolitics geopolitics of East, and bilateral relationof Middle Middle East, and Afghanistan Afghanistan peace peace process process influence influence this this bilateral relation ship. politics of ship. However, However, domestic domestic politics of Iran Iran is is another another significant significant factor, factor, which which could could not get its due share while discussing Pakistan–Iran relations. Domestic politics not get its due share while discussing Pakistan-Iran relations. Domestic politics of of Iran Iran often often shapes shapes the the regional regional security security outlook outlook and and directly directly manages manages external external actors’ perceptions and ultimately becomes a reason to impact actors’ perceptions and ultimately becomes a reason to impact Pakistan–Iran Pakistan-Iran relations - directly directly and and indirectly. relations– indirectly.

Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Approach Approach to to Iran Iran Under Under PTI PTI Government Government The PTI government balanced position position towards towards the The PTI government has has showed showed aa flexible flexible and and balanced the bilateral relationship between Iran and Pakistan. The government wants to to bilateral relationship between Iran and Pakistan. The government wants broaden its bilateral engagement with Iran through China-Pakistan broaden its bilateral engagement with Iran through China-Pakistan Economic Economic CorCor ridor (CPEC) (CPEC) CPEC CPEC investments investments and and Afghan Afghan peace last 2years, 2 years, ridor peace process. process. During During last high-profile visits including Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Iran have high-profile visits including Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Iran have taken taken place. visit to place. Imran Imran Khan’s Khan’s visit to Iran Iran and and subsequent subsequent policies policies have have prioritized prioritized PakiPaki stan’s two-prong strategy. the government stan’s relationship relationship through through two-prong strategy. First, First, the government does does not not want witness active between Iran this regard, want to to witness active conflicts conflicts between Iran and and Saudi Saudi Arabia. Arabia. In In this regard, PM Khan Pakistan can play an between the the PM Khan considers considers that that Pakistan can play an active active role role of of mediator mediator between two countries. The government believes that conflict between the two countries two countries. The government believes that conflict between the two countries is is 16 complex, but it be resolved Iran too considers complex, but it can can be resolved through through dialogues. dialogues.16 Iran too considers it it imporimpor tant that that Pakistan Pakistan may keep assuming tant may keep assuming the the role role as as aa mediator mediator during during any any conflict conflict between the two Middle Eastern rivals; however, Saudi Arabia has always between the two Middle Eastern rivals; however, Saudi Arabia has always shown shown 17 unwillingness to unwillingness to accept accept Pakistan’s Pakistan’s mediatory mediatory role role in in any any Persian Persian Gulf Gulf conflict. conflict.17

146 Khurram Abbas It will likely policy of It seems seems that that the the PTI PTI government government will likely to to continue continue this this policy of medimedi ation between the two countries, which will gain Iranian appreciation, ation between the two countries, which will gain Iranian appreciation, aa good good sign for the bilateral relationship. Overall, Overall, there there is is consensus consensus within within Pakistan Pakistan that that sign for the bilateral relationship. materializing the (CPEC) dream into reality can only be possible through friendly materializing the (CPEC) dream into reality can only be possible through friendly relationship with with Iran. Iran. Therefore, Therefore, aa friendly friendly Iran Iran has has become an utmost utmost priority priority relationship become an for Pakistani government in order to minimize any negative impact of geopolifor Pakistani government in order to minimize any negative impact of geopoli 18 tics the region. The visit of tics and and major major powers’ powers’ ingress ingress in in the region.18 The recent recent visit of Iranian Iranian Foreign Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif to Pakistan after US Presidential elections suggests Minister Jawad Zarif to Pakistan after US Presidential elections suggests that that Iran Iran too Pakistan as too considers considers Pakistan as an an important important country country and and as as one one of of the the major major players players in in power the region. power and and geopolitics geopolitics of of the region. However, the bilateral relationship However, the bilateral relationship will will not not remain remain limited limited to to the the mediatory mediatory role of Pakistan in Persian Gulf conflicts. The PM Khan’s visit has role of Pakistan in Persian Gulf conflicts. The PM Khan’s visit has articulated articulated Pakistan’s Pakistan’s desire desire to to engage engage Iran Iran through through the the development development of of economic economic partnerpartner ship. This eagerness is primarily focused on the economic development border ship. This eagerness is primarily focused on the economic development of of border areas of both sides. For this purpose, the government has taken many positive areas of both sides. For this purpose, the government has taken many positive initiatives to uplift the existing business and border initiatives to uplift the existing business and economic economic environment environment of of the the border region. First, the government government has has set set up 18 new new markets markets along along Iran–Afghanistan Iran-Afghanistan region. First, the up 18 19 Likewise, both both countries border to the region. border to facilitate facilitate trade trade activities activities in in the region.19 Likewise, countries have have increased working hours of border crossings, and an emphasis on joint ventures ventures increased working hours of border crossings, and an emphasis on joint has become aa new the border border areas. trend has has become new norm norm at at the areas. This This trend has started started facilitating facilitating local local inhabitants of both sides. inhabitants of both sides. Further, Border Pakistan are Further, Border Trade Trade Committees Committees (BTCs) (BTCs) of of Iran Iran and and Pakistan are now now meetmeet 20 ing on a regular basis, which is essential for curbing red tape culture and ing on a regular basis,20 which is essential for curbing red tape culture and for for the the improvement bilateral trade. Moreover, the been developimprovement of of bilateral trade. Moreover, the PTI PTI government government has has been develop ing Pakistan at border ing aa mechanism mechanism to to cease cease diesel diesel smuggling smuggling from from Iran Iran to to Pakistan at the the border region Balochistan province. Prime Minister Pakistan region in in Balochistan province. In In this this context, context, the the Prime Minister of of Pakistan Imran plan, which which will the smugImran Khan Khan has has approved approved aa comprehensive comprehensive action action plan, will curb curb the smug gling Pakistan–Iran border border region. to Pakistan gling at at Pakistan-Iran region. The The losses losses incurred incurred to Pakistan due due to to smugsmug gling are estimated between Rs 100billion and Rs 150billion by the Federal gling are estimated between Rs 100 billion and Rs 150 billion by the Federal 21 Board If trade is bilateral trade would substanBoard of of Revenue. Revenue.21 If this this trade is channelized, channelized, the the bilateral trade would substan tially improve in the near future. tially improve in the near future.

Future Future of of Pakistan–Iran Pakistan-Iran Relations Relations under under Conservative Conservative Government Government of of Iran Iran Likely Stressed Regional Environment Environment and Pakistan–Iran Relations Relations Likely Stressed Regional and Pakistan-Iran According the conservative three major According to to Ansari, Ansari, the conservative governments governments of of Iran Iran have have three major comcom ponents of governance– that is political and economic populism, repression, ponents of governance - that is political and economic populism, repression, and and 22 the foreign relations. Perhaps the the crisis the sustenance sustenance of of crisis crisis in in foreign relations.22 Perhaps crisis in in foreign foreign relarela tions tions politically politically serves serves the the interests interests of of conservative conservative governments. governments. The The influence influence of this crisis could affect regional or international security environment. of this crisis could affect regional or international security environment. Their Their overwhelming overwhelming reliance reliance on on the the populist populist slogans slogans such such as as over-projection over-projection of of IraIra nian in the nian dominance dominance in the region, region, overtly overtly supporting supporting militant militant religious religious groups, groups, and and

Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 147 threatening regional countries especially Israel lead to unstable foreign relations and stressed regional security environment. Another reason of stressed regional security environment is the cultivation of identity politics at state level. The conservative governments of Iran often tried to inject superiority complex in the Iranian nation and created a divide between Iran and the rest of Middle Eastern nations.23 This identity or civilizational superiority complex trickles down hatred to the people-to-people level, and between regional countries and Iran. This instability, hatred, and hostility in Middle East directly affect Pakistan–Iran relations due to Islamabad’s close coordination and cooperation with Arab countries. Resultantly, Pakistan faces a serious problem of justifying its relations with Iran at home and in the Arab world. Therefore, a cautious approach of Islamabad is more likely needed to deal with a conservative government during the next term of conservative parliament. There is a consensus in Islamabad’s policymaking circles that Pakistan will play its role only as a mediator in Middle Eastern conflicts. Pakistan has multiple interests to mediate between Iran and GCC states. It has strong economic and defence relations with GCC states, particularly with KSA, the UAE, and Bahrain. Because of having a large diaspora in these countries, Pakistan’s economy is dependent on foreign remittances coming from the Gulf region. At the same time, it does not want to harm its relations with its important neighbor Iran. Since the 1980s, Pakistan has been a victim of sectarian violence which had reached its peak in the 1990s. During 1989–2018, there were 3,072 incidents of sectarian violence that led to 5,602 casualties in Pakistan. While Iran has successfully spread its tentacles in the Middle East in the shape of terrorist proxies, it has also been able to create similar terrorist paraphernalia in the Afghanistan–Pakistan (Af–Pak) region in the shape of two battle-hardened groups– the Liwa Fatemiyoun (Arabic for Fatemiyoun Brigade) and the Liwa Zainebiyoun (Arabic for Zainebiyoun Brigade). Both the groups have fought in the Syrian theatre against the anti-Baathist regime factions and Sunni militant groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh. The exact date of the formation of Liwa Zainebiyoun is not known. However, the militant group came to the limelight in early 2015. The group mainly comprises recruits from the Pakistani Shias– mainly from the Turi and Bangash tribes of Kurram tribal district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP), as well as from other parts of Pakistan, mainly from urban cities of Quetta (Hazara population of Balochistan Province), Karachi and Hyderabad (Sindh province), and Punjab Province. Before the formation of the Liwa Zainebiyoun, its members were fighting under the banner of Liwa Fatemiyoun which mainly comprised Afghan nationals. In a Fatwa, Irani Shia Cleric (living in Iraq) Ayatollah Ali Sistani said that fighting against Daesh (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq is compulsory for all his followers. In response, these fighters volunteered themselves for fighting against Daesh. Hence, Iran has the capacity to lure in thousands of Shias to work according to its political objectives. The last point to be noted is that what Islamabad does not want more trouble at home as it has already been facing terrorist attacks

148 Khurram Abbas in various part of the country since 2002. Islamabad understands that any troubles in relations with Iran may fuel sectarian violence in Pakistan. The current government in Islamabad has been concerned about the domestic fallout of the Iranian–Saudi conflict in the Middle East. The Pakistani authorities have already been not only concerned but also have taken serious actions at home in relation to Pakistani Shi’a pilgrims returning from Iran, Iraq, and Syria as there have been reports of Iran recruiting Afghan and Pakistani Shi’as into its military brigades to support the Assad regime in Syria. Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been a strong supporter of pan-Islamism, and therefore it does not suit its foreign policy to not do anything in terms of fissures within the Ummah. While Pakistan has a foreign policy tilt towards Saudi Arabia, it still wants to have a balance in terms of its relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Apart and parcel of this approach is to act in accordance with its interests, for example through efforts to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 2019, Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan visited Iran and Saudi Arabia with the key agenda of acting as a mediator to resolve the growing differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In August2020, Khan claimed that his mediation between Tehran and Riyadh ‘played an important role in defusing tensions between archfoes Saudi Arabia and Iran.’ However, Pakistan’s ability to act as a mediator might be harmed if rifts of Tehran with Saudi Arabia and the UAE grow under the new conservative administration. The Sectarian Support by Conservative Governments and Sectarian Tensions in Pakistan One of the major concerns of Pakistan in recent years from Iran has emerged when Iran recruited Pakistani youth to fight in Syrian civil war. This recruitment, training, and funding process by IRGC is a practical manifestation of Iranian influence on Pakistani society. Iran has been pursuing robust strategies of enhancing its soft power in South and Central Asia mainly focusing on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Scholars argue that Iran has been pursuing largely three types of soft power strategies to influence societies in South and Central Asia.24 First, Iran’s pre-Islamic cultural and civilizational heritage including language, arts, and culture has been widely used by its embassies to influence larger segments of societies. Second, Iran influences societies through overtly and covertly empowering Shia communities in South and Central Asia. Third, Iran’s anti-Western and anti-American outlook also fascinates many in South and Central Asian societies.25 The accumulating impact of these three elements helps Iran to influence cultural and social policies of other countries. The moderates usually remain reluctant to outrightly support such activities in the region. For instance IRGC faced strong resistance during Rouhani’s administration for its overseas soft power operations. Many leading figures including Foreign Minister Javad Zarif were critical to IRGC’s overwhelming role in the foreign policy of Iran.26 However, with conservatives in power, it is highly likely that IRGC may find like-minded people in Iranian parliament and Raisi’s

Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 149 administration who would support and may further expand IRGC’s activities for cultural and social perception management in Iran’s periphery. Arecent study reveals that in past, the empowering of Pakistani Shia community by Iran has led to sectarian tensions in the country.27 From 1980s to early 2000s, Pakistan has faced the brunt of sectarian violence with over 2,000 killings, which resulted into a tarnishing of the social fabric of the country.28 Therefore, Pakistan does not want another wave of sectarian conflict in the country. This is why it has remained neutral in Yemen’s conflict and tried to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia during their tensions in 2016 after the killing of a prominent Saudi Shia cleric Nirm-al Nimr.29 Hence, the outright support of Iran’s hardliners for Shia community of Pakistan may disturb the equilibrium that has been created by Pakistan in the last one decade. This means that Pakistan will be forced to take various measures to protect its social fabric such as by distancing itself from Iran, revisiting its policy of neutrality in Middle Eastern conflicts, and limiting its interaction with Iran at cultural and people-to-people level. Therefore, the policy approach of hardliners towards Shia community of Pakistan, especially Hazaras, will largely determine the future outlook of Iran–Pakistan bilateral relationship. Nuclear Issue Issue and Pakistan–Iran Relations Relations Nuclear and Pakistan-Iran After Hassan Rouhani’s After President President Hassan Rouhani’s extraordinary extraordinary achievement achievement of of improvement improvement in foreign relations, the event of the signing of the JCPOA in 2015 in foreign relations, the event of the signing of the JCPOA in 2015 took took place. place. The JCPOA had signaled of developing potentially normal relationship between The JCPOA had signaled of developing potentially normal relationship between Iran However, Trump’s withdrawal legitimized Iran and and the the West. West. However, Trump’s unilateral unilateral withdrawal legitimized concon servatives’ narrative within Iran that the United States is an unreliable to servatives’ narrative within Iran that the United States is an unreliable country country to negotiate and to sign any agreement in future would be like a betrayal to Iranian negotiate and to sign any agreement in future would be like a betrayal to Iranian 30 national Keeping view the the nuclear that national integrity. integrity.30 Keeping in in view nuclear issue, issue, it it seems seems highly highly likely likely that the nuclear controversy will further aggravate during the tenure of conservative the nuclear controversy will further aggravate during the tenure of conservative administration be economic administration in in Iran. Iran. The The direct direct result result might might be economic sanctions sanctions and and rising rising tensions between Iran and the United States. Resultantly, Pakistan’s tensions between Iran and the United States. Resultantly, Pakistan’s economic economic cooperation cooperation will will remain remain limited limited and and to to some some extent extent would would lead lead to to negative negative growth growth amid a bleak regional security environment due to aforementioned factors. amid a bleak regional security environment due to aforementioned factors. The is also The nuclear nuclear dimension dimension of of Pakistan–Iran Pakistan-Iran relations relations is also not not pleasant pleasant as as it should be. Pakistan often remained careful while dealing with Iran it should be. Pakistan often remained careful while dealing with Iran over over its its alleged programme. DrAbdul Khan’s controversy further limalleged nuclear nuclear programme. Dr Abdul Qadeer Qadeer Khan’s controversy further lim 31 ited options for Pakistan on the issue. Since the emergence of the controversy, ited options for Pakistan on the issue.31 Since the emergence of the controversy, Pakistan often use of Pakistan often supported supported aa peaceful peaceful use of nuclear nuclear energy energy (in (in aa covert covert manner manner criticized the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran) and remained criticized the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran) and remained cautious cautious over over time. The fraternity believes believes that time. The Pakistan’s Pakistan’s security security fraternity that aa nuclear-armed nuclear-armed Iran Iran might might 32 pose aa potential potential threat Pakistan’s interests. For instance, pose threat to to Pakistan’s interests.32 For instance, on on 20 20 June2020, June 2020, the the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution critical critical to to IraIranian programme. Pakistan Pakistan along with other man nuclear nuclear programme. along with other six six countries countries including including South South Africa, India, Thailand, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, and Niger abstained during Africa, India, Thailand, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, and Niger abstained during the the voting. Pakistan’s noncooperation vibes within within voting. Pakistan’s noncooperation and and silence silence often often leave leave negative negative vibes

150 Khurram Khurram Abbas 150 Abbas 33 Iranian The Iranian academic academic and and policymaking policymaking circles. circles.33 The soft soft approach approach of of moderates moderates on on nuclear issue and JCPOA had made Pakistan’s diplomacy easier. Islamabad nuclear issue and JCPOA had made Pakistan’s diplomacy easier. Islamabad was was happy to deal However, the happy to deal with with aa lesser lesser sanctioned sanctioned and and non-nuclear non-nuclear Iran. Iran. However, the end end of of JCPOA and likely revival of Iran’s uranium enrichment might make Pakistan’s JCPOA and likely revival of Iran’s uranium enrichment might make Pakistan’s diplomatic job tougher tougher during diplomatic job during conservative conservative administration administration in in power. power.

Iran–Pakistan Economic Relations Relations Iran-Pakistan Economic The trade The geopolitical geopolitical environment enviromnent and and suspicion suspicion over over intentions intentions directly directly affect affect trade and mercantile relations. The fear of unstable and unpredictable political environand mercantile relations. The fear of unstable and unpredictable political environ ment the Foreign Foreign Direct bilateral trade. ment negatively negatively affects affects the Direct Investment Investment (FDI) (FDI) and and bilateral trade. The empirical evidence of bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan that The empirical evidence of bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan suggests suggests that trade relations often witnessed a drastic dip during the conservative governments. trade relations often witnessed a drastic dip during the conservative govermnents. Acomparative trade volume volume between between Iran two A comparative chart chart of of trade Iran and and Pakistan Pakistan during during the the two governments of different political ideologies is given in Figure9.1. govermnents of different political ideologies is given in Figure 9.1. Pakistan–Iran economic been underutilized for decades. Pakistan-Iran economic relations relations have have been underutilized for decades. Though Though the two countries signed Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in 2004, this tire two countries signed Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in 2004, however, however, this agreement could not be translated into increased volume of trade between agreement could not be translated into increased volume of trade between the past 16years, PTA into the two two countries. countries. In In past 16 years, the the two two countries countries could could not not convert convert PTA into 34 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) mainly because of Iranian protectionist policies. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) mainly because of Iranian protectionist policies.34 The overall trade figures suggest that the volume of bilateral trade reduces signifiThe overall trade figures suggest that the volume of bilateral trade reduces signifi cantly the conservative because of the impocantly during during the conservative governments. govermnents. This This is is mainly mainly because of the impo sition of international sanctions, which does not allow Iranian banks to issue sition of international sanctions, which does not allow Iranian banks to issue letter letter

.=-----Conservatives ------Moderates

2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19

Figure 9.1 A Brief Comparison Comparison of of Pakistan–Iran Pakistan-Iran Trade Trade During During Conservative Conservative and and ModerModer Figure 9.1 ABrief ates’ Era Era (USD (USD in in Million) ates’ Million) Source: Compiled Compiled by by the author based based on on annual annual reports of Pakistan Pakistan Bureau Bureau of of Statistics Statistics (PBS) (PBS) Source: the author reports of

Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 151 of credit. Pakistani officials are highly careful while dealing with economically sanctioned Iran. Former diplomats have consensus that economic sanctions are the major impediment in bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan.35 The Iranian perspective is that Pakistan can avoid economic sanctions through developing alternative channels as India and China have developed alternative channels to bypass American economic sanctions and carrying out business with Iran. In this context, Pakistan needs to develop alternative transaction channels such as barter system to improve bilateral trade between the two countries. It is interesting to note that Iranian government has shared names of five Iranian banks with Foreign Office of Pakistan, which do not fall under American sanctions.36 However, Pakistan is not willing to pursue trade through those banks due to the likely pressure of the United States and Saudi Arabia.37 The international sanctions on Iran have become a permanent feature. There are many other structural issues that limit Pakistan–Iran trade. The foremost reason is that Iran’s economy is a mixture of central planning, state ownership of oil, and other large enterprises as well as small-scale private trading and service ventures. Iran’s economy is more inward looking, and conservative governments owing to international sanctions often follow highly protectionist policies.38 The textile and furniture industries face severe restrictive trade policies, which creates difficulties for Pakistani traders to compete in Iranian market. These import duties range from 100percent to 150percent on various Pakistan products.39 During conservative government, the Iranian economic system becomes highly bureaucratic. This adds further difficulties for Pakistani traders. Frequent change in rules and regulations without prior notification also discourages the proper functioning of business environment. This practice was frequent during Ahmadinejad’s era due to regional tensions and internal political turmoil.40 However, Rouhani administration lately discouraged this practice.41 If the new conservative administration restarts this practice, it would be detrimental to Pakistan–Iran economic cooperation. Further, the uncertainty in geopolitics also negatively affects bilateral trade. The stark difference between economic achievements of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations’ is primarily due to Rouhani’s engagement with Obama administration that led to JCPOA and lifting of economic sanctions on Iran. That engagement also established an environment favorable to business and trade. Arepeat telecast of conservative government’s furious statements and volatile geopolitical situation may likely discourage Pakistani businessmen to invest and trade with Iran. Smuggling is also one of the biggest hurdles in the expansion of regular bilateral trade. The main items smuggled from Iran to Pakistan include oil, chemicals, petroleum products, cement, tiles etc. while from Pakistan the smuggled items include rice, fruit, livestock, surgical and sports goods, and garments and textiles.42 However, smuggling cannot be attributed to any particular government in Iran. Reportedly, it is often associated to military institutions. The IRGC is allegedly involved in drug smuggling through Nimroz province.43 Such activities often reduce possibilities of expansion of regular trade volume. However, time will judge whether conservative government will strive for curbing this practice or not.

152 Khurram Abbas Further, Iran–Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline will be a test case for both governments in future. Pakistan believes that economic sanctions are major impediments in the materializing of the project. Despite extensive efforts, Pakistan has been able to secure funding for the project. After passing of JCPOA, Pakistan actively sought funding for this project, and initially Asian Development Bank (ADB) agreed to fund the project; however, owing to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from nuclear agreement and subsequent series of conflicts, the process has once again been stalled. Iran has completed its part of project, while Pakistan’s part remains incomplete. According to Gas Sales Purchase Agreement (GSPA) of 1995, Pakistan is bound to pay USD 1million per day from January2015 onwards as per penalty clause of the agreement. So far, Iran has cooperated with Pakistan and extended the deadline of the project multiple times. However, Tehran served a legal notice to Pakistan last year on moving to arbitration court.44 There is strong point of view within Iranian official and academic community that further delay in the completion of IP gas pipeline project might irk Iranian authorities in future and might become a source of tension between the two governments.45

Some Glimpses of Hope Counterweight Policy of Conservatives One cannot rule out the optimism in Pakistan–Iran relations under a conservative administration. It has been observed that the conservatives often consider South and Central Asia as a counterweight to their fractured relationship with Middle East. Iran often tried to minimize pressure of Gulf countries in Middle East through active cooperation with South and Central Asian countries. This has been proved during Ahmadinejad’s tenure who sought active cooperation with South Asia. He not only visited India and Pakistan, but also pursued Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline. Former President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari inaugurated the IP gas pipeline during his visit to Tehran.46 However, it will be highly challenging for Islamabad to develop closer cooperation with Iran amid Tehran’s stressed relationship with Arab countries. Likely Support on Jammu and Kashmir Dispute Likewise, there’s expectation that keeping in view Islamist leanings and populist sloganeering, the conservative government of Iran might be more vocal on Jammu and Kashmir dispute. This has been evident from Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent statements that overtly criticized human rights violations against Kashmiri Muslims by India.47 Majority of conservatives follow Supreme Leader’s statements while formulating their foreign policy priorities. The former diplomats are also authenticating that during their diplomatic overtures, they found conservatives more inclined towards Pakistan’s stance on Jammu and Kashmir dispute as compared to moderate governments.48 Furthermore, the

Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 153 Indian tilt towards the United States has irked Iranian authorities.49 The Iranian perspective is that India has changed its strategy in Himalaya region (reference to China) owing to fulfill American strategic objectives.50 Therefore, a robust criticism of Indian human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir and frequent statements in this regard are more likely expected from the conservative government of Iran in future. If so happens, Tehran–Islamabad relations will likely witness an uptrend. The US Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Intra-Afghan Peace Process Afghanistan has remained one of the serious bones of contentions between Pakistan and Iran. Both countries were supporting the opposing fractions of Afghanistan during 1990s. The Afghan infighting converted into a greater proxy war between Iran and Pakistan. Afghan Sunni groups were financially and militarily backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while Hizb-e-Wahdat and Tajiks were backed by Iran.51 Due to this proxy war, both countries witnessed a dip in their relationship. However, the post-9/11 developments and death of Mullah Omar (former Commander of Taliban) led to a change of geopolitical realities of the region. Iran changed its approach and attitude towards Taliban. In fact, Qatar brokered a détente between Iran and Taliban through latter’s presence in Doha.52 Tehran’s engagement with Taliban led to a convergence of interests between Iran and Pakistan. The basic contentious issue between Iran and Taliban was sectarian hatred.53 Historically, Saudi Arabia through its extravagant funding and export of ideology further aggravated this sectarian hatred. However, the working relationship and rapprochement between Taliban and Iran substantially developed during Rouhani’s era. This is mainly because Rouhani administration had reduced sectarian hatred and followed pragmatic policy. As of now, Tehran’s apparent strategy seems to witness a complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Taliban–US Peace Agreement and Trump’s approach of lesser overseas commitment might materialize Tehran’s desire into reality. On intra-Afghan peace process, Iran and Pakistan both share similar objectives with almost identical approaches. In fact, Tehran appreciates Pakistan’s efforts of facilitation of negotiation process between Afghan factions.54 Thanks to Iran– Taliban normal working relationship, Tehran has no issue if Taliban shares power with Kabul.55 Iran has been supportive of the intra-Afghan peace process and would support any outcome that would satisfy all factions of Afghanistan.56 However, if new conservative government, as happened in the past, starts supporting Hazaras and Tajiks in Afghanistan based on their sectarian leanings, it would be hard to control another conflict between Taliban and Iran, ultimately dangerous to Afghan peace and detrimental to Pakistan–Iran relationship.57 Therefore, the new government in Iran would have to be careful while shaping its foreign policy towards Afghanistan, and sectarian tendencies should not be reflected in its approaches.

154 Khurram Abbas China–Iran Strategic Agreement China–Iran strategic deal might be another source of confluence between Iran– Pakistan relations in near future. The proposed Beijing–Tehran agreement comprising US$400billion and spanning over 25years might be a game changer for the regional security and development. The general atmosphere in Islamabad is largely supportive to this agreement as it has been perceived that India might be sidelined in the region.58 It was Islamabad’s longstanding concern that India has been using Iranian soil to sabotage Pakistan’s strategic interests in Balochistan. The arrest of Indian Navy Commander Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, who was travelling in Pakistan’s Balochistan through Iran, has further coagulated Pakistan’s concerns. However, New Delhi cannot be sidelined easily. According to DrZahid Shahab Ahmad, India won’t give Chabahar easily to China owing to the fact that both Iran and India are strategic partners and remained considerably engaged at multiple forums.59 In fact, Tehran–New Delhi’s strategic cooperation and interests in Afghanistan are aligned to each other’s strategic objectives. Therefore, New Delhi’s expulsion from Iran might not be possible in near foreseeable future. The Iranian leanings towards Russia and China are often hailed by Pakistani academia and public due to Iranian resistance against status quo.60 However, there are skeptics to this deal who believe that Pakistan might be forced by its Arab friends to stay away from China–Iran deal, which is difficult for Pakistan given its strategic, economic, and political relations with China.61 This skepticism is based on the strategic dimension of the agreement between China and Iran. The greater military cooperation, joint military exercises, joint weapons’ development, and robust economic investments would bolster Iranian military strength, which is detrimental to Saudi-led Arab countries’ interests in the region. This situation might create further insecurity which might lead to greater realignments and arms race in the region. Pakistan often paid heavy cost of Saudi-led Arab countries’ insecurities against Iran. The basic problem with Pakistan’s foreign policy is that it is primarily guided with two basic factors, that is money and security. Without money, Islamabad cannot secure better and expansive security deals to strengthen its conventional military muscle. Therefore, the money (in terms of loans and aids) remains a pivotal discussion point during internal meetings on foreign policy issues within civil and military leaderships.62

Pakistan’s Desire for Robust Security Cooperation with Iran Assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh has sparked a new debate within Islamabad regarding enhanced security cooperation with Iran. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is widely referred to Iran’s Robert Oppenheimer due to services rendered by him for nuclear program of Iran.63 This is a major psychological and professional blow to alleged Iranian nuclear program. It has been a declared strategy of Mossad to kill Iranian nuclear scientists so that the Iranian nuclear programme could be delayed. This strategy has intensified recently, which means Israel has been able to develop a subversive Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Iran and Future ofPakistan-Iran 155 Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations Relations 155 network HUMINT network network deep deep inside inside Iran. Iran. The The establishment establishment of of HUMINT network in in Iran Iran is is an an extraordinary Mossad. extraordinary success success story story of of Mossad. Netanyahu’s visit to was not purpose to Netanyahu’s secret secret visit to Saudi Saudi Arabia Arabia was not solely solely for for the the purpose to concon vince Muhammad Bin Bin Salman to recognize vince Crown Crown Prince Prince Muhammad Salman to recognize Israel, Israel, which which is is perper haps a medium-term goal for Netanyahu. The short-term goal is to cooperate haps a medium-term goal for Netanyahu. The short-term goal is to cooperate with Saudi joint regional based with Saudi Arabia Arabia on on an an establishment establishment of of aa joint regional security security network network based on human and artificial intelligence against Iran amid fears that President-elect on human and artificial intelligence against Iran amid fears that President-elect Joe Nuclear Deal, Deal, releasing Joe Biden Biden and and the the European European Union Union may may renew renew the the Iran Iran Nuclear releasing the pressure off the Iranian regime and leaving the GCC and Israel to fend off the pressure off the Iranian regime and leaving the GCC and Israel to fend off against Iran by themselves. It seems that the basic aim behind the UAE to ban ban against Iran by themselves. It seems that the basic aim behind the UAE to visas to Pakistanis visas to Pakistanis and and other other Muslim Muslim countries countries including including Turkey, Turkey, Afghanistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, etc., is to forestall any prospects of building (HUMINT) UAE by by Yemen, etc., is to forestall any prospects of building (HUMINT) inside inside UAE Iran against Israeli citizens. Arab countries are now preparing themselves for subIran against Israeli citizens. Arab countries are now preparing themselves for sub versive their citizens possible versive proxy proxy warfare warfare and and securing securing their citizens and and territories territories from from any any possible retaliation by Iran. This intelligence-based subversion and asymmetric conflict by retaliation by Iran. This intelligence-based subversion and asymmetric conflict by Israel–GCC will likely exacerbate in near future, which means such high–profile Israel-GCC will likely exacerbate in near future, which means such high-profile killings in killings in Iran Iran will will increase increase in in number. number. In this entire context, Jaish ul-Adl be aa logical proxy for for Israel In this entire context, Jaish ul-Adl will will be logical proxy Israel and and Arab Arab countries against Iran. Nexus between Jaish ul-Adl and Baloch terrorist countries against Iran. Nexus between Jaish ul-Adl and Baloch terrorist groups groups could be used transfer, provision could be used for for funds funds transfer, provision of of weapons, weapons, and and establishment establishment of of HUMINT network, the importance Baloch terrorist terrorist group HUMINT network, which which means means the importance of of Baloch group will will likely increase during this subversive between Iran likely increase during this subversive conflict conflict between Iran and and Israel–GCC. Israel-GCC. Therefore, it is safe to claim that this proxy conflict may likely rejuvenate the Therefore, it is safe to claim that this proxy conflict may likely rejuvenate the Baloch insurgency Baloch insurgency in in Pakistan. Pakistan. Therefore, Therefore, Pakistan Pakistan wants wants to to develop develop and and enhance enhance intelligence Baloch separatists intelligence sharing sharing with with Iran Iran against against Jaish Jaish ul-Adl ul-Adl and and Baloch separatists along along the Pak-Iran Pak–Iran border. border. Through the Through this this cooperation, cooperation, Pakistan Pakistan may may not not only only undermine undermine any between Iran but any negative negative implication implication of of aa new new proxy proxy war war between Iran and and Israel-GCC, Israel-GCC, but also may neutralize any subversive activity against CPEC initiated by Baloch also may neutralize any subversive activity against CPEC initiated by Baloch separatists. the option separatists. Likewise, Likewise, Pakistan Pakistan is is also also looking looking for for the option of of convincing convincing Saudi Saudi Arabia and Iran for signing of a non-aggression agreement, which Arabia and Iran for signing of a non-aggression agreement, which can can reduce reduce hostilities threat perception both countries hostilities and and shape shape threat perception of of both countries against against each each other. other. There There is also belief that Iran would be likely to agree to sign this non-aggression is also belief that Iran would be likely to agree to sign this non-aggression agreeagree ment, but convincing would be be aa hard for Pakistan. Pakistan. ment, but convincing Saudi Saudi Arabia Arabia would hard task task for

Concluding Concluding Remarks Remarks Iran–Pakistan Iran-Pakistan relationship relationship is is not not simple. simple. There There are are many many actors actors involved involved to to influinflu ence the relationship. Former diplomats are hopeful that since there is no ence the relationship. Former diplomats are hopeful that since there is no major major dispute between the that both both countries dispute between the two two countries, countries, it it is is highly highly likely likely that countries may may 64 overcome irritants through bilateral negotiation and diplomatic In overcome irritants through bilateral negotiation and diplomatic channels. channels.64 In fact, both countries have been in close coordination on various issues concerning fact, both countries have been in close coordination on various issues concerning bilateral relations border security bilateral trade. bilateral relations such such as as border security and and bilateral trade. Apart Apart from from domestic domestic politics, the influence of Arab countries, the United States, and India bilatpolitics, the influence of Arab countries, the United States, and India shapes shapes bilat eral relationship. However, the influence of Arab countries and the United States eral relationship. However, the influence of Arab countries and the United States is fading away policy. Likewise, Likewise, the is fading away in in Pakistan’s Pakistan’s foreign foreign policy. the China–Iran China-Iran strategic strategic

156 Khurram Abbas agreement may likely minimize the Indian role in Iran– a longstanding concern of Islamabad. Hence, the regional political and security environment has somehow neutralized many hiccups for a smooth cordial relationship. The future of bilateral relationship will largely rely upon the domestic politics of Iran as Islamabad’s eagerness to develop cordial relationship with Tehran is too strong to be ignored. Therefore, the behaviour of conservative government of Iran will be a stronger variable between bilateral relations of the two countries. However, history suggests that conservatives are very good at making enemies through outrageous statements, supporting religious groups in other countries, and so on.

Notes 1 Conservatives won 221 out of 290 seats, while moderates could get only 30 seats, Arash Azizi, “Factbox: The Outcome of Iran’s 2020 Parliamentary Elections,” The IranSource Blog, February26, 2020, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs2/iransource/ factbox-the-outcome-of-irans-2020-parliamentary-elections/. 2 Maziar Motamedi, “Hardliner Ebrahim Raisi Elected Iran’s New President,” Al-Jazeera, June19, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/19/raisi-wins-irans-presidential-elec tion-amid-low-turnout. 3 Nasser Hadian, Faculty of Law& Political Science, University of Tehran in discussion with the author on August3, 2020. 4 Ambassador Javad Kachoueian, Former Ambassador of Iran to Ireland in discussion with the author on August21, 2020. 5 Ibid. 6 “Iran, UAE Foreign Ministers Hold Rare Talks on Regional Challenges, Coronavirus Pandemic,” Daily Sabah, August02, 2020, www.dailysabah.com/world/mid-east/iranuae-foreign-ministers-hold-rare-talks-on-regional-challenges-coronavirus-pandemic. 7 Kim Sengupta, “Iran Elections: Hardliners Win Every Seat in Tehran as They Sweep To Crushing Victory,” Independent, February23, 2020, www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/middle-east/iran-elections-hardliners-victory-tehran-revolutionary-guards-turn out-a9353811.html. 8 Ibid. 9 Nasser Hadian, Faculty of Law& Political Science, University of Tehran in discussion with the author on August03, 2020. 10 Ali M. Ansari, “Iran Under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation,” Adelphi Paper 393, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2007, 07. 11 Farhad Rezaei, Iran’s Foreign Policy After Nuclear Agreement: Politics of Normalizers and Traditionalists (Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 14. 12 M. Ibrahim Youssef, “Iran Calls U.S. Action a ‘Barbaric Massacre’,” The New York Times, July4, 1988, www.nytimes.com/1988/07/04/world/iran-calls-us-action-a-bar baric-massacre.html. 13 Muhammad Noor-ul-Haq, former Senior Research Fellow at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) in discussion with the author on July30, 2020. 14 Dilip Hero, Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy (London: C. Hurst& Co., 2018), 168–69. 15 Masood Haider, “Chabahar Port Not to Rival Gwadar, Rouhani Tells PM,” Dawn, September23, 2016, www.dawn.com/news/1285530/chabahar-port-not-to-rival-gwadarrouhani-tells-pm. 16 “Welcome Peace Gesture by Pakistan, Says President Rouhani Alongside PM Imran,” Dawn, October14, 2019, www.dawn.com/news/1510619.

Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 157 17 Khurram Abbas, “Passive Mediation in Persian Gulf Conflicts: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Peace Initiatives,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 13, no. 4 (2019): 604–20. 18 Sahibzada Muhammbad Usman, “Iran-Pakistan Relation: Impact on CPEC,” Asian Journal of Social Science and Management Technology 2, no. 3 (June2020): 56. 19 Afghanistan, “18 Markets to Be Set Up Along Borders with Iran,” Dawn, September18, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1580291. 20 “Pakistan–Iran Border Trade Committee Meets in Zahedan,” Dawn, November29, 2019, www.dawn.com/news/1519455/pakistan-iran-border-trade-committee-meets-inzahedan. 21 “PM Orders Action Against Fuel Smuggling Across Iran Border,” Dawn, January03, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1599346. 22 Ansari, “Iran Under Ahmadinejad,” 42. 23 Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Untold Story of Iran’s Radical Leader (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Ansari, “Iran Under Ahmadinejad,” 44. 24 Shahram Akbarzadeh, Zahid Shahab Ahmed, and Niamatullah Ibrahimi, “Iran’s Soft Power in Pakistan,” Asian Politics and Policy (2021): 1–21, http://doi.org/10.1111/ aspp.12586. 25 Ibid. 26 Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran’s Foreign Minister, in Leaked Tape, Says Revolutionary Guards Set Policies,” New York Times, April25, 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/04/25/world/ middleeast/iran-suleimani-zarif.html. 27 Akbarzadeh etal., “Iran’s Soft Power in Pakistan,” 10. 28 South Asian Portal, “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/coun tries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm. 29 Khurram Abbas, “Passive Mediation in Persian Gulf Conflicts: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Peace Initiatives,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1–18. 30 Ambassador Javad Kachoueian, Former Ambassador of Iran to Ireland, in discussion with the author on August21, 2020. 31 Zahid Shahab Ahmad, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies Forum, Deakin University, Australia, in discussion with the author on September01, 2020. 32 Col. (R) Muhammad Hanif, former Research Fellow at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and Senior Security and Defence Analyst, in discussion with the author on August07, 2020. 33 Ambassador (R) Dr. Raza Zadah, Senior Executive Director at Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) and former Ambassador of Iran to Nigeria, in discussion with the author on July29, 2020. 34 Commercial Counselor of Pakistan to Iran in discussion with the author on August16, 2020. 35 Amb (R) Asif Durrani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (2016–2018) in discussion with the author on July21, 2020. 36 Ambassador (R) Dr. Raza Zadah, Senior Executive Director at Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) and former Ambassador of Iran to Nigeria in discussion with the author on July29, 2020. 37 Ibid. 38 Ambassador (R) Javed Hafeez, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia, in discussion with the author on August18, 2020. 39 Commercial Counselor of Pakistan to Iran in discussion with the author on August16, 2020. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Khurram Abbas, “Pakistan–Iran Relations: Economic Potential and Prospects,” IPRI Insight 2, no. 1–2 (2015):87–99.

158 Khurram Abbas 43 Ambassador (R) Asif Durrani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (2016–2018), in discussion with the author on July21, 2020. 44 Khalid Mustafa, “IP Gas Pipeline: Iran Issues Notice to Pakistan on Moving Arbitration Court,” The News, May8, 2019. 45 Mustafa Zamani, Political Counselor of Iran to Pakistan, in discussion with author on July29, 2020. 46 “Pakistan, Iran Break Ground on Pipeline Project,” Dawn, March11, 2013, www. dawn.com/news/791865. 47 “Ayatollah Khamenei’s ‘Pinned’ Tweet Calls For ‘Just Policy’ on Kashmir,” The Wire, August22, 2019, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/ayatollah-khamenei-twitterjust-policy-kashmir. 48 Ambassador (R) Asif Durrani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (2016–2018), in discussion with the author on July21, 2020. 49 Ambassador (R) Dr. Raza Zadah, Senior Executive Director at Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) and former Ambassador of Iran to Nigeria, in discussion with the author on July29, 2020. 50 Ibid. 51 Dilip Hero, Cold War in the Islamic World, 168–69. 52 Air Cdr. (R) Khalid Iqbal (Senior Defence Analyst and Chairman, IPS Committee on Pakistan’s Geo-strategic and Geo-political Dynamics, Institute of Policy Studies) in discussion with the author on September2, 2020. 53 Ibid. 54 Ambassador (R) Muhammad Sadiq, Pakistan’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, in discussion with the author on August24, 2020. 55 Brig. (r) Said Nazir Mohmand, Senior Defence Analyst and Expert of Afghanistan Affairs, in discussion with author on August13, 2020. 56 Ambassador (R) Dr. Raza Zadah, Senior Executive Director at Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) and former Ambassador of Iran to Nigeria, in discussion with the author on July29, 2020. 57 Brig. (r) Said Nazir Mohmand, Senior Defence Analyst and Expert of Afghanistan Affairs, in discussion with author on August13, 2020. 58 This assessment is based on author’s discussions with various Pakistani officials and academics in Islamabad. 59 Zahid Shahab Ahmad, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies Forum, Deakin University, Australia, in discussion with the author on September01, 2020. 60 Kulsoom Bilal, “Emerging Politics in Iran: Last Year of Rouhani’s Term and the New Conservative Parliament,” Policy Perspective 17, no. 1 (2020): 105–28. 61 Ambassador (R) Javed Hafeez, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia, in discussion with the author on August18, 2020. 62 Ibid. 63 Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran's top nuclear scientist, assassinated near Tehran, BBC, November27, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55105934. 64 Ambassador (R) Asif Durrani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (2016–2018), in discussion with the author on July21, 2020.

10 Pakistan–U.S. Relations Is Past the Prologue? Rabia Akhtar

Pakistan Choosing Allies: The Cold War in South Asia The period of history dominated by the Cold War from 1945 to 1991 was a struggle between two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, for power, influence and territory around the globe. For the United States, it was also a struggle to break out of isolation and forge new alliances beyond the Atlantic. South Asia as a region played a critical role in enabling U.S. global supremacy. The two newly decolonized, independent countries, Pakistan and India in 1947, were caught in the superpower Cold War struggle for regional alliances within the first decade of their independence from the British Raj. The decision to align their foreign policies by joining one bloc or the other remained a challenge for many third-world countries. For some, the dilemma was acute. But countries in the developing world did make their choice in favor of one or the other bloc as dictated by their domestic political environment and external constraints. While some aligned with the United States in the West and some with the Soviet Union in the East, some countries chose to remain nonaligned, retaining the freedom to make independent foreign policy choices, free of pressures from either bloc. India and Pakistan chose opposite sides of the superpower divide during much of the Cold War even though they both actively continued their flirtation with nonalignment.1 According to Stephen Cohen, Pakistan’s relevance to the regional security debate around 1947 revolved around two questions, How would an independent Pakistan stand between India and Afghanistan, on the one hand, and between India and the Soviet Union, on the other?2 Could Pakistan maintain a viable army? Would it serve as a bulwark for India against Soviet pressure or radical Islamic movements?3 Pakistan did not have much to offer to the Americans in its early days. Unlike India, Pakistan had neither inherited strong infrastructure nor a strong military.4 As per the early American calculations, Pakistan’s location could only have provided them with a possible “bomber base on the Soviet Union’s southern flank” and nothing more.5 DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-12

160 Rabia Akhtar Pakistan did come forth and align its own interests with those of the United States whereas Nehru chose non-alignment over major power alliances. Why was Pakistan enthusiastic about a pro-Western foreign policy as a newly independent small state?6 In order to understand how Pakistan’s foreign policy toward the United States was shaped leading to alliance formation in the first three decades of the Cold War, it is important to conduct a chronological analysis of Pakistan’s motivations for joining the alliance in the mid-1950s and its expectations from the United States at different time periods during the alliance.

From 1947 to 1959: Beginning of the Alliance When the Cold War arrived in South Asia, India steered clear of the superpower rivalry in its initial years while Pakistan showed enthusiasm for pro-Western alignment. Unfortunately for Pakistan, its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not live long enough to lay strong foundations for Pakistan’s foreign policy, but he had visualized its direction. In his September7, 1947 cabinet meeting– within the first month of Pakistan’s independence– Jinnah shared his views and stated, “Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with the two great democratic countries, namely the U.K. and the U.S.A., rather than with Russia.”7 Even though Pakistan’s pro-Western leaning was discernible, it took some time to officially identify with the American camp. Three years later when Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, an Oxford graduate of law, visited the United States on the invitation of the U.S. President Harry S. Truman on May3, 1950– Pakistan was still a nonaligned country that had recognized communist China in 1949 much to the dismay of the United States. Liaquat Ali Khan had also contemplated visiting Moscow, but his visit never materialized.8 In his speech before the U.S. Senate on May4, 1950, Khan spoke directly and openly about Pakistan’s ideology. He assured the Americans that Islamic ideology was not in contradiction with the principles of democracy and freedom– ideals that were valued and practiced by the Western world. Liaquat Ali Khan was the short-lived architect of Pakistan’s nonalignment policy. According to Khan, Pakistan was not tied to the apron strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor was she a camp-follower of the Communist bloc. Pakistan... had all along been uninfluenced by the inter-bloc struggle going on in the world and had supported the cause which it considered to be just.... it was on this principle that Pakistan had voted in the United Nations sometimes with the Western bloc, at others with the communists.9 Khan’s reference to Pakistan’s voting record in the UN caused much anxiety to the United States and the Soviets. At the time of Khan’s visit to the United States, North Korean invasion of South Korea was underway marking the beginning of the Korean War. Pakistan voted in favor of U.S. troops to fight the North Koreans,

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 161 but when the United States dismissed Khan’s proposal for all-out-support for the Kashmir cause, Pakistan decided not to commit its troops to fight in Korea.10 Unfortunately, Khan did not live long enough to pursue nonalignment and was assassinated on October16, 1951 in Rawalpindi. Pakistan had already lost its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, and now with Khan’s assassination, Pakistan’s foreign policy needed direction and leadership. After Khan’s death, seven different prime ministers governed Pakistan until the first martial law was imposed in 1958. Within 3years of Khan’s death, Pakistan had joined four defense organizations– regional associations supported by the United States making it “America’s most allied ally”11 in Asia. Pakistan formally joined the pro-Western U.S. bloc after signing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on May2, 1954. The same year, along with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, it became a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). The purpose of SEATO was to block communist expansion in the region and to seek support for U.S. foreign assistance to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. India, Indonesia and Burma were invited to join, but they refused to form an alliance against communism and preferred to retain their nonalignment or “peaceful co-existence and non-aggression pacts.” Thailand and the Philippines from the region joined the organization. Even though Pakistan did not belong to the region, its basic objective of joining the organization was to gain U.S. support against Indian “aggression,” and it did not want defensive action to be confined only to communist aggression. Though the members of the organization agreed to Pakistan’s broader definition of aggression, U.S. clarified that military action will only be taken against communist entities and “promised to consult in the event of other aggression.”12 In 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, which included Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq– the organization was renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) when Iraq left the Baghdad Pact after 3years of membership. Although the United States was not a member of CENTO– just an observer– it signed a bilateral agreement of cooperation with Pakistan in 1959 as reiteration of its commitment of mutual defense with its regional alliance partners. Like SEATO, under the Baghdad Pact or CENTO, the objective also was to curtail communism and collective military action against communist aggression. The organization dissolved when Iran left the organization post-Islamic revolution in 1979.13 In the initial decades of the Cold War, major U.S. foreign policy objectives in Asia were to gain influence in the region through forging economic and military alliances with free and friendly like-minded governments in the region, and the development of their individual and collective ability to resist communist influences in the region and to gain access to resources for U.S. markets in Asia. In the first decade of their alliance, Pakistan allowed the United States to realize most of its objectives in the region and became America’s bulwark in Asia against SinoSoviet communist influences. But the cracks in the alliance became visible after the end of their first decade. Events from 1962 onwards reveal incompatibility in U.S. and Pakistani alliance objectives and expectations from each other leading to their first breakdown.

162 Rabia Akhtar Pakistan’s President Iskander Mirza had appointed General Ayub Khan, a Sandhurst graduate, as Pakistan’s first chief martial law administrator in 1958 after abrogating the constitution. Ayub Khan joined the Pakistani Army in 1947 after independence as a brigadier and rose to become Pakistan’s first native Commander-in-Chief in 1951. Within two weeks of his appointment by Mirza, Ayub declared himself as the president of Pakistan and exiled Mirza to London.14 As a result of Pakistan’s participation in SEATO and CENTO, the United States signed an Agreement of Cooperation with Pakistan on March5, 1959 which was a bilateral extension of U.S. commitment toward Pakistan which allowed Pakistan to receive military assistance from the United States.15 The United States signed similar agreements with the other two CENTO countries, Turkey and Iran as well.

From 1959 to 1965: Fractures in the Alliance After Field Marshal Ayub Khan became the president of Pakistan, he reoriented the country’s foreign policy and decided to develop friendly ties with China and the Soviet Union. He articulated his rationale for this new policy later in his book Friends Not Masters and discussed at length Pakistan’s security imperatives demanding a change in foreign policy outlook. To understand how the narrative took shape it is important to read through Ayub’s reasoning for “the new outlook” in toto. Addressing Pakistan’s geostrategic imperatives, Ayub wrote: Take the geographical location first. Here is East Pakistan surrounded on three sides by India and the only approach is from the sea which is not difficult for an enemy to control. West Pakistan is wedged in between three enormous powers with the Soviet Union at the top, the People’s Republic of China in the north-east, and India in the south and east. Iknow of no other small country which has the somewhat dubious distinction of having three such mighty neighbours. Now, this location is a source of weakness in physical terms but it could be converted into a source of strength if we could establish normal and mutually acceptable relations with the countries hemming us in.16 With India, the prospects of good relations were not a possibility in the near term given the dispute over Kashmir.17 By joining SEATO and CENTO, Ayub argued, Pakistan had already alienated the Soviet Union but was hopeful that it was “possible to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union by removing her doubts and misgivings” and that the design was never to harm the Soviet Union since Pakistan’s membership of the pacts was dictated by the requirements of Pakistan’s security.18 Change in Ayub’s thinking about accommodating the Soviets resulted from the U-2 incident and the subsequent Soviet threats to Pakistan. Ayub had leased the Americans a communications facility for 10years at the Badaber Air Base, Peshawar on July17, 1959, which was not renewed beyond July17, 1969. CIA had used this facility as a listening post and to run a U-2 spy program to monitor Soviet nuclear and missile developments. On May1, 1960, the KGB

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 163 captured CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers after shooting down his U-2 plane that had flown from Badaber on a reconnaissance mission. This exposed the U-2 spyflight program and angered the Soviets. It also brought to light Pakistan’s role in facilitating the Americans to spy on the Soviets. As Dennis Kux notes, Khrushchev threatened Pakistan that “if any American plane is allowed to use Peshawar as a base of operations against the Soviet Union, we will retaliate immediately.”19 Although Ayub in a public announcement dismissed any knowledge of the U.S. U-2 program operating from Pakistan (his statement was corroborated by the U.S. State Department stating that the U.S. was running this program and using Pakistan’s airspace without Pakistan’s knowledge) he was nevertheless unnerved by the Soviet threat. On April3, 1965, Ayub Khan met the Soviet Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin, for the first time, and they discussed Pakistan’s membership in SEATO and CENTO and also the U-2 incident. In his defense, Ayub maintained that the U-2 incident “had been as much of a shock to us as it was to the Soviet Union.”20 Pakistan saw China as an “emerging power” that wanted friendly neighbors, and all Pakistan had to do to get on her side was to “convince her of our sincerity and friendly intent.” Given that friendly relations with India were more problematic than building friendly relations with the two communist countries in Pakistan’s immediate neighborhood, Ayub felt that [I]f we could not establish normal relations with all our three big neighbours, the best thing was to have an understanding with two of them. They might have their internal differences but we did not need to get involved in that. This was a vital element in our new thinking: to keep clear of the internal disputes and conflicts of other countries; neither to philosophize about their problems nor to act as busybodies. It was on this basis that Iset out to normalize our relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.21 The problem, however, remained that in order to boost Pakistan’s economy, initial capital investments needed to be made, and only one country was capable of making such incredible economic investments in Pakistan– the United States. Ayub understood that given the Cold War ideological confrontations, establishing bilateral relations with all three powers– China, the Soviet Union and the United States– would be an arduous task. However, Ayub believed that “because of the emergence of China, the earlier polarization between the Soviet Union and the United States is gradually disappearing,” and for a long period of time to come they will be engaged to compete with one another for areas of influence and “none of them could afford to isolate and antagonize any of the developing countries completely.”22 The task for Pakistan, Ayub argued, then was to convince the United States that the former’s relations with China and the Soviet Union were not against U.S. interests and to inform the United States that Pakistan could not afford to take sides in major powers struggles, that we were not “in the market for becoming partisans in their struggle for power.”23 The choice, Ayub said, rested with the people of Pakistan.

164 Rabia Akhtar For the United States, it was increasingly becoming difficult to find a balance between India and Pakistan especially when the policy was to arm them against China. Pakistan perhaps learned early on that entente with China would be beneficial in the long run and that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” had merit beyond proverbial and thus had made its choice. During the border conflict between India and China in October1962, Pakistan rejected President Kennedy’s request of assuring India that Pakistan would not attack and open another front for India while it was under attack by China. Such an assurance would have allowed India to move some divisions from its border with Pakistan against the Chinese border in the Himalayas. Kennedy in his letter to Ayub on October28, 1962, also assured Ayub that U.S. aid to India would only be used against the Chinese and not against Pakistan. To Kennedy’s disappointment, Ayub in his reply wrote that he believed the Sino-Indian war would be a short one since China had limited objectives with respect to addressing the disputed border thereby not justifying American military assistance to India against the Chinese. From 1962 to 1965, the United States provided India with $90million worth of grant military assistance. Although both Pakistan and India had been receiving assistance from the United States under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) from 1954 to 1965– Pakistan received “over $630million in grant military assistance for weapons, $619million for defense support assistance, and some $55million worth of equipment purchased on a cash or concessional basis” and India “purchased over $50million in military equipment” from the United States24 – the U.S. decision to grant military assistance to India after the Sino-Indian conflict pushed Pakistan toward China for additional military and economic assistance.25 1965 Indo-Pak War the U.S. Arms Embargo Embargo 1965 Indo-Pak War and and the U.S. Arms As Pakistan–U.S. relations the United United As already already stressed, stressed, Pakistan-U.S. relations hit hit an an all-time all-time low low after after the States imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan and India, following their second States imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan and India, following their second war Kashmir.26 Pakistan Pakistan and fought their first war Kashmir war over over Kashmir.26 and India India had had fought their first war over over Kashmir within months of their independence starting from October1947 until January1, within months of their independence starting from October 1947 until January 1, 1949. between the the occupied 1949. The The war war ended ended with with aa ceasefire ceasefire line line drawn drawn between occupied Pakistani Pakistani and Indian territories in the disputed region of Kashmir. By 1965, they were were ready and Indian territories in the disputed region of Kashmir. By 1965, they ready to fight their their second war. to fight second war. By the broke out between Pakistan Pakistan and both countries By the time time the the war war broke out between and India, India, both countries were were recipients of MAP equipment from the United States, and one of recipients of MAP equipment from the United States, and one of the the greatest greatest U.S. use of U.S. worries worries was was their their use of American-supplied American-supplied military military equipment equipment against against each each other during the war. The United States decided to warn both countries other during the war. The United States decided to warn both countries against against the the use MAP equipment the conditions to India use of of MAP equipment as as one one of of the conditions of of its its supply supply to India and and PakiPaki stan not against stan was was its its use use only only against against communist communist countries, countries, namely namely China China and and not against each Minister on U.S. each other. other. When When Bhutto, Bhutto, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Foreign Foreign Minister on April30, April 30, 1965, 1965, met met U.S. Ambassador P. McConaughy Karachi, he U.S. action Ambassador Walter Walter P. McConaughy stationed stationed in in Karachi, he sought sought U.S. action on to defend on its its assurances assurances to defend Pakistan Pakistan citing citing December23, Dulles-Noon assurances; November29, December 23, 1957 1957 Dulles-Noon assurances; November 29, 1956 1956 assurances assurances given to Baghdad Pact countries; Ambassador Langley reiteration given to Baghdad Pact countries; Ambassador Langley reiteration to to Ayub Ayub

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 165 on April15, 1959 of earlier Dulles assurances to Noon; 1961 Kennedy-Ayub communiqué reaffirming March5, 1959 US-Pakistani agreement and other assurances given Pakistan; and March5, 1959 agreement.27 McConaughy told Bhutto that he would have to consult with Washington on the assurances Pakistan was seeking. He also warned Bhutto not to use MAP against India to which Bhutto replied that he was aware of U.S. concerns about the use of MAP equipment, but he hoped the United States also realized that Pakistan’s territory was under attack.28 After the Rann of Kutch episode, Pakistan planned an offensive “Operational Gibraltar” to “defreeze the stalemate in Kashmir.” As Feroz Khan documents, in the build-up to the Indo-Pak war in September1965, Pakistan’s plans included “infiltration into Indian held Kashmir and formation of an uprising” in the valley. Given how rapidly the situation between India and Pakistan was developing in September of 1965, Ambassador Chester B. Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India (1963–69), wrote a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk proposing a change in U.S. military aid criteria to both India and Pakistan whereby the United States would continue to provide military and economic assistance to both countries only if they were committed in defending the subcontinent against Communist China where the equipment provided by the United States would only be used against the Chinese. But he also acknowledged that the way Pakistan’s relationship with China was evolving, U.S. military alliance with Pakistan was becoming irrelevant. He stressed that the new criteria of giving military aid to India and Pakistan should aim at providing only those weapons that would meet the “logistical and tactical” requirements to defeat the threat from China. Furthermore, he proposed that U.S. military aid “could be discreetly cautioned on India’s willingness to work toward a reconciliation with Pakistan,” and U.S. economic assistance to both India and Pakistan could be used as a “carrot to draw them into mutually beneficial cooperative economic ventures.” Bowles believed that if India’s confidence in the United States increased, “U.S. influence can effectively be used to moderate India’s relationship to Pakistan.”29 The dilemma for the United States was much greater than the potential loss of Pakistan to Communist China if there was inaction on the U.S. part and if the Chinese came to assist Pakistan. Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar to stir an offensive in Kashmir did not go as planned. India decided to cross the international boundary, and Pakistan’s assumption that the international community would not allow India to attack Pakistan across the international border proved to be wrong. On September6 and 7, 1965, when three Indian divisions, out of which two were U.S.-supplied mountain divisions, crossed the international boundary to attack toward Lahore, the heart of Punjab in Pakistan, Pakistan’s offensive strategy had transformed into a defensive one. In a desperate attempt, Ayub Khan once again invoked U.S. alliance commitments to Pakistan demanding U.S. action to protect Pakistan against Indian aggression and reminded Ambassador McConaughy of his earlier warning that any arms given to India to fight China by the United States would eventually be used against Pakistan.30 But the United States referred Pakistan to the UN.

166 Rabia Akhtar Despite Rusk pro-Pakistan positions, Despite Rusk and and McConaughy’s McConaughy’s pro-Pakistan positions, the the Johnson Johnson adminadmin istration decided to suspend military aid shipments to Pakistan and istration decided to suspend military aid shipments to Pakistan and India India after after the the 1965 McConaughy delivered the U.S. 1965 war. war. Ambassador Ambassador McConaughy delivered the U.S. decision decision to to Bhutto Bhutto with with aa word that the the decision was not word that decision was not punitive punitive and and that that the the Secretary Secretary General General of of the the U.N. had appealed the United States to suspend arms shipment to both countries U.N. had appealed the United States to suspend arms shipment to both countries in to bring bring an to the the fighting. Bhutto told told McConaughy that “Pak, in order order to an end end to fighting. Bhutto McConaughy that “Pak, corcor nered, deserted, bitched, had no alternative but interpret US action as punitive nered, deserted, bitched, had no alternative but interpret US action as punitive one US one assisting assisting India, India, aa non-aligned non-aligned and and treacherous treacherous country country aggressing aggressing against against US 31 ally.” ally.”31 The UN Security passed Resolution Resolution 211 The war war ended ended when when the the UN Security Council Council passed 211 on on SepSep tember 20, 1965 calling both countries to accept the ceasefire and start tember 20, 1965 calling both countries to accept the ceasefire and start negonego tiations the Kashmir Kashmir issue. Minister, Lal Lal Bahadur Bahadur Shastri, tiations on on the issue. The The Indian Indian Prime Prime Minister, Shastri, accepted the ceasefire on 21st September, and Ayub accepted the ceasefire, accepted the ceasefire on 21st September, and Ayub accepted the ceasefire, against against Bhutto’s Both countries Union Bhutto’s advice, advice, on on September22, September 22, 1965. 1965. Both countries accepted accepted the the Soviet Soviet Union 32 as a third-party mediator for the resolution of Kashmir’s status. The subsequent as a third-party mediator for the resolution of Kashmir’s status.32 The subsequent Tashkent was signed both sides to Tashkent Declaration Declaration was signed on on January10, January 10, 1966 1966 where where both sides agreed agreed to restore normal relations and withdraw their forces to positions prior to August5, restore normal relations and withdraw their forces to positions prior to August 5, 1965. before signing visited the 1965. Amonth A month before signing the the Tashkent Tashkent Declaration, Declaration, Ayub Ayub Khan Khan visited the United States in December1965 (a trip that had been cancelled by President JohnUnited States in December 1965 (a trip that had been cancelled by President John son to seek U.S. support for the Kashmir and son earlier earlier in in April1965) April 1965) to seek U.S. support for the issue issue of of Kashmir and repair repair the damage done to Pak–U.S. relations in the wake of 1965 war. Johnson categorithe damage done to Pak-U.S. relations in the wake of 1965 war. Johnson categori cally that if Pakistan–U.S. alliance cally told told Ayub Ayub that if Pakistan-U.S. alliance had had any any chance chance of of survival survival in in future, future, Pakistan would need to stay away from China. In private, however, Johnson Pakistan would need to stay away from China. In private, however, Johnson told told Ayub just as wife could Ayub that that he he “understood “understood certain certain relationships relationships just as aa wife could understand understand aa 33 Saturday fling by by her was the the wife.” Saturday night night fling her husband husband so so long long as as she she was wife.”33 The United States reminded Pakistan time and again that the treaty commitThe United States reminded Pakistan time and again that the treaty commit ments only allowed for a U.S. response to a communist aggression ments only allowed for a U.S. response to a communist aggression against against PakiPaki stan, Bhutto remained stan, not not Indian Indian aggression. aggression. But But Ayub Ayub and and Bhutto remained dismissive dismissive of of the the treaty the short Declaration achieved treaty stipulations. stipulations. In In the short term, term, the the Tashkent Tashkent Declaration achieved its its objecobjec tives, but the the essence U.S. desertion tives, but essence of of Bhutto’s Bhutto’s statement statement to to McConaughy McConaughy about about U.S. desertion of its ally became a permanent part of Pakistan’s narrative, and the U.S. embargo of its ally became a permanent part of Pakistan’s narrative, and the U.S. embargo on was seen first betrayal. on Pakistan Pakistan after after its its 1965 1965 war war with with India India was seen as as the the first betrayal.

From 1965 to 1972: Bhutto’s Nuclearization of the Pakistani Narrative On April12, 1967, the United States announced that it would not resume military aid to Pakistan and India that had been suspended in the wake of their 1965 war. The United States maintained that the decision was taken in the interest of maintaining security in the region, preventing another war between India and Pakistan and reducing the threat of arms race between the countries.34 Although the U.S. decision in April1967 was an extension of its arms suspension policy of 1965 with only a ban on the direct sale of lethal weapons, Bhutto viewed this U.S. decision to stop military assistance to Pakistan as a deliberate U.S. policy to pressure Pakistan over India. Bhutto was skeptical of the stated objectives of

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 167 the American arms policy in South Asia on the suspension of aid to both countries. He believed ever since the two countries concluded defense agreements with the United States– Pakistan in 1959 and India in 1962– it had been the biggest contributor to the arms race in the region, even though there was awareness that unresolved disputes between the two countries would have hindered normal relations between them.35 Bhutto acknowledged that the U.S.-supplied military weapons in Pakistan’s possession and their effective use acted as a deterrent for India until the United States decided to stop military supplies. He questioned how Pakistan could maintain a deterrent in the absence of U.S. military assistance.36 The answer had been with him all along– through Pakistan’s own nuclear deterrent. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto started a new chapter with the United States once the 1971 crisis was over and Pakistan had lost its eastern half. Bhutto had praised the Nixon administration “for standing by basic principles of international law and civilized society” (during the Indo-Pak 1971 war) and told the secretary that he was ready for reconciliation with India.37 His efforts toward normalization of relations with India resulted in the signing of the Simla Agreement between the two countries in 1972. Pakistan’s foreign policy tone with the United States found its anchor in the U.S. arms embargo on Pakistan after the 1965 war with India and strengthened with the 1971 breakup of Pakistan after the United States failed to meet Pakistan’s expectations as an ally during that time period. Given its dependency on the United States for economic and military assistance, Pakistan had no choice but to reconcile its differences with the United States In addition to Bhutto’s friendly overtures, two U.S. policies helped smoothen previous anxieties in Pakistan–U.S. relations: a) Nixon’s rapprochement with China and Pakistan’s role in facilitating the opening between the two countries and b) Nixon’s resumption of military sales to Pakistan and India.38 From 1974 to 1998, Pakistan relentlessly pursued nuclear weapons development, ultimately testing its nuclear weapons in response to the Indian nuclear tests in May1998. The United States nonproliferation legislation constrained U.S. foreign policy choices toward Pakistan from 1976 onwards– after the first nonproliferation legislation, the Symington amendment was enacted, and as per U.S. law, Pakistan was sanctioned for its proliferation behavior under different administrations. Pakistan is a unique case, popularly known as “the most sanctioned ally” of the United States, where in almost all cases with the exception of one when Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons in 1998, the United States unilaterally imposed economic, political and military sanctions at different periods in their alliance relationship to deter Pakistan’s proliferation behavior– the result was negative. Pakistan’s narrative that developed during this time period maintained that (a) the U.S. policy selectively targeted Pakistan for nuclear proliferation in South Asia and (b) the U.S. policy was uneven in its approach and sanctioned Pakistan only when the country was no longer needed to achieve other U.S. foreign policy objectives.

168 Rabia Akhtar Post-9/11, when the United States needed Pakistan to join its war against terrorism, sanctions were lifted to enlist Pakistan’s support in Afghanistan. Once again, Pakistan and the United States found themselves in a situation similar to that of the later 70s and early 80s, willing to accommodate each other to align their national interests. Little did Pakistan know at the time that its involvement in U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan which began in 2001 will bring the war home to Pakistan taking lives of its citizens and soldiers alike.

Section2: Contemporary Foreign Policy Challenges in Pak–U.S. Relations This section examines three key bilateral foreign policy interests that drive the contemporary Pak–U.S. relations: a) mutual expectations relating to the future of Afghanistan, b) challenges for Pakistan in navigating the Sino-U.S. rivalry and c) Pakistan’s challenge of the growing Indo-U.S. strategic and defence partnership. Pakistan, U.S. Future of Afghanistan Pakistan, U.S. and and the the Future ofAfghanistan In what was was perhaps perhaps the the history In what the most most swiftest swiftest and and unexpected unexpected ending ending in in the history of of wars, Taliban’s peaceful and nonviolent Blitzkrieg on their way to taking wars, Taliban’s peaceful and nonviolent Blitzkrieg on their way to taking over over Kabul baffled and Kabul on on August August 15, 15, 2021 2021 left left military military historians historians baffled and the the international international 39 community stunned. The future of Afghanistan is uncertain. community stunned.39 The future of Afghanistan is uncertain. However, However, PakiPaki stan’s foreign policy policy interests term by by the stan’s foreign interests in in Afghanistan Afghanistan are are shaped shaped in in the the long long term the investments bringing all together to to ensure investments it it has has made made in in bringing all stakeholders stakeholders together ensure that that peace peace and to Afghanistan. this and stability stability return return to Afghanistan. Abrief A brief overview overview of of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s efforts efforts in in this regard merits acknowledgment. regard merits acknowledgment.

Pakistan’s the U.S.–Afghan Pakistan’s Role Role in in Shaping Shaping the U.S.-Afghan Peace Peace Process Process The between the The Doha Doha agreement agreement signed signed on on February29, February 29, 2020 2020 between the United United States States and and Taliban and the United States and the Afghan government had ushered new Taliban and the United States and the Afghan government had ushered in in aa new era for this this hope bringera of of hope hope for for Afghanistan. Afghanistan. And And for hope to to arrive, arrive, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s role role in in bring ing the Taliban to the negotiating table with the United States and for the United ing the Taliban to the negotiating table with the United States and for the United States States to to recognize recognize Taliban Taliban as as aa legitimate legitimate stakeholder stakeholder of of power power in in Afghanistan Afghanistan 40 was absolutely absolutely critical. critical.40 was A process began began in when aa Pakistani Pakistani delegation A process in 2009, 2009, when delegation explored explored the the scope scope of of peace negotiations between the stakeholders of power in Afghanistan and the peace negotiations between the stakeholders of power in Afghanistan and the United with the the support the Pakistan Pakistan government, United States. States. On On another another level, level, with support of of the government, factions in the Afghan government tested the waters for peace negotiations with factions in the Afghan government tested the waters for peace negotiations with the Hekmatyar. It was not the Taliban Taliban and and also also with with Gulbuddin Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It was not until until 2011, 2011, however, however, that the Afghanistan–Pakistan Reconthat the the first first meeting meeting of of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Joint Commission Commission for for Recon ciliation and Peace took place. The commission reiterated that the peace process ciliation and Peace took place. The commission reiterated that the peace process in to be be Afghan-led in Afghanistan Afghanistan has has to Afghan-led and and Afghan-owned. Afghan-owned. This This effort effort received received its its first blow, later in 2011, with the assassination carried out by the Taliban first blow, later in 2011, with the assassination carried out by the Taliban of of BurhaBurhanuddin former president president (1992–1996) nuddin Rabbani, Rabbani, Afghanistan’s Afghanistan’s former (1992-1996) and and the the leader leader of of

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 169 Afghanistan’s High Council of Peace, an outfit responsible for bringing Taliban to the negotiating table. Undeterred by the fallout, Pakistan offered facilitation of the peace process in Qatar in 2012 and helped Taliban set up a liaison office to pursue peace negotiations with the United States. Pakistan also released some of the captured Taliban prisoners as an incentive to start negotiations between the Afghan High Peace Council and the Taliban. Pakistan was at the forefront of the Afghan peace effort and hosted an Afghan government delegation to meet with Taliban representatives in Islamabad in 2015. In order to make the peace process more multidimensional, Afghanistan–Pakistan– the United States–China Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) was set up, and its first meeting was held on January11, 2016 in Islamabad. Although the QCG was an offshoot of the 2015 Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference, it became the first of its kind forum to discuss the roadmap of the Afghan peace process bringing all stakeholders to discuss the political future of Afghanistan by resolving all outstanding disputes by negotiations. It was believed that with the support of the United States, China and Pakistan, Afghan peace and reconciliation process would find the momentum it initially lacked. Upon the request of Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Pakistan continued its efforts to bring the Taliban to the negotiations, and Mullah Abdual Ghani Baradar met Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi in Islamabad in October2019 to discuss the scope of Taliban’s engagement on negotiations with other parties. The year 2020 finally saw a breakthrough, and Pakistan’s efforts were realized in the form of two agreements that the United States signed on Feb 29, 2020, one with the Taliban and the other with the Afghan government to formally pave the way for intra-Afghan negotiations. In his July2019 meeting with President Trump, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan reiterated Pakistan’s support for the Afghan peace process, conveyed Pakistan’s expectations from the U.S.-led process and expressed Pakistan’s desire for an all-inclusive political solution in Afghanistan.41 While Khan found a convergence of interest with Trump over Afghanistan which helped set the stage for the two historical agreements signed between the United States, Afghan government and the Taliban, there was speculation about the continuation of the same spirit under the Biden administration with whom Khan had to start anew to establish his credentials. The good thing was that the Biden administration had retained Zalmay Khalilzad as the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, which suggested some form of continuity of the process that was initiated with Pakistan’s facilitation. Now that the Taliban have taken over Kabul and are looking toward international recognition of their government to establish Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), Pakistan is being scapegoated for the failure of the Afghan peace process– a process which was owned by the United States and facilitated by Pakistan at every step. The narrative surrounding Kabul’s fall to the Taliban paints Pakistan in a negative light, and the United States’ and allied forces’ collective failure of intelligence in predicting Taliban’s ascendancy is being diverted to blame Pakistan for a double game.

170 Rabia Akhtar Irrespective of who governs Afghanistan in near future and whether that government is internationally recognized or not, there are several areas which are of critical importance for Pakistan, which should form the central pillar of Pakistan’s Afghan policy: •

Pakistan must convey to the Taliban now and any future Afghan government in no uncertain terms that the use of Afghan territory by terrorist groups will not be tolerated and that Afghanistan must ensure no safe havens are provided to the terrorist groups. The one-way conversation about “safe havens” by groups using Pakistan’s territory and working against peace and stability in Afghanistan needs to change. The latest UN report submitted by Trine Heimerback, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011)and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, vindicates Pakistan’s longstanding position on the use of Afghan soil to conduct terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, something to which Pakistan has been apprising the international community for the past couple of decades. The report reveals that Al-Qaeda moderated reunion of splinter groups in Afghanistan, bringing together five terrorists groups namely, Sheryar Mehsud group, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, the Amjad Farooqi group and the Usman Saifullah group (former Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) pledging their allegiance to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).42 •

This is one conversation Pakistan must have with the Biden administration where the United States along with Pakistan should assert the future Afghan government to take steps for joint counter-terrorism activities inside Afghanistan for the elimination of these groups. Ajoint-counter terrorism initiative should be created for intelligence sharing in operations to effectively deal with this menace of terrorism plaguing both Pakistan and Afghanistan. As U.S. evacuates from Afghanistan, its patronage for such a joint venture might receive less resistance from Afghanistan, even under Taliban rule. The deadly attack on Kabul Airport on August26, 2021 in which more than 200 people were killed including 11 U.S. marines was claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) who is Taliban’s nemesis in Afghanistan. ISKP will never want to see the Taliban getting recognized by the international community and will continue to destabilize Afghanistan under Taliban’s control to ensure it does not have a chance at creating an IEA. Herein lies an opportunity for both Pakistan and the United States whereby joint counterterrorism operations against ISKP and TTP can be conducted and Taliban’s hand can be strengthened to stop terrorism inside Afghanistan and that emanating from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

• While Pakistan is having this conversation with the United States and Afghanistan as to what its priorities are in the region with respect to Afghanistan’s peace and stability in particular, it needs to include China as a stakeholder as well to engage on the regional integration and connectivity issues.

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 171

•

The international community is pushing the Taliban to form an inclusive government, in the absence of which no government in Afghanistan will be recognized. Extension of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor to include Afghanistan will provide an incentive to the Taliban and other political stakeholders to accelerate progress on the intra Afghan peace process, which despite Taliban’s takeover is still at stake, given that the peace dividends will be immense for all involved. Pakistan can have two parallel conversations, one with the United States and one with China over Afghanistan and can also become a bridge bringing both China and the United States to not see Afghanistan as a zero-sum game. Once the government is formed in Afghanistan, the United States and China can jointly work toward development and infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. The third conversation Pakistan needs to have with the United States is about the destabilizing role India has played in Afghanistan to launch its proxy war in Pakistan. Indian presence in Afghanistan had always been one of Pakistan’s strategic concerns and will remain so with or without Taliban ruling Afghanistan. Last year, in an unprecedented move, Pakistan published a comprehensive dossier of the Indian state-sponsored terrorist activities in Pakistan, making India a constant fixture of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Some of the highlights from the dossier on the Indian sponsorship of terror inside Pakistan via Afghanistan were: • • • • • • • •

“Promotion/ sponsorship of listed terrorist organisations– Tehreek-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP) and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), which were uprooted from Pakistan, to conduct cross-border attacks Sponsorship of Baloch insurgents inter alia to disrupt the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Merging TTP splinter groups and creating a coalition between the TTP and the Baloch secessionists Providing weapons, ammunition and IEDs to these groups Raising a special force of 700 to sabotage CPEC; training anti-Pakistan terrorists in camps in Afghanistan and India– 66 such training camps have been identified in Afghanistan and 21 in India Tasking terrorists with conducting targeted killings of important Pakistani personalities Organising of a new militia, based in Nangarhar (Afghanistan), called “Daesh-Pakistan” by India’s spy agency (RAW) Setting up a dedicated cell to subvert CPEC projects with Rs 500million to subvert Pakistan’s progress and economic strength”43

Given this evidence, which was shared with the UN Secretary General and the P5, it is easier for Pakistan to situate its concerns about the Indian involvement in Afghanistan to sabotage Pakistan’s interests and raise them with the United States so that at bilateral level, U.S. can engage India using the evidence presented by Pakistan. That conversation should not end with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. India evacuated its citizens and

172 Rabia Akhtar closed its consulates in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August2021. In the absence of a formidable political relationship with the Taliban, Pakistan fears that India could sponsor ISKP in future to deal a blow to the Taliban and Pakistan. Pakistan’s FM, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, made a mention of Indian attempts to recruit terrorists from ISIS to create “Daesh Pakistan.”44 Given the evidence of Indian attempts to destabilize Pakistan, it is not mere speculation to suggest that the Indian strategic interests align well with ISKP as proxy against Pakistan and the Taliban especially at a time when the future of Afghanistan is uncertain under the current Taliban control. For Pakistan’s part on countering terrorism, significant progress has been made on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF)45 Action Plan, and Pakistan has completed 21 points out of 27 points. Pakistan was placed in FATF’s grey list in 2018 for some structural deficiencies with respect to its domestic legal frameworks linked to terrorism financing and money laundering.46 As part of Pakistan’s compliance to FATF Action Plan grey list recommendations, Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) arrested and convicted Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) Chief, Hafiz Saeed. CTD also arrested Zakirur Rehman Lakhvi, mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks on terrorism financing charge.47 Given this progress and promise of more, Pakistan is in a position of strength to demand from the international community, especially the extra regional forces to help engage both India and Afghanistan to stop terrorist activities emanating from Afghanistan and funded by India. Challenges for Pakistan in Navigating the Sino-U.S. Rivalry Pakistan’s biggest foreign policy challenge in the coming decade will be to manage its alliances and partnerships with two major powers, China and the United States. In a post-COVID-19 world and the manner in which regional and global security situation is evolving, it is much likely that the coming years will see increased competition and conflict instead of competition and cooperation between the two powers especially with respect to how these two powers tailor their partnerships.48 The important question for Islamabad, however, is whether it would be asked to compromise on CPEC in order to reset its equation with Washington. Given the trajectory of U.S.–China relations during Biden’s 8years in office as Vice President (2009–2017) during the two Obama administrations, it does not seem likely that Pakistan will be pushed into a “with us or against us” situation with respect to its relations with China. The Trump years (2018–2020) should be considered an anomaly and should not become the lens to view how the Biden administration will continue to deal with China despite this duo’s downward trajectory. In 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis went on record to mark his reservations about President Xi’s One Belt One Road project and stated, In a globalised world, there are many belts and many roads, and no one nation should put itself into a position of dictating “one belt, one road”... that said, the One Belt One Road also goes through disputed territory, and Ithink, that in itself shows the vulnerability of trying to establish that sort of a dictate.49

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 173 This statement was forcefully rejected by both Pakistan and China stating that the disputed nature of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was already accounted for in the CPEC projects. While Pakistan navigated the challenge of U.S. opposition at the time this statement was made, the real challenge still remains: U.S.’ fear of losing influence and leverage over Pakistan and seeing the loss of Pakistan to China’s camp as it continues to drift away. For the current government of Prime Minister Imran Khan, perhaps the biggest challenge is to make sure that the Biden administration does not look at Pakistan through a lens similar to that of Af-Pak. Were that to happen, the relationship would not have any real potential to survive. Pakistan must work toward strengthening its bilateral relationship with the United States and convey to the United States that CPEC is not zero-sum and that Pakistan as a sovereign entity is not a mutually exclusive domain where U.S. and Chinese security and strategic interests cannot coexist. Pakistan needs to communicate to the Biden administration that its primary interest in CPEC is economic, and, at the end of CPEC projects in 2030, Pakistan aims to achieve enhanced economic indicators, improved energy infrastructure with prosperity and better employment opportunities for its people. Pakistan in 2030 with better socioeconomic dividends and marked improvement on SDGs related to overall human security, that is, a prosperous Pakistan, will be a better partner for the United States. Given this long-term goal, the United States must allow Pakistan to continue with the development projects under CPEC with no resistance. The future of the South and Central Asian region in coming years is that of connectivity and regional integration despite the geopolitics, and Pakistan is central to how that future is shaped. Therefore, Pakistan needs to carve out its space in the New Great Game in Central Asia signified by the grand strategic competition between China, Russia and the U.S. amplified by the politics of pipelines and economic corridors. Pakistan’s entry to CARs is through CPEC, expansion of which aims at integrating CARs into China’s BRI.50 While Pakistan continues with the CPEC projects, it must not forget that the United States still is a major player in South and Central Asian region. Given that Pakistan is at the heart of CPEC expansion “to include Afghanistan, CARs and the Middle East, it must not threaten U.S. interests in the region given its incredible clout over current and prospective CPEC partners in the region and its influence over regional economic organizations.”51 Pakistan’s Challenge of the Growing Indo-U.S. Strategic and Defence Partnership The third critical foreign policy challenge for the Pakistan–U.S. relations is the growing Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, part of which is anchored in the SinoU.S. strategic rivalry of which India is one component. While the United States appears to be grooming India to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific region, Pakistan is the “collateral damage” and is at the downward end of what India stands

174 Rabia Akhtar to gain from its strategic and defence partnership with the United States. Being the world’s fifth largest economy, India is the second-largest arms importer in the world. Since the Galwan valley skirmishes between India and China in June2020, India has propagated the threat of the two front war and has raised the spectre of Pakistan–China collusion to engage India on two fronts simultaneously at the Line of Control (Pakistan–India) and the Line of Actual Control (India–China). After losing 20 soldiers in a fist and club fight to the Chinese PLA at the LAC, the world awaited retaliation from India akin to the action seen at the LOC. But India’s muted response toward the Chinese incursions on what India claims to be its territory across the LAC in Galwan, Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh speaks volumes about the lack of India’s preparedness to fight the Chinese or even challenge them at the LAC. Therefore, anchoring its vulnerabilities in the “two-front war” scare affords it the right audience which otherwise was not paying attention to its defense modernization requests. Given the humiliation Indian Air Force (IAF) faced in its botched strikes on Balakot in Feb 2020, the drive to modernize IAF led India to accelerate the pace of its purchase of Rafale jets from France which seemingly will provide India with strategic advantage both against China and Pakistan. Pakistan believes that India will be using these Rafale aircraft against Pakistan in a phantom surgical strike across the LoC or international boundary using Pakistan as a surrogate for deterrence signaling to China since it neither has the capability nor the resolve to tackle China directly (as events post-Galwan suggest). For India, “bogging down China’s ally, Pakistan, and that too, near the route of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) could be one of the ways a beleaguered India may want to deter or at the very least hurt China.”52 This is how “Surrogate Deterrence”53 will manifest itself in South Asia as these three nuclear weapon states continue to engage with each other, with India high on its high-ticket defense purchases. The recent Indo-U.S. strategic communication agreement, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), is another case in point which comes at the heels of India’s confrontation with the PLA in Ladakh. As part of the four foundational agreements, BECA [W]ill enable India access to classified real-time signal intelligence (SIGINT) and other sensitive information gathered by the U.S. satellites about India’s Northern and Western borders. This will significantly enhance the Indian military’s situational awareness for planning conventional or nuclear strikes, especially against Pakistan, in line with India’s evolving counterforce temptations.54 In addition to BECA, the other three agreements between the United States and India include the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) signed in 2002; Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement (LEMOA) signed in 2016 and Communications Compatibility and Security Arrangement (COMCASA) signed in 2018. The other foundational agreements like COMCASA “allows the U.S. military to transfer secure communications and data equipment

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 175 to India”; while GSOMIA will allow India as a third-country to “acquire high-end US-made military equipment through foreign military sales (FMS) and access defense article,” it will also allow India as a participating country to “pledge significant support and actively cooperate with the United States to counter terrorism and violent extremism... to prevent piracy in the Ocean.” Similarly, LEMOA “gives access to both countries, to designated military facilities on either side for the purpose of refueling and replenishment.”55 Pakistan’s concerns with these series of agreements is India’s reciprocity as enshrined in the articles of these agreements, especially BECA, whereby India will be sharing classified information, intelligence and operational details about countries of mutual concern with the United States; Pakistan and China figure prominently in that sequence. Pakistan should raise these concerns with the Biden administration since all these agreements taken together provide India strength which will only add to the perpetual security dilemma Pakistan faces; however, this time, Pakistan is not alone since China too is concerned about the edge India will get through its enhanced strategic cooperation with the United States. If the United States is not sensitive to Pakistan’s concerns, Pakistan will be left with no choice but to counter these agreements matching its own with those of China and coupling up with it to deal with rapid Indian defense modernization. If the United States continues to be the highest exporter of arms in the world and India takes the second slot as world’s highest arms importer, the strategic stability in South Asia which is already fragile between the three nuclear armed states sharing disputed borders with each other will become more precarious. Pakistan–U.S. conversation needs to address this aspect of U.S. responsibility and its contribution to the fragility of overall deterrence and strategic instability in South Asia.

Is Past the Prologue? Pakistan wants to have a fresh prologue as it enters the new era of Pakistan–U.S. relations under the Biden administration. The anchors for this new foreign policy direction are economic security and connectivity, building developmental partnerships for Pakistan with those in the region and extended neighborhood. But if this foreign policy is devoid of Pakistan’s reading of what the geostrategic compulsions are for the United States in South Asia and vice versa, then the dividends will not be realized by either country. The historical survey of Pakistan–U.S. relations conducted in this chapter reveals convergences and divergences developed over the length of this relationship. The story of foreign aid and economic sanctions, which was the hallmark of this relationship for several decades in the 1970s and 1980s, found periods of mutual reliance on each other giving rise to narratives that were specific to each country. Often called a rollercoaster ride, the journey that Pakistan and the United States have covered together since the independence of Pakistan and formal alliance during the early periods of the Cold War is unique and unprecedented. Revival of this relationship from a brutal arms embargo on Pakistan post-1965 war,

176 Rabia Akhtar to proliferation sanctions on Pakistan for the development of its nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, U.S.’ enlisting Pakistan’s support to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan in a decade-long proxy war in the 1980s and lifting of sanctions, back to nonproliferation sanctions on Pakistan in the 1990s, coming full circle to post 2001 with lifting of sanctions and enlisting Pakistan’s support for global war on terrorism in Afghanistan– Pakistan and the United States have experienced it all. Contemporary challenges in their bilateral foreign policy relations are not entirely different than those faced during the Cold War decades. Pakistan is bringing many ghosts from the past to this current relationship. India is still central to Pakistan’s foreign policy alignments and so is Afghanistan. The new conversation perhaps only centers around Pakistan’s management of its relationship with the United States and China as it makes economic security a central pillar of its foreign policy. The good thing is that the conversation is happening and that there is enough space to discuss each other’s expectations and deliverances, given the rich history of their shared past which allows them to learn from what worked for both. If Pakistan plays its cards right, and without compromising on its core national security and foreign policy interests, this relationship will survive the rough waters since history tells us that it has the potential to come back with much more force and vigor than before. Past will definitely be the prologue for this uneasy but essential relationship but will only set the context if the right lessons are learned from history by both sides.

Notes 1 Nonalignment was Jawaharlal Nehru’s legacy, the first prime minister of India. For details see, Jawaharlal Nehru, “Changing India,” Foreign Affairs 41, no. 3 (April1963): 453–65. 2 For an excellent account of the Pasthunistan issue after Pakistan’s independence, see James Spain, “Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier,” Middle East Journal 8, no. 1 (1954): 27–40. 3 Stephen Cohen, “Pakistan and the Cold War,” in Superpower Rivalry and Conflict: The Long Shadow of the Cold War on The Twentieth Century, ed. Chandra Chari (New York: Routledge, 2010), 75. 4 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (New York: New York University Press, 2002); Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). 5 Cohen, “Pakistan and the Cold War,” 76. 6 This research uses the definition of ‘small’ or weak states in terms of their capabilities or power – having limited ineffectual capacity to influence security dynamics in its region or to defend itself against a larger more powerful neighbor. As a newly independent country, Pakistan’s size was small, its resources limited, and its military strength was 1:5 in comparison to India, but it was not small in ‘influence’ given its geostrategic location. 7 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 20. 8 There are conflicting interpretations of Liaquat Ali Khan’s non-visit to the Soviet Union despite the invitation in 1949. One Pakistani commentator notes that Liaquat Ali Khan ‘maneuvered’ an invitation from Kremlin “as a move on the political chess board; the United States had invited Nehru and, fearing that America would be captivated

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 177 by Nehru’s charm, Liaquat Ali Khan applied shock tactics by arranging his invitation from Kremlin,” F. M. Innes, “The Political Outlook in Pakistan,” Pacific Affairs XXVI (1953) quoted in Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, “Pakistan’s Relations with the Soviet Union,” Asian Survey 6, no. 9 (September1966): 493. An Indian account of the invitation maintains that it was the Soviet leadership that was annoyed by Nehru’s U.S. visit and thereby invited Khan to visit the Soviet Union in 1949, but the visit did not materialize and Khan decided to go to the United States, see Shri Ram Sharma, IndiaUSSR Relations, 1947–1971: From Ambivalence to Steadfastness, Part-1 (New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 1999); chapter4, p.24. Yet another account records that Joseph Stalin invited Liaquat Ali Khan to Moscow in 1949, but Khan declined the invitation, see James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan (New York: Facts on File, 2009). 9 Liaquat Ali Khan’s address in Gujranwala, Punjab on March9, 1951 summarized by K. Sarwar Hasan, “The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,” Pakistan Horizon 4, no. 4 (December1951): 181–99; pg. 5–6. 10 For details on Pak–U.S. diplomacy over the Korean War issue, see Hussain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, United States and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); 52–53. 11 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: APolitical Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 130. 12 Pakistan formally withdrew from SEATO in 1973 on the pretext that the organization or its members did not support Pakistan in its 1971 war with India. The organization was formally disbanded in 1977. For a brief history of Pakistan’s membership in SEATO, see “SEATO and Pakistan,” Pakistan Horizon 7, no. 3 (September1954): 138–49. 13 For a Pakistani perspective on CENTO and the narrative of how the United States. undermined its pledges of collective security in helping Pakistan against Indian aggression in 1965 and 1971, see Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, “Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan,” Pakistan Economic and Social Review 49, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 109–32. Pakistan’s fourth prime minister since Liaquat Ali Khan, Mohammad Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy (1956–57) was strongly pro-western in his approach to foreign policy. When asked about Pakistan’s decision against the Egyptian position in the 1956 Suez crisis– which caused much disappointment with Egypt and India in the NAM– Suhrawardy remarked, “The question is asked: why don’t we get together rather than be tied to a big power like the UK or America? My answer to that is that zero plus zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero. We have therefore, to go farther afield rather than get all the zeros together,” quoted in Ardeshir Cowasjee, “Hypocrites to the Core,” DAWN, December19, 2010 cited in Tughral Yamin, “An Appreciation of the Pakistani Military Thought Process,” Strategic Studies XXXII, no. 2–3 (September2012): 114–33, see footnote, 11. 14 For a political history of Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s first military dictator, see Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993). For a review of political development in Pakistan during Ayub Khan’s period, see Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958–1969 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971). 15 “Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Pakistan,” Treaty, March5, 1959, Digital National Security Archives retrieved from, accessed December1, 2014, http://gateway.proquest. com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article: CAF00002. 16 Khan, Friends not Masters, 117. 17 Kashmir is a disputed territory between India and Pakistan and is a legacy of the hasty partition of the subcontinent.

178 Rabia Akhtar 18 Khan, Friends not Masters, 117. For aa beautiful beautiful ode what it meant for 18 Khan, Friends not Masters, 117. For ode to to Badaber Badaber and and what it meant for the who served served there, there, see see Airgram from the in Pakistan the Americans Americans who Airgram A-550 A-550 from the Embassy Embassy in Pakistan to the Department Department of of State, State, October October 6, 6, 1969 1969 by by James James W. Spain, Charge Charge d’Affaires d’Affaires to the W. Spain, in November1969), Document 38, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-7, in Pakistan Pakistan (July (July to to November 1969), Document 38, FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. vol. E-7, Documents on South South Asia, 1969-1972, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ Documents on Asia, 1969–1972, frus1969-76ve07/d38. frus1969-76ve07/d38. 19 Kux, Disenchanted Allies, Allies, 113. 19 Kux, Disenchanted 113. 20 Khan, Friends 171. 20 Khan, Friends Not Not Masters, Masters, 171. 21 Ibid., 118. 21 Ibid., 118. 22 Ibid., 119. 22 Ibid., 119. 23 Ibid., 120. 23 Ibid., 120. 24 Stephen Stephen P. P. Cohen, Cohen, “U.S. “U.S. Weapons Weapons and and South South Asia: Policy Analysis,” 24 Asia: A APolicy Analysis,” Pacific Pacific Affairs Affairs 49, no. no. 11 (Spring 49–69. 49, (Spring 1976): 1976): 49-69. 25 1963 1963 was was an an important important year for Pakistan–China Pakistan-China relations. relations. Pakistan Pakistan signed signed three three agreeagree 25 year for China: The The Boundary Boundary Agreement, Trade Agreement and the the Civil Civil Aviation ments ments with with China: Agreement, Trade Agreement and Aviation Agreement. The Boundary unsettled the deeply who Agreement. The Boundary Agreement Agreement unsettled the Indians Indians deeply who refused refused to to accept legitimacy of of the the agreement, agreement, and and the the Civil Civil Aviation accept the the legitimacy Aviation Agreement Agreement unsettled unsettled United States States since since it it provided China with with unprecedented air access to and the the United provided China unprecedented air access to and beyond beyond Asia. of these see Dennis The United United States Asia. For For an an appraisal appraisal of these two two agreements, agreements, see Dennis Kux, Kux, The States and 1947-2000: Disenchanted (Baltimore: Johns Johns Hopkins Hopkins University and Pakistan, Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies Allies (Baltimore: University Cheema, “Significance “Significance of of Pakistan-China Press, Press, 2001); 2001); Pervaiz Pervaiz Iqbal Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan-China Border Border Agree Agreement of Pakistan Horizon Horizon 39, ment of 1963,” 1963,” Pakistan 39, no. no. 4, 4, Focus Focus on: on: Sino-Pakistan Sino-Pakistan Relations Relations (Fourth (Fourth Quarter, 1986): 1986): 41-52. Quarter, 41–52. 26 In 1972, with with the the Simla Simla Agreement between the the two two governments, governments, the ceasefire line line 26 In 1972, Agreement between the ceasefire was renamed the Line the origins was renamed as as the Line of of Control. Control. For For historical historical overview overview of of the origins of of the the Kashmir dispute, see see Victoria Victoria Schofield, Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: Conflict: India, the Kashmir dispute, Kashmir in India, Pakistan Pakistan and and the Unending War War (London: (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). For an an account account of of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s military strat Unending I.B. Tauris, 2010). For military strategy Asghar Khan, First Round: Round: Indo-Pakistan Indo-Pakistan War egy in in 1965 1965 war, war, see see Asghar Khan, The The First War 1965 1965 (Lon(Lon don: Vikas Vikas Publishing Publishing House Ltd., 1979); 1979); also also see see Farooq Farooq Bajwa, to don: House Pvt. Pvt. Ltd., Bajwa, From From Kutch Kutch to Tashkent: The The Indo-Pakistan War of of1965 (London: Hurst& Hurst & Co, Co, 2013). 2013). Tashkent: Indo-Pakistan War 1965 (London: 27 American embassy 27 “Rann “Rann of of Kutch,” Kutch,” telegram telegram originated originated from from American embassy office office in in Rawalpindi Rawalpindi by McConaughy to Secretary State, State, Department Department of of State, State, April 30, 1965 1965 by Ambassador Ambassador McConaughy to Secretary April30, in Roedad Roedad Khan, The American Confidential India-Pakistancited in cited Khan, The American Papers: Papers: Secret Secret and and Confidential India-PakistanBangladesh Documents Documents 1965–1973 University Press, Press, 1999), Bangladesh 1965-1973 (Karachi: (Karachi: Oxford Oxford University 1999), 3–4. 3-4. 28 With Bhutto’s use of the the word word “Pakistan’s “Pakistan’s territory” territory” under under attack, attack, consult consult 28 With reference reference to to Bhutto’s use of Feroz Khan’s account account of of the 1965 war war in in Eating Grass. Feroz Khan’s the 1965 Eating Grass. 29 Ambassador Bowles Memorandum for 29 “Summary “Summary of of Ambassador Bowles Memorandum,” Memorandum,” Tab-A, Tab-A, Memorandum for the the SecSec retary of States States from from Phillips Talbot, NEA (reference Bowles Bowles meeting the SecreSecre retary of Phillips Talbot, NEA (reference meeting with with the tary on June2, June 2, 1965), 1965), The The American 13. tary on American Papers, Papers, 13. 3300 Telegram Ambassador McConaughy Telegram from from Ambassador McConaughy to to Secretary Secretary of of State, State, September7, September 7, 1965, apprising apprising the the secretary secretary of of his meeting with and Bhutto, Bhutto, The The American 1965, his meeting with Ayub Ayub and American Papers, 36. Papers, 36. 31 Ambassador McConaughy’s to Secretary Dept of 31 Ambassador McConaughy’s letter letter to Secretary of of State, State, Dept of State State on on SeptemSeptem ber 10, 1965, 1965, detailing detailing his his meeting Bhutto, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s foreign foreign minisminis ber10, meeting with with Zulfikar Zulfikar Ali Ali Bhutto, ter, The American 60-61. ter, The American Papers, Papers, 60–61. 32 In April April 1965, Ayub Khan Khan visited the first Pakistani president president 32 In 1965, Ayub visited Moscow Moscow and and became became the first Pakistani to do so. so. Ayub’s visit to Soviet Union was successful, successful, and and both both countries countries had signed to do Ayub’s visit to Soviet Union was had signed agreements advance trade economic cooperation. cooperation. agreements to to advance trade and and economic 33 Memorandum of private meeting with Ayub Ayub on 33 Memorandum of Johnson’s Johnson’s second second private meeting with on Dec Dec 15, 15, 1965, 1965, cited cited in Kux, 168. Ayub Bhutto secretly secretly traveled to China China for for aa in Kux, Disenchanted Disenchanted Allies; Allies; 168. Ayub and and Bhutto traveled to brief on Sep Sep 19–20, 19-20, 1965, 1965, after after the the decision decision of of suspension suspension of of the the U.S. U.S. aid aid was brief trip trip on was finalized and the two. two. F.S. Aijazuddin in his book book From From aa Head, Head, Through finalized and shared shared with with the F.S. Aijazuddin in his Through aa Head, to aa Head and Kux in Disenchanted discuss Altaf Gauhar’s (Information (Information Head, to Head and Kux in Disenchanted Allies Allies discuss Altaf Gauhar’s

Pakistan–U.S. Relations 179 Secretary under Ayub) Ayub) views he details Secretary under views on on the the secret secret China China visit, visit, which which he details in in his his biograbiogra phy Ayub phy Ayub Khan. Khan. 34 The The suspension suspension had only been relaxed in in 1966 1966 to allow both both countries countries to to purchase purchase non 34 had only been relaxed to allow nonlethal lethal equipment equipment from from the the United United States, States, which which included included vehicles vehicles and and electronic electronic gear. gear. An assessment of of U.S. aid suspension suspension in in 1965 1965 revealed it only only encourencour An assessment U.S. military military aid revealed that that it aged both both India and Pakistan to seek seek alternative alternative arms supply partners. to aged India and Pakistan to arms supply partners. According According to the report, Pakistan Pakistan in 200 tanks the report, in 1966 1966 “acquired “acquired at at least least 200 tanks and and 100 100 or or more more aircraft aircraft from from Communist China China as as well substantial amount of other other arms, arms, such such as artillery and and Communist well as as aa substantial amount of as artillery ammunition. It It also also got got two squadrons of of Mirage from France at aa cost cost of of $100mil$100 mil ammunition. two squadrons Mirage III’s III’s from France at lion.” From Soviets and Communist China, China, Pakistan hoped to receive tanks and lion.” From the the Soviets and Communist Pakistan hoped to receive tanks and aircraft. The The report assessed that that after after the 1965 war, received “135 “135 MIG-21 aircraft. report assessed the 1965 war, India India received MIG-21 FL FL jet jet fighters, aa MIG-21 MIG-21 factory, factory, 75 75 SU-7 SU-7 fighter bombers, numerous helicopters and and trans fighters, fighter bombers, numerous helicopters transport aircraft, some 800 800 tanks, naval vessels vessels of of various various types.” types.” port aircraft, missiles, missiles, some tanks, artillery artillery and and naval Moreover, Indians Indians blamed States for for pushing pushing them Moscow due due to to Moreover, blamed the the United United States them towards towards Moscow their lack lack of of response response to to their during the the 1965 1965 war (reference Kennedy’s Kennedy’s denial denial their their needs needs during war (reference of F-104s to India). The report report lists lists lethal lethal weapons weapons or or equipment equipment to include “armed “armed of F-104s to India). The to include or armored armored vehicles, vehicles, such such as as tanks tanks and and APC’s; infantry weapons; artillery; ammuniammuni or APC’s; infantry weapons; artillery; tion; armed armed helicopters; helicopters; and and combat combat aircraft. aircraft. Spare Spare parts in support support of of these items are are tion; parts in these items also included. included. Non-lethal includes transport; observation; trainer trainer aircraft; aircraft; and unarmed also Non-lethal includes transport; observation; and unarmed helicopters and support equipment equipment and and spares; spares; trucks; trucks; communications, communications, radar radar and sig helicopters and support and sigequipment; engineer engineer equipment; equipment; etc.” etc.” This This report report is is part of aa Secret Secret Cover Cover MemoMemo nal equipment; nal part of randum to Secretary Kissinger from Assistant Secretary randum sent sent to Secretary of of State State Henry Henry Kissinger from Assistant Secretary State State for for Near and South South Asian Joseph Sisco, Sisco, on on Nov 14, 1969, 1969, “U.S. “U.S. Military Near East East and Asian Affairs, Affairs, Joseph Nov 14, Military Supply Policy Policy for for South South Asia Response to to NSSM Directives, Part Supply Asia–- Response NSSM 26, 26, Presidential Presidential Directives, Part II, Digital Digital National National Security Archives, accessed December4, 2014 http://gateway.pro http://gateway.pro II, Security Archives, accessed December 4, 2014 quest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article: quest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article: CPR00383. CPR00383. 35 Ibid., Ibid., 80. 80. 35 36 Ibid., Ibid., 112. 112. 36 37 Immediately Immediately after after attending attending the the UNGA UNGA session session on on 1971 1971 India-Pakistan war on on DecemDecem 37 India–Pakistan war ber15, the U.S. U.S. Secretary William ber 15, 1971, 1971, Bhutto Bhutto requested requested aa meeting meeting with with the Secretary of of State, State, William Rogers, and President and met on December18, December 18, 1971. 1971. He returned Rogers, and President Nixon Nixon and met them them on He then then returned to assume assume the charge as as the the president of Pakistan, after Gen. Gen. Yahya’s Yahya’s resignation. resignation. home home to the charge president of Pakistan, after Kux book Disenchanted Disenchanted Allies Allies writes when Bhutto Nixon, he he told told him Kux in in his his book writes that that when Bhutto met met Nixon, him that Pakistan was “completely “completely in in debt debt of of the United States States during during the the recent that Pakistan was the United recent trying trying days,” and and he assured by by Nixon of full full support support by United States States in in the the form form days,” he was was assured Nixon of by the the United of and economic with military assistance being being the the most most difof humanitarian humanitarian and economic assistance, assistance, with military assistance dif ficult one one due due to to congressional congressional ‘attitudes,’ ‘attitudes,’ Kux, complete account account of of the ficult Kux, 204-5. 204–5. For For the the complete the meeting between Rogers, see see Telegram Telegram 227784 227784 from from the State Department Department meeting between Bhutto Bhutto and and Rogers, the State to the Embassy National Archives, Archives, Record Record Group to the Embassy in in Pakistan, Pakistan, Dec Dec 18, 18, 1971, 1971, National Group 59, 59, CenCen tral Files Files 1970–73, 1970-73, POL 15-1 PAK, 1969-1976, Vol. Vol. E-7, on South South tral POL 15–1 PAK, FRUS, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-7, Documents Documents on Asia, 1969-1972. Asia, 1969–1972. 38 Nixon directed U.S. objec38 On On February5, February 5, 1969, 1969, Nixon directed aa review review of of U.S.’s U.S.’s China China policy, policy, U.S. objec tives and and interests interests towards towards China, China, nature nature of of Chinese Chinese Communist Communist threat in Asia and tives threat in Asia and cost-benefit analysis analysis of of U.S. U.S. approaches approaches on on China. China. See See National Security Study Study aa cost–benefit National Security Memorandum 14, 14, www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nationalsecurity Memorandum www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nationalsecurity studymemoranda.php On On February 21, 1969, 1969, Nixon directed aa review of the U.S. arms arms studymemoranda.php February21, Nixon directed review of the U.S. supply policy policy in in South South Asia, see National Security Study Study Memorandum Memorandum 26. 26. supply Asia, see National Security 39 the World Reacted to Taliban Kabul,” Aljazeera,August16, 2021, www. 39 “How “HowtheWorld Reactedto TalibanTakeover Takeoverof ofKabul,”A//'azeera,August16,2021, www. aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/16/how-the-world-reacted-to-taliban-takeover-of-kabul. aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/16/how-the-world-reacted-to-taliban-takeover-of-kabul. 40 For For aa chronology chronology of of Pakistan’s Pakistan’s role role in in Afghan see CSSPR CSSPR Afghanistan 40 Afghan Peace Peace Process, Process, see Afghanistan Country https://csspr.uol.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/AfghanistanCountry Study, Study, https://csspr.uol.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/AfghanistanCountry-Study-1.pdf. Country-Study-1.pdf.

180 Rabia Akhtar 41 Shamila Shamila N. Chaudhary, “Trump “Trump Gave Gave Pakistan What It It Wanted, Wanted, but 41 N. Chaudhary, Pakistan What but Afghan Afghan Peace Peace Is Far From Guaranteed,” NPR, July 24, 2019, www.npr.org/2019/07/24/744575066/ Is Far From Guaranteed,” NPR, July24, 2019, www.npr.org/2019/07/24/744575066/ opinion-trump-gave-pakistan-what-it-wanted-but-afghan-peace-is-far-from-guarante . opinion-trump-gave-pakistan-what-it-wanted-but-afghan-peace-is-far-from-guarante. 42 twenty-seventh report UN Analytical Analytical Support and Sanctions 42 The The twenty-seventh report of of the the UN Support and Sanctions Monitoring Monitoring Team pursuant pursuant to to resolutions 1526 (2004) (2004) and and 2253 (2015) submitted submitted to to the the Security Security Team resolutions 1526 2253 (2015) Council https://undocs.org/S/2021/68. Council https://undocs.org/S/2021/68. 43 Anwer Iqbal Iqbal and Naveed Siddiqui, 43 Anwer and Naveed Siddiqui, “Pakistan “Pakistan Shares Shares Dossier Dossier on on India’s India’s Terror Terror CamCam paign Secretary General,” General,” DAWN, 25, 2020, 2020, www.dawn.com/ www.dawn.com/ paign with with UN UN Secretary DAWN, November November25, news/1592313. news/1592313. 44 Naveed Siddique, Evidence: Dossier India’s Sponsorship 44 Naveed Siddique, “Irrefutable “Irrefutable Evidence: Dossier on on India’s Sponsorship of of State State TerTer rorism in Pakistan Presented,” The The DAWN, 14, 2020, 2020, www.dawn.com/ www.dawn.com/ rorism in Pakistan Presented,” DAWN, November November14, news/1590333. news/1590333. 45 Financial Task Force (FATF) is is aa global global policy-making policy-making body. body. 45 Financial Action Action Task Force (FATF) 46 Mapping Pakistan’s Compliance Compliance with with FATF RSIL Report, Sep 46 Mapping Pakistan’s FATF Recommendations, Recommendations, RSIL Report, September 2020, https://rsilpak.org/2020/mapping-pakistans-compliance-with-fatf-recom https://rsilpak.org/2020/mapping-pakistans-compliance-with-fatf-recom tember2020, mendations/. mendations/. 47 Imran Gabol, Gabol, “LeT “LeT leader leader Lakhvi from Lahore Lahore on on Terrorism Terrorism Financing Financing 47 Imran Lakhvi Arrested Arrested from Charge: CTD,” CTD,” DAWN, Jan 2, 2, 2021, Charge: DAWN, Jan 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1599281. www.dawn.com/news/1599281. 48 Rabia Akhtar, Akhtar, “COVID-19 the Geopolitical Battle of the Elephants?” Elephants?” 48 Rabia “COVID-19 and and the Geopolitical Dilemma: Dilemma: Battle of the in Making ofPost COVID-19 World World Politics, eds. Huma and Nausheen in Making Sense Sense of Post COVID-19 Politics, eds. Huma Baqai Baqai and Nausheen Wasi (Karachi: Lightstone Lightstone Publishers, Karachi Council Council on on Foreign Foreign Relations Relations (KCFR), (KCFR), Wasi (Karachi: Publishers, Karachi July 2020). July2020). 49 Muhammad “Analyzing U.S. U.S. Objections Objections to CPEC,” ISSI Octo 49 Muhammad Faisal, Faisal, “Analyzing to CPEC,” ISSI Issue Issue Brief, Brief, October 17, 2017, 2017, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/IB_Faisal_October_17_ http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/IB_Faisal_October_17_ ber17, 2017.pdf. 2017.pdf. 50 Rabia Akhtar, Connectivity for 50 Rabia Akhtar, Building Building Regional Regional Connectivity for Pakistan, Pakistan, FES FES Monograph, Monograph, December 2019, https://csspr.uol.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/BUILDINGhttps://csspr.uol.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/BUILDINGDecember2019, REGIONAL-CONNECTIVITY.pdf. REGIONAL-CONNECTIVITY.pdf. 51 Ibid., 52. 51 Ibid., 52. 52 Syed Syed Ali Jaffery, “India “India and and the of Control: Control: Reducing Reducing Reputational 52 Ali Zia Zia Jaffery, the Line Line of Reputational Dam Damage,” Strafasia, July17, 2020, https://strafasia.com/india-and-the-line-of-controlhttps://strafasia.com/india-and-the-line-of-controlage,” Strafasia, July 17, 2020, reducing-reputational-damage/. reducing-reputational-damage/. 53 The The author author coined coined this this term in aa webinar the Institute Institute of of Strategic Strategic Studies, Studies, 53 term in webinar hosted hosted by by the Islamabad on July3, July 3, 2020 2020 available here www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yNPG2Zdik0. www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yNPG2Zdik0. Islamabad on available here 54 Adil Sultan, “India-US “India-US Basic and Cooperation Cooperation Agreement (BECA),” https:// 54 Adil Sultan, Basic Exchange Exchange and Agreement (BECA),” https:// strafasia.com/india-us-basic-exchange-and-cooperation-agreement-beca/. strafasia.com/india-us-basic-exchange-and-cooperation-agreement-beca/. 55 ACSA Agree Agree55 “The “The Strategic Strategic Value Value of of Signing Signing GSOMIA, GSOMIA, LEMOA, LEMOA, COMCASA COMCASA and and ACSA ment with the the US,” Global Defense Corp, January17, January 17, 2021, ment with US,” Global Defense Corp, 2021, www.globaldefensecorp. www.globaldefensecorp. com/2021/01/17/gsomia-lemoa-and-acsa/. com/2021/01/17/gsomia-lemoa-and-acsa/.

11 The Contours of Pakistan’s Relations with Russia Adeela Ahmed

Introduction During the Cold War, Pakistan and the then Soviet Union maintained limited ties due to their affiliation with opposite security blocs. Pakistan tilted toward the United States and gained economic and military assistance by signing antiCommunist military pacts. The Soviet Union maintained closer ties with India. Islamabad–Moscow ties further deteriorated during the 1980s as Pakistan vehemently opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was at the turn of the twentyfirst century especially during the 2010s that the relationship began to improve. Against this backdrop, this chapter explicates the significance of Pakistan–Russia relations in the current strategic environment and sheds light on what converges their interests. It first provides a short historical background of the relationship. From Divergence to Convergence: AHistorical Background Pakistan and the former Soviet Union established diplomatic relations in May1948. For the initial years, the relations between the two sides remained stable. In 1950, Joseph Stalin invited the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to visit the Soviet Union. Following this, Khan also received an invitation from the US President Harry S. Truman to visit the United States. Liaquat Ali Khan set aside the former invitation and visited the United States. Analysts termed that it was a decisive moment in Pakistan’s foreign policy to tilt toward the Western Bloc.1 In the following years, Pakistan actively pursued pro-US alignment, and India under Nehru’s leadership tilted toward a socialist camp led by the Soviet Union. Thus, both Pakistan and the USSR were placed in opposite security blocs from the very beginning. Pakistan formally joined the capitalist bloc and signed four defense-related pacts by 1959. Based on its commitment, Pakistan was regarded as ‘America’s most allied ally in Asia.’2 Pakistani decision-makers were clear that it was just the right way to build up country’s defense capabilities against the archrival India. While in return the United States got the extraterritorial privilege, Pakistan allowed the United States to establish an intelligence network in Peshawar for spying on the USSR. In 1962, a US U-2 aircraft that took off from Peshawar, Pakistan, was shot down by the Soviets, and its pilot was captured. DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-13

182 Adeela Ahmed The incident annoyed Soviet leader Khrushchev who threatened Pakistan with dire consequences taking the bilateral relations to the lowest ebb.3 During the 1960s, Pakistan sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union in trade and cultural areas. In April1964, Ayub became the first Pakistani ruler to visit Moscow. The relations again froze as the Soviet Union sided with India during the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 under the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Peace, and Cooperation.4 Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s visit to Moscow in 1974 once again helped in improving two-way ties.5 The Soviet Union assisted Pakistan in the establishment of the Pakistan Steel Mill (PSM) and key thermal power plants at Muzaffargarh, Multan, and Guddu and supported Pakistan in the establishment of the Oil and Gas Development Company (OGDC). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December1979 once again deteriorated the relationship as Pakistan played a frontline state role in the anti-Soviet war of United States throughout the 1980s.6 Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Russia in 1999 began to thaw the relationship. On that occasion, Pakistan acknowledged Moscow as an ‘emerging global power’ and stressed the importance of the multipolarity of world politics. Russian President Boris Yeltsin termed the visit as a start of a new chapter in bilateral ties.7 Under the presidentship of Vladimir Putin who came to power in May2000, relations began to improve. Both sides started two-way visits. As an important development, Russia supplied Pakistan with MI-17 and MI-35 attack helicopters.8 In 2007, the 3-day official visit of the Russian Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov, to Pakistan after 38years brightened the prospects of improved relations in the future. He had in-depth discussions with the then President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.9 In 2010, the relations further improved as Russia invited Pakistan for a summit on Afghanistan. In 2011, Putin publicly endorsed Pakistan’s bid to join the SCO and stated that Pakistan was an important partner of Russia in South Asia. He offered Russia’s assistance in the expansion of Pakistan Steel Mills and the provision of technical support for the Guddu and Muzaffargarh power plants. Russia also offered help in developing the Thar Coal Project.10 Pakistan became a full member of the SCO at the Astana Summit in June2017. This was not possible without Russian support.11 Hence, both countries are positively engaged with each other in different areas.12 An assessment of the evolving structure of the Pakistan–Russia relationship reveals that both sides intend to expand their options in search of reliable regional partners. A look at regional geopolitical environment demonstrates growing tension between Russia and the US. Moscow’s main security concerns are US edge in conventional armaments, NATO expansion, and the prospect of regime change by promoting democracy. The US National Security Strategy-2017 pinpointed Russia as one of the key threats to US interests.13 Likewise, the US Indo-Pacific strategy titled ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP), the reemergence of Quadrilateral Security Alliance QUAD,14 US-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, and the Indo-US strategic partnership all were seen with unease in Moscow. It was in this backdrop that Russia issued its ‘Maritime Doctrine-2020’15 and ‘National

Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 183 Security Strategy-2021’ to highlight its foreign policy priorities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.16 At the same time, Russia was working on economic revival to regain its (lost) political-diplomatic prominence at the international level. It expanded its market especially in the high-tech industry and military enterprises in addition to its traditional market of goods.17 Agradual shift in Russian policy from the West to the East demonstrated its need to make new alliances and strategic partnerships. Pakistan, on the other hand, has realized the importance of collaboration and has started working on revisiting its foreign policy, especially under the current government.18 Pakistan due to its geostrategic location and strong clout in the Islamic world reset its goals to make its geo-strategic significance worthwhile. It partnered with China in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) whose ‘flagship’ project the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passed through it. The CPEC once completed will not only benefit these two strategic partners but also benefit regional countries especially Iran, Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics, and Russia. At the same time, a gradual lukewarmness in Pakistan’s ties with the United States in the backdrop of burgeoning Indo-US partnership especially in defense and nuclear areas further required Pakistan to search for new allies. Against this backdrop, Pakistan and Russia started taking measures to come closer to each other. They began consultation on Afghanistan (along with other countries) while also ramping up their mutual engagements under bilateral and multilateral arrangements like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).19 It is appraised that their relations are mainly affected and shaped by the strategic international environment, rather than the domestic factors.20 As both have decided to improve their relations, they face both challenges and opportunities.

Challenges The key challenges that the two countries are facing include a) trust deficit, b) Russia’s continued ties with India, c) minimal media coverage, d) limited sociocultural ties, e) and the language barrier. Since the two countries had maintained a limited relationship in the past, it will take time for the both sides to fill the gap. At the same time, Russia’s closer strategic partnerships with India, Pakistan’s archrival, continue to remain an issue. In past, both sides did not pay attention to promoting their languages and culture. Only recently, some efforts were made in this regard. For example, the first bilingual Urdu-Russian dictionary was published.21Moreover, the two countries lacked social media platforms which could play an important role in constructing a positive perspective of their relations. Given the limited sociocultural ties, it will be difficult to promote their relations in the absence of specialized organizations. The Area Study Centre at Peshawar University focuses on Russia and Central Asia. However, its scope was limited to academic research. Likewise, the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, had only a few scholars dealing with Pakistan.22 According to Pakistani Embassy in Moscow, there are hardly 1,200 Pakistani nationals in Russia for

184 Adeela Ahmed study, business, or blue-collar work.23 work.23 In popustudy, business, or blue-collar In aa country country with with over over 100million 100 million of of popu 24 lation, this is a very small number and reflects the limited nature of relationship. lation, this is a very small number and reflects the limited nature of relationship.24 Along these challenges and limitations, several opportunities to expand their Along these challenges and limitations, several opportunities to expand their cooperation the changing knocking at cooperation in in the changing geopolitical geopolitical landscape landscape are are knocking at the the door. door. Though relations between Russia and Pakistan have remained turbulent Though relations between Russia and Pakistan have remained turbulent over over the the years, become comparatively the last years, they they have have become comparatively warmer warmer over over the last decade. decade. Moscow Moscow is is reaffirming reaffirming its its role role in in its its economic, economic, political/diplomatic, political/diplomatic, and and defense defense domains, domains, whereas to lessen whereas Islamabad Islamabad is is seeking seeking new new avenues avenues of of opportunities opportunities to lessen its its reliance reliance 25 There is a need to tap those new avenues of cooperation on the West. on the West.25 There is a need to tap those new avenues of cooperation that that were were lost the past. past. lost in in the Russian President politics, Russian President Vladimir Vladimir Putin’s Putin’s vision vision of of multipolarity multipolarity of of world world politics, greater interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and emphasis upon greater interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and emphasis upon ecoeco nomic provide opportunities for Pakistan Pakistan to build upon with nomic revival revival provide opportunities for to build upon its its relations relations with 26 veto-yielding power. In Pakistan is veto-yielding power.26 In particular, particular, if if Pakistan is able able to to connect connect CPEC CPEC with with Russian the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), will open new pathways in Russian the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), will open new pathways in the the 27 Eurasian Using its well as the current Eurasian hinterland. hinterland.27 Using its geostrategic geostrategic location location as as well as the current interinter national political climate, unique position position of national political climate, Pakistan Pakistan is is in in aa unique of having having the the opportuopportu 28 nity to develop close relations with Russia. nity to develop close relations with Russia.28 On there is within Russia Russia that Pakistan is On the the other other hand, hand, there is an an understanding understanding within that Pakistan is aa 29 ‘key regional player.’ The increased number of visits on both sides is its testi‘key regional player.’29 The increased number of visits on both sides is its testi mony. Pakistan’s Foreign Foreign Minister visited Russia Russia mony. In In February2018, February 2018, Pakistan’s Minister Khawaja Khawaja Asif Asif visited and met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. The two ministers agreed to and met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. The two ministers agreed to expand their bilateral engagement. Following this, the 13th meeting of the Pakiexpand their bilateral engagement. Following this, the 13 th meeting of the Pakistan–Russia stan-Russia Consultative Consultative Group Group on on Strategic Strategic Stability Stability was was held held in in Islamabad Islamabad in in March2019. Minister of March 2019. Foreign Foreign Secretary Secretary Tehmina Tehmina Janjua Janjua and and Deputy Deputy Foreign Foreign Minister of Russia Ryabkov led Russia Sergei Sergei Ryabkov led their their respective respective delegations. delegations. In an important development, In an important development, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Prime Prime Minister Minister Imran Imran Khan Khan and and ForFor eign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi held high-level meetings with Russian eign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi held high-level meetings with Russian President Putin and the sidelines President Vladimir Vladimir Putin and Foreign Foreign Minister Minister Sergey Sergey Lavrov Lavrov on on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Bishkek in June2019. This meeting caught world’s of the SCO summit in Bishkek in June 2019. This meeting caught the the world’s attention. Pakistan conveyed that it was interested in building synergies with attention. Pakistan conveyed that it was interested in building synergies with RusRus sia sia and and to to chart chart new new frontiers frontiers of of engagement. engagement. In In September2020, September 2020, Pakistan Pakistan ForFor eign Minister visited visited Moscow to attend Ministers of eign Minister Moscow to attend the the Council Council of of Foreign Foreign Ministers of SCO SCO 30 Member Both countries to expand their cooperation Member States States (SCO-CFM). (SCO-CFM).30 Both countries agreed agreed to expand their cooperation 31 on On on regional regional connectivity connectivity projects. projects.31 On April7, April 7, 2021, 2021, Russian Russian foreign foreign minister minister Sergey Lavrov made a 2-day visit to Pakistan after a gap of 9years. During Sergey Lavrov made a 2-day visit to Pakistan after a gap of 9 years. During the the visit, he met with all high-level officials visit, he met with all high-level officials that that aa month month later later resulted resulted in in the the signsign ing key trade trade agreement Project (NSGPP). ing of of aa key agreement on on North-South North-South Gas Gas Pipeline Pipeline Project (NSGPP). The frequency of bilateral visits has been playing a role to smoothen path for for The frequency of bilateral visits has been playing a role to smoothen the the path mutual understanding of the keys areas that will further open opportunities and mutual understanding of the keys areas that will further open opportunities and will the level through reliable were specuwill develop develop the level of of trust trust through reliable communication. communication. There There were specu lations in media that the Russian President might visit Pakistan once lations in media that the Russian President might visit Pakistan once COVID-19 COVID-19 situation situation is is under under control. control. Cooperation on Cooperation on counterterrorism counterterrorism is is another another emerging emerging area area of of cooperation cooperation between Pakistan and Russia. Both sides are concerned about the between Pakistan and Russia. Both sides are concerned about the rise rise of of terrorist terrorist

Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 185 organizations in the region especially the ISIS Khorasan (IS-K).32 Russia reported that the terrorist body had 71,000 fighters, whereas the US Intelligence reported that it had 20,000 to 30,000 fighters.33 In 2014, when ISIS was at its peak, some 10million people were living in areas controlled by it. At the beginning of 2016, ISIS had control over 78,000 sq/km in Iraq and Syria, but it lost 17,600 sq/km in the same year. In January2015, ISIS declared Afghanistan and Pakistan as being part of the Wilayat Khorasan. It established the Khorasan Council to look after operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.34 Both Pakistan and Russia have serious security concerns for their regional economic projects. Pakistan–Russia cooperation in the defense sector is also on the rise. This reflects in the form of high-level official visits, joint military exercises, establishment of joint military commission, Russian military assistance to Pakistan, and security training agreement and naval cooperation. In 2015, Pakistan’s Army Chief Raheel Sharif visited Russia. Under a defense deal, Islamabad purchased Mi-35M Hind-E assault helicopters from Moscow.35 In March2017, Russian military delegation visited Pakistan’s tribal areas. In the same year, the special forces of the two countries launched joint counterterrorism drills ‘DRUZBAFriendship 2017’ in the mountains and forests of Russia’s North Caucasus republic of Karachay-Cherkessia.36 On April24, 2018, Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Naseer Janjua and Army Chief General Bajwa paid an official visit to Russia. At that occasion, Bajwa appreciated Russia’s ‘positive role’ in resolving the ‘complex security of the region’ and extended Pakistan’s full cooperation. The visit resulted in an understanding to expand the security cooperation between the two countries.37 On July11, 2018, Pakistan hosted an unprecedented meeting of the heads of intelligence agencies from Russia, China, and Iran to discuss counter-terrorism cooperation with a particular focus on the buildup of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. Participating countries stressed the need for more active inclusion of regional powers in the efforts to end the war in Afghanistan and stressed on taking steps to prevent the trickling of IS terrorists from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan, from where they would pose risks for neighboring countries.38 On July3, 2019, Russian Army General Oleg Salyukov, Commander in Chief Russian Ground Forces, visited Islamabad and held talks with the top Pakistani military leadership. Both the countries agreed to enhance security/training cooperation and to adopt measures to further expand joint military ties. Pakistani Army Chief stated that cooperation between both countries will not only help in improving peace and stability in the region but will also usher in economic prosperity.39 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Nadeem Raza, in his meeting with the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Valery V. Gerasimov, discussed bilateral defense ties and the regional security situation. Gen. Raza was on a 2-day official visit to Russia to attend the Defense and Security Cooperation Conference at the SCO forum in September2020.40 After 2 months, on November8, 2020, a two-week-long military drill Druzhba-V (Friendship) commenced in Tarbela, Islamabad.41 Druzhba-VI, military exercises between Pakistan and Russia concluded in October2021 in Molkino Training Area

186 Adeela Ahmed in Krasnodar, Russia.42 The exercise was held despite the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic. Pakistan and Russia each has hosted three exercises. This reflected the consistency in bilateral cooperation between the two countries.43 In the time of shifting geopolitical landscape, Russia’s search for new arms markets44 and Pakistan’s search for new suppliers also drive the evolving pattern of a two-way relationship. This is particularly noticeable if compared to the past when defense ties were very limited. In this regard, the visits of Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani and Air Chief Marshall Tahir Rafiq in 2011 and 2012 respectively played an important role. On June2, 2014, Russia lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan.45 Second, on November21, 2014, both countries signed the defense agreement which was termed as a ‘milestone in their evolving relations.46 Following this, both sides signed the Russia–Pakistan Joint Military Consultative Committee (JMCC) and the ‘Contract for Admission of Service Members of Pakistan in RF’s (Russian Federation) Training Institutes. This enabled Pakistan to gain training in Russian military institutions.47 Moscow and Islamabad conducted joint naval drills in the Arabian Sea in 2014 and 2015. Russia also participated in some of the AMAN naval exercises regularly organized by Pakistan Navy.48 From 2014 to 2021, the frequency of high-level official visits by military officials of both sides, the setting up of the joint military commission, and naval cooperation signaled that both states were cooperating to sustain the momentum of evolving defense relations. Bilateral trade between the two countries remained limited throughout the past. Some of the policies adopted during the 1980s and 1990s imposed restrictions on trade in particular. According to reports, during the 1980s, some Pakistani and the Soviet Union companies were engaged in the trade of textile and other materials. The Soviet companies opened accounts in the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) to ensure the smooth functioning of this barter trade. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, these funds were stuck. There were claims and counterclaims by the business community of both sides. Pakistani companies acquired stay orders from the Sindh High Court (SHC) restraining the NBP from transferring funds amounting to $104.93million to the Russian banks.49 In response, Russia imposed restrictions on trade with Pakistan thus adversely affecting the bilateral trade for years. Under the new bonhomie, Islamabad agreed to return US$93.5million to Russia and the pending exporters’ claims of US$23.8million as per agreements set in 2016 and 2017, respectively.50 This removed the legal barriers and opened new avenues of trade between Pakistan and Russia.51 According to media reports, Russia expressed its willingness to invest in different sectors of Pakistan.52 Thus, the removal of key stumbling block in two-way trade relationship will enable Russia to invest in different sectors of Pakistan. On November19, 2020, Pakistan and Russia signed a revised deal for laying the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline with major shareholding for Islamabad. In the revised project structure, Pakistan will hold 74percent shares whereas Russia will have a 26percent stake. Earlier, the agreement was for Russia to build the pipeline on the build, own, operate, and transfer (BOOT) model and hand over its ownership to Pakistan after 25years.53

Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 187 Under the growing trade ties, ties, the Pakistan–RusUnder the growing economic economic and and trade the sixth sixth session session of of Pakistan-Rus sia Inter-Government Commissions (IGC) on Trade, Economic, Scientific, sia Inter-Government Commissions (IGC) on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and and Technical was held December2018. Technical Cooperation Cooperation was held in in Islamabad Islamabad in in December 2018. Russia Russia extended extended cooperation to Pakistan Pakistan to cooperation to to revive revive the the country’s country’s steel steel mills mills and and enhance enhance its its propro 54 ductivity and in the construction of NSGPP. Both sides urged to remove ductivity and in the construction of NSGPP.54 Both sides urged to remove the the temporary ban ban on potatoes. The temporary on Pakistan’s Pakistan’s agriculture agriculture exports exports including including rice rice and and potatoes. The Russian side Moscow to Russian side invited invited Pakistan Pakistan to to organize organize aa road road show show in in Moscow to provide provide an an opportunity to the Russian private companies to explore new avenues in Pakistan. opportunity to the Russian private companies to explore new avenues in Pakistan. On to participate participate in Pakistan. On the the Pakistani Pakistani side, side, it it invited invited Russia Russia to in trade trade expos expos in in Pakistan. Russia is particularly keen on participating in the gas pipeline, electricity, Russia is particularly keen on participating in the gas pipeline, electricity, and and other Russia has promised aa hefty other energy energy projects. projects. According According to to media media reports, reports, Russia has promised hefty 55 sum US$14billion to be be invested Pakistan’s energy sum of of US$14 billion to invested in in Pakistan’s energy sector. sector.55 At the end, in June2021, Russia lifted its ban on the import Pakistani rice. At the end, in June 2021, Russia lifted its ban on the import of of Pakistani rice. According to reports, Pakistan exported approximately 35,000 tons According to reports, Pakistan exported approximately 35,000 tons of of rice rice and and other Federal Minister Minister for for National Food Secuother grains grains worth worth $40–50million. $40-50 million. Federal National Food Secu rity that “there potential of tonnes rity Fakhar Fakhar Imam Imam stated stated that “there is is aa market market potential of 2.5million 2.5 million tonnes 56 of Pakistan’s rice in Russia.” Pakistani-Russian trade significantly increased of Pakistan’s rice in Russia.”56Pakistani-Russian trade significantly increased in in 2020, 2020, reaching reaching an an all-time all-time high high of of $790million, $790 million, aa 46percent 46 percent rise, rise, owing owing primarprimar ily to substantial Russian wheat ily to substantial shipments shipments of of Russian wheat to to support support Islamabad’s Islamabad’s domestic domestic 57 consumption. According to the Pakistan Economic was consumption.57 According to the Pakistan Economic Survey Survey 2020–21, 2020-21, Russia Russia was 58 not among the top 10 countries of Pakistani food exports. The food group not among the top 10 countries of Pakistani food exports.58 The food group is is aa significant sector of Pakistan’s economy, and the country is already exporting significant sector of Pakistan’s economy, and the country is already exporting rice to 140 utilize these these channels to rice to 140 countries. countries. There There is is aa need need to to utilize channels of of opportunities opportunities to increase trade. increase trade. Russia for its Russia has has vast vast potential potential for its military-industrial military-industrial complex, complex, IT IT Industries, Industries, and and energy resources. According to BP’s Statistical Review of World energy resources. According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy Energy 2020 2020 report, total proven proven natural report, Russia Russia holds holds around around 19.1percent 19.1 percent of of the the total natural gas gas reserves reserves 59 thus being the largest producer in the world. On the other hand, Pakistan is thus being the largest producer in the world.59 On the other hand, Pakistan is energy-deficient Russia intends energy-deficient country. country. As As Russia intends to to revive revive its its economy, economy, Pakistan Pakistan could could be an be an important important destination destination of of its its energy energy exports. exports. At At the the same same time, time, Russia Russia is is looklook ing forward to expanding its business market especially in the high-tech industry ing forward to expanding its business market especially in the high-tech industry and to the the traditional traditional market trade. and military military enterprises enterprises in in addition addition to market of of goods goods and and trade. Pakistan can contribute in the domains of manpower, domestic markets, need for Pakistan can contribute in the domains of manpower, domestic markets, need for defense equipment, and technology with Russia. Pakistan has the potential in food defense equipment, and technology with Russia. Pakistan has the potential in food products the textile textile sectors. Furthermore, given products and and the sectors. Furthermore, given its its strategic strategic location, location, Pakistan Pakistan can provide Russia and the Central Asian States an outlet to the can provide Russia and the Central Asian States an outlet to the Indian Indian Ocean. Ocean. Both pushing their their relations to new new heights. Russian Both sides sides are are pushing relations to heights. According According to to aa Russian analyst: analyst: Russia the potential for expanding Russia should should explore explore the potential for expanding commercial commercial relations relations with with Pakistan through two trans-continental trade corridors. The N-CPEC+ Pakistan through two trans-continental trade corridors. The N-CPEC+ and and W-CPEC+ being the W-CPEC+ being the northern northern and and western western expansions expansions of of CPEC CPEC respecrespec tively. which can be called tively. N-CPEC+, N-CPEC+, which can also also be called the the RuPak RuPak corridor, corridor, envisions envisions the the creation of a trade corridor through post-war Afghanistan, while creation of a trade corridor through post-war Afghanistan, while W-CPEC+ W-CPEC+ would parallel to to the the stalled North-South Transport via would run run parallel stalled North-South Transport Corridor Corridor (NSTC) (NSTC) via

188 Adeela Ahmed Iran and Azerbaijan. It’s arguably in Moscow’s best interests to pursue these proposals since they align with President Putin’s earlier expressed desire to expand Eurasian connectivity, but once again, Russia will have to resist Indian pressure if this is to happen.60 Pakistan plans to import gas and other natural fuel resources by the proposed gas pipeline to Gwadar with the rail and road link and beyond. As already mentioned, Moscow has signed the protocol to construct the NSGPP in Pakistan. However, this project will take time to implement due to the US sanctions on Russian companies and red-tapism on the Pakistani side. About the case of the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess (GIDC), Pakistan’s Supreme Court set a deadline of 6 months, but both countries failed to make progress. While on a political and diplomatic level, efforts are in process to implement the gas pipeline project, Pakistan has to cope up with the technical issues of laying a 56-inch diameter pipeline for gas transmission as Pakistan Sui gas companies can only lay a pipeline of 42-inch diameter.61 Both countries are also consolidating their ties with Beijing thus drifting into a similar group. China has become an economic juggernaut, exemplified by the BRI. This is a linchpin that can bring these countries closer both economically and strategically. Apart from this, the CPEC linkage with the Eurasian Economic Union will augment trade and cooperation in energy while opening up the routes to the warm waters for Russia. According to the International Trade Centre World Trade Map, the volume of bilateral trade between Russia and Pakistan stood at 532million USD in 2018 compared to 442million USD in 2017. In 2021,790million USD trade was observed between Moscow and Islamabad that was of 46percent rise.62 It was primarily due to the export of Russian wheat to Islamabad. This is still much lower than the actual potential. There is a need to remove remaining barriers and tap new opportunities.

Policy Options for Pakistan 1

Pakistan–Russia relations are not high profile and are still in a formative phase. At this stage, there is a need to build greater understanding and trust between the two sides. 2 The CPEC provides an excellent opportunity to Russia for its outlet to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan must not be a battleground for China, Russia, and the United States. Instead, it should focus on making its location strategic to make it more beneficial by availing economic opportunities that have been and are arising. 3 There is a need to expand people-to-people connectivity between Russia and Pakistan. 4 Pakistan should proactively work to establish an institutional mechanism to enhance cooperation in diverse fields. It has to gear up the governmental commission in trade and commerce and institute more working groups in

Pakistan’ with Russia 189 Pakistan’ss Relations Relations with Russia 189 agriculture and the technology industry. Both countries need to use existing channels for enhancing bilateral trade through harnessing business-tobusiness and institutional relations. 5 The Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting should give more media coverage to Russia to further boost the relations in a positive light.

Conclusion With rapid changes in global politics, countries are realigning their foreign policy choices. This is bringing Pakistan and Russia closer to each other, even though both were in opposite camps in the past. In the backdrop of the rapidly changing geopolitical landscape of Eurasia, both sides should focus on connectivity projects. These should lay down a roadmap for future cooperation that will give a new shape to their politics, defense, and trade ties. In fully promoting Pakistan–Russia ties, there seems to be a degree of reluctance on Russia’s side due to the sensitivities of its relations with traditional ally India. What would be the impact of India’s growing ties with the United States on Indo-Russian relations is yet to be seen. Even though Russian–Pakistani ties will not be at the expense of India, New Delhi will be perturbed if Moscow deepens closer ties with Islamabad beyond a certain level. Russia requires a more balanced policy toward the subcontinent to expand ties with Pakistan. Thus far, some encouraging signs can be discerned in Islamabad– Moscow ties, but they still are not enough to ensure the level of trust required to turn the relationship genuinely robust. Both countries should focus to fathom the benefits of economic cooperation as a vehicle of growth, a phenomenon that could help turn a page in this relationship.63 The baggage of history has to be left behind in a bid to take ties to the next level.64

Notes Notes 1 Syed Syed Riffat “Pak-Soviet Relations Since 1947: 1947: A Dissenting Appraisal,” 1 Riffat Hussain, Hussain, “Pak-Soviet Relations Since ADissenting Appraisal,” Stra Stra10, no. no. 33 (1987): (1987): 66, 66, www.jstor.org/stable/45182719. tegic Studies tegic Studies 10, www.jstor.org/stable/45182719. 2 Ayub Khan, Khan, “The Pakistan-American Alliance,” Alliance,” Foreign Foreign Affairs, Affairs, January 2 Mohammed Mohammed Ayub “The Pakistan-American January 1964, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1964-01-01/pakistan-american-alliance. 1964, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1964-01-01/pakistan-american-alliance. 3 Sarfraz Sarfraz Khan Khan and and Noor “An Overview Overview of of Pak-Soviet/Russia Pak-Soviet/Russia Relations,”CenRelations,” Cen 3 Noor Amin, Amin, “An tral Asia71 tral Asia 71 (2012): (2012): 1–28. 1-28. 4 Nazir Hussain and and Quratulain Quratulain Fatima, Fatima, “Pak-Russian “Pak-Russian Relations: Legacies 4 Nazir Hussain Relations: Historical Historical Legacies and New Central Asia 72 (2015): (2015): 6. 6. and New Beginnings,” Beginnings,”Central Asia72 5 Nazir Hussain, Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations: Lost Lost Opportunities Future Options,”Jour5 Nazir “Pak-Russia Relations: Opportunities and and Future Options,” Jour nal of ofPolitical Studies 19, no. no. 11 (2012). (2012). nal Political Studies19, 6 Author’s conservation with Former Official Official of of the of Defence, 6 Author’s conservation with Former the Ministry Ministry of Defence, Pakistan Pakistan Lt. Lt. General Naeem Lodhi. General (R), (R), Naeem Lodhi. 7 Muhammad Muhammad Owais, Owais, “Pakistan–Russia “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Economic and and Political Dimensions,” 7 Relations: Economic Political Dimensions,” Pakistan 60, no. no. 22 (2007): (2007): 127. 127. Pakistan Horizon Horizon 60, 8 Adnan Ali Ali Shah, Relations: Post-Cold Post-Cold War War Era,” Era,”Strategic Stud8 Adnan Shah, “Pakistan–Russia “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Strategic Stud ies 21, no. no. 22 (2001): (2001): 31–60. 31-60. ies21, 9 Muhammad Muhammad Nawaz Khan and and Beenish Beenish Altaf, “Pakistan-Russia Rapprochement Rapprochement and and 9 Nawaz Khan Altaf, “Pakistan-Russia Current Journal13 Current Geo-Politics,”IPRI Geo-Politics,” IPRI Journal 13 (2013): (2013): 125–34. 125-34. 10 Hussain, Hussain, “Pak-Russia “Pak-Russia Relations.” Relations.” 10

190 Adeela Ahmed 11 APP, “It Is a Historic Day’: Pakistan Becomes Full Member of SCO at Astana Summit,” Dawn, June9, 2017, www.dawn.com/news/1338471. 12 Almas Haider Naqviand Yasir Masood, “Rejuvenating Pakistan-Russia Relations,”Strategic Studies37, no. 4 (2017): 18–38. 13 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December2017,” (2017), www.heritage.org/defense/report/preparing-the-us-national-securitystrategy-2020-and-beyond. 14 The Quadrilateral Alliance also known as Asian NATO is a strategic forum between the US, Japan, and India formed in 2007. 15 Petr Topychkanov, “Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine Moves the Focus from Non-Western Threats,” SIPRI, October1, 2020, www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/russiasnuclear-doctrine-moves-focus-non-western-threats. 16 Igor Denisov, “What Russia’s National Security Strategy Has to Say About Asia,” The Diplomat, July14, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/what-russias-nationalsecurity-strategy-has-to-say-about-asia/ see also Elizabeth Buchanan, “Russia’s 2021 National Security Strategy: Cool Change Forecasted for the Polar Regions,” RUSI, July14, 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ russias-2021-national-security-strategy-cool-change-forecasted-polar-regions. 17 Author’s conversation with Gul Dad, Director Research and HR Manager at Pakistan Institute of Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) Islamabad, November23, 2020. 18 For a detailed discussion on the changes in Pakistan’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Imran Khan, see Chapter1 of this book. 19 Author’s conversation with Rabia Akther, Director Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR) Islamabad, November28, 2020. 20 Author’s conversation with Manzoor Afridi, Chairman Department of International Relations and Politics, International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI), November15, 2020. 21 Qaisar Zulfiqar, “Bridging Cultural Borders: First-Ever Urdu-Russian Dictionary Launched,” The Express Tribune, August2, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/416250/ bridging-cultural-borders-first-ever-urdu-russian-dictionary-launched. 22 Author’s conversation with Leonid Savin, Geopolitical analyst, Chief editor of Geopolitica.ru, November12, 2020. 23 Embassy of Pakistan, Moscow, http://parepmoscow.com/en/pakistan-russia-relations/. 24 Author’s conversation with Leonid Savin. 25 Author’s conversation with Najam Rafique, Director Research Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. 26 C. Dale Walton, Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and the Rest: By Angela Stent (New York: Twelve, 2019), 448 pp.’ (2020): 403. 27 Author’s conversation with Muhammed Asif Nawaz, Senior Research Fellow Institute of Policy and Research Institute Islamabad, November15, 2020. 28 Author’s conversation with Dr. Tehmina Aslam Ranjha, Assistant Professor at University of Lahore, Lahore, December2, 2020. 29 Nishtha Kaushiki, “Factors Contributing to an Emerging Russia-Pakistan Strategic Proximity,”Journal of International and Area Studies26, no. 1 (2019): 43–64. 30 “Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of SCO Member States (SCO-CFM), Moscow, 9–10 September2020,” Ministry of Foreign Affair Islamabad, http://mofa. gov.pk/meeting-of-the-council-of-foreign-ministers-of-sco-member-states-sco-cfmmoscow-9-10-september-2020/. 31 Ibid. 32 The word Khorasan was used by Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in his saying that an army of black flags will carry out a war from Khorasan and called it a Battle of Hind. ISIS declared the region as a Wilayat Khorasan (Governorate). Khorasan was a province (Wilayat) under the Muslim rulers of Umayyad and Abbasid era. It had parts of Afghanistan, Central Asian States, Pakistan, and China. In 2014, a group of 50

Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 191 members in used the members in Syria Syria first first used the name name of of ISIS ISIS Khorasan. Khorasan. The The members members of of this this group group were natives of Pakistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, Chechnya, and Pakistan, Afghanistan, the were natives of and Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and and Taliban Taliban are are currently currently fighting against so-called so-called ISIS KhoUnited States, fighting against ISIS Wilayat Wilayat Khorasan. Wilayat is rasan. This This Wilayat is becoming becoming aa direct direct security security threat threat to to Pakistan, Pakistan, China, China, Russia, Russia, and and Iran. Iran. 33 Muhammad Muhammad Amin and Muhammad Muhammad Asif, “ISIS Khorasan: and 33 Amin and Asif, “ISIS Khorasan: Presence, Presence, Affiliations Affiliations and Regional Alliances Alliances with Journal 35, no. 11 (2019): http://waliaj. Regional with Russia,” Russia,” Walia Walia Journal 35, no. (2019): 70–76, 70-76, http://waliaj. com/wp-content/2019/11w.pdf. com/wp-content/2019/11w.pdf. 34 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Advanced Attack Attack Helicopters 35 Franz-Stefan Franz-Stefan Gady, Gady, “Pakistan “Pakistan Receives Receives 44 Advanced Helicopters from from RusRus sia,” The The Diplomat, 19, 2017, sia,” Diplomat, August August19, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/pakistanhttps://thediplomat.com/2017/08/pakistanreceives-4-advanced-attack-helicopters-from-russia/. receives-4-advanced-attack-helicopters-from-russia/. 36 News Desk, Desk, “DRUZBA Pakistan, Russia Hold Anti-Terror Anti-Terror Exercise,” Express 36 News “DRUZBA 2017: 2017: Pakistan, Russia Hold Exercise,” The The Express Tribune, September25, September 25, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515661/pakistan-russiaTribune, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515661/pakistan-russiabegin-military-drills. begin-military-drills. 37 Agree to Dawn, 37 Baqir Baqir Sajjad Sajjad Syed, Syed, “Pakistan, “Pakistan, Russia Russia Agree to Boost Boost Military Military Cooperation,” Cooperation,” Dawn, April 25, 2018, April25, 2018, www.dawn.com/news/1403729/pakistanrussia-agree-to-boost-mili www.dawn.com/news/1403729/pakistanrussia-agree-to-boost-mili tary-cooperation. tary-cooperation. 38 Express 38 Correspondent, Correspondent, “Pakistan “Pakistan Hosts Hosts Spy Spy Chiefs Chiefs from from Russia, Russia, China, China, Iran,” Iran,” The The Express Tribune, July13, July 13, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1756610/1-pakistan-hostsspyTribune, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1756610/1-pakistan-hostsspychiefs-russia-china-iran/. chiefs-russia-china-iran/. 39 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 “Pakistan–Russia “Pakistan-Russia Defence Defence Ties Ties Discussed,” Discussed,” Dawn, September 6, 2020, www.dawn. 40 Dawn, September6, 2020, www.dawn. com/news/1578167. com/news/1578167. 41 Arrive for Drill with Pakistan Military,” Military,” Dawn, Dawn, 41 Staff Staff Reporter, Reporter, “Russian “Russian Troops Troops Arrive for Drill with Pakistan November 6, 2020, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1588880. November6, www.dawn.com/news/1588880. 42 APP, “Pakistan-Russia exercise exercise ends,” ends,” Dawn, October 10, 2021, 42 APP, “Pakistan-Russia Dawn, October10, 2021, https://www.dawn. https://www.dawn. com/news/1651156. com/news/1651156. 43 Staff Staff Reporter, “Russian Troops Troops Arrive for Drill Drill with with Pakistan Pakistan Military.” 43 Reporter, “Russian Arrive for Military.” 44 According to SIPRI SIPRI Report has consistently consistently been among the 44 According to Report 2021, 2021, Russia Russia has been among the world’s world’s top five five military with top military spenders spenders and and modified modified its its world world rank rank to to be be the the fourth-largest fourth-largest with an annual annual increase increase in in its its military military expenditure expenditure of of 4.5 percent to to $65.1billion $65.1 billion after after the an 4.5percent the United States, States, China, China, and and India. United India. 45 AFP, “Russia Lifts Arms Arms Embargo Embargo to to Pakistan: Dawn, June2, 45 AFP, “Russia Lifts Pakistan: Report,” Report,” Dawn, June 2, 2014, 2014, accessed accessed August 20, 2021, August20, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1110131. www.dawn.com/news/1110131. 46 Baqir Baqir Sajjad Sajjad Syed, Syed, “Pakistan, “Pakistan, Russia Russia Sign Sign Landmark Defence Cooperation Cooperation Agree 46 Landmark Defence Agreement,” Dawn, November November21, 2014, www.dawn.com/news/1145875 Ayaz Gul, ment,” Dawn, 21,2014, www.dawn.com/news/1145875 see see also also Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan, Russia Sign Rare Military Cooperation Cooperation Pact,” Pact,” VoANews, VoANews, August 8, 2018, “Pakistan, Russia Sign Rare Military August8, 2018, www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-russia-sign-rare-military-cooperationwww.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-russia-sign-rare-military-cooperationpact. pact. 47 Baqir Baqir Sajjad Sajjad Syed, Syed, “Accord “Accord with with Russia Signed for for Training Training of of Pakistani Pakistani Troops,” Troops,” 47 Russia Signed Dawn, 8, 2018, www.dawn.com/news/1425673. Dawn, August August8, 2018, www.dawn.com/news/1425673. 48 Naveed Navy’s Aman Aman 2021 2021 Exercise Exercise Concludes 48 Naveed Siddiqui, Siddiqui, “Pakistan “Pakistan Navy’s Concludes with with ‘Grace‘Grace ful’ International International Fleet Fleet Review,” February 16, 2021, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/ www.dawn.com/news/ ful’ Review,” Dawn, Dawn, February16, 1607705. 1607705. 49 Bhutta, “Pakistan Russia,” The Express 49 Zafar Zafar Bhutta, “Pakistan Settles Settles Soviet-Era Soviet-Era Trade Trade Dispute Dispute with with Russia,” The Express Tribune, November 7, 2020, 2020, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2095099/2-pakistan-settlesTribune, November7, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2095099/2-pakistan-settlesdecades-old-trade-dispute-russia. decades-old-trade-dispute-russia. 50 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Author’s Conversation with with Lenoid Lenoid Savin. Savin. 51 Author’s Conversation 52 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Deal,” The Express 53 The The Correspondent, Correspondent, “Pakistan, “Pakistan, Russia Russia Sign Sign Revised Revised Gas Gas Pipeline Pipeline Deal,” The Express Tribune, November 19, 2020, 2020, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2272729/pakistan-russiahttps://tribune.com.pk/story/2272729/pakistan-russiaTribune, November19, sign-revised-gas-pipeline-deal. sign-revised-gas-pipeline-deal.

192 Adeela Ahmed 54 Imran Ali Ali Kundi, Russia Agree Agree to to Give Bilateral Trade Nation, 54 Imran Kundi, “Pakistan, “Pakistan, Russia Give Bilateral Trade aa Boost,” Boost,” The The Nation, December 12, 2019, 2019, https://nation.com.pk/12-Dec-2019/pakistan-russia-agree-to-giveDecember12, https://nation.com.pk/12-Dec-2019/pakistan-russia-agree-to-givebilateral-trade-a-boost. bilateral-trade-a-boost. 55 Zafar Bhutta, New Strategic Relationship,” Dawn,August Dawn, August9, https:// 55 Zafar Bhutta, “Building “Building aa New Strategic Relationship,” 9, 2021, 2021, https:// tribune.com.pk/story/2314618/building-a-new-strategic-relationship. tribune.com.pk/story/2314618/building-a-new-strategic-relationship. 56 Web “FM Qureshi Qureshi Lauds Lauds Russia’s Russia’s Decision to Lift Ban on on Paki 56 Web Desk, Desk, “FM Decision to Lift Rice Rice Import Import Ban Pakistan,” News, June14, 2021, www.thenews.com.pk/latest/849443-fm-qureshistan,” The The News, June 14, 2021, www.thenews.com.pk/latest/849443-fm-qureshilauds-russias-decision-to-lift-rice-import-ban-on-pakistan. lauds-russias-decision-to-lift-rice-import-ban-on-pakistan. 57 Sana Sana Jamal, Jamal, “Russia “RussiaLifts Ban on on Import ofRice from Pakistan,” GulfNews,June 57 Lifts Ban Import of Rice from Pakistan,” Gulf News, June111,2021, 1, 2021, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/russia-lifts-ban-on-import-of-rice-fromhttps://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/russia-lifts-ban-on-import-of-rice-frompakistan-1.79837618. see also also Ayaz Gul, “Russia’s “Russia’s Lavrov Lavrov in in Pakistan Pakistan to Discuss pakistan-1.79837618. see Ayaz Gul, to Discuss Bilateral Ties, Afghan VOANews, April 6, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/ Bilateral Ties, Afghan Peace,” Peace,” VOANews, April6, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/ a/south-central-asia_russias-lavrov-pakistan-discuss-bilateral-ties-afghan-peace/62 a/south-central-asia_russias-lavrov-pakistan-discuss-bilateral-ties-afghan-peace/62 04223.html. 04223.html. 58 Government Government of of Pakistan. Pakistan. The The Finance Finance Divison, “Trade and and Payments,” in Pakistan 58 Divison, “Trade Payments,” in Pakistan Economic Survey, Survey, 2020–2021 Adviser’s Wing, Division GovEconomic 2020-2021 (Economic (Economic Adviser’s Wing, Finance Finance Division Gov ernment of of Pakistan, Pakistan, 2021), 2021), www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_21/08-Trade%20 www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_21/08-Trade%20 ernment and%20payments.pdf. and%20payments.pdf. 59 Bernard Lonney, Lonney, “BP World Energy Energy 2021,” 2021,” Statistical Statistical Review, Review, 59 Bernard “BP Statistical Statistical Review Review of of World 70th ed., ed., www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy70th www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energyeconomics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf. economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf. 60 Andrew Will Be Russia–Pakistan Relations,” 60 Andrew Korybko, Korybko, “India “India Will Be aa Roadblock Roadblock in in Russia-Pakistan Relations,” Global Village Village Space, 4, 2020, 2020, www.globalvillagespace.com/india-willwww.globalvillagespace.com/india-willGlobal Space, November November4, be-a-roadblock-in-russia-pakistan-relations/. be-a-roadblock-in-russia-pakistan-relations/. 61 Bhutta, “Building New Strategic 61 Bhutta, “Building aa New Strategic Relationship.” Relationship.” 62 Sana Jamal, Jamal, “Pakistan, “Pakistan, Russia Russia Agree Build Economic, Economic, Energy Energy and and Defence Defence 62 Sana Agree to to Build Ties,” Gulf Gulf News, 7, 2021, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistanTies,” News, April April7, 2021, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistanrussia-agree-to-build-economic-energy-and-defence-ties-1.78395748. russia-agree-to-build-economic-energy-and-defence-ties-1.78395748. 63 Author’s conservation with with Rabia 63 Author’s conservation Rabia Akther. Akther. 64 Ibid. 64 Ibid.

12 The European Union (EU)– Pakistan Relations: ACritique of Strategic Engagement Plan Najimdeen Bakare

Introduction Introduction The back to to the the 1960s, The European European Union Union (EU)–Pakistan (EU)-Pakistan relations, relations, stretching stretching back 1960s, demonstrate that international relations relations transcend transcend immediate immediate regional regional proximity. proximity. demonstrate that international Efforts between the the European European Economic Economic Community Efforts to to establish establish relations relations between Community (EEC) (EEC)11 and Pakistan were were laid when the and Pakistan laid on on 2 2 August1962 August 1962 when the Community Community proposed proposed aa trade trade agreement with and two other South South Asian Asian states. states.22 The The proposal proposal was agreement with Pakistan Pakistan and two other was considered watershed for for the first Commercial considered aa watershed the nascent nascent country. country. In In 1976, 1976, the the first Commercial Cooperation between the European Economic Cooperation Agreement Agreement was was signed signed between the European Economic Community Community (EEC) Pakistan, followed, followed, in by aa new (EEC) and and Pakistan, in 1986, 1986, by new Commercial Commercial and and Cooperation Cooperation Agreement valid valid for 5 years.33 Diplomatic relations continued continued till the 1990s. 1990s. HowHow Agreement for 5years. Diplomatic relations till the ever, the nuclear certain events events in in Pakistan, Pakistan, such such as as the nuclear tests tests in in 1998, 1998, the the military military ever, certain takeover of 1999, 1999, and and the the Kargil Kargil crisis crisis in in 1999, 1999, impinged impinged the trajectory of of mutual mutual takeover of the trajectory relations. till September11, relations. Therefore, Therefore, till September 11, 2001, 2001, EU–Pakistan EU-Pakistan relations relations remained remained on on the periphery of EU’s Asia the dawn the periphery of the the EU’s Asia policy. policy.44 Incidentally, Incidentally, the dawn of of September11, September 11, 2001, 2001, caused caused aa convergence convergence of of interest, interest, and and the the calculation calculation that that Pakistan Pakistan could could be instrumental the menace be instrumental in in surmounting surmounting the menace of of extremism extremism within within and and across across its its border incentivised England to to influence the EU become border incentivised the the United United States States and and England influence the EU to to become more towards the the development the situamore attentive attentive towards development of of Pakistan. Pakistan. At At the the same same time, time, the situa tion offered offered Pakistan Pakistan an an opportunity opportunity to change gears gears by winning back tion to change by winning back the the United United States weak US-Pakistan US–Pakistan relations to States after after extended extended weak relations and and offered offered it it an an opportunity opportunity to draw to the the EU EU at Pakistan’s resolve to join join Washingdraw closer closer to at the the same same time. time. Hence, Hence, Pakistan’s resolve to Washing ton terrorism changed the course ton in in the the war war against against terrorism changed the course of of the the strained strained relations relations55 and and rejuvenated EU’s with Islamabad. Islamabad. The The shift shift in in EU EU policy rejuvenated EU’s peripheral peripheral ties ties with policy precipi precipitated the Union’s tated the Union’s Country Country Strategy Strategy Paper Paper (CSP) (CSP) on on Pakistan, Pakistan, adopted adopted in in 2002 2002 and and later by later revised revised in in 2007. 2007.66 Subsequently, Subsequently, the the Third Third Generation Generation Agreement, Agreement, ratified ratified by the European Parliament on on April22, April 22, 2004, 2004, was was signed signed in in agreement agreement with with PakiPakithe European Parliament stan.77 The The agreement agreement accorded accorded Pakistan Pakistan aa special special status status and and was was premised on the the stan. premised on recognition of frontline state in the was recognition of Pakistan Pakistan as as aa frontline state in the fight fight against against terrorism terrorism and and was aimed Pakistan for for its vis-à-vis the troops in the aimed at at incentivising incentivising Pakistan its support support vis-a-vis the European European troops in the International Force (ISAF) EU International Security Security Assistance Assistance Force (ISAF) in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan.88 In In 2007, 2007, the the EU adopted the 5years’ which covered period from to 2013. adopted the 5 years’ CSP, CSP, which covered the the period from 2007 2007 to 2013. InterestInterest ingly, the different varying degree ingly, the different agreements agreements did did not not rule rule out out aa varying degree of of oscillation oscillation and and DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-14

194 Najimdeen 194 Najimdeen Bakare Bakare

disagreements the conduct For instance, the larger disagreements in in the conduct of of relations. relations. For instance, in in the larger context context of of Europe, “the factors like Pakistan’s image as an extremist state, suppression Europe, “the factors like Pakistan’s image as an extremist state, suppression of of women proliferation and women and and minorities minorities in in the the country, country, sectarianism, sectarianism, nuclear nuclear proliferation and the the issues Pakistan’s image; issues of of illegal illegal immigration/smuggling immigration/smuggling have have maligned maligned Pakistan’s image; EuroEuro 9 pean investors are reluctant to invest in Pakistan.” pean investors are reluctant to invest in Pakistan.”9 Meanwhile, in EU brought brought Pakistan the fold fold of benefitMeanwhile, in 2014, 2014, the the EU Pakistan into into the of countries countries benefit ing from EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Moreover, in 2019, ing from EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Moreover, in 2019, the the Union the profile Pakistan and Union raised raised the profile of of Pakistan and granted granted it it the the GSP-Plus GSP-Plus status, status, considconsid ered yet another watershed in EU–Pakistan relations. while the the GSP ered yet another watershed in EU-Pakistan relations. Interestingly, Interestingly, while GSP or GSP-Plus grants Pakistan huge access to the Union’s market, it does with or GSP-Plus grants Pakistan huge access to the Union’s market, it does so so with this aa determination to effect Pakistan.10 Against determination to effect social social and and political political changes changes in in Pakistan.10 Against this backdrop, while most literature on EU–Pakistan relations has lavishly expressed backdrop, while most literature on EU-Pakistan relations has lavishly expressed how the EU EU remains the largest Pakistan, and how the remains the largest donor donor and and trading trading partner partner of of Pakistan, and how how Islamabad has been cooperating with the EU in the area of counter terrorism, Islamabad has been cooperating with the EU in the area of counter terrorism, development, humanitarian assistance, development, trade trade and and humanitarian assistance, silence silence or or inattention inattention surrounds surrounds the dynamic of power relations between the EU and Pakistan, the dynamic of power relations between the EU and Pakistan, especially especially in in the the context of Pakistan–EU Strategic Engagement Plan signed in 2019. context of Pakistan-EU Strategic Engagement Plan signed in 2019. To place the in perspective, perspective, the unpacks the To place the discussion discussion in the first first section section diligently diligently unpacks the notion of power as understood in the international relations theories. notion of power as understood in the international relations theories. The The section section starts with realism, played aa foundational pivotal role starts off off with realism, aa school school that that has has played foundational and and pivotal role in in shaping understanding of with other shaping our our understanding of IR. IR. Realist Realist concepts concepts are are contrasted contrasted with other nonnon power-centric theories, culminating with radical theories. For power-centric theories, culminating with radical (anti-foundational) (anti-foundational) theories. For aa better better perspective, perspective, the succeeding section theorises power relations the succeeding section theorises power relations and and takes takes that as as theoretical underpinning to critique the relations. Within Within that theoretical underpinning to critique the EU-Pakistan EU–Pakistan relations. the body of international relations literature, especially neorealism, the idea the body of international relations literature, especially neorealism, the idea of of power with capability, political entity be power is is attached attached with capability, suggesting suggesting that that state state or or political entity must must be skilful to achieving skilful in in channelling channelling and and mobilising mobilising its its capability capability to achieving aa set set of of external external objectives. While While theoretical theoretical exposition exposition is is appealing, appealing, it it can can best applied onto onto objectives. best be be applied empirical data data and and arguments. arguments. In In this connection, the chapter takes the EU-Pakiempirical this connection, the chapter takes the EU–Pakistan Engagement Plan Plan (SEP) point of stan Strategic Strategic Engagement (SEP) as as reference reference point of analysis analysis and and carecare fully argues that the power relations between the two revolve around persuasion, fully argues that the power relations between the two revolve around persuasion, reward, followed by by the which offers reward, and and threat. threat. This This discussion discussion is is followed the last last section, section, which offers an an analysis that looks beyond current SEP. SEP. analysis that looks beyond the the current

Power Power Relations Relations The field of vividly punctuated punctuated with plethora of The field of international international relations relations is is vividly with aa plethora of scholschol arship on the concept of power, which is generally associated with realism– arship on the concept of power, which is generally associated with realism - IR’s IR’s traditional thought. Power with state traditional school school of of thought. Power is is often often associated associated with state sovereignty, sovereignty, and and it proportional to the amount it is is conceived conceived that that the the integrity integrity of of aa state state is is directly directly proportional to the amount of of power power it it wields wields (extra) (extra) regionally. regionally. To To mark mark aa meaningful meaningful niche, niche, the the state state must must either be endowed with, or must have accrued, both tangible and intangible either be endowed with, or must have accrued, both tangible and intangible 11 power. Among power power.11 Among realist realist scholars, scholars, especially especially the the neorealist, neorealist, the the concept concept of of power is phenomenon in is not not merely merely aa medium medium of of understanding understanding the the major major phenomenon in international international politics, be an tool of fathoming the the operationality politics, it it can can as as well well be an important important tool of fathoming operationality of of

The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 195 international system.12 Without stretching the history of power in modern discourse of power, Han Morgenthau is the foremost advocate of power as a theoretical optic and core of international politics. Morgenthau’s fixation on power as the bedrock of international politics and the determinant factor that shapes state’s behaviour and relational attitude is an acceptable dictum among the generality of realists, who subscribe to Morgenthau’s analysis and prescriptive theorisation of IR through the lens of foreign policy.13 Irrespective of the strands of realism, the common narrative is state survival and security,14 which are directly intertwined with the quantity and quality of power harboured by a state.15 Without categorically rejecting the reality of power politics, liberalism– a philosophical tradition– offers an alternative understanding of power in international relations.16 The liberals argue that the means of restraining power are liberal internationalisation, commercial cooperation, interdependence, and liberal institutionalism.17 This philosophical worldview posits democratic values and principles to the international realm, with the assumption that democracy is intrinsically peaceful. To them, a world order predicated on democracy is a premium, as democratic states will have less craving and incentives for war, as all nations would reciprocally recognise each other’s legitimacy.18 Additionally, liberal thinking on international relations theorises that country cannot always afford to live in the state of inconvenience but should be willing to eschew war as a means of settling their differences, a view which rejects realist characterisation of international relations as the struggle for power and security.19 The realist response is, if such idealism is tenable, how then democratic governments were supposed to achieve their objectives without playing the card of power-politics? This dialogical venture has remained one of the protracted philosophical discourses in international relations. Against the backdrop of offering multiple conceptual explanations to the major phenomenon in international politics, radical theories such as Marxism have contributed to the larger spectrum of IR. Marxism’s central argument of international politics revolves around the competition and conflict between nation-states. The protracted conflict produces two conflicting social classes: the national bourgeoisies and cosmopolitan proletariat;20 the by-product of the class struggle is an intractable global inequality. Marxist fixation with global inequality as the underpinning factor for conflict has brought this tradition directly into contact with the field of international relations. Like many other critiques of realism– power politics, Marxism has struggled not just to expose the unequal architecture of global order, based on uneven mode of production and the imbalanced wealth resource distribution, but to also offer an alternative approach through which international relations can be better understood. Like many Marxists, Robert Cox argues that “the internationalisation of relations of production and on the forms of global governance which perpetuate inequalities of power and wealth,”21 expose the unequal architecture of the liberal world order. The connection between Marxism and anti-foundational theories such as critical theory cannot be understated. As an anti-foundational theory, the intellectual tradition of critical theory stems from Marxism, dating back to the 1970s22 where it became popular, but it was primarily developed out of the work of the Frankfurt

196 Najimdeen 196 Najimdeen Bakare Bakare 23 School, founded in From aa broader broader lens theory, School, which which was was founded in 1923. 1923.23 From lens of of critical critical theory, global power relations have been long characterised by inequality and domination global power relations have been long characterised by inequality and domination 24 and must must be eliminated.24 and be eliminated. While many states would power While many states would find find Ray Ray Cline’s Cline’s strategic strategic formula formula of of measuring measuring power unsuitable, yet the suitability of this parameter of power for few states is glaringly unsuitable, yet the suitability of this parameter of power for few states is glaringly convincing preponderance of power appears to be be convincing as as Cline Cline rightly rightly argues, argues, “the “the preponderance of power appears to 25 in the hands of a relatively few nations.” This is not to insinuate that many less in the hands of a relatively few nations.”25 This is not to insinuate that many less 26 powerful and powerful states states are are unimportant, unimportant,26 and this this certainly certainly reiterates reiterates the the relativity relativity of of power, which which is is unequal unequal for all. power, for all. While Hamilton and attending to to the the idea idea of of power power relations, relations, Hamilton and Sharma Sharma episteepiste While attending mologically offer multilayers and dimensions of power. Taking Robert R. Dahl mologically offer multilayers and dimensions of power. Taking Robert R. Dahl as aa reference reference point, point, their their argument argument “... “. . . situates situates power as one one element element in in the the as power as 27 To fathom the power relational frameworks of social social and and political political system.” system.”27 relational frameworks of To fathom the power relations between two two entities, relations between entities, one one must must seek seek to to understand understand the the depth depth of of such such aa relationship, the level of interdependence, the area(s) of domination and control, relationship, the level of interdependence, the area(s) of domination and control, the the types types of the constituents– constituents - number number of of players, players, constituting constituting each each entity, entity, and and the of 28 power– capability at the disposal of each entity, which Morriss dubbed power - capability at the disposal of each entity,28 which Morriss dubbed “power “power 29 The fluidity, interdependence, complexity, and as aa dispositional dispositional concept.” concept.”29 as The fluidity, interdependence, complexity, and dyadic power relations dismiss the atomistic dyadic power relations dismiss the atomistic (reductionist) (reductionist) notion notion of of power power as as only being central to the core– core - dominant dominant partner. partner. In In aa dyadic dyadic relationship, relationship, power only being central to the power is to core situated and and never never aa “monopolistic “monopolistic agency” agency” either either to core or or the the peripheral peripheral partpartis situated 30 ner. Nuancing the discourse of power relations, Bachrach and Barate contend ner.30 Nuancing the discourse of power relations, Bachrach and Barate contend that bilateral or that partners partners in in bilateral or multilateral multilateral relations relations must must seek seek moderation moderation and and must must adopt their conversion them, bilateral bilateral or adopt limitation limitation in in their conversion and and discussion. discussion. For For them, or multilatmultilat eral be limited that do threaten the the interest eral discussions discussions should should be limited to to safer safer issues issues that do not not threaten interest 31 of the power holders. of the power holders.31 For Holsti, Holsti, the the capability plays aa defining For capability of of aa nation nation plays defining and and decisive decisive role role in in the the debate of power relations. For instance, let the EU represent Aand Pakistan B. debate of power relations. For instance, let the EU represent A and Pakistan as as B. If the former can get the latter to do something, but the latter does not have similar If the former can get the latter to do something, but the latter does not have similar (political, thing, then (political, economic, economic, and and diplomatic) diplomatic) capability capability to to get get Ato A to do do similar similar thing, then it can easily be surmised that Ahas more power than B, and, therefore, it can easily be surmised that A has more power than B, and, therefore, there there are are asymmetric between the the two. to why asymmetric power power relations relations between two. Such Such aa relationship relationship points points to why some power is in some scholars scholars contend contend that that the the influence influence of of power is intrinsically intrinsically embedded embedded in 32 power quantity. power quantity.32 While the aforementioned While the aforementioned theoretical theoretical underpinnings underpinnings are are important important tools tools of of understanding the relations among states, this chapter and the following understanding the relations among states, this chapter and the following discusdiscus sion will be be anchored the line sion (EU–Pakistan (EU-Pakistan relations) relations) will anchored along along the line of of liberalism. liberalism. As As aa theoretical theoretical lens, liberalism espouses cooperation among political lens, liberalism espouses cooperation among political entities, entities, and and it it does does not not promote promote militarised militarised and and confrontational confrontational relations. relations. As As an an intellectual intellectual tradition, it paves way not just for commercial cooperation, but for intertradition, it paves way not just for commercial cooperation, but also also for inter dependence and liberal institutionalism. It encourages and sponsors democratic dependence and liberal institutionalism. It encourages and sponsors democratic dispensation the civil EU–Pakistan dispensation and and the the strengthening strengthening of of the civil society. society. In In the the light light of of EU-Pakistan relations, it is hard to drag the relations into the realm of realism, which relations, it is hard to drag the relations into the realm of realism, which primarily primarily centres power contestation. centres on on power contestation.

The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 197

EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP) This section dwells on the EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP): a sixpage document that outlined the eight areas in which the two partners aimed at strengthening cooperation. Through the lens of power relations, the section begins with a brief conceptual analysis of EU–Pakistan power relations, then progresses to problematising and critiquing the existing structure of the SEP and, in so doing, proffers answers to the formulated research questions. While the EU–Pakistan relations do not have direct resonance with power politics as forcefully opinionated by the realists, they are, however, in consonance with liberal thinking of power relations, which does not necessarily conjure physical or militarised expression of power. Hence, the subsequent discussion will be largely situated within the neoliberal theoretical lens. The accumulation of power in both tangible and intangible form speaks largely of the quantity and quality of capabilities at the disposal of a state. While this alone does not guarantee the exercise of influence, it is imperative that state must also be skilful in mobilising these capabilities in support of the stated foreign objectives and the credibility of such power– capabilities must be reasonably incontestable. If power equals to influence and is measured by the scope of capabilities and skill in an actor to mobilise these capabilities for political purposes, then one must define the mobilisation skill of the EU and Pakistan. Doing this, we might be able to understand not just the direction and dimension of influence, but also how it has been mobilised over the years. There is a huge disparity between the capabilities of the EU and Pakistan. The disparity begins with one being a regional and powerful institution, with extra territorial power, while the other’s power is limited like every other nation-state. Comparatively, the EU is better positioned to mobilise a wide variety of capabilities in support of its external objectives than Pakistan could ever muster. It is interesting to note that the incomparability between the two is not merely a matter of different geographies but a matter of varying degree of capabilities that are directly proportional and dependent on their external objectives. Hence, a nation with bigger (regional and global) external objectives will be compelled to mobilise and accumulate proportional capabilities as well as the skill to translate the capabilities into influence. The EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP) is a watershed in bilateral relations between the two parties. It was signed in 2019 following a protracted negotiation at the fourth round of Pakistan–EU strategic dialogue. The plan is set to serve and bring cooperation in areas including trade, peace and security, and anti-money laundering.33 The SEP is an example of cross-regional and international partnership, and it has no written centre of authority; nevertheless, it is hard to dismiss that one of the partners possesses comparatively better bargaining leverage. Yet, based on the critique of power relations, there is no indication that the other partner is entirely devoid of any influencing capacity. Scholars have drawn our attention to

198 Najimdeen 198 Najimdeen Bakare Bakare

the bargaining techniques techniques that that characterise the bargaining characterise power power relations relations in in international international polipoli tics, often revolving around persuasion, offering of rewards, threatening tics, often revolving around persuasion, offering of rewards, threatening punishpunish ments, the use use of force.34 In to the the fact fact that that these ments, and and the of force.34 In addition addition to these categories categories are are useful useful for analysing the wielding of influence in relations among states, their utility for analysing the wielding of influence in relations among states, their utility also also depends between them. them. depends on on the the general general climate climate of of relations relations between The following discusses the crosspollination The following discusses the crosspollination and and intersection intersection of of certain certain secsec tions power relations tions of of the the SEP. SEP. In In our our estimation, estimation, EU–Pakistan EU-Pakistan power relations are are characterised characterised by persuasion, the peace by persuasion, offering offering of of rewards, rewards, and and some some degree degree of of threats. threats. While While the peace and security section is analytically more appealing, this is by no means suggesting and security section is analytically more appealing, this is by no means suggesting that they are that other other sections sections are are less less important– important - in in fact, fact, they are closely closely interconnected. interconnected. Peace and Security Peace and Security Seemingly, threat, punishment, force is Seemingly, the the utility utility of of threat, punishment, and and use use of of force is an an implausible implausible option to attain the set of goals under the peace and security section option to attain the set of goals under the peace and security section of of the the SEP. SEP. Instead, the best option and workable instrument is nothing less than persuasion Instead, the best option and workable instrument is nothing less than persuasion and yield aa failed unfavourable outcome and offering offering of of rewards. rewards. Coercion Coercion will will yield failed and and an an unfavourable outcome if Pakistan is asked to denuclearise. However, Islamabad be persuaded if Pakistan is asked to denuclearise. However, Islamabad can can be persuaded on on issues preventing issues such such as as “disarmament “disarmament and and non-proliferation, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, counter-terrorism, preventing and tackling their their root and countering countering violent violent extremism extremism and and tackling root causes, causes, as as well well as as in in the the field of transnational organized crime; money laundering; anti-piracy; and field of transnational organized crime; money laundering; anti-piracy; and cyber cyber security” be rewarded, was the the case when the the EU security” and, and, in in return, return, be rewarded, as as was case when EU rewarded rewarded PakiPaki 35 stan frontline position position and the war Such stan for for its its frontline and sacrifice sacrifice in in the war against against terrorism. terrorism.35 Such aa reward be non-existent were no between the the two. reward would would be non-existent if if there there were no relationship relationship between two. One One aspect, however, remains glaring– that is relationship in international aspect, however, remains glaring - that is relationship in international relations relations goes this context, with goes with with input, input, output, output, and and feedback. feedback. In In this context, as as Pakistan Pakistan complies complies with EU’s wishes and does its bidding, that behaviour consequently prompted the EU’s wishes and does its bidding, that behaviour consequently prompted the EU EU 36 to the interest Such to change change its its approach approach in in the interest of of Pakistan. Pakistan.36 Such reciprocity reciprocity underscores underscores 37 the power relation. the dyadic dyadic nature nature of of power relation.37 At the core of the peace and security At the core of the peace and security cooperation cooperation is is the the protracted protracted Afghan Afghan concon flict. It is meaningless to argue that Pakistan has no crucial role in flict. It is meaningless to argue that Pakistan has no crucial role in advancing advancing mediation between the mediation efforts efforts between the Taliban Taliban and and Washington Washington and and as as such such positioning positioning 38 itself as a powerful bargaining force in the future (and peace) of Afghanistan and itself as a powerful bargaining force in the future (and peace) of Afghanistan38 and as a key player towards peace and security in the region. Interestingly, the EU as a key player towards peace and security in the region. Interestingly, the EU has has also been vocal vocal about Pakistan’s role peace process process by by declaring also been about Pakistan’s role in in the the peace declaring it it aa helpful helpful 39 state peace agreement” state in in reaching reaching aa “sustainable “sustainable peace agreement” in in Afghanistan. Afghanistan.39 Peace in Afghanistan is of paramount importance to the EU, as Peace in Afghanistan is of paramount importance to the EU, as the the protracted protracted Afghan conflict has weighed heavily on the EU in many ways. The Afghan conflict has weighed heavily on the EU in many ways. The EU EU needs needs solutions to the drug and human trafficking emanating from the conflict solutions to the drug and human trafficking emanating from the conflict zone, zone, the the incessant incessant mobility mobility of of Afghan Afghan refugees refugees and and asylum asylum seekers seekers inundating inundating the the EU borders, the political costs EU borders, the socio-economic socio-economic and and political costs of of integration integration amidst amidst aa growgrow ing by European Populist Parties Parties ing anti-immigration anti-immigration and and anti-Muslim anti-Muslim rhetoric rhetoric by European Populist 40 41 and movements, and a safe exit for NATO troops in Afghanistan. These and movements,40 and a safe exit for NATO troops in Afghanistan.41 These are are very to the with peace very crucial crucial to the EU EU and and are are directly directly intertwined intertwined with peace in in Afghanistan Afghanistan for which Pakistan key player. player. Despite Despite his Pakistan, during for which Pakistan is is aa key his past past rhetoric rhetoric on on Pakistan, during

The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 199 a 2-day official visit to Pakistan, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reiterated “Pakistan has an important role and there are strong interdependencies between [the] Taliban and Pakistan. We need to recognize this and arrive at pragmatic approaches to move from conflict to cooperation,”42 This realisation transcends regional acknowledgment, and even the Russians concede to the instrumentality of Pakistan. With particular reference to Afghanistan, President Putin’s envoy Zamir Kabulov marked Pakistan as “a key regional player to negotiate with.”43 The EU recognition of Pakistan as a partner for securing regional peace and security is a testimony to the capability and situational analysis of power vis-à-vis Pakistan. The realisation further points to the dynamic of modern diplomacy and power relations in international politics, which is largely concerned with eliciting support of friends, not just to increase the legitimacy of an action, but also to achieve external objectives through a proxy. Such power relations echo the non-monopolistic agency of power, since it is concentrated neither in the EU nor Pakistan but is interdependent. Another important aspect of the peace and security section of the SEP is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (GCTS). It is argued that there is crosspollination between the FATF and EU’s Generalised System of Preferences-Plus (GSP+) and both nuance the power relations between the EU and Pakistan. The GSP-Plus is a mechanism through which developing and least developed countries are granted easy access to export their products to European Union. This is done through tariff concessions for their goods when entering the EU market. In 2014, the EU granted GSP-Plus status to Pakistan with 406 votes, giving the Pakistani products duty-free access to the European market till 2022. The status has exponentially impacted Pakistan’s economy based on an enhanced export to the EU from 4.538billion Euros in 2013 to 7.492billion Euros in 2019.44 Meanwhile, according to the International Trade Centre, EU–Pakistan trade balance stands at $728.257.000, $736,866.000, and $608.381.000 for 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.45 Consequently, Pakistan stands as the third-largest textile- and garment-exporting country in Asia with an improved export of around 78percent to the EU, representing almost 20percent of Pakistan’s exports globally.46 Nevertheless, despite the enormous opportunity presented by the GSP-Plus, Pakistan still has huge challenges to surmount in order to meet the EU standards.47 For Pakistan, the discontinuity of the GSP-Plus would be a perilous external policy outcome. The stakes for Pakistan are plenty, as its GSPPlus status “allows almost 20 per cent of Pakistani exports to enter the EU market at zero tariff and 70 per cent at preferential rates.”48 Therefore, given the intrinsic connection between the GSP-Plus and the protection of human rights, compliance with labour laws and standards, sustainable development, good governance,49 and above all, clearance from FATF through EU’s technical support,50 the EU demonstrates its capacity and capability to influence Pakistan, which underscores what the EU expects of Pakistan. One, Pakistan must significantly satisfy the strict conditionality that is exigently required to unhook Islamabad from or remain in the FATF grey list or the worse “blacklist.”51 According to Pakistan’s foreign office, Pakistan risks $10billion loss annually, if it protractedly remains in the “grey

200 Najimdeen 200 Najimdeen Bakare Bakare 52 list.” Additionally, why the the administration Prime list.”52 Additionally, this this apprehension apprehension explains explains why administration of of Prime Minister Imran Khan is forced to tighten the nation’s banking and financial Minister Imran Khan is forced to tighten the nation’s banking and financial reguregu 53 latory Two, the international latory system. system.53 Two, Pakistan Pakistan must must comply comply with with the international labour labour law law and and standards. To remain eligible for the EU market, concerted effort must be geared standards. To remain eligible for the EU market, concerted effort must be geared towards the promotion promotion of towards eradicating eradicating forced forced and and child child labour. labour. Three, Three, the of good good govgov ernance, ernance, sabotaging sabotaging the the chain chain and and mechanism mechanism of of money money laundering, laundering, and and freeing freeing the from the key expectations the country country from the menace menace of of extremism extremism and and terrorism terrorism are are also also key expectations from Pakistan. from Pakistan. While EU has ways of to doing bidding, the While the the EU has ways of influencing influencing Pakistan Pakistan to doing its its bidding, the nature nature of relations does not indicate that Pakistan possesses similar capability influof relations does not indicate that Pakistan possesses similar capability to to influ ence the EU, which the latter does not necessarily want to happen– for instance to ence the EU, which the latter does not necessarily want to happen - for instance to increase foreign aid payment, to lower tariff on goods, or to integrate Pakistan into increase foreign aid payment, to lower tariff on goods, or to integrate Pakistan into its power become become meaningful its GSP. GSP. As As aforesaid, aforesaid, the the quantity quantity and and quality quality of of power meaningful only only when mobilised and steered towards achieving a set of foreign objectives. this when mobilised and steered towards achieving a set of foreign objectives. In In this case, the capability of Pakistan rests on its skill to influence politics in Afghanicase, the capability of Pakistan rests on its skill to influence politics in Afghani stan, by extension favour Islamabad, but also stan, which which by extension does does not not only only favour Islamabad, but also swayed swayed the the EU EU to consider Pakistan as a potential ally in the search for solutions to Afghan to consider Pakistan as a potential ally in the search for solutions to Afghan crisis crisis and for the and an an eligible eligible candidate candidate for the GSP-Plus GSP-Plus status. status.

Trade Investment and Democracy, Rule Rule of Law, Good Trade and and Investment and Democracy, ofLaw, Good Governance, Human Rights Rights Governance, and and Human Another way of through the the dependency Another way of analysing analysing EU–Pakistan EU-Pakistan relations relations is is through dependency optics, optics, characterised by persuasion and threat. Such relationship conveniently characterised by persuasion and threat. Such relationship conveniently explicates explicates the the EU EU treats Pakistan the the way way the the former treated and the way way the treats Pakistan former treated and integrated integrated the the forfor mer communist countries of Central and East Europe (CEE) into the EU. mer communist countries of Central and East Europe (CEE) into the EU. The The integration was subject to structural integration of of these these countries countries was subject to structural and and institutional institutional reforms. reforms. There is no indication that Pakistan intends to or will be integrated the EU, There is no indication that Pakistan intends to or will be integrated into into the EU, however, token of EU integration however, in in similar similar token of the the EU integration policy policy towards towards the the CEE, CEE, mutual mutual interest EU and having deeper trade interest has has pushed pushed the the EU and Pakistan Pakistan towards towards having deeper and and larger larger trade relations under the SEP, thus the provision of the GSP-Plus status. The prerequirelations under the SEP, thus the provision of the GSP-Plus status. The prerequi sites the EU to be be closely the politisites of of the the status status cause cause the EU to closely concerned concerned and and involved involved in in the politi cal process of Pakistan, especially the restoration and transition of the democratic cal process of Pakistan, especially the restoration and transition of the democratic governments, which is yet another power relations the EU EU governments, which is yet another display display of of power relations wherein wherein the mobilises its resources– capabilities to influencing Pakistan into being commitmobilises its resources - capabilities to influencing Pakistan into being commit ted political reforms. to argue Pakistan ted towards towards political reforms. It It is is safe safe to argue that that such such relations relations make make Pakistan the dependent partner, who dependson the world’s largest economic union the dependent partner, who depends on the world’s largest economic union for for its its 54 trade and business ventures. Given the dependency, the EU has severally trade and business ventures.54 Given the dependency, the EU has severally comcom plained violation or to fulfilling fulfilling the plained over over Pakistan’s Pakistan’s violation or laxity laxity to the prerequisite prerequisite of of the the GSPGSPPlus status. While it is hard to paint this as transactional relation, Islamabad Plus status. While it is hard to paint this as transactional relation, Islamabad has has remained jeopardise the the status. remained on on aa cautious cautious mode, mode, tailored tailored not not to to jeopardise status. For For instance instance the EU places the contribution the EU places aa premium premium on on the contribution of of the the civil civil society society and and democratic democratic process, but, based on its recent report, the civil society space is shrinking, process, but, based on its recent report, the civil society space is shrinking, notanota 55 bly in Besides, the the Union Pakistan against bly in Pakistan. Pakistan.55 Besides, Union also also cautioned cautioned Pakistan against risking risking its its GSP-Plus GSP-Plus status, status, if if Islamabad Islamabad does does not not cease cease imposing imposing sanctions sanctions on on international international

The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 201 non-governmental organisations (INGOs) operating in country,56 which Pakistan has occasionally accused of undermining its national interest. This power relation characterised by persuasion and threat vividly demonstrates and reinforces the capabilities of the EU to employ multiple tools geared at ensuring that Pakistan complies with the EU-standard regulations; for instance Pakistan has seen a drop in child labour down from 16 per cent to 1 per cent through pioneering “Child Labour Free Zones.”57 Migration and Mobility Migration and Mobility In power is partner, In aa dyadic dyadic relationship, relationship, power is never never the the monopoly monopoly of of one one dominant dominant partner, and relationship is predicated on mutual interest, interdependence, reciprocity, and relationship is predicated on mutual interest, interdependence, reciprocity, trust, trust, and and open-endedness. open-endedness. It It is is equally equally important important to to dissect dissect EU–Pakistan EU-Pakistan relarela tions through similar dyadic relational analysis and under the tions through similar dyadic relational analysis and under the optics optics of of migramigra tion people is the fundamental fundamental cores tion and and mobility. mobility. Free Free movement movement of of people is one one of of the cores of of human rights. While migration is as old as humans, today’s nation-states and borhuman rights. While migration is as old as humans, today’s nation-states and bor der hold some der regimes regimes hold some degree degree of of restrictions restrictions and and regulations regulations on on human human mobilmobil ity, particularly on irregular and forced migration. Over the last four decades, ity, particularly on irregular and forced migration. Over the last four decades, Pakistan been able influx of refugees from Pakistan has has been able to to successfully successfully host host the the largest largest influx of refugees from Afghanistan to and US invasion Afghanistan prior prior to and after after the the US invasion of of Afghanistan. Afghanistan. The The EU EU is is facing facing similar borders are by refugees refugees fleeing similar conflict-induced conflict-induced migration migration as as its its borders are flooded flooded by fleeing conflict zones in the Middle East. In a dyadic relationship, the EU conflict zones in the Middle East. In a dyadic relationship, the EU can can adopt adopt the the same to host the SEP, EU same model model that that Pakistan Pakistan adopted adopted to host the the refugees. refugees. As As part part of of the SEP, the the EU expects Pakistan to border against expects Pakistan to secure secure its its border against irregular irregular migrants, migrants, smuggling, smuggling, and and human trafficking. Once again, the possibility of this to happen depends human trafficking. Once again, the possibility of this to happen depends on on recireci procity, trust, persuasion, persuasion, and procity, trust, and reward; reward; all all of of which which define define aa dyadic dyadic relationship. relationship. For instance, in the case that Pakistan secures its border from For instance, in the case that Pakistan secures its border from drug drug and and human human trafficking that might end up in the EU countries, such behaviour may trafficking that might end up in the EU countries, such behaviour may prompt prompt the the EU positively deepen for EU to to positively deepen its its relations relations with with Islamabad Islamabad and and reward reward Islamabad Islamabad for acting responsibly. acting responsibly. The this chapter The primary primary objective objective of of this chapter is is the the critique critique of of the the EU–Pakistan EU-Pakistan relarela tions through the lens of SEP, but, other than that, few contentious tions through the lens of SEP, but, other than that, few contentious issues issues are are equally equally important important and and worthy worthy of of critiquing. critiquing. These These complementary complementary issues issues are are not not necessarily but are fundamental to to the the larger picture of necessarily an an integral integral part part of of SEP SEP but are fundamental larger picture of the the EU–Pakistan relations. EU-Pakistan relations.

Beyond Beyond Strategic Strategic Engagement Engagement Plan Plan Selective Relations Selective Relations South potential and South Asia Asia is is aa vast vast political political geography geography with with enormous enormous potential and proclivity proclivity to contribute immensely to regional and global geo-economic and to contribute immensely to regional and global geo-economic and geopolitical geopolitical development. However, the protraction of development. However, the protraction of intra-state intra-state and and inter-state inter-state conflicts conflicts in in the region has long acted as impediment to such potentials. Among the region has long acted as impediment to such potentials. Among others, others, the the Kashmir just an Kashmir conflict conflict is is not not just an imbroglio imbroglio to to the the sense sense of of diplomacy diplomacy of of the the states states

202 Najimdeen 202 Najimdeen Bakare Bakare

involved, but it by all involved, but it is, is, by all standards, standards, also also one one of of the the world’s world’s most most intractable intractable debadeba cles without a foreseeable resolution. Given this premise, peace cles without a foreseeable resolution. Given this premise, peace in in South South Asia Asia and between India been severely traumatised and and that that especially especially between India and and Pakistan Pakistan has has been severely traumatised and decimated. to the decimated. Aplethora A plethora of of works works suggest suggest that that aa resolution resolution to the Kashmir Kashmir conflict conflict will been barely barely difficult the major will open open many many opportunities. opportunities. While While it it has has been difficult for for the major players (India and Pakistan) in the conflict to make peace, foreign political players (India and Pakistan) in the conflict to make peace, foreign political entity, entity, especially the EU, with South especially the EU, whose whose external external interest interest intersects intersects with South Asia, Asia, should should have have mobilised its political and diplomatic clout to influencing the trajectory mobilised its political and diplomatic clout to influencing the trajectory of of the the Kashmir Union must Kashmir dispute. dispute. The The Union must muscle muscle up up its its political political and and diplomatic diplomatic clout clout to to influence the trajectory trajectory of the Kashmir Kashmir dispute, the EU EU is parinfluence the of the dispute, as as if if overdue. overdue. If If the is par ticularly the well-being well-being of Pakistan as ticularly concerned concerned about about the of Pakistan as depicted depicted in in the the SEP, SEP, then then it must start playing a pivotal and instrumental role in resolving Indo-Pakistan it must start playing a pivotal and instrumental role in resolving Indo-Pakistan intractable the Kashmir intractable conflict conflict and and most most particularly particularly the Kashmir dispute. dispute. Brussels Brussels cannot cannot afford to remain an onlooker, it must be seriously and pragmatically afford to remain an onlooker, it must be seriously and pragmatically concerned concerned about to about the the conflict conflict in in distant distant region– region - like like South South Asia. Asia. This This is is necessary, necessary, in in order order to prevent the transmigration of conflict consequences into its borders. For instance, prevent the transmigration of conflict consequences into its borders. For instance, the Middle East borders should be aa glaring the recent recent Middle East refugee refugee crisis crisis on on European European borders should be glaring reminder. reminder. It EU has It argued argued that that the the EU has largely largely limited limited its its role role in in the the Kashmir Kashmir conflict conflict to to that that of a facilitator, and not as an intermediary, fearing being entangled in the India– of a facilitator, and not as an intermediary, fearing being entangled in the India58 Pakistan Interestingly, fearful to to entangle Pakistan tensions. tensions.58 Interestingly, the the Union Union is is not not fearful entangle itself itself in in the the economic, financial, and commercial relations but has, however, been maintaining economic, financial, and commercial relations but has, however, been maintaining aa cautious vis-à-vis the tensions. Given cautious approach approach vis-a-vis the geopolitical geopolitical tensions. Given its its capability capability level, level, one can argue that the EU has huge responsibility and must avoid one can argue that the EU has huge responsibility and must avoid remaining remaining aa spectator for the the subsequent spectator for the reasons reasons given given in in the subsequent paragraphs. paragraphs. First, virtually all the EU member Kosovo’s unilateral unilateral First, virtually all the EU member countries countries agreed agreed with with Kosovo’s independence declaration and stood by the ICJ ruling over the same issue independence declaration and stood by the ICJ ruling over the same issue in in 2008. 2008. Yet, the EU has failed to replicate similar political and diplomatic stamina Yet, the EU has failed to replicate similar political and diplomatic stamina towards towards the vis-à-vis the the long-relegated plebiscite, which which would would accord the Kashmir Kashmir conflict conflict vis-a-vis long-relegated plebiscite, accord voice to the Kashmiris and their future and in fact grant legitimacy or voice to the Kashmiris and their future and in fact grant legitimacy or delegitimise delegitimise India’s the valley. valley. India’s claim claim over over the Second, if the EU maintains partnership with both India Second, if the EU maintains strategic strategic partnership with both India and and Pakistan, Pakistan, the Union should muscle up its capabilities to influence both countries the Union should muscle up its capabilities to influence both countries towards towards mutually the conflict. behoves the the EU EU to to transit transit from mutually acceptable acceptable resolution resolution of of the conflict. It It behoves from aa mere rhetoric towards embracing a more pragmatic approach regarding the Kashmere rhetoric towards embracing a more pragmatic approach regarding the Kash mir conflict. India has long maintained that the Kashmir conflict is an internal mir conflict. India has long maintained that the Kashmir conflict is an internal issue premised on the international issue and and premised on its its democratic democratic credential credential and and that that the international comcom munity should trust India not to commit any excesses; however, the recent munity should trust India not to commit any excesses; however, the recent develdevel opments Not only opments in in the the valley valley abundantly abundantly contradict contradict such such aa claim. claim. Not only did did India India violate the international law by revoking the Articles 370 and 35A of the violate the international law by revoking the Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Indian Constitution– which respect the autonomous territory– Constitution - which respect the autonomous status status of of the the disputed disputed territory - it it has also exacerbated the gruesome violation of human rights in the valley. These has also exacerbated the gruesome violation of human rights in the valley. These atrocities UN human the first atrocities spurred spurred aa powerful powerful UN human right right report report and and the first ever ever OHCHR OHCHR 59 report on Kashmir. The human rights violation has failed to evade the traction traction report on Kashmir.59 The human rights violation has failed to evade the of the US State Department, whose report denounced the horrid and unpleasant of the US State Department, whose report denounced the horrid and unpleasant

The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 203 scenario in the valley.60 The opponents of the revocation question the legality of the unilateral Indian action, considered as a blatant violation of international law and a breach of the UN trust, which entrusted the valley to India till the people of Kashmir make their own decision through plebiscite.61 While Jammu and Kashmir– a largely Muslim-populated valley has remained besieged by the Indian army in an attempt to showcase a different story and build bridges with sections of the international community, New Delhi invited curated far-right and Islamophobic European politicians to the valley, worsening a volatile issue.62 Third, peace in Kashmir is important for the EU as it is for the region, hence the cogent reason why Brussels should leverage its financial and diplomatic influence over Islamabad and New Delhi. No doubt, India has been adamantly against any intermediary role to be played by the EU or any other global player, but, notwithstanding, the Union should be prudent enough to understand that Peace and Security as envisioned in the SEP will simply remain a paperwork without pragmatic effort. Pakistan–India relations centre on numerous issues, of which the Kashmir dispute is at the core. Thus, peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute will not only be a realisation of the EU aspiration that peace and security reign in the region, but it will equally guarantee the EU against unwarranted immigrants inundating its borders. Fourth, while the EU has remained cautious from being entangled in global conflict; nevertheless, the fruition of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) underscores the instrumental role of the EU. Brussels’ pivotal and indelible role demonstrates the victory of multilateralism, dialogue, and diplomacy over unilateralism and confrontation.63 The amount of diplomacy poured into the success of the JCPOA can be replayed in South Asia, even though President Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA is nothing but a jeopardy to the long-laboured agreement. With the stock of its capabilities, Brussels must replicate and demonstrate its diplomatic skill for the peace of South Asia. Allowing economic and commercial preferences to outweigh the consideration for peace and security will be less beneficial for all, be it for the regional players or external player like the EU. Beyond geopolitics, it is imperative that the EU should avoid being labelled as selective in its approach towards democratic dispensation, human rights, and civil society in Pakistan. While Brussels has demonstrated its support for democracy in Pakistan, scholars argue that the EU has a predilection for military, given the strong hold of the latter on Pakistan’s polity. Similarly, the SEP requires the two sides to embrace the value of protecting human rights, but should the EU be selective? The European Parliament deeply concerned about the fate of a Christian women Aasia Bibi, sentenced to death for blasphemy against Islam, urged Pakistan to release the woman. The parliament also reiterated the need to revise blasphemy laws and their application. However, the EU never raised a voice for the release of Afia Siddiqui, facing trial in the US, despite its avowed concern for human rights.64

204 Najimdeen Bakare Subsequently, both parties agreed on enhancing the capacity of the civil society, enriching its parliamentary system, and strengthening the mushrooming democratic dispensation; yet, unlike the United States, the EU must muscle up beyond being a marginal political player and should prioritise Pakistan, similar to the United States and China.65

Conclusion The EU–Pakistan relations stretch back to the 1960s. The fact that the relationship between the two covers a long period of time hints at periods of oscillation, agreement, disagreement, negotiation, and compromise. Understanding power relations between or among states requires identifying the elements of power. Influence is an important element of power, an instrument of inducement, a cause of behavioural change, and a means to an end. Influence is not just to change but a plan of action to get others to continue a course of action or policy which is commensurate with the interest of the supposed influencer. It is unquestionably glaring that the EU is more capacitated and endowed with an abundance of resources to induce and influence Pakistan to change its behaviour and comply with the EU’s external objectives. It follows that influence as an integral element of power is meaningless without tangible and demonstrable capability. Furthermore, power relations between the two demonstrate and speak of power as non-momentary, but a process. Relationship between states comes in many complexions, shapes, and often revolves around bargaining techniques which include but not limited to persuasion, offering of rewards, threatening punishments, and the use of force. In the case of the EU–Pakistan relations, the bargaining techniques have generally revolved around the first three, while the utility of force has been virtually non-existent. Although the SEP claims that the relation is that of trust and mutual interest, it does not truly portray a transactional diplomatic intercourse, given the imbalance of power and dependency contour. While the EU might apparently appear more influential than Pakistan, it does not discount the ability of Islamabad to influence Brussels. Nonetheless, it is also hard to dispute how the relations have helped both sides achieve their foreign policy objectives. For the EU, its influence over Islamabad is ever more glaring and deeper, and for Islamabad, the relations draw it closer to the most powerful economic Union, having accessibility to the EU market, but at some cost. It has to fulfil the demands of the EU and trade-off some of its sovereign rights and integrity in order to achieve a greater good. Though not entirely like the CEE, yet, Islamabad had to initiate internal reforms, not because of its own volition, but upon the demand of a foreign entity. Nevertheless, the EU–Pakistan relationship is not truly transactional but is rather based on power relations predicated on compromise, persuasion, reward, and threat.

Notes 1 The European Economic Community (EEC) morphed into EU in 1993. 2 Sanam Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations,”Pakistan Horizon 61, no. 3(2008): 20.

The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 205 3 Ibid., 21. 4 Shada Islam, “EU–Pakistan Relations: The Challenge of Dealing with a Fragile State,” in The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, eds. Christiansen Thomas, Kirchner Emil, and Murray Philomena (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 591. 5 Hassan Oz, “Securitising Proliferation, Failing Security Governance: The European Union’s Role in India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Rivalry,”Asia Europe Journal 11(2013): 93–112. 6 Noor, “Pakistan–EU Relations,” 19–20;Rashid Soorty, “Pakistan-European Union Relations,” Pakistan Horizon 57, no. 4 (October2004): 29; Ana Ballesteros-Peiró, “The EU–Pakistan Relationship: Looking Beyond the Trading Partnership,” Elcano Royal Institute (2015): 1–11, www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/e6a53b00485ef6c5a64eb77939ebc85f/ARI26-2015-The-EU-Pakistan-relationship-looking-beyondthe-trading-partnership.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=e6a53b00485ef6c5a64 eb77939ebc85f. 7 Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations.” 8 Ballesteros-Peiró, “The EU–Pakistan Relationship,” 1; Soorty, “Pakistan-European Union Relations,” 30; Islam, “EU–Pakistan Relations: The Challenge of Dealing with a Fragile State.” 9 KhurramAbbas, “Pakistan’s Relations with European Union (EU),” IPRI, March31, 2015, accessed July2, 2020, https://ipripak.org/pakistans-relations-with-european-union-eu/. 10 Ballesteros-Peiró, “The EU–Pakistan Relationship.” 11 William Nester, International Relations: Politics and Economics in the 21st Century (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001), 85. 12 Kalevi J. Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations,”Background7, no. 4 (1964): 179–94. 13 Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations Third Edition, eds. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 29. 14 Chris Brown, “Realism: Rational or Reasonable?”International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)88, no. 4 (2012): 860. 15 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Realism and Security Studies,” in Contemporary Security and Strategy, ed. Craig A. Snyder (London: Palgrave, 1999), 53–76; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,”Journal of International Affairs44, no. 1 (1990): 21–37. 16 Tim Dunne, “Liberalism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations Eighth Edition, eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 163. 17 Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in Theories of International Relations Third Edition, eds. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 57. 18 Francis f*ckuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 20. 19 Burchill, “Liberalism,” 56. 20 Andrew Linklater, “Marxism,” in Theories of International Relations Third Edition, eds. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 110. 21 Andrew Linklater, “Marxism,” 127. 22 Steve Smith, “Reflectivist and Constructivist Approaches to International Theory,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations Eighth Edition, eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 223. 23 Robert J. Antonio, “The Origin, Development, and Contemporary Status of Critical Theory,”The Sociological Quarterly24, no. 3 (1983): 325–51. 24 Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory,” in Theories of International Relations Third Edition, eds. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew

206 Najimdeen Bakare Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 146. 25 Ray S. Cline Boulder, World Power Assessment 1977: ACalculus of Strategic Drift (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 35. 26 Ibid., 34. 27 Tim Hamilton and Satish Sharma, “Power, Power Relations, and Oppression: APerspective for Balancing the Power Relations,” Peace Research28, no. 1(1996): 23–24. 28 Robert A. Dahl, The International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), 405–15. 29 Peter Morriss, Power: APhilosophical Analysis, Second Edition (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 14–20. 30 Peter Bachrach and M. Barate, quoted in Jeffry C. Isage, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: ARealist Critique,” in Rethinking Power, ed. Thomas Wartenberg (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 85–94. 31 Ibid., 37. 32 Kalevi J. Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations,”Background 7, no. 4 (1964): 181. 33 Nation, “Pakistan, EU ink New Strategic Engagement Plan,” June26, 2019, https:// nation.com.pk/26-Jun-2019/pakistan-eu-ink-new-strategic-engagement-plan. 34 Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations,” 189. 35 Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations,” 22. 36 Ibid. 37 Peter Bachrach and M. Barate, quoted in Isage, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power,” 85–94. 38 Murat Sofuoglu, “Where Does Pakistan Stand in the Afghanistan Deal,” TRT World, February26, 2020, www.trtworld.com/magazine/where-does-pakistan-stand-in-theafghanistan-deal-34142? 39 Joint Press Release between the European Union and Pakistan on Regional Peace and Security March25, 2019. 40 Erin Cunningham, “Europe Wants to Deport Afghan Migrants, but Kabul Is Reluctant to Accept Them,” Washington Post, March19, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/ world/asia_pacific/europe-wants-to-deport-afghan-migrants-but-kabul-is-reluctant-toaccept-them/2016/03/17/8b2d9e6a-e54e-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html. 41 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Afghanistan Challenge: U.S. Troop Withdrawal and the Stability of Afghanistan,” in Evolving Situation in Afghanistan: Role of Major Powers and Regional Countries, ed. Sarah Siddiq Aneel (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2016), 85. 42 Ayaz Gul, “Ghani Seeks Pakistan’s Support for Afghan Peace Talks with Taliban,” VOA, June28, 2019, www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/ghani-seeks-pakistans-supportafghan-peace-talks-taliban. 43 Vinay Kaura, “Russia’s Changing Relations with Pakistan and Taliban: Implications for India,” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 22, no. 1(2018): 58–79. Also see, Najimdeen Bakare, “Contextualizing Russia and South Asia Relations Through Putin’s Look East Policy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies (July2020), doi:10.1177/0021909620939113. 44 Khalid Mustafa and Mehtab Haider, “EU Extends GSP Plus Status to Pakistan Till 2022,” The News, March7, 2020, www.thenews.com.pk/print/625091-euextends-gsp-plus-status-to-pakistan-till-2022. 45 www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c586%7c%7c492%7c%7cTOTAL% 7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c3%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1. 46 Democracy Reporting International, “GSP+ in Pakistan: A Brief Introduction,” democracy-reporting.org › wp-content › uploads › 2016/05 › gsp__i. 47 Islamabad Chamber of Commerce& Industry, “Status of GSP Plus: Its Implications and Benefits for Pakistani Industries,” www.lcci.com.pk › pdfs › Benefit of GSP Plus.

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Update Update of the the situation situation of of human human rights rights in in Indian-administered of Indian-administered Kashmir Kashmir and and PakistanPakistanadministered Kashmir from May 2018 to 2019, www.ohchr.org/Documents/ administered Kashmir from May2018 to April April2019, www.ohchr.org/Documents/ Countries/IN/KashmirUpdateReport_8July2019.pdf; Countries/IN/KashmirUpdateReport_8July2019.pdf; OHCHR, OHCHR, “First-Ever “First-Ever UN UN Human on Kashmir Kashmir Calls Calls for for International into Multiple Multiple VioVio Human Rights Rights Report Report on International Inquiry Inquiry into Geneva, 2018, 2018, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? lations,” Geneva, lations,” www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? NewsID=23198%20. NewsID=23198%20. 60 State State Department, Department, “2018 “2018 India India Human Human Rights 2018, www.state.gov/wpcon 60 Rights Report,” Report,” 2018, www.state.gov/wpcon tent/uploads/019/03/INDIA-2018.pdf. tent/uploads/019/03/INDIA-2018.pdf. 61 Political Impact Impact of Kashmir’s Spe61 Sarral Sarral Sharma, Sharma, “The “The Political of India’s India’s Removal Removal of of Jammu& Jammu & Kashmir’s Spe cial Status,” Status,” South Voices, 2019, cial South Asian Asian Voices, 2019, https://southasianvoices.org/understanding-thehttps://southasianvoices.org/understanding-thepolitical-impact-of-indias-removal-of-jammu-kashmirs-specialstatus/. political-impact-of-indias-removal-of-jammu-kashmirs-specialstatus/. 62 Angshuman Choudhury Dhawan, “Why 62 Angshuman Choudhury and and Prannv Prannv Dhawan, “Why the the European European Parliament Parliament Group’s Group’s KashmirVisit on India,” India,” The The Diplomat, Kashmir Visit Backfired Backfired on Diplomat, November November55,2019, , 2019, https://thediplomat. https://thediplomat. com/2019/n/why-the-european-parliament-groups-kashmir-visit-backfired-on-mdia/. com/2019/11/why-the-european-parliament-groups-kashmir-visit-backfired-on-india/. 63 Najimdeen Bakare, Impacts and Ramifications of U.S-Iran Rapproche63 Najimdeen Bakare, “Strategic “Strategic Impacts and Ramifications of U.S-Iran Rapproche ment: The The End of aa Beginning,” ofInterdisciplinary Interdisciplinary Studies Studies 5, 5, no. no. 11 ment: End of Beginning,” Academic Academic Journal Journal of (2016): 153–62. 153-62. (2016): 64 Relations; Focus Focus on 64 Tasneem Tasneem Sultana, Sultana, “An “An Overview Overview of of EU–-Pakistan EU--Pakistan Relations; on DemocratizaDemocratiza tion of of Pakistan,” Pakistan,” Journal ofEuropean Studies 29, 29, no. no. 1(2013): 1(2013): 41. 41. tion Journal of European Studies 65 Islam, Islam, “EU–Pakistan “EU-Pakistan Relations.” 65 Relations.”

Index

Afghanistan 7, 9, 12, 13, 20, 28, 64, 66, 71, 72, 75, 193, 198, 199, 201; Soviet invasion of 7 Afghanistan-Pakistan confederation 100 – 1, 107 Afghan Taliban 26, 105, 106, 111, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124 agency 10, 66, 68, 69, 73, 75 alliance 159, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 172, 175 Al-Qaeda 103, 104, 111, 118, 122 Australia 45, 46, 49, 56, 57, 59

Cold War 64, 73 Communist government 115 counter-terrorism 184, 185 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 193

Bajwa, General 75, 76, 185 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 4, 12, 72, 73, 74, 75 Bhutto, Benazir 19, 64, 86 Bibi, Aasia 203 Bin Laden, Osama 70 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) 44, 46

East Pakistan (Bangladesh) 6 energy exports 187 England 74 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip 75 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 184 European Economic Community (EEC) 193 European Union (EU)-Pakistan relations 193 extremism 122, 123, 124

Central and East Europe (CEE) 200, 204 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 64, 161, 162, 163, 177 Chief of Army Staff (COAS) 64, 68, 70, 73, 76 Child Labour Free Zones 101 China 5, 12, 44, 46, 56, 57 – 8, 60; as challenger in Indo-Pacific 137 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 12, 72, 73, 74, 75, 131, 135, 137, 138, 171, 172, 173, 174, 180, 183, 184, 187, 188 China-Pakistan relations 64, 65, 71, 73, 85, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94 Chinese arms (to Pakistan) 5 – 6 civil military relations in India 136, 138 Cold Start doctrine 136

Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) 118, 119, 122 feminism 46 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 11, 25, 76, 172, 199 Foreign Office 73, 76 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 67, 68 Frankfurt School 195 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 182

Dawn Leak 74 defective democracy 63 defence partnership 168, 173, 174 defense 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190; spending 136 Doklam crisis 131, 136, 137 Durand Line 99 – 101, 103, 108, 118, 123

Galwan Valley clash 129, 132, 135, 137, 174 Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 199, 200 geoeconomics 35, 36 geostrategic location, Pakistan’s 3, 4, 10 Germany 63

Index 209 Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) 199 globalization 12, 44 great power(s) 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 56, 57, 59 Green Theory 46 Gwadar 12, 88, 89, 90, 94 high-level official visits 185, 186 Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai 129 India 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53 – 4, 56, 57, 58, 65, 71, 72, 76, 103, 112 – 20, 123, 129 – 38, 154, 159, 164 – 7, 171 – 4, 181; as an emerging power 13, 128, 138 Indian Ocean 4 India’s relations with neighbors 129, 138 India’s two frontal war 129, 135, 136, 137 Indo-China rivalry 138 Indo-China trade 131 Indonesia 66 Indo-Pak rivalry 132, 138 Indus Waters Treaty 67 institutional mechanism 188 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 74, 75, 92 International Relations (IR) 67, 68 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 104, 193 Iran 14, 66, 71, 73, 123, 142 – 56 Islamic Emirates 115 Israel 76 Jaish-e-Mohammed 129 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 51, 52 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 203 Junagadh 3 Karakoram Highway 88, 94 Kargil conflict 132 Kashmir 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 34, 65, 66, 76, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 123 Kashmir conflict 201 – 4 Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act 69 Khan, Ayub 63, 100, 162, 163, 165, 166 Khan, Imran 8, 9, 18, 19, 23, 25, 28, 36, 74, 75, 76, 91, 145, 148 Khan, Mahathir Mohammad 75 Kuala Lumpur Summit 75 Kulbhushan Yadav 133

liberalism 195 – 6 Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) 8, 10 Maritime Doctrine-2020 182 Marxism 46, 195 material power 56, 58, 59 Middle Power 45 – 50; Pakistan as 50 – 60 military 63, 65, 68 – 76, 181, 183, 185, 186, 187, 191; agency 76; ranking 54, 57, 59 military drill Druzhba-V 185 Modi, Narendara 72, 131, 132, 133, 1 34, 135 Morgenthau, Hans 195 Mujahideen 7, 113, 115, 117 multipolarity 182, 184 Musharraf, Pervez 64, 65, 68 narrative 162, 166, 167, 169, 175, 177 National Security Advisor (NSA) 76 NATO 71, 75 naval drills 186 nonproliferation 167, 176 Northern Alliance 115, 116, 117, 118, 120 North-South Gas Pipeline Project (NSGPP) 184 nuclear test (1998) 128, 131 Obama, Barack 20, 69, 70 Oil and Gas Development Company (OGDC) 182 Pakistan 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192; ideology of 51 Pakistan-China (friendship, diplomatic relations) 85, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94 Pakistani-Russian trade 187 Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) 85 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 7, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75 Pakistan–Russia Inter-Government Commissions (IGC) 187 Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline 186 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 72, 74 Panama Papers 74 Panjsheela 129 Pashtunistan 99 – 102 Pashtun nationalists 114 Pathankot attack 133 peace 185, 192; process 112, 114, 121, 122, 132; and stability 185 PML-N 11, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75

210 Index post-colonialism 46 Pulwama attack 134 Pulwama/Balakot conflict 129 Pulwama/Balakot crisis 129, 137 Putin, Vladimir 182, 184 Quadrilateral Security Alliance (QUAD) 182 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 132 Qureshi, Shah Mahmood 76 Rafale 136, 137 R&AW 133 Rawat, General Bipin 136, 137, 138 Ray Cline’s strategic formula 195 Raymond Davis 71 realism 47 – 9, 54, 195 relations, China-Pakistan 5 – 6 revisionist theories 46 Russia 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192 Salala 71 Salman, Mohammad Bin 75 sanctions 167, 168, 175, 176, 180 Saudi Arabia 66, 74, 76 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 182, 183, 184, 185, 190 Sharif, Nawaz 64, 70, 72, 73, 74 Siddiqui, Afia 203 Sino-US rivalry 128 Sir Creek 3 Social Constructivism 46 South Africa 44, 46, 59 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 65

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 4, 64, 161, 162, 163, 177 sovereignty 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 Soviet intervention 115 Soviet Union 181, 182, 186 Soviet Union-Pakistan relations 6 stability 185 status-quo theories 49 strategic depth 117, 118, 122 Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP) 197 – 9 surgical strike 133 Taliban 65, 102 – 8 Taliban movement 117 Taliban regime 111, 115, 116, 118 terrorism 18, 19, 21, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31 Thucydides 128, 138; trap 128 trade 182, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192 Trump, Donald 75 Turkey 66, 74 United States 63, 64, 67 US-Afghan Taliban truce 123 US-Pakistan relations 64, 65, 71, 74 USSR 5, 64 War on Terror 114, 117, 120, 124 Wing commander Abhinandan 134 Yusuf, Moeed 76 Zardari, Asif Ali 69, 70, 71, 152

Ghulam Ali (Editor) - Pakistan's Foreign Policy - Contemporary Developments and Dynamics-Routledge (2022) - 1 - PDFCOFFEE.COM (2024)

References

Ghulam Ali (Editor) - Pakistan&#x27;s Foreign Policy - Contemporary Developments and Dynamics-Routledge (2022) - 1 - PDFCOFFEE.COM (2024)

References

Ghulam Ali (Editor) - Pakistan's Foreign Policy - Contemporary Developments and Dynamics-Routledge (2022) - 1 - PDFCOFFEE.COM (2024)